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Abstract 
 
 This thesis examines the relationship between violent young offending that has no clear 
political motive and state fragility. It does so by conducting an in-depth evaluation of crime, 
underdevelopment and crime control systems in Yemen, using existing theories of criminology and 
international development to suggest new ways of understanding and responding to violent criminal 
behaviour in that country and elsewhere. While one of the stated goals of this thesis is to generate 
new theoretical understandings of criminal violence in Yemen, its main contribution to knowledge is 
that it brings criminological theory into the discourse on international socio-economic 
underdevelopment in order to open up a new conduit for the academic analysis of fragility. In so 
doing, it merges criminological theory with the study of international development and state 
fragility, where the two academic disciplines have previously remained quite separate.  
 The above aims are achieved through an extensive study of the Yemeni development 
context, based upon a combination of field research interviews conducted with prominent 
stakeholders in Yemen, distance research by phone and online conducted with Yemeni stakeholders, 
and expert consultations conducted with important analysts working either on Yemen directly or 
more broadly in the area of security and justice reform. The research itself, meanwhile, also provides 
a detailed overview of relevant theory and literature on criminology, justice reform and state 
fragility, while being supported by Yemeni criminal justice statistics.  
 In light of the theoretical emphasis of this investigation, the findings of this thesis are 
suggestive rather than empirical. The author argues that the absence of state services, legitimate 
opportunities and socialising activities for young people, along with their exposure to significant 
levels of violence, produces extreme economic, psychological and socio-cultural stresses that lead to 
their increased aggression and rejection of state legitimacy, all of which combine to raise the 
likelihood of violent young offending in Yemen. It is argued that these trends yield a coherent 
analytical framework with relevant lessons for other fragile states, notwithstanding that Yemen's 
cultural specificities and tribal communities have produced unique influences that distinguish it from 
other fragile settings. 
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Introduction 
 
 Recent years have seen the emergence of multiple of analytical frameworks within the field 
of international development, aimed at understanding and classifying countries according to the 
economic, social and political challenges that they face. They have underscored the severe 
development gaps that have emerged between the world’s richest and poorest states. The World 
Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, Carleton University’s Country Indicators for 
Foreign Policy, and the American Political Science Association’s Global Forecasting Model of Political 
Instability are but some examples. Yet while many of these tools highlight economic indicators and 
country progress towards meeting the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, for instance, 
international attention to state fragility and complex emergencies has also demonstrated a growing 
interest in international security, whereby Western fears of terrorism in particular have prompted a 
broad “securitisation” of development assistance packages in line with the objectives set out by the 
American-led War on Terror (Mark Duffield, 2002).  
            The 2011 World Development Report summarises that the “global system” of international aid 
is centred on a “paradigm of conflict”, whereby both national and international actors – in 
development, diplomacy and humanitarianism – have become chiefly concerned with providing 
states with the means and capabilities to overcome civil war through increased prosperity and 
dispute resolution (World Bank, p. 2). This view, writes the World Bank, prioritises violence and 
conflict as an inherent cause of underdevelopment, but does not take into account the reality that 
such an approach is no longer suited to addressing a new mould of “21st century violence”.  
The 2000s and early 2010s have thus far proven to be a fluctuating and continuously 
evolving period in which, due to “successes in reducing interstate war, the remaining forms of 
conflict and violence do not fit neatly either into ‘war’ or ‘peace,’ or into ‘criminal violence’ or 
‘political violence’” (World Bank, 2011, p. 2). In particular, a prioritisation of political violence, 
insurgency and terrorism in international development and stabilisation strategies (a prioritisation 
that has emerged due to the very important role that these phenomena play in prolonging complex 
emergencies in accordance with Paul Collier’s “conflict trap” model (2003)) has meant that more 
common forms of social and criminal violence have been overlooked in multiple fragile contexts, as 
they have been in Yemen – the primary case study of this thesis. 
 Yet even a brief examination of global comparative criminologies reveals statistical trends 
that ought to prove interesting to researchers of international development. The seventh United 
Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems indicates that, on 
average, economically stable and developed countries seem to suffer from significantly higher 
recorded rates of crime per capita than so-termed “fragile states” (2005). Countries like New 
Zealand, Finland, Denmark, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Netherlands, in 
particular, showed the highest rates of total crime per capita among surveyed countries. In 2005, 
New Zealand occupied second place on the list with a rate of 105,881 offences committed per 1,000 
people, while the United States had, at 11,877,218, the highest number of total recorded offences. 
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Meanwhile, Yemen, an extremely poor country with multiple conflicts and dwindling natural 
resources, ranked bottom of the list with allegedly only 1.16109 crimes per 1,000 people, or 
approximately 24,000 offences committed yearly.  
 These statistics1 are misleading, however, because they offer a better picture of the 
comparative effectiveness of crime detection capacities and positive police-community relations 
than they do of comparative criminologies. Countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, which 
are mired in a crisis of chronic insecurity and are known to have extremely high rates of kidnapping, 
banditry and smuggling, are not featured on the list at all due to a lack of available data (Phil 
Williams, 2009; Gretchen Peters and Don Rassler, 2010), while countries like New Zealand and the 
United States of America have much higher law enforcement capacities than Yemen, leading to a 
higher rate of crime reporting, detection and recording. As Rodrigo R. Soares summarises: 
“Reporting rates of crimes are strongly related to development” and “the positive correlation 
between crime and development sometimes reported is entirely caused by the use of official 
records” (2002, p. 156). Development itself, Soares concludes, is, therefore, “not criminogenic”. 
 What is more interesting to note is that, if we run a comparison through the same survey 
data of global homicide rates, incidence frequency related trends are instantly reversed. Relatively 
developed countries with otherwise very high rates of total crime per capita, like Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Japan, New Zealand, Denmark and the United Kingdom are all ranked near the bottom of the 
list, while less prosperous states like Columbia, South Africa and Jamaica come top, Columbia having 
a murder rate of 0.617847 deaths per 1,000 people and Yemen moving up the chart to the 27th out 
of 60 positions (see Annex 1). Violent crime in general, including battery, assault and sexual abuse, 
tends to represent a proportionally larger percentage of total recorded offences in least developed 
countries than it does in developed ones. While records show crime rates to be lower in fragile 
states, the severity of the crimes that they do exhibit is substantially higher than elsewhere. 
 
Figure 1 Offence Incidence Rates and Their Relationship with Human Development Index Rankings 
                                                          
1
 For a complete breakdown of rates of offending per country per capita, please see Annex 1. 
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 In charting crime trends against development through each country's official data, a more-
or-less consistent positive correlation emerges, with only a few deviations. However, a correlation of 
violent crime trends as a percentage of total crime against development (approximated from the 
same survey) would yield a directly opposite result, so that total recorded general offences would 
increase in number as economic development increases, while violent offences would decrease2. 
The chart above (Figure 1) does just that, using the 2005 Human Development Index to rank 
countries according to their position in the index, with 1 being most developed and 573 being least 
developed. 
 The linear regressions of total recorded crime and violent offences follow the anticipated 
pattern. The graph illustrates not only that violent offending is high in least developed countries but 
also that crime detection and reporting are low, leading to an inescapable conclusion about the 
reliability of available data, namely: the inflated rates of violent offending in fragile states made 
visible by police records and surveys are likely to be masking an even greater volume of undetected 
violent offences, the total number of which is, logically, higher than that displayed by official 
statistics. This is often true of stable and developed countries where much violent offending takes 
place in the home and is left unreported. However, poor institutions, low rates of birth registration, 
lack of access to basic services, low school attendance, high unemployment and mass displacement 
all impact upon the ability of fragile states to monitor the well-being and survival of their citizens. 
This leads to a lack of detection of non-domestic crimes against the person, including murders and 
disappearances. Not only do fragile states tend to suffer from all of these conditions at once, but 
their policing capacities are often additionally undermined through negative police-community 
relations that diminish public confidence in official law enforcement channels and thereby lower the 
public reporting of offences to authorities. 
                                                          
2
 See lists attached in Annexes 1 and 2. 
3
 Although the Human Development Index actually contains data for 177 countries, United Nations crime 
statistics are only available for 57 of them. 
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Figure 2 Middle to Low Income Countries, Ranked According to Their Human Development Index Rankings 
 Taking only those middle and low development status states from the Human Development 
Index with available data on murder and crime rates, Figure 24 Illustrates that, with the exception of 
a high South African spike in homicides (as likely caused by racial violence (Michael Neocosmos, 
2008)), there is a continuous increase in murder rates in least developed states, as can be correlated 
with a slight but steady decrease in GDP per capita in purchasing power parity5. This continuous 
increase in murder represents a steady proportional increase of homicide as a percentage of total 
recorded offences. 
 Those few statistics that fragile states are able to make available show a much higher 
incidence rate of social violence and political violence than that exhibited by more economically 
developed or stable countries. As the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
notes: “homicidal violence and violent crime” as well as “armed violence disproportionately [affect] 
low- and middle-income countries”, whereby “The human costs of armed violence” include the 
destruction of “lives and livelihoods, ... education, health and social services, ... social and human 
capital”, resulting in “high economic costs owing to years of lost productivity” (2009, pp. 28-29). 
What is interesting is that a large proportion of this violence is classed as “mindless”6, in that it is 
committed without a clearly discernible economic or political motive. Yet what is more disturbing is 
the reality that much of this mindless violence is committed by children and young people under the 
age of 18, suggesting that something is impacting their cognitive development in a way that makes 
                                                          
4
 Values used to compile this graph are taken from the Human Development Index values for 2008. 
5
 For more statistical comparisons between crime and socio-economic development trends, please see Chapter 
5 and Annex 2. 
6
 As argued in section viii.3, the word “mindless” is used here, not to imply that violence occurs as an eruption 
of pure irrationality, but to engage more broadly with incidents of repeat violent offending, domestic violence, 
violence relating to social power negotiation on a small scale, or violence that has not been categorised by 
judicial systems. Above all, it is not to be used to negate the autonomy or integrity of those who commit acts 
of so-termed mindless violence. 
2005 GDP Per
Capita in Purchasing
Power Parity
2005 Murders Per
Capita
2005 Crimes Per
Capita
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criminal violence seem like an appropriate, or at least a necessary, means of communication. This 
has been found to be the case in Yemen, as will be argued in Chapter 3, but is also true of other 
states, as discussed in section ii below.  
 If fragile states are affected by conflict, these trends can have additional consequences by 
embodying the potential to disrupt peace processes, to (re-)ignite political violence, or to plunge 
countries into a perpetual spiral of escalating insecurity, feeding back into the causes of fragility, 
stalling development and regenerating violence. In many contexts, as in Iraq, Columbia and 
Tajikistan, the threat of violent crime has come to heavily outweigh the threat of conflict as a 
security challenge for both governments and their people. It has been observed that, in Guatemala 
and El Salvador, “the rate of killings” related to drug trafficking and drug-related violence greatly 
exceeds the death tolls of both countries' previous civil wars, highlighting the destabilising nature of 
high levels of interaction between “apolitical” violence, “mindless” violence and criminality (The 
Economist, 2011, p. 26). It is posited in this thesis that something about the social environment 
created by fragile states encourages violent behaviour among people (with young people emerging 
as an important demographic group among them, the average age of fragile states being generally 
much younger than that of the developed world) and that violence instigating risk factors are likely 
to have severe consequences for the long-term peaceful development of affected countries. 
 Despite the relevance of this subject, the impact of criminal violence on state fragility and 
the impact of state fragility on criminal violence have not yet been studied in sufficient detail within 
criminological or developmental literature, though much research is available upon the interactions 
between war and fragility and between poverty and crime. One issue here is definitional in nature7, 
whereby it is extremely difficult to analyse criminal violence, mindless violence and social violence 
separately from broader political violence-related phenomena in conflict-affected fragile states. The 
statistical challenges alone emerging from this problem have been addressed in part in this thesis 
through the selection of Yemen as the primary case study, because Yemen’s Government already 
disaggregates its judicial data according to three categories of “criminal”, “political” and “moral” 
offences, though this system is not without its limitations8. However, other difficulties relating to the 
isolation of criminal behaviour in fragile contexts abound9. 
 Another issue that has hindered research is to do with the emergence of a seemingly 
untested assumption that elevated violent crime rates in fragile states can be explained by existing 
economic theories of crime (Soares, 2002), or by poor law-enforcement capacities, as determined by 
low expenditures on police services (Bourguignon, 1999, p. 15). An obvious limitation of these 
explanations is that they are more appropriate for an analysis of property-related, rather than 
violent offences or, at the very least, violent offences that are committed in the course of 
completing an economically-motivated crime. Using these explanations obscures the causality of 
social violence, increased levels of mindless or “motiveless” youth aggression, and multi-level 
                                                          
7
 This is argued in more detail in section vii.3 
8
 The reliability of the Yemeni Government’s system of data segregation is dealt with in more detail in section 
1.5 of Chapter 1, and again in Chapter 3.  
9
 These challenges include difficulties relating to attributing meaning to the actions of individuals on a nation-
wide level, as well as problems relating to the legitimacy of the researcher as an unbiased or impartial 
observer in this process. Some of these issues are addressed in greater detail in section v, though, ultimately, 
they also form a recurring theme throughout the thesis as a whole.  
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physical abuse in fragile states. Beyond this, the literature indicates a lack of integration of 
criminological theory into the development sector in general. It points to a lack of adaptation of 
criminological theory to the specific environment of fragile states. Criminological theory remains 
predominantly targeted towards more politically and economically stable environments, while 
international development narratives touch upon crime only with relation to insecurity and specific 
programming areas that include security sector reform and combatant disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration.  
 The main contribution to knowledge that this thesis makes is to merge the two disciplines of 
criminology and international development in order to test the adaptability of criminological 
theories to fragile states, and thereby, potentially, to expand the way that youth violence is 
perceived within the international development sector and to add to the set of tools which are used 
by development practitioners to analyse and respond to this problem. This is achieved in a number 
of different ways, the most central of which is the process of testing existing analytical approaches 
within previously under-explored contexts like Yemen.  
 Although numerous investigations have been made by notable researchers into crime 
generation within given case studies (which have included violence in South Africa (Michael 
Neocosmos, 2008), policing in Northern Ireland (Ronald Weitzer, 1995) and narcotics cultivation and 
trafficking in Afghanistan (David MacDonald, 2007)), there is yet to be an attempt made to create a 
single unifying theory of criminology that would explain violent young offending in fragile state 
contexts, and that would correlate the causes of offending with the reality of state fragility. 
Both fields of criminology and development have much to bring to bear upon one another 
within fragile states. To continue to fail to integrate the two is no longer practical, given the weight 
of evidence to suggest that the degree of social violence present in fragile states may be having 
serious consequences for the healthy cognitive development and social integration of children and 
young people therein. This thesis will strive to fill the void by providing an overview of existing 
literature and by applying it to Yemen, a least developed fragile state, in order to suggest an 
explanatory causal theory of violent offending among young people that may, in time, be made 
generalizable and exported to other fragile state contexts.  
 Based upon academic literature, rather than pure data, this causal theory and the claims 
that it contains will be suggestive rather than empirical. Seeking above all to apply existing 
theoretical frameworks from the fields of criminology and international development in new ways 
that have not been utilised before, this application and testing of existing theoretical frameworks is 
the primary purpose of the thesis. The main output of the study will be to experiment with the 
adaptability of two academic disciplines in order to pave the way for new investigations into 
violence and fragility.  
 The remainder of this introduction will now set out the parameters of this research project, 
explaining the operational context of fragile states more thoroughly, outlining the problem 
statement and research purpose, providing the work's principle research questions, explaining the 
case study selection process, flagging key findings, defining important terms and giving an overview 
of the completed document. 
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i. The Operational Context of Fragile States 
 State fragility remains a loosely conceptualised and highly contested framework for 
analysing countries facing a range of institutional and political challenges10. The term has been 
selected for use in this thesis due to its focus upon governance, infrastructures and institutions, 
which allows for an analysis of nation-wide contributors to criminological environments, and 
potentially for development-based solutions to the problem of violent young offending in least 
developed countries. Yet because authors like Nick Grono contend that state fragility is consistently 
correlated with conflict (2010), the concept needs to be understood as a sociological phenomenon: 
one that is both affecting and being affected by an absence of positive relationships between 
communities, as well as between communities and their governments.  
 Sultan Barakat argues that the socio-political composition of any one functioning state can 
be loosely contextualised according to four main categories (Supervisor Consultation, 19 May, 2011), 
as illustrated in the graph below. He argues that while state fragility is symptomatic of state 
infrastructure limitations or failures, social indicators can prove equally important. According to this 
model, state fragility only begins to overrun countries in cases where social cohesion is weak and 
societies are heavily fragmented. The high level of competition for services and resources between 
communities and between individuals that is generated by state incapacity is likely a key 
determining factor for this, because governmental failures to maintain the welfare and well-being of 
their citizens often push them towards conflict or disagreements with each other and towards a 
rejection of the state, both as a service provider and as a symbol of authority. It is for these reasons 
that very few examples of weak states with socially cohesive societies can be found today. 
 
Figure 3 State Fragility and Social Cohesion 
 It should be noted that this thesis will operate upon a fairly strict definition of state fragility, 
whereby only countries with weak infrastructures and fragmented societies will be considered, 
despite the prevalence of other frameworks11. Working on the basis of this definition, this section 
will offer an overview of the operational context of fragile states in order to better frame the 
                                                          
10
 This term, including the variety of definitions put forward for it in policy and academia, is analysed more 
extensively in Chapter 6, where the author presents their own typology of fragility as a method of analysing 
countries facing key development challenges that are relevant to increasing rates of violent young offending. 
See section 6.3 for more details.  
11
 As above, see section 6.3. 
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argument of this thesis, relying upon simple descriptions of the realities faced by practitioners 
working in countries affected by fragility.  
 Fragile states provide unique operational contexts for theorists and practitioners working in 
the areas of justice, security and crime control because, as John Mueller writes: 
When governments become weak, it is likely (almost by definition) that criminal activity 
will increase - not the least because prisons become insecure. And sometimes the 
resulting criminality will be organised enough to look like war. ... Often the government 
itself, or even one from a neighbouring country, can essentially become one of the 
criminal or warlord bands. (2004, p. 101) 
Multiple studies have associated crime with development and state strength, in which governance 
and state authority are normally highlighted as key determining factors for the prevalence of various 
forms of criminal activity. For instance, Angélica Durán Martínez writes with specific relation to 
organised crime in Central America and the Caribbean that:  
… a state that controls the monopoly on the use of force while respecting individual and 
collective rights is better able to deter and prevent organized crime. Such a state can 
control its territory, guarantee the security of its citizens, uphold its internal legal order 
and deliver public services to the population.  (2007, p. 1) 
Conversely, a state that is unable to retain a “monopoly on violence” and the use of force (as defined 
originally by Max Weber (1918)) while also respecting individual and collective rights will be unable 
to deter organised crime. “[A]ny strategy to address crime requires discussion on the roots of state 
crisis and on how to build state capacities” (Martínez, p. 1). 
 Fragility is generally considered to originate within a lack of administrative capacity, which in 
turn leads to an inability by the state to deliver basic services evenly and equitably to its citizens 
(Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2008, p. 14). Such basic services include 
but are not limited to; education, healthcare, water and sanitation provision, social welfare and 
social protection, and a reasonable level of public safety, maintained through either military or law 
enforcement services. Under such circumstances, fragile states can experience elevated levels of 
social and political violence, especially when these result from conflicts over resources or from an 
inability by the state to respond to its citizens' demands for change. Beyond this, violence itself 
produces heightened levels of insecurity and disrupts service provision further, feeding back into a 
seemingly endless cycle of underdevelopment, a process for which Paul Collier has coined the term 
of “conflict trap”12 (2003).  
 A quick overview of some key human development indicators reveals the impact of such 
prolonged insecurity and absences in basic services on demographics and life expectancies in fragile 
states. Within the developed world life expectancies at birth for a handful of countries scattered 
across their Human Development Index values range between 79 and 82 years (see Table 1). 
Meanwhile, their under-5 mortality rates are representative of recent advances in modern day 
                                                          
12
 Paul Collier’s theories on the “conflict trap” are outlined in detail in Chapter 6, section 6.2. They suggest that 
countries that are affected by chronic conflict and underdevelopment will continually generate the conditions 
necessary to re-ignite fighting.  
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medicine and healthcare services, with only between 4 and 8 out of every 1000 children dying 
prematurely. 
Human Development 
Indicator America Canada France Germany 
United 
Kingdom 
Life expectancy (years) 
for 2010 79.6 81 81.6 80.2 79.8 
Under 5 mortality rate 
(per 1000 people) for 
2008 8 6 4 4 6 
Adult literacy percentage 
for 2010 - - - - - 
GDP per capita in US$ 
for 2010 46653 39035 33103 34743 34342 
Homicide rate (per 
100,000 people) for 2008 5.2 1.7 1.4 0.8 4.8 
Human Development 
Ranking for 2010 4 8 14 10 26 
Table 1 Key human development indicators in the Western world 
Within fragile states, the figures paint a very different picture (see Table 2). 
 
Human Development 
Indicator Afghanistan Somalia Iraq South Africa Yemen 
Life expectancy (years) for 
2010 44.6 51.2 68.5 52 63.9 
Under 5 mortality rate (per 
1000 people) for 2008 257 180 44 67 69 
Adult literacy percentage for 
2010 28 - 74.1 89.3 63.2 
GDP per capita in US$ for 
2010 1419 - - 10140 2595 
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Homicide rate (per 100,000 
people) for 2008 - - - 36.5 4 
Human Development 
Ranking for 2010 155 - - 110 133 
Table 2 Key human development indicators in fragile states 
Here, life expectancies fall between 44 and 73 years, depending upon the context, while the under-5 
mortality rate ranges between 20 and 257 deaths per 1000 children. GDP per capita in the poorest 
country represented, Afghanistan, amounts to only 3.04% of that recorded in the richest country 
featured in the previous table, America. These contrasts are startling, though they are to be 
expected in countries like Yemen, for instance, where roughly 60% of the population was believed to 
be living below the poverty line in 2011, many of whom were cut off from food, fuel and fresh water 
supplies as the Arab Spring hit the country (Sadeq Al-Wesabi, 2011). It is for these reasons and 
others that fragile states are to be treated differently from countries within the developed world, so 
that a unique theory of crime causation within such contexts has become necessary in the quest to 
generate solutions to their specific challenges. 
 
ii. Problem Statement 
 While the elevated crime rates exhibited by fragile states are not in and of themselves 
surprising within such backgrounds of conflict and extreme underdevelopment (contexts that are 
usually marked by a breakdown of governmental law enforcement services and a resulting 
escalation of opportunistic behaviour): the high incidence rate of violent crime among populations 
experiencing fragility and the high rate of violent crime committed by children and young people 
within such contexts is unsettling. Social control theories pertaining to legitimacy and cooperation13 
suggest that even after policing services are removed from most cultural settings, certain social 
constraints14 usually serve to keep crime rates low. It is speculated, for instance, that most normally 
socialised community members would not immediately commit murder or deliberately harm their 
neighbours purely because they had no reasonable expectation of getting caught and being 
punished for their actions. The desire to cause others harm through mere opportunism would 
ordinarily be associated with psychopathy or other similar psychological disorders that are not 
common in the general population15, where, in actuality, even “the majority of psychopaths are not 
criminals” (Paul Babiak et al, 2010). Morality, ethics, a sense of community and simple empathy help 
to reduce violent behaviour in most contexts even when policing is absent. A necessary conclusion is 
that fragile states produce other conditions, distinct from low law-enforcement capacity, which 
promote criminal behaviour and encourage violent criminal behaviour in particular.  
                                                          
13
 These theories will be outlined in detail and analysed in terms of their relevance to fragile states in Chapter 
4. 
14
 See Chapter 4, section 4.3.1. Elements of social control include an individual’s attachment to society, their 
commitment to their own investments in society, their involvement in activities that include labour or 
education, and their belief in common social and moral values.  
15
 Paul Babiak et al argue that psychopathy disorders themselves are prevalent in only approximately 1% of 
Western civilisations (2010). 
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 If social violence is to be discouraged and the rule of law is to be restored for the positive 
development of fragile states, then it is necessary to start thinking about potential theoretical 
explanations for crime causation in fragile state contexts. Even if such explanations are only 
suggestive at this stage, these theories need to be mapped onto existing law enforcement, social 
control and judicial structures to determine whether it is possible to improve their efficiency. More 
importantly, it is necessary to look at existing theoretical frameworks developed in other sectors, 
like that of criminology, which are geared towards explaining violent criminal behaviour among 
children and young people, in order to test whether these modes of explanation can help us to 
address serious social challenges in fragile contexts that have largely been neglected by 
development policies.  
 While much violence within fragile states can be linked to political, religious or ethnic 
antagonisms, and some violence can be analysed as a by-product of other forms of criminal 
opportunism, such as banditry, racketeering, armed robbery and theft; the root causes of a lot of 
other forms of social and mindless violence within such contexts are far more difficult to determine. 
They seem to originate from the mere positioning of children within a context of protracted 
insecurity. A recent video of Afghan or Pakistani children playing 'Suicide bomber', for instance, 
which has taken YouTube, Facebook and other websites by storm, offers one example of the degree 
to which such contexts of insecurity have become integrated within the everyday reality of children 
living in fragile states (Huffington Post, 2011). The video shows one child solemnly bidding his friends 
farewell before rushing to a group of boys pretending to be soldiers, jumping up and throwing dust 
into the air to simulate the visual effect of an explosion. When the dust clears, the video reveals the 
boys to be lying down on the ground, trying not to smile or laugh as they pretend to be dead. A far 
more harmful version of such 'war games' is played by young children in Iraq, who, as Ray Jennings 
summarised when interviewed by Charles Ferguson, amuse themselves by purchasing grenades at 
the local market and throwing them off buildings into supposedly empty ally-ways in order to 
witness the explosions caused, where they sometimes either inadvertently or deliberately hit people 
(Ferguson, 2008, p.237). 
 Both in Kashmir and in Iraq, playing with grenades has left several children injured or dead, 
often through handling defective trigger mechanisms (ABC News, 2011 and Frank, 2003). 
Meanwhile, in Yemen, gun misuse is a common phenomenon, whereby many children are reported 
to flee their homes after accidentally killing family members every year in the course of playing with 
guns (Integrated Regional Information Network, 2010). In South Africa, on the other hand, children 
are often seen to emulate gang leaders and the heads of organised crime syndicates in the course of 
such games, be they playing with real or toy guns.  
 While many of these games do not result in immediate physical harm to anybody, they 
indicate an inherent idealisation of violence, practitioners of violence and instruments of violence by 
children and young people in fragile environments, which can result in a greater reliance on violence 
as a means of social communication and conflict resolution later in life. What is even more troubling 
is when physical harm is inflicted by children upon others on purpose, which usually occurs in fragile 
states through fighting, bullying and more general participation in crime and conflict. It is not that 
fragile states are unique in facing problems of violence idealisation and escalation, but that the scale 
of social violence committed by young people is proportionally much greater in such countries than 
it is in more prosperous ones.  
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 There are many conditions present in fragile states that could be contributing to increased 
violence. Existing theories of crime, fragility and conflict imply that weak governance, 
underdevelopment, resource competition and broad social inequality might prove to be relevant. 
However, such theories are poorly integrated and require extensive re-evaluation if they are to be 
relied upon for analysing emerging trends in criminal activity. This will form the main subject of 
investigation in this thesis. Political violence, which is distinct from children and young people 
naturally falling into aggressive and violent processes of social interaction, will not be analysed. 
 
iii. Purpose of the Investigation 
 The purpose of this investigation is to combine the two academic disciplines of international 
development and criminology and to apply them to the under-researched terrain of Yemen as a 
fragile state in order to generate new insights into the relationship between violent young offending 
and state underdevelopment. 
 The main contribution to knowledge made by this thesis emerges from its process of 
analysis, through which a wide range of theories of crime causation and social control are applied to 
Yemen, and contrasted with theories of conflict and fragility in order to test their applicability and to 
reveal their potential to expand the range of analytical tools used to understand and respond to 
youth violence in fragile states.  
 The investigation starts with the notion that international development literature and policy 
have been overly concerned with political violence in conflict-affected fragile states. This has 
resulted in a neglecting in international development literature of useful advances that have been 
made in other academic disciplines to address the issue of youth violence, which includes, just as 
importantly (if not more so), violent young offending committed without a clearly discernible 
political objective. Based predominantly within theoretical rather than statistical and evidentiary 
research, the findings of this thesis are intended to be suggestive rather than empirical. They have 
been collated with the aim of generating a new theoretical framework that might shed some light on 
the reasons for the emergence of elevated levels of apolitical youth violence and violent criminality 
within such contexts. Adopting a single case study approach, this thesis aims to analyse the 
processes of violent crime causation in Yemen, and to test established academic theories within a 
complex and continuously fluctuating context. 
 The indirect secondary purpose of this investigation is to generate a theory of violent crime 
causation in fragile states, a process through which the author will be able to combine and apply 
theoretical approaches from the fields of criminology and international development. This task is a 
very large one, though it is made somewhat easier by a narrower focus on offending among children 
and young people. This is because, as children and young people enter into various key formative 
periods in their lives (Anna Aszmmann et al, 2012), the impact of fragility upon their behaviour 
becomes more immediately visible than it would be in fully-matured adults. 
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iv. Research Questions 
 In order to isolate important criminogenic risk factors that are relevant to fragile states, this 
thesis poses five research questions relating to the development context of the countries in which 
children and young people offend and to the context of Yemen more specifically. The focus of these 
questions is intended to draw attention to the nation-wide macro-level impact of underdevelopment 
and fragility on crime rates, rather than to analyse the personal motivations of offenders at a micro-
level through in-depth research with individuals.  
 
iv.1. Question 1 
How appropriate a concept is state fragility for providing a unifying framework through 
which low-ranking countries in the Human Development Index might be analysed in the context of 
similar patterns of criminality? 
At the outset of the investigation, this was the very first question that the author posed 
when establishing the parameters of the thesis. A number of different frameworks16 were 
considered in terms of their benefits for framing the analysis. State fragility, due to its focus on 
governance processes and capacities, was deemed to be the most appropriate tool available, though 
its definition has been refined by the author to better suit the analysis17.  
Nevertheless, the appropriateness of the state fragility framework as a tool through which 
to generate theories of violent young offending will form a recurring theme in this thesis, because 
state fragility is a hugely contested concept within the academic world, as well as in development 
programming. While it is true that the correlation between development and criminality is an 
observable phenomenon, whereby a number of socio-economic indicators within the Human 
Development Index clearly have much to bring to bear upon the nature and scale of emerging 
criminal activity within given contexts, there is an argument to be made that the lack of specificity 
within the state fragility framework and its broadly debated and varied definitions mean that any 
attempt to produce a comparative analysis of crime in fragile states would be extremely vulnerable 
to similar accusations and to an oversimplification of the emerging issues. These challenges are 
addressed in Chapters 5 and 8. 
 
iv.2. Question 2 
In what ways are fragile states different from more stable ones? 
Taking the state fragility framework as the basis of comparison for underdeveloped 
countries facing similar patterns of criminal activity, this question is intended to help the author to 
better define and frame the argument of the thesis. It is intended to provide a basis for narrowing 
the analysis by identifying relevant influences on nation-wide patterns of criminal behaviour in 
fragile states, as well as for prioritising selected influences on criminal behaviour that will be 
                                                          
16
 Frameworks included the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, Carleton University’s 
Country Indicators for Foreign Policy, and the American Political Science Association’s Global Forecasting 
Model of Political Instability, among others. 
17
 See section viii.2 for the author’s definition of fragility. 
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identified in the Yemeni context more specifically. Examining the common features of fragile states 
and using these to distinguish them from more stable or more developed countries will also allow 
the author to broaden the implications of the thesis’ major findings, using implications for 
criminological and development literature gleaned from the Yemeni case study to consider more 
generally how governance failures impact rates of violent young offending in other fragile states.  
 
iv.3 Question 3 
What are the main causes of criminal violence in Yemen, and to what extent are these causes 
related to state fragility? 
This question deals with the heart of the analysis of this thesis, generating an exploratory 
case study of crime patterns in Yemen, and prompting an analysis of their evolution over time. In 
answering this question, the author strives to generate an understanding of the causes of crime in a 
fragile setting. This analysis will be integrated within the answers to several other research questions 
and will incorporate descriptive elements that will present an overview of both criminality and 
development in Yemen for the reader.  
 
iv.4 Question 4 
Which (if any) specific attributes of fragile states promote criminality and violent criminal 
behaviour among children and young people? 
Building upon the answers to questions 2 and 3, question 4 will be used to extract relevant 
indicators from both the Yemeni context and the state fragility framework in order to determine 
whether or not a unifying theory of violent young offending in fragile states is possible, and to 
produce the groundwork for such a theory if it is deemed to be possible. While this question could 
produce a broad range of answers that might be based upon the research biases of the author to 
varying degrees, numerous efforts have been taken in order to ensure the reliability of the emerging 
analysis, which will be at all times supported both by existing academic and practitioner research 
(produced by international organisations, think tanks, donors and local government agencies), field 
work, statistical data and analysis of theoretical frameworks taken from the fields of criminology and 
international development alike.  
 
iv.5 Question 5 
How, if at all, are the identified criminogenic attributes of fragile states mitigated by existing 
youth justice systems, and how can youth justice systems be better used to advance the cause of 
peace? 
This question will be addressed only on the basis of the findings generated by previous 
analyses and will also be conditional upon an exploration of the Yemeni context. Answering this 
question is important for both testing the applicability of any theories to emerge from the thesis and 
for assessing their usefulness: after all, if it is found that existing justice systems in fragile states 
already engage with identified risk factors successfully, then such risk factors may not in the end 
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prove to be as important in determining crime rates as originally assumed. If, on the other hand, 
justice systems have no way of engaging with identified risk factors, then the emerging theory of 
crime causation in fragile states will not prove useful in assisting practitioners to tackle the 
underlying problem. In both instances, the purpose of the theory will be heavily undermined. 
 
 The five research questions reflect within themselves the nature of the investigation. This is 
based within a realm of theoretical analysis and comparative study, rather than statistical evidence, 
though such data will be relied upon to reinforce claims and suggestions put forward in the work. 
The five questions will remain at the centre of the thesis throughout, and have been used in turn to 
generate sub-questions that were needed in order to further define chapterisation and structure. 
Such sub-questions are listed in the overview section of the introduction and are further expanded 
upon within each individual chapter of the work. 
 
v. Research Strategy and Methods 
 Although this thesis draws upon criminological theory and other bodies of literature, it is 
ultimately submitted as a political investigation, grounded in the discipline of post-war recovery and 
international development studies. Though the thesis has remained trans-disciplinary in nature, it is 
worth clarifying here how its strong connection to the political sciences has influenced the 
construction of its research strategy, and how this in turn has determined the selection of research 
methods.  
 Andy Sumner and Michael Tribe write that international development studies are largely 
constructed around three fundamental conceptions of change: the historical; indicator-based; and 
post-modern perspectives (2008). These three positions can be adapted and represented 
diagrammatically (See Figures 4, 5 and 6). 
 
Figure 4 The Historical Approach to Development 
The historical perspective views development as a process of long-term structural change, in which 
the purpose of development research is to document natural socio-economic, cultural and political 
evolution. Such research is ultimately non-judgemental: it is neither associated with normative 
valuation systems nor interested in distinguishing “good change” from “bad change”. It is, at its core, 
more concerned with establishing how and why changes to society occur over time. 
 
Figure 5 The Indicator-Based Approach to Development 
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 Conversely, the policy-based or indicator-based perspective is far more heavily value-laden. 
This is an approach adopted by international organisations like the United Nations, whereby “good 
change” and “bad change” is evaluated over short- to medium-term periods according to 
measurable progress towards development indicators like the Millennium Development Goals. 
Charles Gore refers to these kind of development studies as “performance assessment” research 
(2000), while Sumner and Tribe call this perspective “technocratic and instrumental”, where the 
purpose of development research is to identify the outcomes of change (2008). 
 
Figure 6 The Post-Modern Approach to Development 
 Rejecting the legitimacy of the other two positions, the post-modern perspective situates 
the development researcher as a participant in the development process, whereby development 
influences the observer's understanding of change, and where the observer's categorisation of 
“good change” versus “bad change” ultimately influences the course of development. The post-
modern perspective integrates the architecture of development and international intervention into 
conceptualisations of development, and reads development studies as a subjective discipline that 
heavily influences policy and practice within the world that it analyses. This view, write Sumner and 
Tribe, is extremely critical of what is perceived as a “dominant 'discourse' of Western modernity”, 
through which “Western ethnocentric notions of development” are imposed “upon the Third World” 
(2008, p. 14).  
 All three positions must be acknowledged in any study of international development, though 
priority needs to be given to one above the others in order to ensure logical consistency in any one 
research project. In this thesis, the author has prioritised the indicator-based perspective: the 
purpose of this thesis is not to look at the development of a fragile-state as a whole over a long 
period of time, but to examine the development of specific negative outcomes – the emergence of 
harmful anti-social behaviour patterns among children and young people over medium periods – 
and to deliberate upon new pathways through which these changes can be understood and 
addressed by the international community and within the academic world.  
 While maintaining this position, the author will make reference to the others, by using the 
impact of long-term historical development changes in order to complement her research, and by 
being mindful of the dangers posed by the potential impact of development research and the 
imposition of artificial research perspectives upon foreign cultures. The incorporation of these two 
strands will be evidenced by a historical analysis of Yemen in Chapter 2 and an overall commitment 
throughout the thesis to emphasise the importance of contextualisation in the application of theory 
to diverse development contexts. These adjustments form an attempt to navigate beyond an overly 
narrow view of state fragility, which is cited by Sumner and Tribe as a common danger of the 
indicator-based perspective. 
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 These three views of international development and international development studies are 
translated within the political sciences into three contradictory ontological and epistemological 
positions, so that the prioritisation of the policy-based or indicator-based perspective by this thesis 
has been translated into a clear research strategy (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7 Approaches to Development Studies 
As indicated above, the perspective adopted by the author necessitates a realist analysis, in which, 
as Cassandra Bergstrøm and Elisabeth Molteberg argue, knowledge is a social construction that is 
influenced by the observer's perspective, but in which the aim of knowledge acquisition is to explain 
a single physical reality (2000). While strands of historical and post-modern analyses will be used at 
various junctions throughout the thesis, this reasoning will not extend to alternative ontological and 
epistemological positions, so that both positivist and relativist arguments are excluded from the 
research initiative. This approach is supported by John Martinussen's requirement that research in 
the social sciences must always state explicitly its ontological and epistemological background, which 
is the basic way in which a research project frames the confines of the reality in which it is designed 
to operate (1997, p. 346). Such distinctions are important, explains Peter Preston, because:  
If the social world is construed as essentially a realm of material facts then enquiry can 
appropriately be descriptive and explanatory. … If, on the other hand, the social world is 
construed as essentially a realm of cultural meanings and understandings then enquiry 
can appropriately be interpretive and critical (1996, p. 6).  
Historical Perspective: 
Development is a long-
term process that can be 
studied without 
judgement. 
There is only one reality, 
which can be observed. 
Positivist Perspective: 
The researcher is 
objective and the 
purpose of research is 
to understand reality.  
Quantative research 
methods are prioritised. 
Policy-Based Perspective: 
Development is a 
collection of good changes 
that can be measured over 
the short- and medium-
term. 
There is only one reality, 
which can be described. 
The researcher is part of 
that reality. 
Realist Perspective: The 
researcher exists within 
the reality that they 
study, but the purpose 
of research is still to 
understand that reality.  
A blend of quantatitve 
and qualitative research 
methods can be used. 
Post-Modern Perspective: 
Development is an 
industry built around the 
goal of imposing Western 
values on the Third World. 
There are multiple 
realities, which can be 
experienced. 
Relativist Perspective: 
The researcher is 
subjective and the 
purpose of research is a 
more informed 
construction of reality. 
Qualitative research 
methods are prioritised. 
Epistemology 
Ontology 
Methodology 
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Taking the middle view, the realist position allows for exploratory and explanatory research, while 
remaining conscious and critical of standardised normative positions. Accordingly, as Figure 7 
demonstrates, the realist position allows for both quantitative and qualitative data to be used to 
enhance knowledge, with quantitative data aiming to accurately describe a physical reality, and 
qualitative data aiming to capture and appraise competing perspectives of that reality in order to 
produce a more informed analysis.  
 Chapter 1 will offer a far more coherent overview of the methodological structure and 
approaches of this thesis. In particular, it will offer a detailed account of the theoretical framework, 
which is a product of the ontological and epistemological positions. It is important to note here that 
the overall research strategy of this thesis has necessitated the use of a number of research 
methods. In particular, quantitative data has been used in order to document patterns of criminal 
activity and underdevelopment in Yemen in Chapters 2, 3 and 5. Such data has been taken from 
secondary sources that have included United Nations data and Government of Yemen statistics on 
criminal justice and security, among others. Primary statistical data was not gathered by the author 
in this case because: “Quantitative work rests on the observation and measurement of repeated 
incidences of a political phenomenon … . By observing variables over a large number of cases, it is 
possible to make inferences about a class of political behaviour” (Peter John, 2002, pp. 268-269). In 
this case, “Statistical theory shows that the larger the number of cases (or the greater number in 
proportion to the whole population), the surer the data analysts can be that what they observe is 
not a random occurrence” (p. 269). As an independent researcher working in the confines of a three-
year doctoral research project, it was simply not feasible for the author to gather a sufficiently large 
range of primary statistical information that would warrant a nationally-located analysis of crime in 
Yemen. 
 As noted by Sumner and Tribe, an over-reliance on secondary quantitative data in 
international development studies can result in the transfer of organisational biases to new 
research, as well as in the reproduction of errors, although the impact of such limitations can be 
mitigated through reliance upon a wider range of data sources. In order to combat these obstacles, a 
range of quantitative data sources have been combined with qualitative data, acquired through field 
work, expert consultations and distance research. In practice, qualitative approaches to research will 
be prioritised above quantitative ones, owing to their flexibility and adaptability. This method of 
blending different data collection methods is drawn in part from Julia Brannen's methodological 
guide, according to which “mixed methods research is an opportunity that deflects attention away 
from theoretical work that is often specific to particular disciplines”, which fits well with this thesis' 
ambition to integrate criminological and development research: “Thus [mixed methods research] 
may encourage thinking ‘outside the box’, ... bringing together researchers across disciplinary 
boundaries” (2005, p. 5). 
 Elite stakeholder consultations were conducted in Yemen in 2010 in order to help bridge 
these two methodological approaches, whereby members of the international community and the 
Yemeni Government were questioned about their interpretations of data implications and about 
their priorities for Yemen's development. A secondary field research phase was also planned in order 
to gather additional qualitative data at the ground level directly from Yemeni communities. 
However, this plan was abandoned due to the emergence of the Arab Spring and the significant 
destabilisation of the country as a whole in 2011, as is discussed in Chapter 1, so that the author 
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relied instead upon online data collection tools and distance research in order to supplement 
resulting gaps in the research strategy.  
 Ultimately, despite the use of supporting quantitative and qualitative evidence, the research 
strategy of this thesis has relied primarily upon literature reviews, which have been used in order to 
engage with existing debates on criminology and underdevelopment in line with Bob Hancké's guide 
to research design (2010, p. 237). Its sphere of applicability is specifically to fragile states, with 
additional context-specific applications to Yemen. 
 
vi. Case Study Selection 
 Yemen was selected as the primary case study for this thesis in line with Robert K. Yin's Case 
Study Research methodology (2004). This requires an in-depth examination of a so-called “typical 
instance” of a phenomenon being investigated – the phenomenon being, in this example, conflict-
affected state fragility, – so as to allow for detailed exploratory research of specific contexts. As 
Martyn Descombe outlines in his guide to Good Research: 
The logic being invoked here is that the particular case is similar in crucial respects with 
the others that might have been chosen, and that the findings from the case study are 
therefore likely to apply elsewhere. Because the case study is like most of the rest, the 
findings can be generalised to the whole class of the thing. (1998, p. 33) 
Yemen, as a least developed country affected by prolonged humanitarian crisis, provides a solid case 
study for generating a theory of crime causation in fragile states and for creating a set of exportable 
findings. The country is positioned midway between the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, and is 
affected by the political and social fluctuations of both regions. It holds implications and lessons to 
be learned that may prove effective and relevant within a very large territory. 
 The author first became interested in Yemen while working under contract for the Post-war 
Reconstruction and Development Unit in 2010 (see Chapter 1). Up until this point, Iraq and 
Afghanistan had also been considered as important examples of fragile states that were affected by 
acute deprivation. It was in studying these countries that the author found a gap in policy coverage 
where criminal activity was significantly side-lined in conflict-affected countries in favour of peace-
building programming. Yemen was prioritised as a case study because, unlike Iraq, it was a more 
generalizable example of naturally evolving conflict: more specifically, the war in Iraq was an unusual 
consequence of foreign intervention and, it might be argued, de-Ba'athification, so that state 
fragility was a fairly new social dynamic for the country. Similarly, Yemen was considered to be more 
accessible than Afghanistan, where decades of international intervention had contributed to 
increasing hostility against foreigners, and to respondent fatigue, both of which have been identified 
as serious structural issues inhibiting contemporary research efforts there (Samy Ahmar and 
Christine Kolbe, 2011, p. 10). As a chronically underdeveloped state with a relatively under-explored 
research environment, Yemen presented a solid and convincing case-study. 
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Figure 8 View Over Sana'a's Historic City Centre 
 As the investigation continued, the timing for conducting an in-depth evaluation of under-
researched forms of insecurity in Yemen became more urgent. With the 2011 Arab Spring and the 
2012 Revolution of Institutions having pushed the Yemeni Government and the international 
community to begin planning for a severe restructuring of military, police and judicial services in the 
country, there is a danger that a lack of understanding of- and information about- more mainstream 
criminal violence in Yemen could lead to an overly enthusiastic side-lining of conventional law 
enforcement spending needs. This danger emerges more specifically from a recent assertion by the 
British Government – which is taking the lead in police training in Yemen as part of a broader 
European Union commitment to security sector reform post-2012 – that restructured police services 
in the country will likely take on a “paramilitary” identity, as part of which Yemeni police will above 
all be tasked with reinstating territorial control of their state (Expert Consultation, Nicholas Hopton, 
20 July, 2012). As will be argued in Chapters 5 and 7, the author is convinced that there is a need to 
support international policy-makers at this critical juncture by making available additional 
information on violence and instability that has not been considered as part of this new security 
strategy.  
 Yemen is also an appropriate representative example of fragility because it is a country 
battling with multiple conflicts and a crisis of state legitimacy, while maintaining a basic 
infrastructure and a strict and visible legal system. Yemen was found to have a middling incident rate 
of violent crime when compared to the broader Middle-East and North Africa area in 2010, as 
substantiated by the Global Peace Index, while ranking 129th out of 149 countries with available 
data for its general stability. In 2007, Yemen was also shown by the International Centre for Prison 
Studies' World Prison Population List to have, at 14,000 inmates, one of the highest prison 
populations in the Middle East within its government managed prisons alone. Since then, while 
accurate data specific to Yemen has been difficult to come by, the rest of the region has experienced 
a significant increase in detentions (as documented by the World Prison Population List in 2009), 
with strong indications of similar trends in Yemen.  
 Yemen is thereby deemed to fit the requirements of the case study approach through both 
its political situation and crime rates, offering a relevant context within which to work towards 
answering the research questions while also providing a generalizable example of conflict and 
fragility. More importantly, it offered some degree of infrastructure at the time of case-study 
selection in 2010, particularly with regard to its justice sector, through which the extent of crime 
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became, if not fully measurable, then at least more visible. Furthermore, unlike other countries 
experiencing similar trends, including Afghanistan and Iraq, Yemen provided at the time a relatively 
safe environment within which to carry out field work. 
 However, while lessons drawn from the Yemeni context have far-reaching implications for 
other contexts, the country itself is also unique in its cultural, religious, tribal and social identity. The 
country’s history has further produced a very distinctive system of governance18. Therefore, while 
findings produced from this investigation of the Yemeni case study will be presented according to an 
analysis that is intended to be exportable, this thesis will remain sensitive to local particularities in 
its reading of crime and fragility in Yemen, and future comparative analyses that might emerge from 
this thesis will need also to be catered to their specific contexts. 
 
vii. Key Findings 
 This thesis has generated findings that are connected to the Yemeni development context, 
its emerging patterns of criminal activity and associated judicial structures, as well as to the 
applicability of theoretical criminological and fragility literature in assessing these challenges, and 
finally to the unifying characteristics of fragility and criminality. Most crucially, it has been found that 
existing criminological literature and theories of international development are separately 
insufficient for producing a fully contextualised theory of violent young offending in fragile states: a 
theory that takes the nuances and complexities of least developed countries into account. Through 
careful integration, these two academic disciplines are significantly strengthened in their suitability 
for analysing violent young offending in fragile states. By analysing the Yemeni context more 
specifically and by looking at Yemen's commonalities with other fragile states, it has been possible to 
generate a number of important socio-economic and political trends that could form the 
foundations of a rigorous unifying theory of crime and fragility (though such a theory would require 
further investigation if it could be said to be empirically validated).  
 These trends, which have been left suggestive within this thesis, include: a deterioration of 
state legitimacy; a breakdown of social services; poor communal integration of children and young 
people; and a widespread socialisation to violence. Based upon independent research and existing 
theories, an appreciation for these trends yields a coherent analytical framework, which argues that 
the absence of state services, legitimate opportunities and socialising activities for young people in 
fragile states, along with their exposure to significant levels of violence, produces extreme 
economic, psychological and socio-cultural stresses that lead to their increased aggression and 
rejection of state legitimacy, all of which combine to raise the likelihood of violent young offending 
in Yemen and other fragile states.  
It has furthermore been found that the cultural specificities of individual contexts can 
produce important mitigating circumstances that are lost in comparative studies that seek to merge 
multiple fragile contexts together. Explanatory theories pertaining to violent young offending in all 
fragile states therefore require a certain degree of adaptation and customisation when analysed 
within specific cultural and religious backgrounds. 
                                                          
18
 The history and evolution of the Yemeni state will be overviewed in Chapter 2. 
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viii. Important Terms 
 Three concepts frame the analysis of this thesis, and these are; childhood, violent criminality 
and state fragility. While each of these terms is fairly self-explanatory, this section will address each 
one individually in order to avoid later confusion through clear definitions. 
viii.1. Children and Young People 
Children and young people are defined within this thesis as individuals who have reached 
the age of legal capacity but are nevertheless protected by the Yemeni justice system as a result of 
their extreme youth. The author is primarily interested here in children above the age of 10 as 
individuals who are entering into a key developmental period of their lives, where opinions on ethics 
and morality are being formed, and important lifetime decisions are beginning to be made. 
Nevertheless, the criteria established by this definition encompass all those under the age of 18, 
although it is extremely rare for children under the age of seven to be arrested in Yemen (so that the 
Yemeni Central Statistical Organisation tends to separate juvenile offenders into groups of 7 to 14 
and 15 to 18 year old people19).  
Yemen’s laws contravene the 1990 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
which stipulates that young people who have not reached an age of full maturity should not be 
placed under the weight of full legal responsibility, either because they do not yet have the capacity 
to infringe the criminal law, or because they are more vulnerable within the judicial process than 
adults20. Without condoning this reality, the definition of childhood and youth adopted by this thesis 
recognises children and young people as individuals who can be and are arrested and tried on 
suspicion of having committed a criminal offence. Owing to the difficulty of identifying children in 
fragile states, as children often operate without documentation and are frequently miss-classified as 
adults, the parameters of this thesis’ definition will also be extended, wherever clearly stated, to 
encompass young people up to the age of 25. The definition used acknowledges that perceptions of 
childhood vary from country to country across the world, and is therefore adapted for better 
application to the Yemeni context.  
Childhood is a culturally sensitive concept, with the age of criminal capacity varying from 
country to country21. In her study on culturally-based integrative approaches to childhood, Kathleen 
Kostelny writes that:  
While childhood is defined by the Convention on the Rights of the Child as the period 
from birth through eighteen years of age, many non-Western cultures view the period 
quite differently. … In addition to having different conceptualisations of when a child 
                                                          
19
 This data sorting method can be seen in the Central Statistical Organisation’s Statistical Yearbook of 2003 to 
2008. 
20
 Article 40 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child deals with the appropriate legal process for 
prosecuting a young offender (under the age of 18), while subsection 3(a) requires that countries establish a 
minimum age below which children “shall be presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the penal law” 
(1990). 
21
 Example minimal ages of criminal capacity, according to Gregor Urbas, are; 10 for the United Kingdom and 
Australia; 12 for Canada, Greece and the Netherlands; 13 for France, Israel and New Zealand; 14 for Austria, 
Germany and Italy; 15 for  Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden; 16 for Japan, Portugal and Spain; 
and 18 for Belgium and Luxenbourg (2000, p. 2). 
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becomes an adult, many developing societies diverge from industrialised societies in 
their views of children's roles, responsibilities and expected behaviours. In these 
societies young boys are expected to contribute to the household resources by tending 
animals, farming, or working outside the home, and young girls are expected to spend 
much of their day doing domestic chores such as cleaning, cooking, and caring for 
younger children. (2006, pp. 20-21) 
In some societies, as in Yemen, where legislation aimed at prohibiting child marriages has been slow 
in being developed and implemented, children are also parents and primary bread-winners, with 
girls as young as nine years marrying and starting families of their own (Stakeholder Consultation, 
United Nations Population Fund, 14 August, 2010). Children of all ages fail to attend school and 
become separated from parents and loved ones through either choice or circumstance (Stakeholder 
Consultation, United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, 15 August, 2010). They can 
also be soldiers and combatants, bearing witness to potentially traumatising events and taking part 
in armed violence against others.  
 With the adoption of social roles that can be thought of as being beyond their level of 
maturity, it is difficult to talk about many young people within such settings as children. Thus, while 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child strictly prohibits child labour by insisting upon a minimum 
age for entry into employment (article 32.a), many countries across the world take the stance that 
their children work to survive and form an integral part of their domestic economies. The 1990 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child formalises this assertion for participating 
African states by stating that: “Every child shall be protected from all forms of economic exploitation 
and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child's physical, 
mental, spiritual, moral, or social development”, but failing to ban children from working entirely 
(article 15.1). Not only would placing a ban on child labour be virtually unenforceable in many 
countries (like Somalia, for instance, where there is no functioning state to speak of that could 
regulate employment), but preventing children from taking on important employment and social 
roles could rob them of their only means of survival. 
 
Figure 9 Young Yemeni merchants pack up their stalls at the end of a market day 
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 Conceptions of childhood and adulthood in Yemen will emerge as a reoccurring theme 
within this thesis. For further ease of discussion, the resulting group has been conceptually sub-
compartmentalised according to the Health Behaviour in School-Aged Children (HBSC) study 
framework, which disaggregates age groups according to known stages in human cognitive 
development, rather than exclusively according to cultural and legal formulations of childhood and 
adulthood. The HBSC study, conducted by the World Health Organisation and described by Anna 
Aszmmann et al in their analysis of 'Multiple Risk Behaviour and Injury', separates young people into 
three age-groups that are deemed to be cross-nationally relevant, extending to multiple global 
settings. These sub-groups represent three key formative stages in the lives of children that have 
been identified as: “the onset of adolescence” at age 11; “the challenge of physical and emotional 
changes” at age 13; and “the middle years when very important life and career decisions are 
beginning to be made” at age 15 (2002, p. 122). This classification method allows for the 
exportability of research findings. However, as Naile Berberoglu summarises, the danger of such 
classifications lies in that:  
the way developmental psychology has approached children as biological beings going 
through different pre-determined life stages, which in turn are used to describe and 
define childhood, can be seen as another example of how children were being studied as 
unified and passive beings in a state of becoming. (2011, p. 42)  
Thus, in much developmental psychology, “the child” is conceptualised “as ‘an empty vessel’ who is 
innocent, vulnerable and predictable”. Owing to the exposure of children and young people to great 
social hardships and significant levels of violence in fragile states, it is tempting to view them as 
victims of circumstance, rather than free-moving agents. While this thesis will lean heavily upon 
arguments relating to cognitive development, it will strive to posit children and young people as fully 
autonomous, yet vulnerable individuals. 
 
viii.2. Fragile State 
 As has already been asserted, state fragility is a broad and fluid concept that has been 
adopted by donors, practitioners and academics working in the area of international development to 
group together a number of countries that have “been associated with various combinations of the 
following dysfunctions: inability to provide basic services and meet vital needs, unstable and weak 
governance, persistent and extreme poverty, lack of territorial control, and high propensity to 
conflict and civil war” (Graziella Bertocchi and Andrea Guerzoni, 2011, p. 2). Many donors, like the 
British Department for International Development, define state fragility as characteristic of countries 
that are incapable of independently initiating progress towards the eight Millennium Development 
Goals enshrined within the United Nations 2000 Millennium Declaration (2006). Yet fragile states are 
also defined by their successes in that they are distinct from failed states, which are countries whose 
governments have ceased to perform all basic functions. Thus, it should be noted that Graham 
Brown and Frances Stewart define fragile states as “failing,” or being “at risk of failing”, but not as 
being “failed” or “collapsed” states (2010). A necessary criterion of fragile states is that they retain a 
minimal amount of institutional capacity that allows them to continue to exert a concrete influence 
over their citizens and their territories, so that the label of fragile states is often used by the United 
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Nations and other international bodies to justify immediate assistance to governments in order to 
avoid state collapse and the humanitarian emergencies associated with state collapse. 
 The language of state fragility is politically loaded, however, and has been rejected by those 
who: 
[deny] the existence of a set of 'fragile states' that, when their economic aggregates are 
compared to governance aggregates, would be basically identical to the group of [least 
developed countries]. This doctrine holds that each individual case of 'fragility' is 
absolutely unique, as impoverished but peaceful countries … should not be treated in 
the same way as potentially rich states that are ravaged by civil war … or regional 
crossroads with complex histories. (Jean-Marc Châtaigner and François Gaulme, 2005, p. 
5)  
Equally contentious is the association of the word “fragility” with notions of weakness and 
powerlessness. This thesis links state fragility primarily to extreme poverty, lack of institutional 
capacity and an inability by governments to streamline conflicts into the mainstream political 
process, placing them at a greater risk of war. In this sense, the labels of “state fragility” and “least 
developed country” will be used almost interchangeably, although the language of “least developed 
countries” will be more strongly associated with weak economies, and that of state fragility with 
poor governance. It is important to note here that, as Châtaigner and Gaulme explain, the danger of 
using the concept of state fragility is in that it frequently fails to take into consideration regional 
stress factors that may be weakening the ability of states to exert their authority (p. 6). Thus, while 
definitions of state fragility vary, almost all of them consider the phenomenon at a national level, so 
that understandings of fragility are bordered within a country's territories instead of taking regional 
and global influences into account. This thesis rejects this view and will instead analyse the causes of 
Yemen's fragility from a multilevel perspective. 
 The investigation presented here recognises that state fragility, due to the huge variety of 
frameworks and indices that have been produced by competing institutions22, can be a confusing 
and continuously fluctuating concept within academic research, practitioner policy and practice. This 
thesis has had to narrow its definition of fragility for purposes of analytical clarity23, and in order to 
pin down fragility to a single concrete typology that is more strictly defined. Fragility has been 
understood here as the intersection of three major conditions, which include: poor state capacity, as 
generated by a lack of authority and ability to control state territories, and as evidenced by a lack of 
effective state service provision; high social fragmentation, accompanied by a history of conflict, 
community isolation and conflicting localised identities; and poor political integration, leading to low 
levels of community access to political processes, reinforced by a perceived lack of political will to 
reflect popular demands in policy changes. This definition rules out cases of “weak” and “strong” 
state fragility where fragility is read as a “spectrum” (World Bank, 2005). Fragility is viewed instead 
as a condition encapsulating a multitude of social and structural challenges, rather than as a scale 
                                                          
22
 Notable examples that will be returned to in later Chapters include the United States Agency for 
International Development's Fragile States Assessment Framework, the Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index, 
or the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessments tool, among others. 
23
 See Chapter 6, section 6.3 for details relating to the process through which the definition has been refined 
by the author. 
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where countries can be ranked according to their degree of instability. It excludes from its analysis a 
large variety of recovering states facing only low priority development challenges. 
 
viii.3. Violent Crime and Offences Against the Person 
 For the purposes of this thesis, violent crime and offences against the person are taken to 
refer to all forms of social violence prohibited by law, not including actions taken by the state or by 
its citizens to fulfil a political objective, such as acts of terrorism and warfare where victims are 
chosen for their political affiliation, ethnic or religious identity, or to strike fear into the hearts of a 
population, as part of broader movement to effect regional or national change24.  
Beyond this, this thesis is primarily interested in mindless violence, which incorporates all 
physical acts of violence committed by a person or a group of people against another person or 
group of people without any clearly discernible economic or political motive. While the connotations 
of the word “mindless” imply that violence occurs as an eruption of irrationality, sometimes caused 
by trauma or severe psychological stress, the term is also used to analyse repeat violent offending, 
domestic violence, violence relating to social power negotiation on a small scale, or violence that has 
not been categorised by judicial systems. In short, it is important to note that every act of violence, 
including every act of mindless violence, is committed by a thinking individual or group. This 
understanding of violence is behavioural, not psychological, being grounded within behavioural 
theories, where violence is seen as an externalised physical gesture resulting in a negative physical 
impact upon another person. Under this definition, the author supports Richard Mizen's proposal 
“that the term ‘violence’, at least in a clinical context, be reserved for ‘action’ … which fulfils a 
particular psychological function”, such as “the ridding of unwanted mental contents”, thoughts, 
worries and pressures (2003, p. 293-294). In this sense, Mizen believes that “Violent acts are 
attempts not to have violent feelings (or be subject to violent affects)” (p. 300), so that the term 
“violence” is different from the term “aggression”, which is often considered, according to Mizen, to 
be either an instinctual or an emotional impulse to commit violence, sometimes failing to manifest 
itself in a physical action.  
 The term “aggression”, evoking psychological stress factors that result in increased violent 
behaviour, will be drawn upon to better analyse the environment of violent young offending in 
Yemen and other fragile states25. This use of terminology is taken from Felicity De Zulueta's From 
Pain to Violence, in which she argues that violence should always be read as being distinct from 
aggression, and not to be used as an interchangeable term for aggression (2006). While aggression is 
a trait of most human beings, De Zulueta argues that violence is the physical manifestation of 
heightened or elevated aggression in a particular form, or “transformed aggression”, but that: 
it is often far from clear when aggression ceases to be seen as 'normal', to become 
'transformed' or 'malignant'. 
                                                          
24
 The concepts of violent crime and offences against the person will be further defined within the confines of 
Yemeni law in chapters 1 and 6, which will offer a more in-depth analysis of offending patterns in that country. 
25
 Aggression will mainly be investigated in Chapters 6 and 7, which will look more closely at stress factors 
impacting children and young people in Yemen. 
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 In fact, the confusion cannot be avoided, because aggression is a form of social 
behaviour studied by ethologists, biologists and psychologists, whereas violence is more 
about the interpretation that is given to a form of social behaviour, an interpretation 
that is essentially determined by the social context in which we live. (p. 3) 
To be perceived as criminally or socially violent, a physical manifestation of aggression needs to be 
seen, within the context of the society and legal system in which it is committed, as a violation of the 
personal integrity of the victim, recognised as such by both “its victims” and “by those who witness 
it, particularly as the perpetrators of violence often fail to do just that” (De Zulueta, p. 6). In Chapter 
5, the author will explore the fact that violence committed in Yemen can be seen by its perpetrators 
as a form of retributive street justice, an attempt to equalise a wrong. Nonetheless, Yemeni police 
officers will often arrest perpetrators, because the families of their victims will rarely see such 
retributive actions as being legitimate, threatening to escalate retributive street justice into full-
blown blood feuds. According to this social pattern, while violence may be perceived as being 
legitimate by communities, it requires state-based intervention for the sake of national well-being 
and future social cohesion, which is the point at which violence becomes criminalised. Yet this 
example illustrates that tensions always remain between state and community perceptions of 
criminal and social violence, with these tensions also impacting the distinctions between social, 
criminal and political violence. An understanding of violence based upon social and national 
perception is an extremely challenging definition to maintain, especially as a foreign analyst, because 
acts of violence perceived as acts of brutality within one locality (such as the nation home of the 
author or the reader) may not necessarily be perceived as being aggressive beyond the confines of 
normative behaviour within another (such as the country being studied).  
 The definitions of social and criminal violence put forward incorporate all violent offences 
committed by young people as individuals, community members, co-workers, families or friends, but 
not as political representatives acting to demonstrate a political opinion or achieve a political 
objective. Here, a focus is placed on physical violence more than verbal violence, though the threat 
of violence and the use of verbal coercion in fragile states are nevertheless identified as important 
elements of Yemen's criminological environment, with their own set of causes and social impact.  
While fairly rigid, these definitional parameters have been difficult to implement, because 
separating political and apolitical actions with any degree of accuracy when examining statistical 
data is extremely problematic, particularly within fragile states, which are often beset by conflict or 
strong political unrest. This challenge is addressed in part through a focus on Yemen, where the 
sorting process has already been initiated by the state. Concerns about the legitimacy and validity of 
this mode of data analysis, as well as measures taken to address these issues, are reviewed in 
section 1.5. To better frame these concerns here, it is useful to ask at what point within a country's 
recovery from conflict the unlawful killing of a human being ceases to be read as an act of war in 
order to become a straightforward murder? That there is no easy answer here lays testimony to the 
fluidity and interaction between the concepts of crime and conflict. The only workable solution is to 
treat each case-study individually. A religiously-motivated attack may be analysed as a criminal 
action in the United Kingdom, but as a political one in Iraq, where the incident is unlikely to be an 
isolated one and instead forms part of a greater political movement. Even taking such precautions, 
complexities abound on a case-by-case basis, where violent offenders can be influenced by complex 
and overlapping economic, political, social and physical motives for their actions.  
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ix. Overview 
 The introduction of this thesis has established why violent crime and violent crime 
committed by children and young people in fragile states is important, justifying the reasons why a 
theory of crime causation has become necessary so as to better engage with the problem. The 
chapters which follow also revolve around their own set questions. Chapter 1 will outline how the 
subject of crime causation will be approached within this thesis by describing the researcher's 
methodology. Chapter 2 will then begin to engage with the main research questions of the thesis by  
identifying the specific characteristics of Yemen, as a fragile state, that may be proving most relevant 
in understanding its emerging crime patterns. In this sense, it will ask how Yemen is unique from 
more stable countries and what the root causes of its fragility are. Chapter 3 will then set about 
determining the extent of the problem of violent young offending in Yemen by providing an in depth 
analysis of the country's crime rates. Once the problem has been quantified, Chapter 4 will build 
upon the analysis of Chapter 3 by evaluating existing criminological theory and determining whether 
such theory is suitable and sufficient for adequately explaining the causal relationship between state 
fragility and violent offending. Chapter 5 will add another analytical layer to this discussion by 
examining Yemen's existing crime prevention systems and assessing the extent to which they are 
effectively engaging manifestations of social chaos. Following on from this evaluation, Chapter 6 will 
explore theories of social development, conflict causation and state fragility in order to extract a 
unifying theory of violent offending in fragile states. Chapter 7 will test whether or not the resulting 
theory of crime causation is helpful in engaging with the problem of violent offending by testing 
whether there are any points of interaction between the two within Yemeni crime and social control 
systems. Finally, Chapter 7 and the Conclusion will also strive to identify any potential areas for 
reform within Yemeni crime control systems, keeping cultural and capacity issues in mind. 
Additionally, the Conclusion will answer the five research questions set out in section iv. 
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Chapter 1: Methodology 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 In Jarol B. Manheim and Richard C. Rich's guide to Empirical Political Research, the authors 
identify three forms of political investigation: exploratory; descriptive; and explanatory research 
projects. Exploratory research aims to generate “greater familiarity” with a given phenomenon or 
phenomena. Descriptive research aims to provide an accurate representation of that phenomenon. 
Explanatory research aims to test a causal hypothesis relating to an identified phenomenon (1991, p. 
73). This thesis adopts elements of all three approaches to suit its purposes, though it is primarily an 
exploratory piece aimed at generating greater familiarity with the relationship between youth 
violence and fragility in Yemen.  
 While operating within the confines of a realist epistemological perspective26, this thesis 
engages with an existing debate on security and underdevelopment in line with Bob Hancké's guide 
to research design, and uses a case study research strategy to identify Yemen as a country “which 
simultaneously address[es]” the investigation's research questions “and the others in the debate”27 
(2010, p. 238). The argument begins by highlighting a phenomenon (the high prevalence of violent 
young offending in fragile states), then proceeds by exploring that phenomenon through a detailed 
contextual analysis (aimed at determining the manifestations of crime in Yemen) while surveying 
and describing the conditions that may be impacting the development of that phenomenon (by 
examining the Yemeni development context), and consequently moves on to identifying possible 
causes of the phenomenon (by producing a suggestive theory of crime causation based on existing 
literature and testing the usefulness of that theory in terms of overcoming the challenge of violent 
young offending in fragile states).  
 The primary purpose of this thesis is to explore and to understand, though it cannot achieve 
that purpose without describing and attempting to explain. It is for this reason that the author has 
adopted a wide array of tools and methods to suit different stages of research. The political nature 
of the analysis has also led to the necessity of adapting such methods to constantly fluctuating 
political realities, brought about by Yemen’s processes of governance reform and transition. The 
mixed methods approach selected through the research strategy28 has been instrumental in creating 
an adaptable methodology in this sense. This approach is drawn from the epistemological and 
ontological positioning of this thesis within a single-reality realist perspective that is open to a 
blending of quantitative and qualitative research techniques.  
                                                          
26
 See section v of the Introduction on ‘Research Strategy and Methods’. 
27
 The Yemeni case study will be used to engage existing theories of criminology and development in Chapters 
4 and 6. 
28
 Again, see section v of the Introduction on ‘Research Strategy and Methods’. 
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 While both types of technique have been used in this thesis, an overall emphasis has been 
placed on qualitative approaches, which Ariande Vromen writes are centred around four core 
attributes (2010). These attributes include: 
1. “Inductive analysis” where the purpose of research is to discover categories by “being 
exploratory with open questions, rather than only testing theoretically derived hypotheses 
through deduction” (2010, p. 257); 
2. “Holistic perspectives” in which the researcher intends to understand the entirety of the 
phenomenon being studied and in which contextualisation of research is key to generating 
relevant knowledge (p. 257); 
3. “Qualitative and adaptive data collection based on detailed thick description and depth”, 
where methodological flexibility is essential to paving the way for “new paths of discovery as 
they emerge” (p. 257); and 
4. “Empathetic neutrality”, according to which, under a realist perspective, due to the inability 
of a researcher to be truly objective within the political sciences, it is essential for research 
methodologies to be structured around a principle of neutral and “non-judgemental” 
investigation (p. 257). 
This qualitative philosophy is supported by a selection of quantitative methods that have used 
summary descriptive statistics29 in accordance with Peter John's model of quantitative analysis, 
where “descriptive measures allow the observer to split observations and to examine proportions” 
so that “Judgements about these proportions [can] form an essential part of the interpretation of 
data” (2010, p. 271). This type of supporting quantitative analysis will feature in later Chapters30. 
 The research project itself has been implemented and completed through a period of three 
years, wherein the theoretical framework and approaches used have remained constant, though 
data collection strategies have been continuously redesigned in order to respond to unanticipated 
political changes, like the Arab Spring, that have occurred in the field since the project was initiated 
in October 2009. These strategic changes are reflected in the following sections, which establish the 
theoretical framework, theoretical approaches, field work and distance research methods that have 
been used. The limitations of this methodology are also detailed. 
 
1.2 Theoretical Framework  
 The theoretical framework of this thesis establishes its structure and research strategy, as 
well as the reasons for the selection of these methods. It offers the simplest means of engaging with 
the investigative process of this research project. The development of this framework has followed a 
logical course, where the purpose of the investigation has determined the choice of research 
methods and has shaped the analysis (see Figure 10). The following subsections establish the aims 
and objectives of this investigation, as well as further outlining the research questions and 
hypothesis, including the case study selection strategy, the research methods used and the analytical 
structure. It shall not touch upon the justification of the theoretical approaches used, which will be 
outlined in their own section. 
                                                          
29
 Summary descriptive statistics are used predominantly in Chapter 3 to illustrate patterns of crime in Yemen 
over time. 
30
 In particular, Chapters 2 and 6 will rely on graphical regressions, as well as on tables and inferential statistics. 
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Figure 10 Theoretical Framework 
 
1.2.1 Aim 
 The central aim of this thesis is to combine the two academic disciplines of international 
development and criminology and to apply them to the under-researched terrain of Yemen as a 
fragile state in order to generate new insights into the relationship between violent young offending 
and state underdevelopment. Based predominantly within theoretical rather than statistical and 
evidentiary research, the findings of this thesis are suggestive rather than empirical, and they have 
been collated with the aim of generating a new theoretical framework that might shed some light on 
the reasons for the emergence of elevated levels of apolitical youth violence and violent criminality 
within such contexts. This thesis aims to integrate and test the validity of criminological and fragility 
literature for understanding the relationship between violent crime and underdevelopment.  
 This will be accomplished through an in-depth analysis of Yemen, which aims to produce an 
informed and holistic appreciation for violence and weak state capacity in one fragile state. Thus, the 
overall purpose of this thesis, a collective product of these aims, has become to understand the 
processes of violent crime causation in Yemen, and to test established academic theories within a 
complex and continuously fluctuating context, in order to suggest new ways of understanding 
apolitical violence, or mindless criminal violence committed by children and young people in fragile 
states. 
 
1.2.2 Objectives 
 To accomplish the above aims, this thesis has adopted multiple objectives. Firstly, it seeks to 
bring criminological theory into the discourse on socio-economic underdevelopment in order to 
open up a new conduit for the academic analysis of fragile states. Secondly, in order to blend these 
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two literary fields together and to test their applicability to new contexts, it will provide an analysis 
of violent young offending as a factor of state fragility in Yemen, introducing the reader to the 
Yemeni development context and to the country's complex justice system. In doing so, it will use a 
broad theoretical analysis of the principles of youth justice, conflict and fragility theory to provide an 
in-depth exploration of the Yemeni case study. 
 
Figure 11 View of Sana'a City Centre, Yemen 
 Finally, while remaining heavily grounded within Yemen, the main argument will strive to 
produce theories and recommendations that may be exported to other settings with similar 
contexts. It will do so by evaluating the staple theories of state fragility and criminology, and testing 
their limitations within new settings and new applications. 
 
1.2.2 Research Questions and Hypothesis 
 As has been set out in the introduction, this thesis adopts five central research questions 
within its investigation. In order to isolate the relevant aspects of state fragility that may be 
impacting rates of violent young offending in Yemen and elsewhere, it asks: 
1. How appropriate a concept is state fragility for providing a unifying framework through 
which low-ranking countries in the Human Development Index might be analysed in the 
context of similar patterns of criminality?  
2. In what ways are fragile states different from more stable ones? 
3. What are the main causes of criminal violence in Yemen, and to what extent are these causes 
related to state fragility? 
4. Which (if any) specific attributes of fragile states promote criminality and violent criminal 
behaviour among children and young people? 
5. How, if at all, are these criminogenic attributes mitigated by existing youth justice systems, 
and how can youth justice systems be better used to advance the cause of peace? 
In asking these questions, the author will endeavour to create a unifying theory of crime causation. 
That theory will emerge from an overview of the literature, an in-depth analysis of Yemen, and an 
integration of development and criminological literature.  
 Throughout the completion of this thesis, the author has endeavoured to use the research 
questions to guide her analysis, rather than relying upon a single hypothesis. The broad range of 
data and theoretical approaches to be analysed meant that any attempt to generate a hypothesis 
could serve to create a research bias, whereby only information relevant to proving or disproving the 
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main hypothesis would be considered. Nevertheless, at the completion of the initial desk research 
phase, the author did begin to prioritise certain existing theories over others, due to their relevance 
to the case study, and to formulate predictions in the pursuit of answers to the five research 
questions. These predictions formed the basis of a hypothesis that would eventually provide the 
foundations of the theoretical framework generated by this thesis.  
 At the outset, based on existing literature, it was determined that countries that are affected 
by state fragility are prone to exhibit a set of specific criminogenic risk factors, which create 
significant developmental challenges for governments striving to secure internal stability.  Existing 
theories indicated that key trends, such as economic inequality, proved important as potential 
drivers of increased criminality31. These theories read offenders to be “goal-driven” but reactive 
agents who responded to perceived opportunities for illicit activity in order to achieve criminal 
objectives. Such analytical slants proved disturbingly unsatisfying as explanations for increased 
tendencies towards so-called “mindless” violence, or the propensity for everyday violent and 
aggressive behaviour32. These restrictions within the literature on criminogenic risk factors led to a 
prioritisation of other readings in the end analysis of the criminological environments of fragile 
states. 
 When criminogenic risk factors proved increasingly unsatisfying for determining the broad 
causes of youth aggression, the author began to pursue alternative avenues of explanation within 
criminological theory, identifying the rich theoretical body of social controls on human behaviour33 
as a potential key to determining the stark difference in criminal activity evidenced between fragile 
and stable states. According to these theories, it was found that criminal behaviour in the developed 
world was mitigated by strong social forces and positive socialisation processes. The next question 
that the author asked, in line with the second research question which strove to understand the 
uniqueness of fragile environments, was whether or not these social dynamics of interactions within 
the developed world were also present in fragile states. It was found that many of these were 
missing due to a lack of socialising opportunities made available through schooling and the 
employment sector. While common perceptions of right and wrong and social stigma for criminal 
behaviour were present in fragile states, the integration of young people into communities was 
found to be weak in many places, and fear of prosecution, as well as respect for state bodies of law 
enforcement were generally very low34.  
 An initial hypothesis, produced as a result of these observations, concluded that three risk 
factors, emerging from common social control theories, might prove especially relevant for 
generating a unifying theory of violent young offending in fragile states. These included:  
 pervasive violence;  
 a breakdown of governmental legitimacy;  
                                                          
31
 See Chapter 4, section 4.2.5, on ‘Economic and Labour Market Causes’ of crime. 
32
 See the Introduction, including section ii, which outlines the ‘Problem Statement’. These factors will also be 
analysed in more depth in Chapter 4, so that the reader may be guided through the process of theory 
elimination by the author. 
33
 See Chapter 4, section 4.3, for a detailed overview and evaluation of theories of social control and their 
relevance to fragile states. 
34
 See Chapter 6, sections 6.6 and 6.7 on ‘Violent Young Offending in Fragile States’ and ‘Peripheral Causes of 
Criminality in Fragile States’. 
45 
 
 and, an erosion of traditional norms of socialisation35.  
 It should be understood that the author considered that fragile states, particularly those 
affected by conflict, are subjected to multi-level, pervasive social and military violence. This impacts 
the norms of social interaction within countries by establishing a culture in which violence becomes 
inherently linked to authority and social dominance. Children growing up within such environments 
are more likely to perceive violence and physical abuse as an effective means of gaining social 
standing and credibility. This emerging culture of violence is made more volatile by the fact that 
fragile states are frequently marked by reduced border control capacity, which leads to the influx of 
criminogenic commodities like narcotics and firearms that have in turn been linked to the rising 
severity of violent offending36.  
 At the same time, fragile states, which are intrinsically defined as countries suffering from 
weak governance, experience a breakdown of government legitimacy. This leads to a lack of respect 
for government authority, a lack of respect for the government's laws and a lack of faith in the 
government's law enforcement capacities. Many forms of crime become more socially acceptable, 
while there is little expectation among perpetrators that they will be held to account for their 
actions by the state. Once again, children are more prone to suffer the effects of these 
environmental conditions upon their development: a failure by the state to establish a positive 
relationship with young people early on can lead to their aggressive rejection of such formal 
institutions later in life.  
 Lastly, fragility leads to the erosion of traditional norms of socialisation. This inhibits the 
formation of positive social bonds that would encourage people to ascribe value to communal 
relations and to empathise with other members of society when they fall victim to crime. According 
to the initial hypothesis of this thesis, a combination of these three risk factors could create the 
conditions necessary to produce high rates of violent offending, becoming more dangerous in times 
of political unrest when they might lead to the gradual radicalisation of societies and the prolonging 
and escalation of conflict. It was considered that this hypothesis could offer a unifying theory of 
crime causation in both Yemen and other fragile states. 
 However, this thesis has at all times been guided by its research questions first, rather than 
this hypothesis. Upon application of these theories to the Yemeni context, it was found that existing 
theoretical frameworks within criminology and its more specialised branch of social control were 
quite limited in their capacity to adapt to fluctuating fragile state settings whose trends did not 
follow anticipated patterns. As shall be argued further in Chapter 6, this initial hypothesis was 
altered when generating the fragility-sensitive theory of violent young offending in Yemen, which 
required the incorporation of local cultural and tribal dynamics in order to reflect the development 
realities of that chosen setting.  
 
                                                          
35
 The reasoning behind the selection of these risk factors will be outlined further in section 1.3. 
36
 Chapter 4, section 4.2.1 on ‘Substance Abuse and Exposure to Addictive Substances’ will look in more detail 
at theories that link crime to narcotics, while section 8.2 will highlight the impact of weapons distribution in 
Yemen upon crime rates.  
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1.2.3 Case Study Selection 
 The case study selection process has already been outlined in the Introduction, as has the 
justification for the implementation of a single case study approach. Yemen was selected for its long-
term fragile status and prolonged conflicts, but also for its relative stability, which allowed for 
limited field work and for the author to rely upon nation-wide governmental and non-governmental 
statistics. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the situation in Yemen turned dramatically more 
volatile, restricting ease of travel two years into the research project. Nevertheless, soaring levels of 
violence in Yemen highlighted the importance and urgency of the investigation. 
 
1.2.4 Research Methods 
 A combination of literature reviews, field work and desk based research has been used in 
order to gather the data necessary to complete this investigation. To begin with, Yemen was studied 
holistically in order to give the author a full understanding of the research context. Broad 
criminological, peace-building and development theories were read extensively, allowing the author 
to position her arguments within a wider dialogue on youth justice systems, displacement and child 
development. Then, the research focus was narrowed in order to answer the research questions and 
to test the parameters of the hypothesis, and both desk based and field research methods were 
refined to suit this purpose. 
 
1.2.5 Analytical Structure 
 The analysis contained in this work links theory and practice within an envelope structure37. 
The beginning of the text examines offending patterns and the development context within Yemen, 
The middle chapters provide an overview and analysis of existing criminological and developmental 
theory in order to extract a new unifying approach. The final sections apply this approach to Yemeni 
judicial systems in order to identify a possible way forward. 
 
                                                          
37
 See the Introduction to this thesis, and especially section ix, which provides the ‘Overview’.  
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1.3 Theoretical Approach 
1.3.1 Principle Theories Used to Produce the Hypothesis 
 
Figure 12 Principal Theoretical Approach Used 
 The hypothesis used within this thesis to launch the development of a theoretical framework 
stems from three broad theoretical approaches towards human behaviour. The first of these 
theories is drawn from Jeffrey Fagan and Tom R. Tyler’s work on 'Legitimacy and Cooperation', in 
which the authors try to determine why people in peaceful communities will often help their local 
police forces to fight crime within their neighbourhoods (2008). They argue that cooperation 
between communities and law enforcement personnel is motivated by social control and 
institutional legitimacy, that “people's actions are governed by their self-interest either in the form 
of sanctions or incentives” (p. 233) and that, where such examples of social control fail, people often 
continue to obey the law if they perceive the law and its bodies of enforcement to be legitimate. 
Such perceptions of legitimacy are a logical consequence of laws that are in line with local customs, 
morals and social norms, but are strengthened significantly by law enforcement and judicial systems 
that appear to be procedurally fair so that perceived legitimacy becomes: 
a feeling of obligation to obey the law and to defer to decisions made by legal 
authorities. Legitimacy, therefore, reflects an important social value, distinct from self-
interest, to which social authorities can appeal to gain public deference and cooperation 
(p. 235).  
In other words, people obey the law in most situations because they do not object strongly to the 
principles upon which the law is founded, do not disrespect the authority of their law-makers and 
have a certain degree of confidence in the ability of law enforcement services to identify and punish 
transgressors.  
 Looking to fragile state contexts, it is easy to see from the outset how this first body of 
theory would be appealing to analysts striving to understand the propensity for violent crime in 
Theoretical 
Approach 
Tom R. Tyler and Jeffrey Fagan's Theory 
of Legitimacy and Cooperation 
Albert Bandura's Theory of 
Social Learning 
Karl E. Bauman et al's Theories on the 
Impact of Violence on Social Learning 
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countries suffering from weak state capacity and institutional legitimacy. After all, this argument 
dictates that societal feelings of obligation to obey the law will suffer if governments, law makers 
and their associated bodies of law enforcement are not: generally perceived to be legitimate; seen 
to act in a way that is procedurally fair; or believed to have the capacity to detect and punish 
offenders adequately. Where this theory begins to show its limitations is in those cases where it is 
applied to countries with strong alternative forms of communal self-regulation, brought about, for 
instance, through tribal or religious structures.  
 In Yemen, tribal affiliations vary quite substantially within different parts of the country so 
that it is difficult to assess their national legitimacy38. They differ significantly in the degree to which 
they are successful in both discouraging and encouraging local levels of violent offending among 
children and young people. The reliance of tribal leaders in Yemen upon informal methods of conflict 
mediation and dispute resolution would seem to indicate that they are committed to operating as a 
law-enforcement service, dedicated to preserving local community values in some cases, and 
authoritarian structures in others39. Either way, this has positioned tribes within the law-making and 
law-enforcing tapestry of Yemeni society, so that their authority and legitimacy should form an 
influential force in the behaviour of young people, particularly under a legitimacy and cooperation-
based model of analysis. There is a question of whether or not this framework is sufficiently flexible 
to be applied to a de-legitimised state with semi-legitimate systems of alternative social control40.  
 The second theoretical dimension upon which the hypothesis is founded is based upon 
Albert Bandura's social learning theory (or social cognitive theory) (1977), which states that children 
learn about social interaction through their observation of others. This process is particularly 
important in infants and very young children, but plays a significant role in the development of 
young people during the key formative years41. Here, young people begin to fall into set patterns of 
behaviour and social interaction, which are heavily influenced by their communities and peers but 
also, according to David Howitt's theory of elite social constructionism (1992), by authority figures 
and prominent institutions, particularly with regard to social conceptions of crime. Bandura and 
Howitt's works are used today to explain “minor forms of juvenile offending and substance abuse” 
(Stephen W. Verill, 2008, p. 2) because they speculate that the perceived norms of behaviour of 
others will alter the way in which people act, with an especially telling influence upon the behaviour 
and development of children and young people. Michael D. Berzonsky writes that social learning will 
dictate biases and influence reasoning about moral situations and dilemmas (2002). In practice, 
these theories imply that positive networks of socialisation developed in schools and in after-school 
programmes, for instance, can prove effective in breaking patterns of harmful behaviour among 
teenagers, while association with delinquent peers and other negative influences may conversely 
help to reinforce such patterns. 
 While social learning theory has become a staple of development psychology and 
undoubtedly contains many hidden lessons for analysts of fragile states, the fact that it has 
predominantly been applied to individuals living in the Western world has meant that any 
assumptions made as to corresponding linkages with Yemen, for instance, remain untested. In 
                                                          
38
 See Chapter 5. 
39
 Yemeni tribalism is described in relation to processes of self-administration in Chapter 5, section 5.3.  
40
 This question will be revisited in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
41
 Key formative years occur when children pass into the 10 to 12, 13 to 14 or 15 to 17 age groups especially. 
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particular, while it might be fairly clear that conflict, displacement, and an absence of socialising 
activities brought about by a lack of schooling and employment opportunities could negatively 
impact the social development of children, it is not at all obvious how integration within strong tribal 
structures or exposure to strict Islamic values would affect the propensity for young people to 
display enhanced or diminished behavioural aggression.  
 Although much work has been done lately on the role of Islam in youth radicalisation  and 
gender-based violence across the Middle East and North Africa, as well as in the wider world, this 
has largely focused upon extreme examples of youth recruitment into terrorist or insurgent groups42 
and upon feminist theory integration43, with little investigation into the impact of Islam upon every 
day so-called “mindless” violence. Interestingly, many of the lessons contained within the Holy 
Qur'an and other Islamic texts incorporate a strong abhorrence for social violence and other forms 
of criminal activity so that it has been found that crime is actually very heavily stigmatised within 
many Islamic countries. In interviews conducted as part of this thesis in 2011, while many protesters 
admitted to being the victims or witnesses of violence, only a select few admitted to the presence of 
looting in their country, while the majority asserted quite vehemently that “we have no crime in 
Yemen” despite then referring to high levels of institutional corruption (March, 2011). One 
prominent Yemeni activist, Husam al Sharjabi, also noted in interview that “considering the fact that 
there was no government, no police, and many many guns” in some geographic areas of the country 
in 2011, it is extremely surprising that, while instances of theft and other petty crime did increase 
during the Arab Spring, they did not increase substantially (Interview conducted March 20th, 2012). 
The shamefulness of criminal activity in this sense is an important theme when striving to 
understand processes of socialisation to behavioural standards and normative values in Yemen, as in 
many other Islamic fragile state contexts.  
 The third theory upon which the hypothesis is founded emerges from the works of multiple 
psychologists who have attempted to analyse the effect of violence upon the emotional 
development of young people. Much of this body of research documents exposure to violence when 
it impacts very early on in childhood, though its application to children and young people of all ages 
who are directly affected by conflict or social violence during such formative stages is obvious. Betsy 
McAlister Groves explains that exposure to violence during childhood results in two important 
changes for the child: that, firstly, it “changes the emotional landscape for children by distorting 
their emerging view of the world and their place in it”, and that, secondly, it alters “young children's 
understanding of events”, which is foremost “shaped by their cognitive development” (2002, p. 31). 
Of greater consequence to this thesis is the idea voiced by Karl E. Bauman et al that violence can 
have an impact on the social learning process, because “Social learning theory posits that aggression 
is learned by observing the behaviour of others and its positive consequences” (1999, p. 331). In 
other words, children and young people who observe the effect of violence on others or on 
themselves as a dominating force and method of social control, and who are not exposed to other 
more peaceful means of conflict resolution and mediation, are more likely to adopt aggressive 
modes of behaviour as they grow older.  
                                                          
42
 One example is Jonathan Githens-Mazer's work on 'The Blowback of Repression and the Dynamics of North 
African Radicalisation' (2009). 
43
 E.g. Suzanne Brenner's 'Private Moralities in the Public Sphere' (2011). 
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 David P. Farrington surmises that conduct disorder, aggression and delinquency are often 
“transmitted from parents to children” (2004, p. 640). In particular, he writes that child victimisation 
has a strong causal link to adolescent antisocial behaviour, and argues that: 
First, childhood victimization may have both immediate and long-lasting consequences 
(e.g., shaking may cause brain injury). Second, childhood victimization may cause bodily 
changes (e.g., desensitization to pain) that encourage later aggression.  Third, child 
abuse may lead to impulsive or dissociative coping styles that in turn lead to poor 
problem-solving skills or poor school performance. Fourth, victimization may cause 
changes in self-esteem or in social information-processing patterns that encourage later 
aggression. Fifth, child abuse may lead to changed family environments (e.g., being 
placed in foster care) that have deleterious effects. Sixth, juvenile justice practices may 
label victims, isolate them from prosocial peers, and encourage them to associate with 
delinquent peers. (p. 640-641) 
While Farrington is writing here specifically about peaceful contexts, where child abuse stems mainly 
from the home or the community and falls within the remits of the state to interfere, his arguments 
are easily extended to conflict-affected countries and fragile states where children and young people 
are affected by military and social violence, and where they are easily separated from their families 
by displacement, economic migration and numerous other trends.  
 If it is found that this theory holds true in fragile states, it could mean that violence and 
young offending are self-perpetuating cycles. This argument is supported by much of the literature 
on conflict and development, with Paul Collier et al, among other theorists44, arguing that many 
fragile states are in danger of falling into a “conflict trap”, where violence, once initiated, becomes 
very difficult to overcome (2003). A key issue for investigation here would be the extent to which 
violence is perceived by children and young people to be a natural phenomenon in Yemen and other 
fragile states, as well as the extent to which violence is glorified or idealised. This will form an 
important theme in Chapter 6, which will endeavour to determine the validity of all three theoretical 
branches that have informed the development of the hypothesis. 
 If they are found to be accurate when combined with characteristics of state fragility like 
poverty, underdevelopment, and widespread social and political violence, then these three 
theoretical outlooks will come together to form a disturbing picture of the situation in which young 
people must live their lives in conflict affected fragile states. Firstly, conflict emerges as a direct 
threat to state legitimacy. Groups of combatants challenge the authority of the government so that 
the population at large begins to question (often with good reason) the ability of the state to protect 
them from harm. Throughout such periods, law enforcement institutions are usually painted with 
the same brush as the authorities that they serve, often being used as tools of political control or 
even coercion rather than as units for social protection (John Casey, 2010, p. 63). Secondly, the 
reduced availability of educational facilities and employment opportunities within fragile states, 
coupled with displacement and the break-up of communities that accompanies conflict and natural 
disaster, leads to the obliteration of any positive networks of social interaction for young people that 
would otherwise have protected their cognitive development. Thirdly, prolonged exposure to 
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 Other notable writers who have discussed the idea that conflict is self-propagating include Robert Zoellick 
(2009) and Mary Kaldor (2000). The works of these theorists will be revisited in Chapter 6, sections 6.2 and 6.3. 
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violence or the constant threat of violence, as is common in fragile contexts, can lead to the build-up 
of significant emotional pressure that pushes young people into adopting anti-social modes of 
behaviour. Such behaviour is reinforced by the lessons taught to young people by their social 
experiences.  
 Combined, these three theoretical dimensions lead to the conclusion that pervasive 
violence, a breakdown of government legitimacy and an erosion of traditional norms of socialisation 
create favourable conditions for increased violent offending among young people within fragile 
states, as well as to the secondary conclusion that such problem behaviour will likely continue or 
mutate into political radicalisation if it is not interrupted by positive interventions. It is clear, even 
within this short overview of existing criminological theories, that any attempt to extract a unifying 
theory of crime causation at a nation-wide level in Yemen, let alone at a fragile-states based global 
level, will be severely hampered by a tendency for over-generalisation that could obstruct the 
interaction of these theories with the less observable nuances of the local setting. By focusing upon 
principles of legitimacy and authority, socio-economic phenomena and other universally 
recognisable dynamics that might be measured and analysed in multiple countries, these theories 
risk obscuring the cultural factor, whereby local community structures can be incredibly important 
for determining criminal behaviour. While these theories have heavily informed the theoretical 
approaches of this thesis they have also been subsidised by additional research and other bodies of 
literature, while the author has strived at all times to continue to question both their reliability and 
their applicability within Yemen. 
 
1.3.2 Supplementary Theoretical Approaches 
 While the hypothesis put forward by this thesis emerges from the triple-theory approach 
detailed above, other theoretical modes of analysis have played an important role. Additional 
theories relating to fragility, conflict causation and criminology are analysed in order to limit the 
biases of the overarching approach. In discussing these, the author will avoid references to criminal 
insanity along with other psychiatric disorders, and will adopt arguments that are more suited to the 
thin rational choice model of human behaviour. 
 
Figure 13 Integrated Theoretical Approach 
 Far from making the case that all criminal behaviour is rational, this thesis strives to analyse 
behaviour in terms of opportunity; the availability of resources; necessity; and social values. 
Individual actors are as self-interested agents who make cost-benefit decisions every day that 
dictate the way in which they interact with one another, even within a “mindless violence” context. 
The extent to which trauma and stress impact their ability to make such decisions effectively is a 
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Fragile States 
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Theories of Crime 
and Social Control 
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crucial point that will deserve some analysis, with stress emerging as an important determinant for 
violence in fragile states45.  
 The rational choice approach provides a unifying method of analysing behaviour under 
multiple theoretical dimensions, allowing for a coherent analytical framework that does not jump 
significantly in its discourse on crime as it manoeuvres between different arguments and subject 
areas. This mode of analysis is used primarily to help the thesis to meet Stephen M. Walt's criterion 
that all social science must aim “to develop knowledge that is relevant to understanding important 
social problems” in a way that is above all “logically consistent”, but also “precise … original, and 
empirically valid” (1999). Logical consistency, as strengthened through a particular understanding of 
behaviour that analyses people as being self-interested, has been deemed an important basis of this 
thesis' theoretical approach because: “without logical consistency, neither the originality of a theory 
nor its empirical validity can be judged” (Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and James D. Morrow, 1999, p. 
45). 
 This approach fits well with the thin rational choice model, which assumes that all 
participants in the research and other agents are rational actors, “positing the individual as a 
strategic actor who makes choices according to rational criteria” (Geoff Cooper, 2001, p. 5). 
According to Daniel Little, under the rational choice theory: 
Individuals are assumed to have a set of interests against which they evaluate 
alternative courses of action; they assign costs and benefits to various possible choices 
and choose an action after surveying the pros and cons of each. (1991, p.41) 
By understanding the behaviour of children and young people according to this model, rather than 
according to a model that analyses them as purely opportunistic delinquents, it is easier to find entry 
points for intervention and to establish a productive dialogue with young offenders.  
 The obvious danger of using this model for the explanation of human behaviour is that 
rational choice theory involves a great deal of assumption to be made on the part of the author, 
including the assumption that an agent's choices can be predictable for outsiders that have sufficient 
access to data. However, the rational choice theory is not the sole theory utilised within this thesis 
and the author has attempted, wherever possible, to substantiate her arguments with empirical 
evidence. The merger of these different theoretical approaches has been used to limit assumptions 
and to provide an accurate portrayal of the situation faced by children and young people in Yemen. 
This methodology is not without its limitations and potential dangers, which the author has strived 
to limit through constant observation and self-evaluation. 
 
1.4 Literature Reviews and Desk-Based Research 
 Using Bob Hancké's guidelines for research design (2010), this thesis is built on a foundation 
of extensive theme-based literature reviews that are intended in Chapters 4 and 6 especially to 
engage with the principal theorists working in the fields of criminology and state fragility. Such 
reviews are based upon the theoretical framework outlined in this Chapter and are supported by the 
                                                          
45
 Stress will emerge as an important factor in violent young offending during the analysis that will take place 
in Chapter 6, sections 6.6 and 6.7. 
53 
 
author's theoretical approaches. Literature has been reviewed using qualitative methods, where an 
emphasis on discourse-based and historical analysis are encouraged alongside the in-depth 
investigation of only a single or a very small number of case studies (Ariande Vromen, 2010).  
 At the initial research stage, a comprehensive literature review was undertaken in order to 
document theories relating to the causes of crime and conflict, and the interaction between these 
two areas. It was found that few academic works intersected both criminological theory and the 
study of state fragility, and the author was determined to marry the two disciplines within her thesis. 
Upon further reading, it was found that the scope of such an undertaking was too wide for the 
confines of this project, and the research focus was narrowed to encompass one single case study 
with a more specific exploration of violent young offending – a form of offending that was deemed 
to be over-represented in fragile states. 
 
Figure 14 The Narrowing of The Research Focus Through Consecutive Literature Reviews 
 Once the case study and sample group had been selected, a second literature review was 
initiated in order to analyse and interpret theories of displacement; cognitive development; young 
offending; and, youth justice. At the same time, the author began to read extensively on the subject 
of Yemen, its history and development. Once field work was initiated, the author was able to gain 
access to a comprehensive array of unpublished project documents and reports written by 
international organisations, research institutions and government bodies in Yemen. This spurred a 
separate desk-based research phase, during which a qualitative research technique, adapted from 
Ariande Vromen's guide to qualitative methods, was used to categories project texts and documents 
on Yemen, and to analyse them according to their status as primary and secondary sources using an 
interpretive discourse-analysis method (2010).  
 According to this method, original documents that were produced “by political actors 
ranging from executive, parliamentary or judicial arms of government, policy-making agencies or 
non-government organisations” were considered primary sources that reflected the normative 
values, development priorities and financial interests of the authors (Vromen, 2010). Scholarly 
journal articles, on the other hand, were classed as secondary sources whose intended purpose was 
“unbiased” analysis (though these could be assessed according to their ability to achieve this goal). 
In accordance with Vromen's guide, which builds upon the work of John Scott (1990), the reliability 
of primary sources was assessed according to four criteria, which included: authenticity; credibility 
(accuracy); representativeness (assessed according to whether a document offered a “typical” 
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interpretation of an event); and, meaning (clarity and comprehensiveness) (2010, pp. 262-263) (See 
Table 3). 
Document Type Primary 
The authors are active 
participants in the events 
described 
Primary 
The authors are active 
participants in the events 
described 
Secondary 
The authors are not 
actively involved in the 
events described 
Example Document Republic of Yemen, 
National Environment 
Summary, 2010 
Food and Agriculture 
Organisation with the 
World Food Programme, 
FAO/WFP Crop and Food 
Security Assessment 
Mission to Yemen, 2009 
Gerhard Lichtenthäler, 
Political Economy and the 
Role of Water: 
Environment, Society and 
Economy in Northern 
Yemen, 2003 
Is it Authentic? Yes, this is an authentic 
report produced by the 
Government of Yemen 
Yes, this is an authentic 
report produced by the 
FAO and the WFP 
N/A 
Is it Accurate and 
Credible? 
Yes, the document 
provides an accurate 
account of environmental 
challenges, but over-
emphasises progress made 
through policy changes 
Yes Yes, though the account is 
out of date 
Does it Represent a 
“Typical” Interpretation 
of the Environmental 
Challenges in Yemen? 
Yes. Yes Yes 
Is it Clear and 
Comprehensive? 
Yes. Yes Yes 
 
Table 3 Source Evaluation Processes 
 After the completion of the field research stage, the author took some time to consolidate 
data gathered with the literature she had read, undertaking new investigations into specific theories 
or development programmes. A final literature review was carried out as the foundation of Chapter 
5, through which the author was able to carry out an in-depth examination of formal and informal 
justice systems in Yemen. 
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Figure 15 Systematic Literature Review and Desk-Based Research Phases 
 Throughout the lifetime of the three year project, the author has made substantial efforts to 
keep her thesis up to date with new occurrences documented within local and international media 
broadcasts. The need for such additional research was increased once the Arab Spring began in 
2011, as this brought with it a series of rapid changes and violent escalations within the Yemeni 
context that required some alteration of the overall research methodology. 
 
1.5 Data Sources 
 A number of different data sources have been used in the production of this thesis. For 
theoretical background research, the author has looked to academic journals and textbooks on state 
fragility, criminology, child development and political organisation, including governance and law 
enforcement. In addition, Yemen's history has been studied extensively through anthropological, 
historic and political accounts of the territory's evolution and the emergence of the contemporary 
country. By undertaking contractual research with the Post-war Reconstruction and Development 
Unit of the University of York, the author has further been able to gain access to a wealth of project 
documents provided by United Nations organisations as well as by the Yemeni Government, 
including monthly and annual Ministry reports. These have been complemented by independent 
assessments of the country's development status published by research institutes like the RAND 
Organisation and Chatham House.  
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 In terms of gathering the statistical data necessary to provide an account of Yemen's crime 
patterns, the author has had to rely heavily upon national statistics published by the Government of 
Yemen's Central Statistical Organisation. Primary data sources used for this purpose have included 
the Organisation’s Statistical Yearbooks of 2005 to 2010 and Security and Justice Statistics of 2003 to 
2009. In order to resolve issues of bias arising from an over-reliance upon Governmental data 
sources,  the author has striven wherever possible to verify trends emerging from Government 
reports with United Nations data, made available by Undata, as well as with trends identified by the 
Global Peace Index and the World Prison Population List. For a more impartial take on the reliability 
of Government data, the author has relied heavily upon Dennis Jay Kenney's report on Public 
Perceptions of the Police in Yemen, which deals with reporting and other issues that may have 
impacted the ability of the state to gather statistical data in the country.  
 Finally, all research has been complemented by stakeholder interviews with high-level 
Governmental representatives and representatives of the international community, as well as grass-
roots level interviews and surveys. These were used primarily to verify identified trends, rather than 
to gain new lines of investigation. 
 
1.5.1 Data Coverage 
 Statistical analyses of crime patterns are problematic by nature because crime itself is an 
activity that is designed to occur undetected. While it is obvious that law-breakers usually have a 
vested interest in ensuring that their actions remain unreported, victims of crime may also have an 
endless array of reasons not to bring the offences committed against them to the attention of 
official law enforcement services. To make matters more complicated, justice systems are not 
perfect, and those who are accused or even convicted of crime are not necessarily guilty, while those 
who are acquitted are not always innocent. Statistical records have no way of reflecting these 
ambiguities. Institutional corruption, both before and after a crime is reported, further obscures the 
reality hidden behind the numbers. It is fairly safe to assume that no country's statistical records, no 
matter how well kept, can be said to provide an accurate portrait of its criminal life. In Crime in 
England and Wales, Chris Kershaw et al emphasise that the British Crime Survey, a tool used by the 
British Home Office to canvass victims of crime across the United Kingdom, was never intended to 
“provide a total count of crime, but to provide robust trends in crime over time” (p. 7). Robust 
trends are the best for which researchers and practitioners in the field can hope.  
 Statistical records in Yemen are less reliable than those kept in England and Wales, with 
large areas of the country isolated from the state by conflict or natural disaster, and other rural 
settings lacking the infrastructure necessary to detect and process offences through official 
channels. Associated discrepancies in data trends are evident from the fact that certain governorates 
in Yemen, like Al-Jawf, have consistently shown a significantly lower rate of reporting than their 
neighbours46. While certain parts of Yemen, particularly in the capital where reporting is 
substantially higher than elsewhere, may be said to provide a more detailed survey area than Al-
Jawf; data availability in Yemen as a whole is relatively high when compared to other fragile states. 
                                                          
46
 As will be argued in Chapter 3, this likely denotes a failure on the part of the state to detect offences 
because Al Jawf is otherwise considered to be at heightened risk of exposure to criminogenic influences like 
the high availability of weapons and elevated levels of poverty. See section 3.4. 
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Although Government statistics may provide uneven coverage of crime rates in different 
governorates, they nonetheless provide a continuous and consistent portrait of each governorate 
individually over time, allowing for the extrapolation of country-wide and area-specific trends.  
 From 2003 to 2010, these statistics have been relatively comprehensive, allowing the author 
to gain a genuine glimpse of patterns of offending across the country. As of 2011, with the advent of 
the Arab Spring, the Government of Yemen has experienced a significant deterioration of its 
administrative capacities, limiting the reliability of official statistics. The author has therefore 
substituted for official data by running detailed online surveys and telephone interviews with 
Yemeni people demonstrating in favour of and against President Saleh's regime. These participants 
have been asked to comment on perceived changes in criminality that have emerged as a result of 
the protests. This data has been used to estimate changes in patterns of offending up to December 
2011, which was determined as the cut-off point for the admission of new information into this 
thesis (though some expert consultations continued to be carried out in 2012, in order to verify and 
validate existing findings).  
 While surveys and interviews offered an important way of maintaining access to wide 
portions of the country, as of August and September 2011 respondents tended increasingly to 
represent inhabitants of the Sana'a governorate. This change in data coverage probably occurred as 
massive power cuts throughout Yemen began to heavily disrupt access to online survey tools. It 
remained possible to identify important changes in patterns of offending after 2011 despite these 
restrictions, and these changes have been reflected in the analysis and arguments of this thesis. 
 
1.5.2 Reporting 
 The validity of the Central Statistical Organisation's records falls somewhat into question 
when rates of reporting are taken into account. Although Dennis Kenney has demonstrated that 
more than 64% of his 6,000 Yemeni interviewees across the country who have admitted to falling 
victim to crime also said that they reported the offence to the police, the author of this thesis has 
proven unable to reproduce his findings. Approximately 90% of the 61 Yemenis interviewed and 
surveyed asserted that they would not report an offence to the police if they fell victim to crime. 
Instead, interviewees claimed that they would seek assistance from hospitals if they were injured in 
the course of an offence, from community leaders, families, tribes or non-governmental 
organisations if they required assistance, and from lawyers if they required legal representation in 
securing reparations. When asked why they would not seek police assistance, those interviewed, 
including supporters of President Saleh's regime and protesters against it, claimed that law 
enforcement services would do nothing to help them, indicating a significant break in community-
police relations.  
 The discrepancy between these findings and Kenney's can be attributed to the Arab Spring. 
In this sense, Kenney's findings may still speak to the reliability of Government statistics gathered 
prior to 2008. In 2011, when the author endeavoured to reproduce his experiment, most law 
enforcement services had been redirected towards containing public demonstrations and many 
were accused of corruption and human rights abuses. It is not surprising that public confidence in 
law enforcement services should have diminished throughout this time. It should be noted that 
Dennis Kenney had access to a larger sampling group. Both surveys would indicate that there has 
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been a decrease in the reporting of offences in Yemen. This means that offending rates shown in 
Government statistics can be assumed to be an underestimation of the true rate. Certain types of 
offences remain generally under-reported in the country due to cultural and religious stigmatisation. 
In particular, sexual offences committed against men and women, as well as domestic abuses, are 
generally denied by victims before both law enforcement services and independent researchers in 
order to avoid shaming their families (Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations Population Fund, 14 
August, 2010). 
 
1.5.3 Data Limitations 
 While project reports and documents provide detailed and useful accounts of Yemen's 
development context, one of the principal limitations of Yemen's national statistics and the United 
Nation's data collection services is that they are disaggregated by year, rather than by month. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to correlate Yemeni patterns of offending against peaks in political 
unrest, conflict, poverty, unemployment, or other key indicators. Nevertheless, a triangulation of 
data findings through the use of multiple data sources has helped in the extraction of useful and 
telling trends. In particular, interviews conducted with Yemeni nationals throughout 2011 have 
assisted the author in finding anecdotal evidence connecting violent offending to a nationwide 
dissatisfaction with the current political order. Beyond this, background reading, elite stakeholder 
interviews conducted in 2010, and expert consultations run throughout 2011 and 2012 have allowed 
the author to gain an in-depth understanding of the Yemeni development context. 
 
1.6 Field Work 
 Yemen is a country with a fluctuating security situation, which offers researchers only 
limited windows of opportunity to carry out field work safely. The author of this thesis chose to 
undertake fieldwork in phases, first testing theories of crime causation in safer locations, such as 
England and Northern Ireland, before travelling to Yemen in 2010 to conduct a series of elite 
stakeholder interviews to gain a better understanding of the country's development context. In 
2011, before it was possible to conduct field research at the grass-roots level, the window of 
opportunity closed as the Arab Spring rendered the security situation in the country too unstable for 
independent travel. In particular, a dramatic increase in hostility against foreigners, and Western 
academics among them, was observed47. Throughout the year, airports in the country began to 
cancel international flights, while in August of 2011 Sana'a Airport was closed down entirely due to 
nearby Government clashes with Hashed tribesmen (Yemen Post, 2011). In light of these socio-
political changes, the author was only able to complete two probing field research phases, while 
more specialised research was undertaken at a distance through telephone interviews and online 
surveys48. Field work conducted both within the United Kingdom and in Yemen was developed in line 
with strict ethical guidelines. 
 
                                                          
47
 This will be detailed further in Chapter 2. See section 2.4 for a full overview of conflicts and political crises in 
Yemen.  
48
 See section 1.8 for a full account of distance research methods used. 
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1.6.1 Ethical Framework for Field Work Conducted 
 A wealth of ethical implications accompanies social research and particularly any research 
that seeks to document the experiences of children and young people, and conflict-affected 
communities because “Research with human participants is an intrusive process” (Geoff Lindsay, 
2000, p. 3). To minimise any potentially harmful consequences for all field research conducted, the 
author took care to operate within a set of strict ethical parameters, loosely adapted from the British 
Educational Research Association's (BERA) Revised Ethical Guidelines for Educational Research 
(2004), in order to manage the expectations of all participants. In particular, the author committed 
herself to conducting her studies according to the BERA principle of voluntary informed consent, 
which dictates:  
Researchers must take the steps necessary to ensure that all participants in the research 
understand the process in which they are to be engaged, including why their 
participation is necessary, how it will be used and how and to whom it will be reported. 
(p. 6) 
Such consent includes the absolute right of all participants to withdraw their consent at any time in 
the research process and for any reason, without the obligation to inform the author of such 
reasons. This principle of informed consent was merged within this thesis with the ideals developed 
and espoused by Lindsay in his overview of the European Federation of Professional Psychologists 
Association's codes of practice. These ideals are: 
 that researchers must at all times maintain respect for the rights and dignity of their 
participants; 
 that researchers “should be competent, know when to increase their competence by 
training, and when to seek the support of another skilled or knowledgeable researcher” (p. 
19); 
 that researchers should at all times “have regard to scientific professional responsibility, and 
have a sense of social responsibility” (p, 19); 
 and that researchers should conduct their studies with a sense of integrity. 
To protect young participants in particular, the author undertook to act in accordance with the BERA 
guideline that “in all actions concerning children, the best interests of the child must be the primary 
consideration”, while “children who are capable of forming their own views should be granted the 
right to express their views freely in all matters affecting them, commensurate with their age and 
maturity” (p. 7). These last two principles stem from the United Nations 1990 Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (articles 3 and 12). In the application of the field research methodology, these 
principles were taken to mean specifically that children and young people were not to be pushed 
into discussing their experiences of conflict, violence or trauma with the author, who had not at the 
time of interview received sufficient training to address such issues in a way that maintained and 
protected their psychological well-being. Questioning was designed specifically to avoid all 
foreseeable harm to participants. 
 
1.6.2 Training and Preparation, Including Research into Crime Causation 
 Prior to entry into the field, the author undertook specialised training and experimented 
with various data gathering techniques, in order to build competence and to act in as much of a 
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scientifically professional and socially responsible manner as possible. This training and preparation 
represented the first research stage and was used to test the reliability of crime causation theories 
in general and in conflict-affected countries more specifically. 
 The author had some previous experience of running interviews and surveys among refugee 
communities, law enforcement professionals, high ranking members of international organisations 
and government officials before undertaking this research project. This was gained by: running 
healthcare appraisals among Iraqi refugees in Jordan with the Post-War Reconstruction and 
Development Unit (2008); participating in the training of Iraqi, Jordanian and Russian law 
enforcement officials from all levels with the International Organisation for Migration (2009); 
interviewing high-level dignitaries at the first annual West Asia North Africa Forum on 
Reconstruction and Development (2009); and, participating in other similar field research exercises. 
Owing to the specific challenges of researching children and young people, as combined with the 
sensitivity of crime and young offending as a cultural issue across the world, the author opted to 
undertake additional specialised training with the York Youth Offending Team and spent the 2009 to 
2011 period volunteering part-time with the North Yorkshire Police and the Youth Offending Team in 
York, England, as an “appropriate adult”. This role involved ensuring the welfare of young people 
during police interviews. 
 Working with young people aged 10 to 17 in custody, the author was able not only to gain 
experience of talking with young offenders about their backgrounds and aspirations but also to 
establish a baseline of their responses against which to contrast the Yemeni development context, 
correlating violence in the home and economic deprivation with offender backgrounds. It was found 
that young offenders, and particularly violent young offenders, faced extreme difficulties in thinking 
about their futures, and that few had considered possible positive methods of contributing to 
society, such as gaining legal employment. Most had ceased attending school and retained virtually 
no contact with their parents. Many lived in Government facilities. In addition, very few of them 
were able to successfully take responsibility for their offences, exhibiting an inherent disconnection 
between their decisions to take action and their ability to anticipate the consequences of those 
actions. Invariably, their actions were always seen to be the product of someone else's behaviour or 
someone else's mistakes (thus, in one instance, a child had struck a social worker because the latter 
had told him to go back to his room, while, in another, a young offender had assaulted a police 
officer because they had grabbed his wrist too tightly).  
 This process of working with young offenders (during which a little under 50 young 
offenders were interviewed) was deemed sufficient for testing theories of violent crime causation. It 
was not sufficient for establishing a causal link between young offending and development or 
conflict, though some economic-based observations were inevitable when virtually all offenders 
came from relatively impoverished backgrounds. The author therefore also determined that it was 
necessary to test basic assumptions about young offending within conflict-affected environments 
safely, before travelling to Yemen. The author was able to test and refine her survey techniques 
thanks to the cooperation of Hydebank Wood, a young offender's centre and prison in South Belfast, 
where 56 inmates participated in surveys in February 2010. Their identities were strictly protected, 
though their key demographics were recorded, including their ages and genders. They were asked to 
state whether they had felt safe in their neighbourhoods prior to being incarcerated, as well as 
whether they had felt safe in their homes. They were also encouraged to state the nature of their 
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offences. It was found, overall, that those who had committed the most violent offences, including 
grievous bodily harm, manslaughter, and in one case murder, had felt intimidated either within their 
homes or within their communities, indicating a positive correlation between broad social violence 
and the tendency towards violent offending. Those who had committed so-called “petty” crimes 
tended to have felt relatively safer. 
 It was hoped that these experiences of working with young offenders, coupled with the 
experience of working in other Middle Eastern contexts, would provide the author with the skills and 
sensitivity necessary to conduct her field work, while providing an effective means of testing the 
reliability of accepted criminological theories. 
 
1.6.3 Yemen Field Work 
 The author was able to travel to Yemen through the invitation of her primary supervisor, 
Professor Sultan Barakat, to perform a rapid appraisal of the Yemeni context, or a Common Country 
Assessment (CCA), as part of a research team. This allowed her to implement an exploratory field 
research stage in order to build a holistic understanding of the country's development status. The 
research was conducted in Yemen by Alexandra Lewis and three senior research staff members from 
the Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU) including: Professor Sultan Barakat; Dr 
David Connolly; and, Dr Sean Deely. Mr. Sam Milton, a doctoral candidate at the PRDU, provided 
research support throughout this time from his post at the University of York in England. The CCA, 
written by these members of the PRDU, represented an investigation commissioned by the United 
Nations Development Project as part of the United Nations Yemen Country Team in June 2010. 
Participation in this project offered the author the opportunity to sit in on and contribute to 
interviews with high-level Government and non-governmental representatives, integrating her own 
doctoral questions within these, with the permission of her supervisor and the interviewees.  
 Perhaps most importantly, the author was able to secure an interview with the Yemeni 
Minister of Justice for 2010, Ismail Ahmad al-Wazir, and his cabinet, including his Deputy Ministers 
and heads of Juvenile Justice. The author was able to take the lead in these interviews, and to gain 
access to Ministry of Justice data and internal documents, as well as to establish a line of 
communication with Ministry of Justice Liaisons from the United Nations Development Project. 
Interviews conducted at the Ministry of Justice centred upon their judicial reform programmes, their 
priorities for development, their capacities (including their geographic service delivery capacities), 
their integration with alternative dispute resolution processes, and ground-level perceptions and 
utilisation of state justice processes. These interviews were extremely detailed and comprehensive, 
representing approximately two hours of direct interaction (with Minister al-Wazir leaving the room 
roughly an hour into the interviews due to other engagements), succeeded by follow-up questions 
and communications by e-mail.  
 Equally informative were meetings held at the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of 
Education, though these were led by Dr Sean Deely and Dr David Connolly respectively. Here, 
findings relating to corruption and youth integration within employment and education sectors were 
very informative, and have been referenced extensively with regard to their relation to established 
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criminological theories throughout this thesis49. The validity of these findings was verified through 
parallel interviews with country directors of the UN International Children's Emergency Fund, the UN 
Development Project, the International Organisation for Migration and the International Labour 
Organisation, among others (see Table 4). While the author did not individually interview each of 
these, her thesis-related questions were integrated into interviews wherever relevant, and the 
author had access to all interview transcripts. 
 The wide range of stakeholders interviewed is indicative of the broad research and analytical 
parameters of the CCA project that the PRDU was commissioned to write, which represented the 
implementation of a standard analytical tool of the UN system. The purpose of the CCA model is to 
document and evaluate a country's development progress from a human rights based approach and 
over a five year period (in this case, 2005-2010). It measures the extent to which a country has 
moved towards the international goals enshrined within the Millennium Declaration of 2000 and 
outlines the corresponding steps taken by local governments to meet national priorities within the 
given time frame. The broad nature of the CCA framework allowed the author to participate within a 
multi-sectoral analysis of Yemen that enabled her to study its politics, economy, infrastructure, 
business markets, education levels, health systems and resources, along with many other indicators 
that form a major influence on the country's young people today. 
Stakeholder 
Type 
Consulted Stakeholders Consultation 
Date 
International 
Government 
Organisations 
Unite Nations Resident Coordinator*; United Nations Country Team*; United 
Nations Development Project*; United Nations Population Fund*; World Food 
Programme*; Food and Agriculture Organisation* 
14 August, 
2010 
United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund*; World Health 
Organisation; International Fund for Agricultural Development*; International 
Labour Organisation*; Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
15 August, 
2010 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; International Organisation for 
Migration*; World Bank 
16 August, 
2010 
Yemeni 
Government 
Ministries 
Ministry of Health and Population; Ministry of Human Rights; Ministry of Planning 
and International Cooperation 
15 August, 
2010 
Ministry of Fish Wealth; Ministry of Social and Labour Affairs*; Ministry of State 
for Parliamentary and Shura Affairs; Ministry for Strategic Planning; Social Fund 
for Development; Supervising Committee for Relieving IDPs, Operational Unit for 
IDPs Camps 
16 August, 
2010 
Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation; Women's National Committee; Ministry of 
Water and Environment; Ministry of Education*; Ministry of Justice*; Ministry of 
Local Administration 
17 August, 
2010 
International 
Donors 
United States Agency for International Development; European Union Delegation 17 August, 
2010 
United Kingdom Department for International Development 18 August, 
2010 
Table 4 Stakeholders Consulted in Sana'a, Yemen, During the Field Research Stage
50
 
                                                          
49
 The findings of these meetings have been integrated into Chapters 2, 3, 5 and 8. 
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 Starred stakeholders denote interviews in which the author was either present or took the lead. 
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 The CCA research process offered opportunities to gain access to a wide range of elite 
stakeholders who not only represented members of the Yemeni state, but also included the heads of 
international government organisations and foreign donors. Each stakeholder was consulted within 
a semi-structured in-depth interview format, the aim of which was to extract their understandings of 
the development context in Yemen and to capture their priorities for the future. Their interviews 
were used to determine the reliability of available literature on state fragility in Yemen, and to 
identify trends in recent socio-political and economic development. In other words, the purpose of 
each interview at this stage followed Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman's guidelines for 
Designing Qualitative Research, which require the exploration of “a few general topics to help 
uncover how the participant[s] fram[e] and structur[e their] responses” (2006, p. 101).  
 Marshall and Rossman argue that the appropriate use of in-depth interview techniques 
allows the “participant's perspective on the phenomenon of interest” to “unfold as the participant 
views it (the emic perspective), not as the author views it (the etic perspective)” (p. 105). Certainly, 
this tool proved very useful in the interview of elite stakeholders in Yemen, who are “considered to 
be influential, prominent and/ or well-informed” members of their organisations or communities 
that were “selected [for interview] on the basis of their expertise in areas relevant to the research” 
(Marshall and Rossman, 2006, p. 105). In particular, interviewees offered an insight into the 
structures and operations of influential organisations working to fulfil set agendas in Yemen and 
allowed the author to get a better grasp of the challenges barring progress away from Yemen's state 
of fragility, as well as to identify opportunities for change.  
 The nature of the elite stakeholders consulted was such that they often represented 
multiple parties, both local and international, working in the same sectors of development. This 
allowed the author and the research team to triangulate their findings prior to drawing decisive 
conclusions from them. Finally, because the CCA is meant to stem from a collaborative research 
process, the author, as part of the research team, was able to present important findings back to the 
stakeholders, and particularly to the United Nations Country Team, for further comment in order to 
test various interpretations of the available data. This allowed stakeholders to maintain their active 
participation in the research process and to draw attention to any gaps or areas of concern within 
the final CCA document. The resulting network of communication that the research project 
produced allowed the author not only to gain access to governmental and non-governmental 
documents, project reports and unpublished data, but also to establish the important connections 
that would facilitate distance research after the advent of the Arab Spring. Unfortunately, having 
been part of a team contracted by the UN in this project, the author was not necessarily viewed as 
an impartial party by all stakeholders. However, without the facilitation of the UN Country Team in 
this and other research areas, it would not have been possible for the author to gain the same 
degree of access to participants and their opinions. 
 As part of the research conducted by the PRDU, it was found that an inherent disconnection 
existed between UN and Government of Yemen development priorities, which triggered a conflict of 
competing narratives whereby participants often held contradictory interpretations of the same 
social phenomena, calling their arguments into question. Emerging issues of particular relevance 
were the preservation of Yemeni tribal customs, cultural practices and religious beliefs, as 
manipulated by the state to foster territorial control and legitimacy, versus the prioritisation of 
counter-terrorism and counter-Islamic radicalisation programming by large donors and the defence 
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of human rights by international organisations. These competing priorities no doubt contributed in 
some way to the social pressures that led to a nation-wide backlash against the Yemeni state in 
201151.  
One immediate unfortunate implication of the Arab Spring protests that followed in Yemen 
was that many statistical data findings gathered as a result of this field work became rapidly 
outdated by the completion of this thesis. However, it has been determined that the strategies and 
opinions of major stakeholders, particularly international stakeholders, have remained constant 
throughout this time, while security and justice initiatives launched by the Yemeni state prior to 
2011, especially as they concerned juvenile crime, have not been altered or withdrawn. This has 
been confirmed through the expert consultations detailed below. Therefore, the benefits of 
fieldwork conducted in 2010 have remained extremely relevant to the completion of this study. 
 
1.7 Expert Consultations 
 Throughout the completion of this thesis, the author verified the validity of her findings 
through expert consultations conducted in England in 2011 and 2012. Key organisations with strong 
research presences in Yemen were contacted, and interviews with experts on the Yemeni 
development context were requested with their staff members. Such interviews were successfully 
arranged with Chatham House, the Department for International Development and Islamic Relief. 
Likewise, interviews were held with experts on urban violence and Middle Eastern security sector 
reform in order to help validate suggestions put forward in Chapters 7 and 8. Each of these 
interviews served a dual function, with data collection being their primary purpose, and networking 
being their secondary purpose. In other words, they served as conduits for establishing new contacts 
through a snow-balling effect, whereby interviews with one specialist would lead to contact details 
for additional interviewees and so on, with many of those interviewed being based in Yemen. The 
author also used specialist events, such as the 2012 Chatam House public presentation on Yemen: A 
Way Forward52, to gain access to additional people working in or researching Yemen.  
 Key experts interviewed as part of this research stage included: Nicholas Hopton, British 
Ambassador to Yemen; Kate Nevens, Middle East and North Africa Programme Manager for 
Chatham House; Danniel Shimmin, Yemen Governance Advisor for the Department for International 
Development; Kerrin Smith, North Yorkshire Police Officer and Security Sector Reform Consultant; 
Martin Baines, former Police Inspector and founding Director of Pacalis Associates and MDB 
Coaching Associates; Letta Taylor from the Human Rights Watch in Yemen; Erinma Bell, urban gun 
violence expert and founding member of Charisma, Manchester; Khaled Almulad, Country Director 
for Islamic Relief in Yemen; James Firebrace, Director of JFA Consulting; Husam al-Sharjabi of the 
Yemeni Civic Coalition of Revolutionary Youth; Rafat al Akhali of Resonate Yemen; Maysaa 
Shujaaldeen, a prominent Yemeni journalist; Nadwa al Dawsari of the Partners for Sustainable 
Leadership programme in Yemen; and, Atiaf Alwazir, a major Yemeni activist and author of the 
Woman in Yemen blog.  Upon the request of several participants, interview transcripts have not 
been included in this thesis. 
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 See Chapter 2, sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.4, as well as Chapter 7, section 7.4 to learn more about the impact of 
donorship on conflict in Yemen and the impact of aid on state legitimacy, respectively.  
52
 This was held in London on March 7, 2012. 
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 Depending on the identity and background of the participants, interviews generally followed 
one of two structures aimed at foreign experts and Yemeni nationals respectively. In both instances, 
the author's primary interest was youth violence, aggression and isolation. Some questions about 
the events of 2011 were also asked in order to help the author to keep up-to-date with political 
changes in Yemen. Either way, these were always linked back to youth participation and youth 
engagement, so as to entice the experts into talking about the situation of young people in Yemen. 
However, questions of youth engagement were always asked after questions relating to 
demographics, so that the author would not unintentionally lead the interviewees. 
Foreign expert consultations loosely followed the interview outlined below, with more 
person-specific questions integrated into this structure in order to reflect the knowledge and 
background of interviewees. 
 Foreign Expert Consultation Questions 
1 Could you start by telling me about your own background, your work and your organisation? 
2 What is your assessment of the current situation in Yemen? What would you say were the main causes 
of the instability we witnessed in 2011? 
3 How would you categorise the demographics of protesters who participated in the Arab Spring in 
Yemen? 
4 Why do you think the Arab Spring has proved to be so appealing to young people in Yemen? 
5 Do you believe that patterns of violence have changed in Yemen over the past five to ten years? If so, 
would you say that violence, including social and political violence, is increasing or decreasing? 
6 What do you think are the main forms of violence in Yemen? Is violence social, political, tribal, or 
discriminatory, for instance? 
7 Who would you say are the main perpetrators of violence in Yemen? 
8 Do you believe that the appointment of the new president will help to stem violence in 2012? 
9 How much of a relationship would you say that young people have with their Government in Yemen 
today? 
10 Do you think that under the new regime young people will be encouraged to play a bigger role in the 
political process? 
 
Table 5 Standardised Research Questions Used for Foreign Expert Consultations 
 Interviews conducted with Yemeni nationals were aimed at extracting more specific 
information about the overall behaviour of young people throughout this time, including their 
commitment to stated principles of non-violence. 
 Yemeni Expert Consultation Questions 
1 Could you start by telling me about your own background, your work and your organisation. 
2 What is your assessment of the current situation in Yemen? What would you say were the main causes 
of the instability we witnessed in 2011? 
3 How important would you say that social media and the internet were for facilitating the Arab Spring in 
Yemen? 
4 At what point did you become involved in the protests and why did you join them? 
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5 One of the stated themes of the 2011 protests was change through non-violent reform. How effective do 
you think protest organisers were in sticking to this goal? 
6 What methods did protest organisers use to keep violence low? 
7 How difficult was it for you to keep those around you/ members of your movement from resorting to 
violence? 
8 What methods were used by protest organisers to keep protesters safe from harm? 
9 Were there instances of skirmishes or physical confrontations between demonstrators? 
10 What was the overall demographic make-up of those demonstrators who tended to resort to violent 
forms of expression? 
11 How safe were protesters from petty crime? How serious was crime as a problem during this time? 
12 Who did protesters turn to when they fell victim to violence or crime? 
13 Who were the main perpetrators of violence in 2011? 
14 What do you think is needed in the country now to keep violence from re-emerging in 2012? 
 
Table 6 Standardised Research Questions Used for Yemeni Expert Consultations 
 General questions relating to the tools used by protest organisers were asked, in order to 
attempt to extract lessons on youth engagement for Chapters 7 and 8, as well as to test the 
penetration of social media in Yemeni society so as to better inform the methodological design of 
this thesis.  
 Interviews with experts on security sector reform and urban violence were less rigidly 
structured and centred more on clusters of subject areas and the conversations that they generated. 
Much like the stakeholder interviews carried out at the Yemeni field research stage, these 
consultations were substantially longer than other expert consultations, lasting between an hour 
and an hour and thirty minutes. 
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Figure 16 Security Sector Reform and Urban Violence Expert Consultation Question Clusters 
 The biggest surprise for the author came from interviews with Yemeni experts and activists, 
in which participants were extremely candid about the difficulties that they had experienced in 
trying to keep demonstrators peaceful. Husam Al-Sharjabi, the head of one of the largest youth 
movements in Yemen, for instance, openly referred to the challenges of keeping demonstrators 
from “provoking” security forces and inciting violence, where “kids and teenagers” proved the 
hardest to control in this regard. He stated that this challenge was so difficult that it forced the Civil 
Coalition for Revolutionary Youth and other like-minded organisations to institute training 
programmes aimed at teaching demonstrators to communicate with Yemeni security forces in a 
respectful manner so as to minimise the risk to their own lives (Interview conducted March 20th, 
2012).53  
 
1.8 Distance Research 
 In 2011, it became apparent that the security situation in Yemen was spiralling out of control 
and that the window of opportunity for independent travel and field research had largely closed. 
From February of that year onwards, Yemen grew steadily more unstable, with large-scale 
demonstrations, armed violence, brutal and almost daily reprisals against pro-change protesters, 
and an escalating threat of terrorist activity, rendered all the more threatening by a resurgence of Al 
Qaeda in the South of the country, seemingly unaffected by the death of Osama bin Laden earlier 
that same year. As of late February and early March, Western Governments, of which the United 
States and Italy proved the most vocal, began to evacuate their citizens from the country, while in 
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 Other findings from these interviews are integrated within Chapters 5 and 6. 
What are the main 
causes of urban and 
rural violence in 
conflict-affected fragile 
states 
Who are the main 
perpetrators of 
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How would you like 
to see policies in 
security sector 
reform changed in 
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specialisation? 
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late June Yemen officially became one of only four countries54 to which the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) advised against all travel.  
 In July, the FCO issued a statement that if those British nationals remaining in Yemen failed 
to leave the country immediately by commercial means, it would be “extremely unlikely” that the 
British Government would be able to evacuate them, or even to provide them with access to 
consular assistance (2011). It became clear at this stage that additional fieldwork would be infeasible 
within the allotted time-scale for this research project, as a stabilisation of the security situation in 
the near future was exceedingly unlikely. While these dynamics were steadily unfolding, it also 
became apparent that field work was no longer the only medium through which it was possible to 
interact with the Yemeni people at a grass-roots level. In this regard, the importance of social 
networking websites like Facebook and Twitter in shaping political events and mobilising young 
people was becoming readily observable. In addition, the anonymity offered by such internet-based 
methods of communication allowed for potential access to a wide range of Yemeni members of the 
public, while limiting the dangers for both the author and the respondents – who retained the 
option to protect their identities at all times. The research methodology was adapted to include 
elements of distance interview and surveying techniques, accompanied by their own ethical 
framework and considerations. 
 
1.7.1 Ethical Framework for Distance Research Conducted 
 As of 2011, not only did it become extremely dangerous for independent researchers to 
conduct field work in Yemen, but it also became more dangerous for potential Yemeni respondents 
to answer questions relating to politics and security as reprisals against those who openly criticised 
the regime were on the increase. From February, high ranking and high profile opposition leaders 
began to disappear in the country, some of them even taken from hospital beds, as noted by Sarah 
Leah Whitson of the Human Rights Watch (2011), while Yemenis began to report the arbitrary 
detention of family members with growing frequency, with many of those missing said to be under 
the age of 18. While the author strived to conduct distance research in accordance with the BERA 
guidelines as she had conducted her field work, a supplementary ethical framework was necessary in 
order to ensure that every precaution had been taken in order to protect respondents from any 
potential harm arising from their communications. These steps were drawn from the principles of 
anonymity and confidentiality, as outlined within Vikki Charles et al's paper on the subject (2006). 
 Seemingly quite similar, the principles of anonymity and confidentiality are fairly distinct 
from one another and hold various different implications and restrictions for both researchers and 
respondents. Anonymity is read as a method of protecting identities, while confidentiality is treated 
as a means of safeguarding privileged information. Both hold implications for data collection and 
distribution. Yet Charles et al argue that confidentiality is by far the more problematic framework for 
researchers to adopt, since “researchers have a duty to report on the findings of their research and 
they cannot do so if the data they collect is confidential (i.e. cannot be revealed)” (2006, p. 3).  
 Although key pieces of information collected during the field research stage were treated 
with confidentiality due to the contracting restrictions of working within the United Nations system, 
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these were not directly related to the central themes and issues of this thesis and did not pose 
significant ethical constraints to the author. Where distance research was concerned, confidentiality 
was used rather as a masking system, designed to restrict information that could lead to the 
detection or identification of respondents. Such information, collected in the telephone interview 
phase, included demographic details, respondent names and locations. In order to work in line with 
a confidentiality framework, such responses were averaged out to be used to chart trends in data, 
rather than as specific examples of individuals. This method allows for the reader to gain an 
understanding of the author's methodology and findings, without revealing information that may 
have placed respondents in danger. 
 While confidentiality was used as a general blanket system for protecting sensitive data 
throughout the distance research phase; as the intensity of public violence increased throughout the 
Arab Spring so rates of responses began to decrease, indicating a reluctance by participants to come 
forward in light of new security threats. This led to further alterations to the research methodology 
and its ethical framework, in order to provide respondents with additional guarantees of full 
anonymity.  
 The distance research phase was divided into two parts, and after May 2011 information 
about Yemeni nationals and their perceptions of crime and insecurity was gathered solely through 
completely anonymous online surveys. This new data analysis tool offered respondents the ultimate 
guarantee that the author would not reveal their identities to third parties, as the author chose not 
to collect such revealing data. This ethical framework allowed for this thesis to respond to a complex 
and rapidly changing political reality in Yemen, without compromising opportunities for continuing 
data collection. Meanwhile, any information on named respondents was secured in an encrypted 
database. 
 
1.7.2 Telephone Interviews and Online Surveys 
 In their study of MySpace.com – one of the first online social networking websites to move 
into popular usage by young people interested in forming internet-based communities on a global 
scale – Carpenter et al write that: “The internet has enabled social interactions to go beyond the 
traditional venues of one's community, work and home settings. The internet has created new 
societies based upon niche interests such as auctions, literature and hobbies” (2006, p. 1). While this 
statement very much holds the origins of online social networking as we understand it today, it does 
not take into consideration the fact that the internet has now taken “traditional venues” of social 
interaction, like community, work and home settings, and has translated those relationships into 
digital ties developed through websites like Facebook and Twitter, which fuse real world and online 
networking groups together. Thus, as Sonia Livingstone writes:  
In terms of their affordances, social networking sites enable communication among 
ever-widening circles of contacts, inviting convergence among the hitherto separate 
activities of e-mail, messaging, website creation, diaries, photo albums and music or 
video uploading and downloading (2008, p. 394).  
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Beyond this, social networking sites have provided new points of contact in the sharing of ideas and 
beliefs for the purposes of developing friendships, business relations and increasing one's 
international fame.  
 The usefulness of social networking sites for stimulating communication at a local, national, 
regional and international level is self-evident. While these tools have always arguably held a 
phenomenal potential for social mobilisation, it is now, through the Arab Spring, that the Internet's 
power and influence – even over countries with sporadic access to electricity and connectivity – has 
become genuinely apparent (though the use of social networking sites in shaping and spurring 
revolutions is not unprecedented).  
 The Dubai School of Government note in their annual Arab Social Media Report that social 
networking sites have begun increasingly to “merg[e] online and offline identities” across the Middle 
East and North Africa regions and that internet-based communication has played a pivotal role in 
shaping the Arab Spring (2011). The emphasis of these sites on user-created content, rather than on 
news media or state-controlled information distribution, has played a pivotal role in generating their 
popularity. This is because people in countries like Yemen began steadily to lose confidence in 
information provided by governments as well as opposition parties, with one bystander reporting: 
“'We hear the sounds of fighting on a regular basis but we never know what is actually going on 
because the power is always off … Even if the power is on we cannot trust the information we get 
from television, all the news channels have their own agenda.'” (Shatha al-Harazi, 2011). In short, 
the confidence of the people in more traditional forms of social media became substituted by a 
stronger reliance on online content generated through social networking sites.  
 Though multiple tools for online networking exist today, including Friendster, Bebo, 
LiveJournal and others, those sites that have proven particularly dominant within the Middle East 
and North Africa according to the Arab Social Media Report are Facebook and Twitter, with Husam 
Al-Sharjabi, head of the Civil Coalition for Revolutionary Youth, highlighting in interview that “if you 
want to reach the young people of Yemen today, you do it through Facebook, even if they are 
outside of Sana'a. Yemeni youth have become very internet savvy” (interview conducted March 
20th, 2012). Twitter and Facebook have been used to keep local communities informed of news 
about public demonstrations, government crackdowns and violent hotspots; they have been used by 
those affected by demonstrations to vent their frustrations over political stalemates or disruptions 
to daily life; and they have been used by organisers of public protests to mobilise support and 
organise participants. YouTube has also proven to be an important tool in this regard. These services 
have been so heavily incorporated into the tapestry of current events that manifestations of the 
Arab Spring across the region have variously been termed as “Facebook” and “Twitter Revolutions”. 
It is for these reasons that social networking sites were identified as a massive store-hold of valuable 
data for the analysis of social changes in the criminal and security situation in Yemen since the 
advent of the Arab Spring, through which Yemenis at the grass-roots level proved more readily 
accessible than through fieldwork, particularly when an Arabic to English translator was used.  
 While Albrecht Hofheinz notes that, in 2007, only 10 of every 100 people in Yemen had 
regular internet access, 35.5 of every 100 were said to have access to mobile phones. It has been 
estimated that the use of communication technologies has since increased in the country, while 
connections between internet and mobile phone communication have expanded considerably, with 
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many internet users updating their circles of contacts about current events through mobile phone 
networks. By December 2011, internet usage had increased to 2,609,698 access points, many of 
which included internet cafés55 that allowed for multiple users to log onto the internet from a single 
access point (Internet World Stats, 2012). In telephone interviews conducted in 2012, both Husam al 
Sharjabi and Atiaf Alwazir highlighted the importance of these internet cafés and their high 
popularity during the Arab Spring. These cafés were considered to be so important that they were 
often supplied with independent generators and satellites by protesters in order to get around state 
triggered black-outs.  
 Social Bakers wrote in 2012 that 436,080 Facebook user accounts were registered in Yemen, 
representing an increase of 188,160 accounts (or 36.99%) over a six month period and placing 
Yemen at 103 of 213 countries with Facebook access. This figure did not include those users who 
had kept their geographic locations confidential. Atiaf Alwazir noted that throughout this time, 
secret Facebook groups and hidden events pages were often used to plan protests or to increase 
participation at demonstrations, while Yemenis tended to use Twitter – due to its more public 
nature – to communicate with foreign members of the media and to spread news and information 
about Yemen to the outside world.  
 Alex Comninos writes that, while internet-based research conducted across the region 
during the Arab Spring has been limited by the fact that emerging sample groups are predominantly 
representative of urbanised and literate people, user-generated content on Facebook and Twitter 
has nevertheless come “to represent popular demands”, so that there are “clearly demonstrated 
linkages between mobilising demonstrators by social media and the mobilisation  of demonstrators 
on the streets” (2011, p. 6). Thus, online and distance research has emerged as the preferred 
method for individuals and large research organisations for monitoring the Arab revolutions of 2011. 
In order to limit the influence of potential biases, distance research was not relied upon to extract 
new information, but rather, was predominantly used to verify criminological trends previously 
identified through elite stakeholder interviews, field work and statistical data, as well as to map 
changes in the criminal make-up of Yemen after the beginning of significant political unrest.  
 Distance research methods were used to reach a total of 61 Yemeni respondents. From 
February 2011 onwards, the author joined various Yemen-based interest groups  through Facebook 
and Twitter, and distributed a request for telephone interviews in English.  Participants were asked 
to anonymously message the author a contact number and to provide the author with a convenient 
contact time. The conduit of telephone interviews offered three important and immediate benefits: 
1. they allowed the author to talk directly to interviewees and to utilise a broad and adaptive 
research technique;  
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 Although it is not now possible to uncover the exact number of internet cafés in the country due to the high 
prevalence of tax evasion among small businesses in Yemen, as far back as 2003 Mohammed Goath wrote of 
the increased prevalence of such facilities and its important impact upon Yemeni social lives. He described the 
popularity of internet cafés at this time as “spreading through the streets of the main cities like fire in hay”. In 
interviews with internet café owners, he was able to link this phenomenon with the relatively “inexpensive” 
price of computers, and the “great appeal of the internet to youths, students and researchers” who “can't 
afford their own internet at home”. The spread of internet cafés is also evident in most tourism information 
websites, which describe them as being “all over the place” and costing between 1 and 2 Riyals per minute 
(Talibiddeen Jr, 2009). 
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2. they allowed the author to extract detailed information about people, places and events in 
Yemen; and  
3. they allowed the author to verify the identity of interviewees by checking that all dialled 
phone numbers were located in Yemen.  
These calls for participants in telephone interviews were, of course, on occasion met with intense 
hostility, suspicion and accusations of governmental espionage. Overall respondents proved fairly 
cooperative and most gave their names though they were not asked to do so. 
 
Figure 17 Distance Research Respondent Ages 
 This process yielded 21 telephone interviews ranging from 25 to 40 minutes in length, 
depending upon the willingness of respondents to engage with various questions. Some also 
provided telephone contact details for their English-speaking friends, resulting in an additional 7 
interviews. Respondents lived in multiple governorates, were aged mainly between 18 and 27 years, 
and were equally divided between pro-government and pro-change protesters, and people who did 
not take part in the demonstrations. At later stages of distance research, respondents between the 
ages of 28 and 35 also began to participate, though the majority were still comprised of younger 
people. This age distribution roughly reflected the overall Yemen Facebook usage statistics, as 
captured by Social Bakers, according to which 45% of users are aged between 18 and 24, and 28% 
are aged between 25 and 34 (2012). 
 At later stages in these initial telephone interviews, the author contacted the Network of 
Yemeni Scholars, an independent social networking site, and was able to secure an additional 9 
telephone interviews in Yemen. Participants in telephone interviews were kept engaged through a 
discussion of the Arab Spring, during which they were directed to answer a series of questions 
relating to their perceptions of crime, safety, and law enforcement services and their roles in 2011. 
These interviews began as informal and loosely structured, and were then refined and perfected. In 
all cases, a set of standardised questions was included in order to generate findings that were easily 
comparable to one another. The interview questions were shortened and simplified over time, after 
which the author contracted and trained a native Arabic speaker to redistribute the same request 
for interviews across Arabic-language groups on Facebook and Twitter. The translator had already 
undertaken training on interview techniques as part of her graduate-level studies at the Post-war 
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Reconstruction and Development Unit, and received strict additional guidance from the author. She 
proceeded to conduct telephone interviews in Arabic on behalf of the author, translating the 
interview transcripts back into English. In doing so, she completed 11 telephone interviews in April 
2011.  
 Calls for interviews in Arabic proved remarkably unsuccessful, with the translator reporting 
similar outbursts of aggression, with some Facebook members accusing her of being a Mujahideen – 
a Muslim worshipper who has strayed away from the path of God. It was clear that interview 
responses significantly petered out by May 2011, indicating a growing reluctance to engage with 
foreign researchers. At the same time, while only 11 people came forward to take part in the Arabic 
telephone interviews, over 50 'liked' the call for interviews on Facebook, indicating a positive 
reaction from the majority of Yemeni account holders. Many potential respondents wrote in stating 
that, while they were unwilling to provide their telephone contact details, they would answer any 
relevant questions by e-mail. Through this written process, an additional set of 5 responses was 
obtained. Here, the immediate danger emerged that without verifying the dialling codes of 
respondents, it became more difficult to ensure that respondents were currently situated within 
Yemen. However, the geographically-specific nature of their responses, as well as their detailed 
awareness of localised political events and activities of Government forces prior to the emergence of 
media reports (with many discussing issues of state attacks on protesters or night-raids that they 
had witnessed) meant that it was extremely unlikely that any were not being honest about their 
situations or identities.  
 It became apparent that the primary issue generating a reluctance to participate in the 
research process was a fear of being identified. The author deemed it necessary to digitise her 
interview questions and transform them into an online survey, available on kwiksurvey.com, which 
could be completed entirely anonymously. This survey was provided both in English and Arabic, and 
included a link to the author's University profile page in order to help dissuade any potential 
concerns about the purposes of the questionnaire. It was based upon a set of standardised 
questions that had been previously incorporated into all telephone interviews and sent out to 
respondents to complete by e-mail. In keeping with the research method, these questions were left 
fairly broad, giving participants the opportunity to expand upon questions and to provide additional 
information. The emphasis here was placed upon allowing participants to assess in their own words 
the security-based changes that had occurred in Yemen as a result of the Arab Spring. 
 
 
 Survey Question 
1 Please state your occupation, whether you are employed or unemployed, and whether you are in full-
time education 
2 Please state your age  
3 Please state your gender  
4 Please state your marital status and whether you have any children.  
5 Which area of Yemen do you live in?  
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6 Do you currently participate in public demonstrations? If yes, are you a pro-government or pro-change 
protester?  
7 Why do you choose to participate or not to participate in public demonstrations? 
8 How have the protests affected your daily life?  
9 Has your work or education been disrupted by the protests? If so, how?  
10 Do you feel as though your safety has been in any way affected by the protests? Have you noticed an 
increase in looting or violent crime in 2011?  
11 Has there been a strong military/police presence on the streets throughout this time?  
12 If you were to fall victim to a crime, who would you go to for help?  
13 Would you ask police services for assistance if you were to fall victim to crime?  
14 What do you believe the future holds for Yemen? 
 
Table 7 Standardised Research Questions Used in Distance Research 
 Within its first launch week, the online survey generated an extra 9 responses, though 
interest dropped substantially thereafter, so that only another 5 respondents completed the survey 
in the weeks that followed. Here, due to the fact that many of those surveyed relied upon very brief 
responses in the survey's open questions, it was less easy to guarantee the identity of respondents, 
so that 6 surveys had to be discounted due to the fact that those who answered them may not have 
been Yemeni nationals or current residents of Yemen.  
 The table below illustrates examples of surveys that were discredited, versus surveys that 
were added to overall data collected. 
Survey Question Included Results Excluded Results 
Please state your occupation, whether you are 
employed or unemployed, and whether you are in 
full-time education 
Student Private buisness owner 
Please state your age  19 25 
Please state your gender  Female Male 
Please state your marital status and whether you 
have any children.  
Single Married with 2 children 
Which area of Yemen do you live in?  Sana'a Ta'ez 
Do you currently participate in public 
demonstrations? If yes, are you a pro-government 
or pro-change protester?  
Pro-government protester I am with the revolution 
Why do you choose to participate or not to 
participate in public demonstrations? 
I joined the protests so that they 
could hear my voice 
I want a free Yemen 
How have the protests affected your daily life?  Protests have no influence, it is 
the strikes that have had the bad 
influence 
In Ta'ez there is no effect 
for protests 
Has your work or education been disrupted by the 
protests? If so, how?  
Yes. Strikes at the University of 
Sana'a have affected education 
Protests affect life a little 
but we are accepting it in 
hope for a better Yemen 
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Do you feel as though your safety has been in any 
way affected by the protests? Have you noticed an 
increase in looting or violent crime in 2011?  
Yes No 
Has there been a strong military/police presence 
on the streets throughout this time?  
Yes No 
If you were to fall victim to a crime, who would 
you go to for help?  
Police, the brave police I don't know 
Would you ask police services for assistance if 
you were to fall victim to crime?  
Yes No 
What do you believe the future holds for Yemen? If strikes continue especially in 
universities I don't think there 
will be a future for Yemen. 
I hope for a better future 
 
Table 8 Credited and Discredited Survey Data, Translated From Arabic 
 Also included above is an illustration of more comprehensive data collected through surveys, 
where certain key answers have been obscured in order to protect the identity of the respondents.  
 The distance research phase, when telephone, e-mail and survey data were totalled, 
produced 61 fairly reliable and rigorous accounts of 2011. While this did not represent a statistically 
relevant portion of the Yemeni population, it did provide substantial anecdotal trends, allowing the 
author to verify socio-political changes in the absence of Government statistics collected after the 
emergence of the Arab Spring. Respondent demographics and important details about their 
perceptions of changes in public safety levels in 2011 can be found in Figure 1856. This illustrates that 
Yemeni perceptions of public safety diminished in 2011 (with 49 people saying that their safety had 
decreased), but that only 13 respondents willingly linked this to increased criminality in the form of 
looting, theft and other property-related offences. 
                                                          
56
 These findings are also integrated throughout the thesis, though they are particularly prominent in 
subsections 2.4.4, 5.2.4 and 6.5. 
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Figure 18 Demographics and Important Information Given by the 61 Survey and Telephone Interview Respondents 
 
1.9 Peer Review 
 In order to test the validity of data obtained throughout the course of this thesis, the author 
took steps to obtain regular feedback from her peers, both locally and around the world. In doing so, 
she took part in regular consultations both with her two academic supervisors and her wider circle of 
professional contacts within the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit of the University of 
York. As part of her research with the Unit, she was able to participate in an extensive research 
feedback session for the Common Country Assessment report, with feedback provided by the Yemen 
Country Team and main international stakeholders at an initial findings presentation in Sana'a in 
August, 2010. The author also took care to release regular publications and to participate in 
conferences on international development issues in order to gain feedback from the broader 
academic community. This feedback has been carefully integrated into the structure of this thesis. 
Publications were released through Atlantic Community, Parliamentary Brief, the Post-war 
Reconstruction and Development Unit and elsewhere. Conferences and specialist seminar series 
included; the University of York's '4x4 Seminar Series', its 'International and Comparative Research 
• 31 Employed; 12 Unemployed; 18 Students  
Employment Status of 
Respondents 
• 6 respondents were aged between 18 and 20; 15 respondents were aged 
between 21 and 25; 20 respondents were aged between 26 and 30; 20 
resondents were aged between 31 and 35 
Age of Respondents 
• 38 Single; 6 Married; 17 Married with children 
Marital Status of 
Respondents 
• 31 pro-change protesters; 19 pro-government protesters; 8 respondents with 
no involvement in protests;  3 respondents who participated in protests in early 
2011 and then stopped, due to concerns about personal safety 
Involvement in Arab 
Sping 
• 17 respondents stated that there had been no impact on their daily lives; 19 
stated that there had been some impact; 25 stated that there had been a major 
impact 
Impact of Arab Spring 
on Daily Life 
• 12 respondents state that 2011 brought no change to their sense of safety on 
the streets; 15 said that their sense of safety had diminished; 34 said that they 
now felt extremely unsafe because of the Arab Spring 
Public Safety in 2011 
• 24 respondents said that they did not witness and did not hear about looting or 
theft taking place in Yemen during the Arab Spring; 24 said that they had heard 
about some instances of looting or property damage (especially to government 
offices); 13 said that looting and theft during the Arab Spring had become a 
major problem 
Perceptions of Crime in 
2011 
• 2 would post information about the crime online; 2 would tell the media about 
the crime; 5 would seek assistance from committees established by protest 
organisers; 7 would seek help from NGOs; 2 would speak to a lawyer; 6 would 
go to the police; 2 would ask their tribe for help; 12 would ask their family or 
friends for help; 12 would take matters into their own hands; 9 would do 
nothing; and 2 wouldn't know what to do 
Where Respondents 
Would Go To In Order 
to Seek Assistance 
After a Crime 
• 6 said yes; 55 said no 
Would Respondents 
Ever Seek Help From 
the Police 
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Cluster' Conference on 'Ideas, Institutions and International Politics', and the Sheffield International 
Development Network's 3rd Annual Postgraduate Conference on the 'Challenges for Development 
Studies'57. 
 
1.10 Methodological Limitations and Conclusions 
 While the author feels that she has collected and processed a substantial amount of data 
throughout the three-year life-time of this project, one key methodological limitation in the 
production of this thesis is that it was simply not feasible for its author to return to Yemen after the 
commencement of public demonstrations in 2011. While the author compensated significantly for 
this shortfall through distance research, the thesis itself and its analysis would have benefited 
significantly from interviews with younger participants, aged between 10 and 18 years, as well as 
from interviews with a broader spectrum of people, including poorer members of Yemeni society 
who are suspected of being illiterate and without internet access. As the information gathered 
through distance interviews was used solely to complement statistical data and to anticipate 
changes in pre-2011 trends that had already been identified and verified, this methodological 
limitation did not inhibit the completion of this thesis.  
 Another limitation that this thesis has suffered from has been a lack of access to hospital 
statistics which, revealing the injuries suffered by the victims of crime, might have painted a more 
accurate picture of the true extent of violent offending in the country.  
 These limitations have meant that the author has maintained that most claims produced as 
part of the research initiative are suggestive rather than empirical. Seeing that this thesis' primary 
aim is to apply and evaluate criminological and development theories, this lack of empirical data has 
not negated the contribution of the suggestive claims put forward throughout the analysis. The data 
gathered throughout this methodological framework has proved sufficient to meet the aims and 
objectives of the research project, leading to the production of a workable theory of violent young 
offending in Yemen that might be exportable to other fragile contexts. 
  
                                                          
57
 A full list of such publications and activities is available at: http://york.academia.ed/AlexandraLewis 
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Chapter 2: The Yemeni Context 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 Based on Ariande Vromen's mixed methods research strategy for research with a qualitative 
approaches core (2010)58, this Chapter has been designed to offer an in-depth analysis of the Yemeni 
case study, supported by a full historical analysis and an indicator-based assessment of the country's 
underdevelopment. It fits into the wider structure of the thesis by providing a holistic, multi-sectoral 
overview of the Yemeni context, founded within a fragile states theoretical framework that seeks to 
understand the extent of Governmental authority, legitimacy and capacity, and the ways in which 
these manifestations of Government influence and strength have changed over time. It reads Yemen 
as a classic fragile state under the definition provided in section viii.2, where state fragility is 
symptomatic: of poor state capacity, as generated by a lack of authority and ability to control state 
territories, and as evidenced by a lack of effective state service provision; of high social 
fragmentation, accompanied by a history of conflict, community isolation and conflicting localised 
identities; and of poor political integration, leading to low levels of community access to political 
processes, reinforced by a perceived lack of political will to reflect popular demands in policy 
changes.  
 The aim of this Chapter is not so much to contribute to the main argument of the thesis, but 
to provide the reader with a coherent, in-depth understanding of Yemen and the sources of its 
fragility, creating the knowledge base necessary to appropriately contextualise the implications of 
criminological and development theories that will be presented in later chapters59. It paves the way 
for the overview of criminal activity in Yemen that will be put forward in Chapter 3 by providing 
another layer of data about the context being analysed60. 
 The Yemeni case study necessitates an in-depth evaluation because it is relatively complex 
from an international developmental perspective, with multiple political crises that have manifested 
themselves over a prolonged period of time. The 2010 Failed States Index classes Yemen as a 
country in danger of imminent state failure, ranking it at number 15 of its 60 long list of fragile 
states. It is easy for external observers unfamiliar with the context to be overwhelmed by the range 
of overlapping conflicts and humanitarian emergencies that impact the country. In order to simplify 
the analysis, this Chapter will chart these crises as they have emerged naturally over the course of 
the evolution of the Yemeni state by providing a historical account of the country's formation and 
the emergence of its various political challenges. Taking important indicators like government 
legitimacy, social inequality and lack of access to basic services, the Chapter will proceed by 
                                                          
58
 These principles state that qualitative research must utilise inductive analysis, holistic perspectives, 
qualitative and adaptive methodologies, and emphatic neutrality. 
59
 In particular, these theories include works relating to criminology and international development. They will 
be overviewed in Chapters 4 and 6.  
60
 In Chapters 4 and 6, existing theories of criminology and international development will be used to knit 
together the findings of Chapters 2 and 3 to provide a causal analysis of how state fragility in Yemen shapes 
violent young offending. In line with this aim, this Chapter will provide as open and detailed an investigation of 
the Yemeni context as possible, given the confines of this doctoral thesis (see section 8.6). 
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distinguishing key outcomes of Yemen's history that have presented obstacles to its development. 
The Chapter will conclude by outlining the implications of this analysis for the country's overall 
security; linking it to the more targeted analysis of Yemen's justice and law enforcement systems 
that will be carried out in Chapter 5. 
 
2.2 The Evolution of the Contemporary Yemeni State Through Unity and 
Civil War 
 The state that is known today as the Republic of Yemen has only existed as a single 
administrative unit since May 22nd, 1990. It emerged from a history of disunity and fragmentation, 
through which the citizens of a vastly contested and disputed territory were able to realise their 
aspirations for national unification only briefly before calls for federalism or renewed separatism 
began to spread through the country once more. This social fragmentation is connected to an 
extended period of domination over Yemeni society by competing colonial interests and locally-
based elite power struggles. Thus, “Yemen – almost throughout its history – lacked the kind of 
single, centralised control that would qualify it to be described as a unified state” (Brain Whitaker, 
2009, p. 5). Although it eventually succeeded in forming one government to preside over all of its 
people: Yemen may be “a land with a long history”, but it remains “a state with a short one” (p. 5). 
An understanding of -, as well as an appreciation for -, this basic truth is key to acquiring an insight 
into the causes of Yemen's fragility and the challenges with which the country is faced. 
 While Yemen lacked unity for the majority of its history, one of the single most important 
determining factors in its contemporary development was its formal partitioning by the British and 
Ottoman Empires in the late 1800s and early 1900s. War over the Yemeni territories saw them 
segregated according to an arbitrary line into two countries, North and South Yemen (See Figure 19). 
Their division continues to dominate national politics. In North Yemen, a long, costly and ultimately 
futile struggle to enforce control over Yemeni tribesmen eventually led the Ottoman Empire to 
retreat from the area, establishing an imamate in its place in 1918 (Paul Dresch, 1993). This legacy 
was overthrown in 1962, when the Yemen Arab Republic was formed. In South Yemen, British rule 
continued until 1967, when the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen was created in its stead, 
under a communist leadership with strong economic ties to the Soviet Union (Fred Halliday, 1990). 
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Figure 19 The Division Between North and South Yemen 
 Inspired by growing regional pan-Arabic sentiment, the Yemeni people retained a strong 
sense of national unity throughout this time, many believing that unification would bring back a 
“golden age” in their history (Brain Whitaker, 2009, p. 15). By this time, both Yemens had evolved 
according to radically opposing ideological models – the communist and Islamic republic models 
respectively, as influenced by a rejection of British and Ottoman colonialism – and both had radically 
different visions of their shared futures. The boundaries between them would prove almost 
impossible to erase so that Yemen today continues to “[reflect] a series of nested divides – 
geographic, demographic, political and ideological” (Bryce Loidolt et al, 2010, p. 19). 
 While Yemen was free to pursue its dreams of unification from 1967 onwards, with both 
governments openly advocating for the principle with the popular backing of their people, dialogues 
aimed at increasing unity were of a more ideological than a practical nature. Few politicians on 
either side seriously weighed the full implications of unification, and both states recognised 
unification as an outright threat to their existence. Both wanted to shape a new Yemen in their own 
image, preserving their own authority and leadership. South Yemen was at a significant 
disadvantage here because of its substantially smaller population, which could have meant that any 
form of unification would see the country dominated by Northern interests. In 2012 the North 
outnumbered the South approximately 20 million to 4 million, with similar differences in proportions 
being present in the 1960s when both populations were much smaller (Expert Consultation with 
Nicholas Hopton, July 19th, 2012). Thus, prior to unifying, the two countries went through twenty 
years of political competition, each striving to bolster their own legitimacy as future leaders while 
undermining the credibility of the other, triggering open warfare in 1972 and again in 1979.  
 From 1988 onwards, a string of not entirely unrelated domestic and international political 
failures and economic downturns pushed both countries to explore the issue of unity more 
fervently, if only to distract their nationals from their own internal crises. For the Yemen Arab 
North Yemen 
South Yemen 
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Republic, these crises stemmed from the ruling Government's over-valuation of their developing oil 
industry, leading to widespread discontent at the failure of the state to generate promised revenues. 
For the Democratic People's Republic of Yemen, internal crises emerged from increased 
marginalisation from the Soviet Union, which had previously acted as a major donor. As North and 
South began to relax border controls and Yemenis began to travel between the two, Southern 
citizens became aware of their relative poverty compared to the North so that their regime was left 
with few excuses to avoid unification any longer, despite the fear that unity might represent the 
“annexation” of their sovereignty (Whitaker, 2009, p. 26).  
 The unification process itself was rushed. While North and South had agreed upon a 
unification period of a year, the process was pushed forward in 1990 in order to avoid the growth of 
new oppositional movements in both countries, who threatened to cause a revolt if the unification 
plan went ahead. In practice, while the unification process succeeded in merging the Yemeni 
territories, it failed to marry the leading General People's Congress (GPC) in the North with the 
Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) in the South, effectively leaving two administrative units bidding for 
internal dominance. Provisionally, the two parties adopted a pluralist political system that 
maintained rival ideologies and offered representation to discontented groups. In 1990, Yemen 
became the first democratic country in the Arab World, a legacy for which it is seldom remembered. 
The fragile peace created by this democratic system was not to last.  It is the belief of the author that 
democratic politics accentuated existing rivalries by fostering direct political competition, eventually 
triggering conflict. 
 While Yemen was ruled by a coalition of the GPC and the YSP for its first three years of 
union, forming the country's constitution and developing its administrative core in Sana'a, the 
electoral process would reveal the fragility of their union. National elections, which took place in 
Yemen for the first time in 1993, were seen as a mechanism through which to legitimise the existing 
state (Whitaker, 2009, p. 129). However, both parties, which had retained their own independent 
military forces after unification, exercised considerable financial and military resources to undermine 
each other's positions in the polls, just as they had undermined each other across their shared 
border prior to 1990. An unintended side-effect of this was that several new parties and 
independents were able to move in and secure a large percentage of the national vote. One new 
competitor, the Yemeni Alliance for Reform, or Islah, emerged throughout this time as a prominent 
rival to both ruling parties, securing 62 of 302 seats in the election, the GPC and the YSP winning 123 
and 56 seats respectively (p. 130). These results occurred largely as a result of the short-sightedness 
of the GPC and the YSP, who had utilised considerable military and financial resources to secure 
their victories over each other during the election, rather than considering other parties as a 
potential threat to their united leadership. Whitaker summarises that “with 47 independents and 12 
representatives of smaller parties, no party had a clear mandate to govern alone” after 1993 (p. 
130). 
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Figure 20 1993 Election Results 
 The GPC and YSP were faced with an unanticipated political crisis, which, though it 
accentuated the need for a union of their two parties, failed to bring about such a merger.  After all, 
to the YSP a union would have represented an absorption into the larger GPC party and the 
disappearance of their hitherto separate military forces, owing to their proportionally lower 
representativeness. Rather than merging with the YSP or handing leadership of the country over to 
Islah, the GPC, under the authority of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, chose simply to integrate Islah 
into the existing coalition, which vested power above all in the GPC, followed by the YSP, 
irrespective of election results. The positions of Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister were 
awarded to the YSP and Islah respectively to reflect this chain of command, much to the anger of 
Islah's many supporters. To this day, national confidence and participation in Yemen's electoral 
processes has dramatically diminished as a result of this move.  In December 2010, the Yemen Times 
reported that one Minister of Parliament, Ali Al-Ansi of the Islah Party, recognised wide-spread 
disillusion among Yemeni voters. He claimed that Yemen “suffer[s] from a severe crisis of confidence 
in government. Most Yemenis are depressed and down in the dumps, but they will rage against the 
government if this bad situation continues” (Sadeq Al-Wesabi). In the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring, 
his prophecy has proved more accurate than many external analysts had anticipated. 
 The GPC's republicanism, the YSP's socialism and Islah's Islamic revivalism did not blend 
together well in the new coalition, crippling the state's decision-making capacity and stalling 
development across the country. Although numerous efforts were made by the GPC to produce 
legislative requirements on all parties to act in union, the YSP began to act as a voice of opposition, 
despite its position of authority; perhaps to ensure its own continuing status as a key player in 
Yemeni politics, or in protest against its diminishing legitimacy in the new political order 
(Stakeholder Consultation, Supervising Committee for Relieving IDPs, 16 August, 2010, Interview 
Conducted by Sultan Barakat). It was not long after that Prime Minister Ali Salim al-Baid deserted his 
post entirely and retreated to Aden, the former Southern capital, leaving the newly-formed 
government in a state of suspended animation, unable to swear in a Presidential Council or to pass 
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any meaningful legislative reform. This open show of hostility was soon to be accompanied by calls 
for separatism, eventually leading to civil war in 1994. 
 In May of that year, the South of Yemen broke away from the North once more to form the 
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. This country was not recognised by the international 
community as independent (Global Security, 2010). Furthermore, while limited air and missile strikes 
were launched against North Yemen's cities, most of the actual fighting took place in the South, 
which was quickly overrun by Northern forces and some defected Southern military units, lead by 
General Abd Rabbuh Mansur Al-Hadi (later to become President Saleh's Vice President and then 
President himself) (Expert Consultation, Rafat al Akhali, 7 March, 2012). By July of that year, the YSP 
had surrendered to total Northern control, and this time unification was imposed upon them. It was 
a devastating blow from which the South never truly recovered. While the YSP survived the war as a 
political party, its position within the Yemeni political sphere was severely weakened. Meanwhile, 
President Saleh was elected by his new Parliament to serve another five year term in October 1994, 
remaining largely uncontested in his seat of power until the Arab Spring of 2011.  
 The effect of this short history upon the evolution of the Yemeni state was such that its 
Government had to develop in a very careful way in order to avoid annihilation from the very 
beginning. Money ear-marked for the creation of one single state was funnelled instead into the 
military expenses of two parties that continued to see each other more as rivals than as allies post-
unification. After the 1993 election, the GPC, perhaps sensing the threat of renewed separatism 
from the South, made certain to retain crucial control over Yemen's Ministry of Finance and began 
developing newly discovered oil reserves in the territory of the former People's Democratic Republic 
of Yemen, exacerbating complaints in the South that Northerners were sapping their resources dry 
to develop their half of the country (Expert Consultation, Danniel Shimmin, 3 June, 2012). At the 
same time, these resources failed to bring about any significant benefit to the rural Northern poor, 
pushing them to arrive at the opposite conclusion.  
 Accusations of rampant corruption within the central administration only worsened nation-
wide hostilities. As President Saleh's regime fought to develop its seat of power, it failed to bring 
about substantive change for the people of Yemen, who quickly lost confidence in the power of 
unity and democracy to improve their social circumstances. The belief began to spread throughout 
the South that a return to separatism would at least grant them sovereignty over their own limited 
resources, while the far North began to shrink from centralised rule all together. The result was the 
emergence of a very weak state with an over-developed military and a people without a vested 
interest in its survival. It is not surprising that this unstable combination brought about war and 
conflict, almost from the moment of its inception. 
 
84 
 
2.3 Geographic Characteristics and Demographic Composition 
 
Figure 21 Yemen and Its Geographic Position 
 Due to its geographic location and development status, the Republic of Yemen is affected by 
the political and economic fluctuations of both the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. The country 
shares a land boundary with Saudi Arabia and Oman, and overlooks Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia 
across the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea (See Figure 2161). As a result of this location and due to its 
comparative stability and weak border management capacities, Yemen has attracted numerous 
refugees and labour migrants from the North-East of Africa through shipping and sailing lanes, the 
majority of whom arrive from Somalia and Ethiopia62. Meanwhile, unemployed Yemenis tend to look 
to their wealthier Middle Eastern neighbours for employment opportunities, travelling to Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and other places, often illegally, in search of work (Stakeholder 
Consultation, International Organisation for Migration, 16 August, 2010).  
 Relations with its immediate neighbours have historically proven to be of crucial importance 
to Yemen. Many of its recent governmental development priorities, as listed in the Ministry of 
Planning and International Cooperation's National Reform Agenda (2010) and 10-Point Plan (2009), 
have involved building stronger regional relations within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in order 
to boost Yemen's struggling economy and business sector. 
                                                          
61
 This map was taken from http://stpeteforpeace.org  on November 12th, 2010, but was subsequently 
amended by the author. 
62
 See Chapter 3, section 3.10 on ‘Organised Crime’, for more details on how migrants use smuggling routes to 
get in and out of Yemen. 
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Figure 22 Yemen's Twenty-One Governorates 
 Development across Yemen has always been uneven, with the North benefiting from trade 
routes with Saudi Arabia (particularly during the 1980s) and the South receiving strong material 
backing from the Soviet Union in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Fred Halliday, 1990). Regardless of 
fluctuations in inequality, governmental development programmes traditionally favoured the centre 
over the peripheries, both before and after the formation of what is today the Republic of Yemen. 
Yemen is divided into 21 governorates (See Figure 2263). Infrastructure is strongest in Sana'a and its 
immediate surrounding areas, while the peripheral regions, which are mainly comprised of rural 
areas, are extremely poor.  
 Although 42.8% of the population in Yemen was classed as living below the poverty line in 
2010, 29.9% of the country's urban population was considered to be poor, as compared to 47.6% of 
the rural population, with 'Amran, Abyan, Ad Dali, Al Jawf, Al-Bayda', Hajjah, Lahij and Shabwah 
reporting a poverty prevalence rate of over 50%, 'Amran reaching 66.4% (World Food Programme, 
2010, p. 25). Only 31% of the population of the country is urbanised and the vast majority of the rest 
live in small rural communities with little access to government services (CIA World Factbook, 2012). 
In 2011, the overall rate of poverty across Yemen was said to increase to 60%, due to widespread 
disruptions in the labour market and government services, as well as the cessation of donor 
assistance and the withdrawal of humanitarian agencies (Sadeq al Wasabi, 2011). 
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 This map was developed by Wikimedia Commons (2007) and can be found at: 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/ 
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Figure 23 Actual and Estimated Population Growth in Yemen, 1994-2014 
 Yemen's extreme poverty and underdevelopment are exacerbated by increasing 
competition for resources and employment opportunities, which emerges as a result of nation-wide 
resource mismanagement and more directly because of the country's rapid population growth. 
According to the Yemeni Central Statistical Organisation's Statistical Yearbooks of 2003 to 2010, the 
population of Yemen has grown from 14.59 million in 1995 to 22.49 million in 2010. The population 
is expected to grow further to approximately 25.96 million by 2014 (See Figure 23), although the 
estimated total fertility rate has recently fallen due to massive governmental awareness raising 
campaigns from an average of 8.7 children being born per woman between 1985 and 1990 to 5.3 
per woman being born between 2005 and 2010, according to the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (though the accuracy of such data is difficult to assess in light of Yemen's 
very weak rate of birth registration). The chief demographic implication of Yemen's rapid population 
growth is an emerging youth bulge: the median population age in 2010 was 17.9 years and 43.9% of 
Yemenis were aged under 14 years (CIA World Factbook).  
 The vast majority of Yemenis are ethnic Arabs who fall into either the Shaf'i Sunni or Zaydi 
Shia religious groupings, though a small number can be found who are members of the Jewish, 
Christian or Hindu faiths. Yemeni society is also extremely tribalised, so that tribal allegiances often 
take precedence over ethnic and religious identities64. The strength of these tribal structures has 
offered a communal support net to those living in hard-to-reach areas of the country in times when 
government infrastructure has proven inaccessible. However, these same tribal structures have 
proven remarkably resistant to centralisation, leading to repeated incidents of conflict between 
state authority and tribal legitimacy which have held important implications for Yemen's history and 
progress.  
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 Chapter 5, section 5.3, will outline more thoroughly the details of Yemeni tribal divisions. 
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 It is tempting to think of the country's strong tribal system as one of the primary obstacles 
for the Government in its quest to secure legitimacy and sovereignty. In reality, the relationship 
between tribes and the state is not so clear cut. In Tribes, Government and History in Yemen, Paul 
Dresch writes: 
the tribes themselves are the basis of what power most governments have ever held. 
Not only have many prominent figures in recent national politics been of tribal 
background, but the tribes themselves remain important, and one cannot follow the 
events of the last few decades, any more than those of preceding centuries, without 
some grasp of what the tribes amount to. In the midst of which the assumption is 
widespread that they will all one day disappear. (1993, pp. 28 – 29) 
The tribal system in Yemen has been used by Yemeni governments as an administrative tool, 
particularly in more isolated areas that have proven difficult for state forces and bureaucracies to 
access. Where local reliance upon such systems has been very high for a protracted period of time, 
tribal identities have solidified and tribal structures have become entrenched. Conversely, where 
local reliance has shifted toward governmental services, tribal identities have gradually been eroded.  
 As Barbara Bodine observed in an interview conducted by Riz Khan, tribes in Yemen are not 
organised into one collective social unit that can be easily appealed to or accessed (2010). They do 
not have similar aspirations, goals, customs or philosophies, though they do have limited 
organisational sub-structures65. Depending upon where a tribe is located, tribal allegiances and intra-
tribal connections become either trivial or hugely relevant, while tribes themselves are either 
broadly socially intermixed or isolated from one another. 
 
2.4 War and Conflict in Yemen 
 Yemen is currently experiencing no less than four distinct security crises, which means that, 
according to an interview conducted with Nicholas Hopton, British Ambassador to Yemen, the 
Yemeni Government currently controls no more than 30% of its territory (Expert Consultation, July 
20th, 2012). The four main political challenges that the state faces today are: an on-going conflict 
against localised combatant groups in the far North; rising separatist sentiment in the South; a 
growing terrorist insurgency from within its borders; and, threats to its very survival under the 
impact of the 2011 Arab Spring. War and conflict are products and causes of continuing fragility, 
resulting from a historical Government mismanagement of local grievances and disrupting the ability 
of the state to intervene so as to return order to the lives of its citizens. 
 
2.4.1 The Sa'ada Wars 
 Economic competition between North and South Yemen before and after unification, 
culminating in the 1994 civil war and followed immediately by a need to consolidate a new 
government leadership, meant that for a prolonged space in Yemen's history the Northern 
peripheries of the country were marginalised by state development programmes in favour of 
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building a strong capital city with a solid administrative base. The resulting situation of chronic 
underdevelopment that emerged in the North, particularly along the areas that bordered the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, contributed to overall increases in levels of hostility among local 
communities towards President Saleh's Government (Christopher Bouceck, 2010). When combined 
with historic grievances, the formation of new identities, and increased social mobility, all of which 
came to the fore in the late 1990s and early 2000s, such hostility eventually sparked mass protests. 
Once the Government of Yemen intervened to subdue public outcry in 2004, a wave of military 
clashes began between the state and emerging groups of combatants known as the Houthis and the 
Believing Youth. Since then, six consecutive wars have enveloped Sa'ada and its surrounding 
governorates, Hajja, Amran and Al Jawf (See Figure 24). 
 
Figure 24 Areas Affected by Fighting During the Sa'ada Wars 
 While the Houthis and the Believing Youth are followers of the Zaydi Shia faith (the same 
religion as that of former President Saleh, though an under-represented religion in Government as a 
whole), and while they have adopted a strong Zaydi Revivalist narrative, the conflict in the North was 
not initially thought of as a religiously motivated one (Bouceck, 2010). However, in recent years, the 
conflict has begun to move away from its roots to become more ideological in nature. This 
development has occurred mainly as the conflict has spilled over Saudi Arabian borders, becoming 
embroiled in an alleged regional cold war between a predominantly Sunni Saudia Arabia and a Shia 
Iran66, and furthermore gaining an international dimension through the involvement of the United 
States of America. In this regard, Saudi Arabia has openly provided military assistance to President 
Saleh's regime, while Oxford Analytica, among other organisations, note that there is an unverified 
“suspicion, encouraged by the regime, that Iran and perhaps Hizbollah are assisting the Huthis” in 
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the fulfilment of what they perceive to be common Shia interests (2009, p. 8). The conflict in Sa'ada 
is entrenched and multi-faceted, leading to a state of protracted emergency in Yemen. 
 The International Crisis Group write that: 
The Saada war … can be traced back to the decline of the social stratum led by 
Hashemites and legitimised by Zaydism (a branch of Shiism), failed management of 
religious pluralism, lack of investment in Zaydi strongholds like Saada after 1962, 
permeability to external influences and the emergence of new political and religious 
actors, in particular Salafis. As a result, it has variously and at times simultaneously taken 
the shape of a sectarian, political or tribal conflict, rooted in historical grievances and 
endemic under-development. (2009, p. 5) 
The social environment of Sa'ada and Northern Yemen is heavily influenced by religious constraints 
on behaviour and by tribal allegiances, dictated by qabyala – the ethical code of tribalism in the 
North (Lisa Wedeen, 2008). The evolution of its culture is linked to administrative attitudes towards 
the North and its geographic location, while the resultant uniquely “Northern” identity of the Sa'ada-
Hajja-Amran-Al Jawf area has emerged as an important contributing factor to the conflict there.  
 Bryce Loidolt et al note that, prior to the outbreak of war, the region had been allowed to 
function fairly autonomously, both before and after unification, leading to a strong local sense of 
independence (2010, p. 3). There are multiple reasons for this. Firstly, Northern preference for tribal 
identities over national ones has meant that many Yemeni communities exist on both sides of the 
Saudi Arabian border, prioritising tribal divisions of the land over state ones. Through leaked 
American diplomatic cables, the Wikileaks website confirmed in 2010 that contested border areas 
like Jebel al-Dukhan may officially be part of Saudi Arabia, but they cut through territories that were 
traditionally used by Zaydi Yemeni tribes. The cable outlines that: 
because “tribal territories transcend international borders,” the tribes living in that area 
consider it Yemeni even if it is officially Saudi. Furthermore, while the members of the 
tribe whose territory straddles the two countries identify first and foremost with their 
tribe, they identify secondly as Yemenis, not Saudis - regardless of which side of the 
border they live on. Adding to the confusion about whether Jebel al-Dukhan falls in 
Yemeni or Saudi territory is the fact that [Republic of Yemen Government] forces 
continue to fight throughout the area. (November, 2010) 
This has rendered some Northern tribes very difficult to administer, as government attempts to 
control them on both sides of the border have always held the potential to trigger accusations of 
encroachment upon another state's sovereignty. For many decades, such communities were left to 
manage their own affairs.  
 A second contributing factor to the independence of the Northern peripheries is their 
extremely harsh geographic make-up. Communities are small and insular, scattered between deserts 
and mountain ranges, and kept small by natural obstacles and limited resources (Expert 
Consultation, Danniel Shimmin, 3 June, 2012). They are difficult to access and even more difficult to 
police, leading to a convention whereby governments have in the past sought to secure their loyalty 
through material negotiations with their leaders, rather than through direct administration. Thirdly, 
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the dominance of the Zaydi faith in the North has fostered a sense of common Northern identity 
distinct from Yemeni nationalism, whereby the descendants of the Prophet Mohammed's family, 
Sayyids or Hashimis, are seen as the legitimate rulers of Islamic states, contrary to the composition 
of the current Yemeni Government (Loidolt et al, 2010, p. 5). This identity and the ideals 
accompanying it provide an explicit challenge to the sovereignty of the state, although in practice 
Zaydis have historically coexisted relatively peacefully with their Sunni neighbours. 
Finally, it is argued that the political struggles faced by North Yemen over time, including its 
struggle against colonialism and its wars with the South have, right up through the aftermath of the 
1994 war for separatism, kept the focus of most administrations away from the reformation of the 
tribalised Northern peripheries. The Northern tribes have historically provided various incarnations 
of the Sana'a Government with a source of direct military support, and proved especially effective in 
Yemen's struggle against Ottoman Imperialism. These and other reasons convinced most Yemeni 
Governments not to interfere in the customs and leadership of the Northern territories prior to the 
1960s. 
 After 1962, when the leading Imam of North Yemen was overthrown in an Egypt-backed 
military coup, government attitudes towards the Northern peripheries began to change. Whether or 
not Zaydiism presented an actual threat to the state, government propaganda  campaigns began to 
portray the people of the Sa'ada-Hajja-Amran-Al Jawf area as “atavistic and backward”, according to 
Loidolt et al. They write that: 
This perception gained greater weight after the 1990 unification with the previously 
socialist People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY)—and, along with Saleh’s political 
approach of neopatrimonial cooptation, has worked against the integration of the Zaydi 
heartland with the rest of the state. (2010, p. 4) 
By the 1980s, dissatisfaction with the Government's confrontational stance began to solidify into 
real and actionable grievances as increased social mobility, facilitated through the construction of 
new roads between the centre and the peripheries, as well as by advances in communication 
capacities, allowed Northern Yemenis increased access to information and to each other.  
 Improved literacy and the widening of trading roots exposed the area to broader political 
and ideological trends affecting the Middle East (Whitaker, 2009). Ideas such as pan-Arabism and 
Zaydi Revivalism offered new points of self-definition, while the emerging regional impact of 
increased Wahabi and Salafi influence appeared a looming threat on the horizon towards their way 
of life, standing, as such belief systems did, in direct opposition to the elitism enshrined by the Zaydi 
faith. After the 1993 election, this threat became a lot more tangible to many Zaydi Shias with the 
rising popularity of the Islah party, a firm supporter of Wahabiism. Long before the Sa'ada conflict 
began in 2004, the 1990s saw a wave of clashes between tribes and sects in Northern Yemen, 
motivated by competition for resources and influence.   
 In response to these conflicts and the emergence of Islah, Badr al-Din al-Houthi and his sons 
began to establish a network of political parties, clubs and social programmes under the all-
encompassing title of the Believing Youth in order to mobilise the Zaydis in Sa'ada and to give them 
an organised political voice. What was initially perceived and funded by the state as a means of 
quieting the local population later became seen as a political threat, particularly, because President 
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Saleh began to view al-Houthi's son, Husayn al-Houthi, “as a political threat — a plausible prospect, 
since the latter’s local prestige exceeded that of [Government] representatives in the governorate” 
(Loidolt et al, 2010, p. 7). 
 In 2001, President Saleh allied his Government with the United States in their global War on 
Terror in exchange for military assistance in the fight against terrorist cells in Yemen. America's 
reciprocal support of Saleh's Regime had two direct and immediate consequences:  
1. It boosted the Yemeni Government's confidence in its own ability to exert its authority 
across the country through the application of military force, with the help of its new-found 
ally; 
2. It provided Husayn al-Houthi with a lightning rod through which to attract multitudes of new 
supporters to his cause by painting President Saleh as a pawn of American foreign policy 
(Bouceck, 2010). 
The American-led war in Afghanistan was at this time and remains to this day incredibly unpopular in 
Yemen, with countless Yemeni insurgents moving to Afghanistan specifically to assist the Taliban in 
their struggle for power, chief among them the late Osama bin Laden. This communal sense of 
hostility towards the United States was compounded in 2003 by the Coalition's overthrowing of 
Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the escalation of their campaign there, which was seen to be severely 
anti-Islamic and angered pro-Iraqi Yemeni Ba'athists among others (the Ba'athists having gained a 
sizeable following in Yemen since unification, espousing a socialist pan-Arabic political narrative 
(Whitaker, 2009, p. 130)). This propelled anti-state sentiment way beyond the remits of the 
Northern peripheries. 
 In June of 2004, the Government responded to emerging hostilities by sending its forces to 
arrest Husayn al-Houthi. This move bypassed both the autonomy of the Northern peripheries and 
the obligations of qabyala that all socio-political disagreements be mitigated by tribal mediation 
prior to the utilisation of physical force by any party. It sparked a wave of clashes between 
Government forces and al-Houthi's supporters, who now emerged as a group of armed combatants 
named after their leader. As the Yemeni Government strove to recruit loyal tribes to assist them in 
containing the crisis, they inadvertently radicalised the region further by forcing Northern 
communities to take sides in the conflict. Since that day, the state has been unable to restore real 
and lasting peace to the Northern peripheries, despite the numerous ceasefires that have broken 
the conflict up into six separate wars. 
 The first phase of the conflict lasted until September, 2004 (See Figure 25), when, after over 
three months of fighting and approximately 480 casualties, Government forces declared that they 
had killed Husayn al-Houthi, allegedly bringing an end to the crisis (Loidolt, 2010, p. 134).  
 The death of the Houthi leader failed to resolve the root causes of the first war, and no 
effective peace agreement was reached between the two fighting sides. The following five stages of 
the conflict followed similar patterns, each marked by an arrest or the death of an important 
stakeholder at its end. Each time, the Yemeni state declared an end to the fighting, minor skirmishes 
would continue, eventually re-triggering all-out war. 
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Figure 25 Timeline of the Sa'ada Conflict 
 By the time the fourth war in Sa'ada began in February 2007, the Government of Yemen had 
considerably escalated its military campaign in the region, showing a distinct policy shift from 
targeting Houthi leaders to eradicating the Houthi threat as a whole (Human Rights Watch, 2010). 
This time, the entire Sa'ada governorate was enveloped in war and reports showed that numerous 
tribes from Hajja, Amran and Al Jawf had migrated North to offer their support to the Government's 
troops. Suspected Houthi strongholds were exposed to continuous bombings and heavy artillery 
strikes, with casualties rising to an estimated 3,035 people (Loidolt, 2010, p. 144). The Houthis 
responded to the Government's onslaught by skilfully and effectively utilising guerrilla tactics against 
military convoys, stealing equipment to arm their forces.  
 Both sides were accused by the Human Rights Watch and other international actors of 
committing significant human rights violations in the pursuit of their goals, which included the 
targeting of civilians and the use of child soldiers (Human Rights Watch, 2010). In May 2007, 
Yemen's distant neighbour, Qatar, stepped in to mediate an end to the conflict, offering to resolve 
one of the Houthi's primary grievances (underdevelopment) by pledging financial aid to Yemen to 
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initiate the rapid reconstruction and development of the far North upon the restoration of peace 
(International Crisis Group, 2009, p. 21). This intervention significantly dampened fighting on the 
ground for a time, illustrating that poverty remained the root cause of the conflict, despite its 
religious and tribal overtones. By February 2008, both sides had agreed to sign a peace settlement to 
bring about a permanent end to hostilities.  
 The period following the fourth Sa'ada war was probably the most peaceful that the region 
had witnessed since the conflict began in 2004.  
 It was not to last. Continued violence has been blamed on the general instability of the area 
and strong tribal notions of revenge, though it is unclear to what extent this assessment has been 
influenced by the official government line67. Another two full-blown conflicts followed, the last of 
which took place in 2009. During the build-up to the sixth phase of the conflict, President Saleh's 
regime began actively to liken the Houthis to a terrorist movement in the hope of enlisting 
international support for the Government's war effort. Their case was strengthened in June 2009 by 
the kidnapping of seven Germans, one British national and one South Korean in the Sa'ada area, 
three of whom were killed immediately (Al Jazeera, 2009a).  
 Internal political pressure on Saleh's Regime and the President's growing unpopularity led to 
the need for a decisive victory in the North, while continued violations of the ceasefire agreement 
gave the Government a solid reason to send forces to the region at any time. In August 2009, 
President Saleh famously called together a meeting of the High Security Committee and concluded 
that the Houthis needed to be struck down “with an iron fist” (Al Jazeera, 2009b). Government 
forces were able to realise this goal to some extent when the sixth war began, as they received 
considerable backing from Saudi Arabia. Fighting between Saudi border guards and Houthi rebels 
had really begun the year before, when Saudi Arabia issued permission to the Yemeni Government 
to attack the Houthis from their territory.  
 From November 2009 onwards, the Saudi Arabian military launched a full campaign in the 
Northern peripheries of Yemen, bombarding the area with devastating air strikes (Human Rights 
Watch, 2010). Bryce Loidolt et al note that: “It is unclear whether Saudi-initiated ground 
engagements have occurred on sovereign Yemeni territory, although its military build-up along its 
southern border reportedly constituted the largest deployment of Saudi ground troops since the 
1990–1991 Gulf War” (2010, p. 156).  
 Despite Saudi Arabian backing, the Government of Yemen was unable to bring about a 
decisive victory against the Houthi movement during the sixth war, which came to an end in 
February 2010. Nor is it likely that future military interventions will bring an end to the conflict. The 
casualties of the sixth war are currently unknown, while the total number of deaths caused by the 
Sa'ada conflict are still to be tallied. Yet thus far, the Houthis have weathered the obliteration of 
their homes and bases of operations, the mass arrests of their members and the deaths of many of 
their leaders, and they are still a strong fighting force. Their grievances remain valid. The chief issue 
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here is extreme underdevelopment, which not only extends the lifetime of the conflict but also 
compounds the economic and humanitarian crises faced by the country as a whole. 
In 2011 and 2012, the Houthis took advantage of the power vacuums generated by the Arab 
Spring in Yemen and elsewhere to regroup and establish a semi-federal system of self-administration 
in the far North. It is not yet clear how this new system of governance will be incorporated into 
Yemen’s post-Arab Spring national political transition more broadly. 
 
2.4.2 The Secessionist Movement 
 The origins of the Southern Yemeni secessionist movement have already been alluded to68: 
to summarise, it is important to note that the first three years of Yemeni union did not bring much 
material benefit to the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. On the contrary, in the 
aftermath of their democratisation, Southern communist government structures were slowly 
dismantled, privatising services and bringing an end to severely subsidised healthcare and education 
in that half of the country, among other funding cuts. These cuts only reinforced rumours spreading 
among the local population that Southern resources, and Southern oil and gas, were being siphoned 
by Sana'a to promote Northern interests. Together with the gradual reduction of the Yemeni 
Socialist Party's authority and influence across the country, this growing Southern dissatisfaction 
with the new status quo eventually lead to the 1994 Civil War for separatism, in which Southern 
forces were quickly overwhelmed by the North, despite military assistance from countries like Saudi 
Arabia (which saw at the time a unified Yemen on its border to be a potential strategic threat).  
 The aftermath of that war has not yet been fully analysed, but following the unquestionable 
victory of the North of Yemen over the South, President Saleh's regime set about a process of 
purging YSP leaders from key positions in the South and replacing them with Northern officials, in 
order to ensure that a second war would never occur. Simultaneously, “an estimated 100,000 
military and civil employees” were also “forcibly retired” (Human Rights Watch, 2009b, p. 15). While 
President Saleh succeeded in crushing the ability of the former Southern leadership to mobilise any 
significant forces against the Sana'a Government by integrating the Southern and Northern armies, 
he failed to effectively address Southern grievances, leading to prolonged and continuing hostility 
towards his regime after 1994. In the ten years that followed, Southern Yemenis for the most part 
found few outlets in mainstream politics for voicing their discontent, pushing them to protest 
frequently against the Yemeni state. Ever fearful of budding revolutions, the Government of Yemen 
responded to these protests with brutal reprisals, inadvertently sowing the seeds of what would 
become a flourishing secessionist movement. 
 The Southern Yemeni secessionist movement today, sometimes referred to as the Hiraak (or 
Southern Mobility Movement), is most commonly connected to groups of disaffected military 
personnel, known as the Society of Retired Military Officers, who put together a large public 
demonstration campaign in 2007 (Small Arms Survey, 2010, p. 5), decrying their unfair dismissal and 
poor pension arrangements. Due to the popularity of thematic linkages in their protests to issues of 
unemployment and extreme poverty, their movement served to radicalise the local population, 
drawing new participants to public demonstrations from all sectors of Yemeni society, many of them 
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from the Yemeni Socialist Party, but some also from other parties, including Islah. By 2009, calls for 
increased Governmental development of the South had merged with demands for outright 
separation from the North, and these have only grown in intensity and popularity in recent years. 
Oxford Analytica explain that “Demonstrations have since taken place in many major cities in the 
South, including Aden, Zingibar and Mukalla” (2009, p. 5).  
 Due perhaps to their significant defeat in the 1994 Civil War, representatives of the Southern 
secessionist movement have at all times maintained a passivist narrative, heralding dialogue and 
understanding as the keys to achieving their goals. Recently, unfortunately, they have been linked to 
growing terrorist activity and armed combatant movements, but, as with the Houthis, their ties to 
terrorist groups are yet to be confirmed69. Oxford Analytica report that clashes between armed 
combatants and Government forces have thus far occurred in the governorates of Lahej, Dhala and 
Abyan, with Dhala, they argue, being the point of origin of the 2007 protests (p. 5). 
 
Figure 26 Areas Affected by Secessionist Protests Since 2007 
 The map above indicates that the secessionist movement has had wide-ranging appeal in 
the South of the country. Yet while Southern anger at the Sana'a Government is steadily rising, with 
the slow resolution of their grievances in the aftermath of the Arab Spring gradually turning the 
population against the new regime as well, it is by no means true that all Southerners favour 
secessionism as the only viable solution to their problems. Furthermore, the danger that the Hiraak 
poses to the unified Yemeni state has traditionally been mitigated by the movement's significant 
internal divisions and lack of organised leadership.  
 The Human Rights Watch notes that: 
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There appear to be many competing bodies and persons portraying themselves as the 
leadership of the Southern Movement, and it is unlikely that there is a single over-
arching leadership body, but rather various locally and regionally organized groups that 
loosely coordinate their activities, but often act independently of one another (p. 16).  
The involvement of multiple parties within the Hiraak has lead to on-going struggles for control over 
it, while the ideologies and political positions of many of these parties themselves are antithetical to 
one another. Writing in 2009, Oxford Analytica add that the Hiraak's chances for success have been 
traditionally limited by the reality that “Many prominent Southerners serve in the Government and 
have vested interests in the current regime” (p. 6), although temporarily this ceased to be the case 
after the Arab Spring of 2011, when many abandoned President Saleh in order to voice their outrage 
at his targeting of civilian protesters with military and police forces. 
 The Yemeni Government's responses to Southern protests have been immediate and 
violent. In this sense, President Saleh's regime has viewed the Southern separatist movement, 
almost from its origins, as a significant threat to Yemen's integrity, though it is not yet clear what 
President Hadi's position will be on this. Christopher Boucek writes that such fears have been 
reinforced by the growing popularity of the movement, and he argues that:  
The potential scope of the separatist challenge to the Saleh regime was made evident in 
spring 2009 when an important regime supporter defected to the southern movement. 
Tariq al-Fadhli, a former mujahid who had fought in Afghanistan, has family roots in the 
South including claims to hereditary lands. According to some analyses, the withdrawal 
of al-Fadhli’s support for the government is symptomatic of the southern issue’s 
propensity to challenge the status quo (2009, p. 16). 
Certainly, despite the Yemeni Government's harsh response to Southern protests, or perhaps in 
answer to it, the secessionist movement has continued to draw in new members, including entire 
tribes, with varying degrees of influence. A further area of concern is that the secessionist 
movement is growing increasingly violent, and the Human Rights Watch note that there have been 
frequent reports of attacks on Northerners in the South, some of them fatal (2009b, p. 23). 
Meanwhile, continued shelling of the South in the war against Al Qaeda, is contributing to rising 
hostilities. 
 
2.4.3 Regional Security, Piracy and Terrorism 
 As a buffer between the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, Yemen plays an important role 
in regional security, which is affected by a number of strategic issues that include an on-going 
regional struggle between Shia and Sunni domination, increased Islamic radicalisation and terrorism, 
and rising levels of organised crime and piracy. Most famously, Yemen is the nation home of the late 
Osama bin Laden, founder of the Al Qaeda terrorist movement, and the new operational centre of 
the Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) movement – a group that easily rivals its parent 
organisation in scale and operational capacity. In recent years, AQAP has probably proved to be the 
most important of these regional dimensions in determining national and international policy 
frameworks for development in the country, which have reflected an alarming shift towards the 
securitisation of foreign aid under the auspices of so-called “stabilisation” programmes that favour a 
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risk-containment philosophy over a humanitarian one (Roger Mac Ginty, 2012). The US $150 million 
stabilisation strategy launched for Yemen in 2009 is a key example of this trend in programming 
priorities (Sultan Barakat et al, 2011b). 
 
Figure 27 Areas Suspected to Contain AQAP and Ansar al Sharia Fighters in 2012 
 In practice, the threat of AQAP and Ansar al-Sharia (which has been suspected of ties with 
AQAP) in Yemen, has acted as one of the main determining factors for continuing American and 
Saudi Arabian support for the Yemeni government, which has proved crucial for President Saleh's 
regime in determining domestic military policy, particularly in relation to the war against the 
Houthis, and is currently proving equally important for President Hadi. American intervention in 
Yemen on this basis is now over a decade old: an American missile strike that resulted in the death 
of Abu Ali al Harithi in November 2002, for instance, the then-leader of Al Qaeda's Yemen offshoot, 
effectively crippled the movement (Sarah Phillips, 2010). However, after a prison break in February 
2006 allowed Nasser al Wahayshi and Qasim al Raymi to reform the organisation, AQAP once again 
grew to constitute a significant threat in Yemen (Barakat et al, 2011b, p. 71).  
 In reality, rumours of Al Qaeda's movements in Yemen are often greatly exaggerated by the 
state among others, who have traditionally relied upon predominantly American security concerns 
to rally financial and military support to the Government from abroad in times of heightened conflict 
and political unrest. Thus, during the Arab Spring of 2011, both President Saleh's regime and the 
opposing Joint Meetings Party played upon the theme of a resurgent AQAP to enlist foreign support 
for their causes: President Saleh claiming that his departure would see Yemen overrun by terrorists, 
and Abdel Rahman Ba Fadel of the Islah party claiming that Saleh was secretly supporting AQAP in 
order to increase their profile and justify his argument in the eyes of the international press (Al 
Jazeera, 2011). Likewise, the regional Sunni-Shia divide has been used by President Saleh to allege 
that Iran may be the main financial backer of the Shia Houthi movement in order to gain military aid 
from a Sunni Saudi Arabia.  
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 Due to the wide-scale manipulation of these issues by multiple actors in Yemen, it is often 
difficult to assess their physical impact on the country and its implications for regional security, 
particularly in light of evidence presented by leading experts on the situation, including Sarah 
Phillips, who cast doubt on the assertions of actors like Ba Fadel by stating that AQAP's mission in 
Yemen has always been “to destroy the existing political system and establish its own” (2010, p. 3). 
In 2011, AQAP moved one step closer to this goal by seizing important cities in the South of the 
country and establishing emirates in their place with the hope of forming a caliphate70. Thus, 2012 
has seen a considerable military effort by the Yemeni state under President Hadi to take back these 
areas with international support. While many cities seized have been liberated by the Yemeni 
military, bolstering support for the Yemeni Government among more mainstream Yemeni 
community members, the AQAP and Ansar Al Sharia movements have not been fully eradicated, 
with Nicholas Hopton estimating in interview that 1000 fighters remain in the country – some of 
them hard-line ideologues, but others being new recruits interested in a steady income or simply 
“looking for trouble” (Expert Consultation, 19 July, 2012). 
 Quite possibly the only regional dynamic that has not been manipulated and over-inflated in 
media and Government reports for political reasons is the piracy phenomenon, potentially because: 
“no state wants to be known for having a piracy problem”, as this compromises maritime economic 
development and trade, so that “consequently there is considerable temptation to discourage 
incident reporting by demanding of any master and crew that reports an incident that they remain 
as witnesses while subjecting the ship to a long and expensive delay” (Martin N. Murphy, 2010, p. 
18). Furthermore, piracy off the Yemeni coastline is analysed as a Somali issue, and whenever it is 
seen to affect Yemen directly it is often blurred with the theme of maritime terrorism, which saw the 
attempted destruction of the French Limberg oil tanker and the USS Cole by Al Qaeda bombers in 
2002 and 2000 respectively, leading to the vast withdrawal of shippers from Yemeni ports at a 
significant cost to the country's economy. Having said this, Al Qaeda and other regional stress factors 
do continue to pose a substantial challenge to the integrity of the Yemeni state. It has been noted 
that, after the attack on the USS Cole and the 2001 September 11th destruction of the American 
Twin Towers and Pentagon, Yemen experienced a severe crackdown on terrorist activities in the 
country, with President Saleh vowing to join the United States as a key ally in its global War on 
Terror. Few questions are asked, however, about the role that Yemen should play in helping to 
reduce piracy in the Gulf of Aden. 
 
2.4.4 The Arab Spring 
 The Arab Spring that originated in Tunisia in 2010 before spreading elsewhere across the 
region left virtually no country in the Middle East and North Africa untouched by mass protests (See 
Figure 28). It arrived in Yemen in late January 2011, when thousands of demonstrators took to the 
streets, demanding a change of leadership, with the removal of President Saleh as the head of the 
Yemeni Government a central and non-negotiable demand for most participants. Such removal, pro-
change protesters insisted, needed to be immediate, without allowing for “a phased transition that 
would defer [the President's] departure until the end of an interim period in which constitutional 
changes would be agreed” (Hill et al, 2011, p. 3).  
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 While President Saleh is generally acknowledged to have been consistently democratically 
elected within the country, the demand for his immediate resignation stemmed not only from a 
popular desire for political change emanating from a wave of sudden pan-Arabic revolutionary fever, 
but also from a loss of faith in the Yemeni democratic system. This call for his removal from power 
was accentuated by a history of unrepresentative politics, allegations of multi-level corruption and 
growing public suspicions that the President would institute a policy of hereditary rule in light of his 
ailing health, passing leadership of the country down to his son (Stakeholder Consultation, United 
Nations Population Fund, 14 August, 2010). In an anonymous online survey conducted in May 2011, 
one Yemeni citizen commented: “I participate in protests because the situation in Yemen is 
hopeless, corruption is everywhere. Siblings of officials have lots of benefits other citizens do not 
have”, summarising the growing levels of frustration among Yemeni youth which had spread 
throughout the country by this point, contributing to an emerging civil war. 
 
Figure 28 2011 Arab Spring Affected Countries, Highlighting Tunisia as the Point of Origin, and Yemen as the Case-Study 
Country 
 As a non-negotiable issue, the theme of President Saleh's immediate departure proved 
extremely contentious, with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and Qatar especially, striving from 
the outset to broker a deal for a phased transfer of power. Though the agreement has now been 
signed, with Saleh officially handing over leadership of the country to President Abd Rabbu Mansour 
Hadi in February 2012, power transfer negotiations in 2011 and 2012 were left lacking legitimacy 
and have remained largely contested throughout the country in the aftermath of the Arab Spring for 
a number of reasons (Expert Consultation, Rafat al Akhali, 7 March, 2012).  
 Firstly, they were extremely slow in securing President Saleh’s departure from power, a 
process that was only successfully negotiated eleven months after protests began, while negotiated 
peace settlements also left Saleh’s family members in key positions of control over military and state 
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infrastructures (Expert Consultation, Atiaf Alwazir, 5 June, 2012). This remaining network of allies 
and contacts, experts argue, may mean that Saleh could, in theory, continue to influence the 
country’s politics long after his resignation (Expert Consultation, Nicholas Hopton, 20, July, 2012).  
 Secondly, the agreement granted the President and key members of the Yemeni 
Government, including the ruling party, immunity from prosecution by the International Criminal 
Court, despite the use of hugely oppressive tactics to disband and punish protesters.  
 Thirdly, negotiations largely took place between the Yemeni state and the Joint Meeting 
Parties (JMP), who were not considered to be representative of the majority of demonstrators.  
 Fourthly, the single-candidate election process signalled by the agreement was largely read 
on the ground as an attempt to prolong Yemen’s emerging system of electoral authoritarianism, 
failing to bring about democratic reform and being, as a result, boycotted by both Southern and 
Northern opposition groups alike (Expert Consultation, Rafat al Akhali, 7 March, 2012).  
 Finally, the continued strength of President Saleh’s local support base and the prevalence of 
pro-Saleh demonstrations in early 2011, highlighted the extremely questionable position of external 
interventions in Yemeni politics, particularly as protests were combined with the overall rejection of 
negotiated peace agreements by both sides in the Arab Spring conflict. Ultimately, the agreement 
left many unanswered questions as to the scale of democratic reform to follow and, having failed to 
assuage fears of continuing governmental corruption, eventually lead to the somewhat less 
glamorous Revolution of Institutions in 2012 that has largely been ignored by Western media (Expert 
Consultation, Atiaf Alwazir, 5 June, 2012).  
 This issue of external intervention (as aggravated by current American military support for 
President Hadi’s counter-terrorism initiatives) has been rendered more important by Yemen's 
historically reinforced suspicion of foreign intervention, which, in the case of the GCC, is enhanced 
by Saudi Arabia's dual role as a leading player in the Council and a great supporter of former-
President Saleh's regime. The agreement for President Saleh’s removal that was eventually signed in 
2012 had its roots in these challenges. While President Saleh left the country temporarily after the 
signing to seek medical treatment in the United States of America, the suspicion expressed by many 
Yemeni citizens upon his return to the country in February 2012 highlighted considerable remaining 
concerns about the long-term prospects for real regime change and governance reform in Yemen (Al 
Jazeera, 2012).  
 At a local level, there is considerable suspicion of the international community’s future role 
in the country, with America having proven to be an important ally of President Saleh’s regime in the 
struggle against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and the United Nations Security Council 
having taken almost an entire year to issue a formal statement decrying violence against protesters 
in Yemen, while actively protecting protesters in Libya.  
 To better understand these legitimacy-based concerns, it is useful to look at the progression 
of the Arab Spring in Yemen as a whole, which began very much as a youth movement, with 
university students and graduates playing a central role in organising and mobilising protesters. 
Though they were bypassed quite significantly within peace negotiations in 2011 and 2012, protest 
organisers inspired by the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution developed a relatively sophisticated 
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administrative and welfare structure for themselves from the onset of demonstrations, particularly 
in Sana’a, in order to form a collective and unified front in their call for regime change. Independent 
online surveys and telephone interviews conducted by the author revealed that, between February 
and April 2011, student movements established special zones for securing peaceful demonstrations 
by removing weapons and arms from all participants upon entry. They established links with the 
press in order to ensure the monitoring of human rights violations by state and non-state actors, and 
created medical and legal assistance centres for those injured or harmed during demonstrations. 
These welfare services proved especially important at the beginning of the Arab Spring as Yemeni 
hospitals were generally seen by protesters to be compromised and insecure areas, where those 
injured in the course of demonstrations could easily be identified by the state, arrested and 
removed without notice.  
 As Government reprisals against protesters increased, those Yemenis interviewed as part of 
this thesis reported that these unofficial medical centres became steadily less relevant and less 
active, due to their significant lack of resources and capacity. When asked why these original 
members of the pro-change movement had taken to the streets in February and March 2011 and 
why they remained on the streets in April after it became apparent that their involvement in the 
movement was extremely dangerous, one participant answered: “We went to the streets because 
we believe in a better future for Yemen. This will not happen, though, unless we get rid of all 
members of the corrupted regime”. Another argued: “We need change as the situation in Yemen is 
bad, we need to have better living conditions, economics, etc”. Meanwhile, a pro-government 
protester argued that: “We need a change, but not through the destruction of the current system. 
Yemeni people are not like Egyptian or Tunisian people. They are poor, they have war, and there are 
50 million guns” in the country, leading to a heightened risk of civil war.  
 In February 2011, protests in Yemen remained fairly small and self-contained, with non-
violence being one of the key principles held by demonstration organisers, including Nobel Peace 
Prize Laureate Tawakkul Karman.  
It was not long before the pro-change movement exploded in popularity and therefore 
began to generate real reprisals by supporters of the state. Violence increased dramatically and 
casualties began to soar. Participants began to report increased levels of hostility and aggression, 
specifically on the streets outside demonstration hotspots. One pro-change protester reported at 
the time that: “We don't have trouble getting to protests, but the street has been affected. Clashes 
of opinions turn violent. There is a real passion”.  
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Figure 29 View Over Sana’a City Centre 
 One protest organiser, Husam Al-Sharjabi, the head of the Civil Coalition for Revolutionary 
Youth (one of the largest youth movements in Yemen), commented in interview that he felt 
throughout this time that governmental violence was manipulated by President Saleh as a tool for 
provoking demonstrators into breaking their commitment to non-violence, thereby losing the 
popular support of foreign observers (Expert Consultation, March 20th, 2012). He commented quite 
candidly, that, while his movement made a concerted effort to institute training programmes aimed 
at teaching demonstrators to communicate with Yemeni security forces in a respectful manner so as 
to minimise the risk to their own lives, many “kids and teenagers” in particular began entering into 
deliberate violent confrontations with state officials. Meanwhile Yemeni bloggers and independent 
journalists began to refer increasingly to “martyrs of the revolution” and “revenge killings”, 
indicating a steady increase in the glorification of violence flowing just beneath the surface of a more 
mainstream peaceful narrative, with the continuous tension between these two facets being an 
extremely important element of the 2011 Yemeni Arab Spring experience.  
 The mass appeal of the Arab Spring to young people in Yemen, and to young people in 
Yemen's major cities, resulted from the country’s growing rate of unemployment, as well as from 
the high prevalence of unemployment among university graduates (which was estimated as being at 
54% in 2008 by the International Labour Organisation). It is important to note here, as confirmed in 
an interview with Kate Nevens of Chatham House, that many youth joined the protests stating that 
they had come to Sana’a, for the period of the Arab Spring, as independent citizens, rather than as 
representatives of their tribes, putting minor tribal conflicts on hold for the duration of the 
demonstrations (Expert Consultation, February 29th, 2012). However, they were soon joined by 
various other factions as demonstrations gained in momentum.  
 The Arab Spring represented the opportunity for various actors who had been in conflict 
with the Government for the past decade to advance their own individual agendas. In the far North 
of Yemen, insecurity generated by protests across the country offered the chance for the Houthi 
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insurgency movement to reorganise and secure an operational stronghold, establishing a virtually 
self-contained and separate governance system in the Sa’ada area that may have begun to spread its 
influence into neighbouring governorates (Horton, 2011). The Arab Spring and its explicit call for a 
change of leadership and, therefore, a change in the structures of government also reinvigorated the 
Southern Separatist Movement, who used protests to vocalise their own grievances (though 
secessionism itself remained a fairly concealed element of their political narrative in 2011) (Ginny 
Hill, 2011). At the same time, the diversion of security forces towards containing public 
demonstrations led to the escalation of Al Qaeda’s activities in the country, with rumours of Al 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) seizing control of important cities and strongholds in the 
South (Sarah Phillips, 2011).  
 From April 2011 onwards, the Arab Spring in Yemen took on a notably different character, as 
high ranking members of the existing political system began to adopt more overtly anti-Government 
stances along with popular protesters, so that one interviewee noted at this time that: “every day a 
lot of military are joining us, even high ranking personnel, but especially soldiers”. The JMP, with 
Islah and the Yemeni Socialist Party as two of its foundational sub-structures, began to appoint 
themselves as the official spokesmen for the pro-change movement, despite the clear cultural, 
religious and ideological divisions between different groups that had joined in demonstrations.  
 The JMP’s critics, including April Longley Alley, have observed that the JMP’s “deep personal, 
financial, and political connections with the current regime … raise questions about the ability or 
desire of the JMP to faithfully negotiate on behalf of those protesting on the streets”, though they 
were nevertheless treated as the voice of the Arab Spring in Yemen in negotiations organised by the 
GCC and other parties (2011). Some of these political connections were severed through the mass 
resignation of JMP officials from the Yemeni Government out of protest against the state’s use of 
military violence against demonstrators in 2011. However, personal and financial connections 
remained for many of the JMP’s members. Cynical observers of the situation might have concluded 
at the time that the JMP’s actions represented, if anything, only a last bid attempt to distance 
themselves from a collapsing state in order to ensure their own survival.  
 Similar accusations have been directed toward some of Saleh’s previous supporters, who 
included powerful tribal leaders and military stakeholders. Chief among these are the Al-Ahmar 
Family, head of the Hashid tribal federation (Horton, 2011), and General Ali Al Mohsen, who 
defected from the military along with several of his units in March 2011, allegedly to protect 
protesters from state violence (Expert Consultation, Atiaf Alwazir, 5 June, 2012). While the Al-Ahmar 
family eventually opted for all-out war against the Government, with tensions lessening only with 
the removal of President Saleh from power, General Mohsen and his men were known to have shied 
away from military confrontation in 2011. This, as Michael Horton summarises, was likely because 
the General knew that his troops lacked the manpower and capacity to engage the Yemeni army 
directly, as headed by President Saleh’s son, Ahmed al Saleh (2011). 
 The roles of the Al-Ahmar family and General Mohsen in the Arab Spring soon came to 
dominate media reports on Yemen with good reason. Sarah Phillips writes that: 
The tribes are the most pervasive social forces in Yemen but their level of influence at 
the national level varies greatly depending on their proximity to the regime. Saleh’s tribe 
(the Sanhan), for example, is small but enjoys tremendous access to state resources. … 
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The Sanhan are members of the Hashid tribal confederation, which is the smaller but 
more internally cohesive of the two major northern tribal confederations … Both the 
Hashid and the Bakil (to a lesser extent) have disproportionate influence at the elite 
level, and at the lower levels of the tribal hierarchy (2011, p. 51) 
The Yemeni Government has been based since its formation on extensive systems of patronage that 
are designed to ensure tribal loyalties to the existing regime. The Hashid and Bakil Federations have 
previously acted as a major support structure for the Yemeni state and have maintained a vested 
interest in the state's survival71.  
 These allegiances, supported, as Phillips claims, by financial stipends paid through “the 
Department of Tribal Affairs, an opaque organisation that is officially attached to the Ministry of 
Local Affairs” (2011, pp. 52-53), function to all effects and purposes as a shadow state, whose 
undemocratic foundations have been a central motivating factor of general unrest in Yemen for 
several years, as well as a prominent element of the early 2011 protests. It is a system that various 
tribal groupings are said to have a direct vested interest in maintaining. Yet in May 2011, the al-
Ahmar family, headed by Sheik Sadiq al-Ahmar, openly ended its alliance with President Saleh, 
representing a break of the Hashid Federation from the Government for reasons that are largely 
unknown. In June, the Government of Yemen began a direct military campaign against the al-Ahmar 
family in Sana’a (Johnson, 2011), sparking what historians will likely come to refer to as a second 
Yemeni civil war.  
 The abandonment of the Saleh regime by the al-Ahmar family has not been directly 
correlated with the defection of General Mohsen from the Yemeni army, though the two are cited as 
being next door neighbours in Sana’a as well as close allies (Johnson, 2011). 
 General Mohsen was originally tipped as a likely candidate to take over after President 
Saleh’s departure from power. He quickly gained in popularity, particularly in the capital, though he 
never quite succeeded in living up to his promise of offering physical protection to Yemeni civilians. 
Ahmed al Saleh remained a favourite of pro-Government supporters to take over leadership from his 
father after a bomb attack on President Saleh forced him to leave Yemen between June and 
September 2011 to seek medical treatment in Saudi Arabia. While both of these figures have been 
bypassed by the February 2012 election process, along with all other party leaders, to make way for 
the ascension of Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi to power, any one of them could reignite a military 
confrontation in a bid to take over leadership of the country. 
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 See Chapter 5, section 5.3, for more details on the relationship between tribal and state structures.  
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Figure 30 The Al Saleh Mosque - Yemen's Largest Mosque, Built on the Outskirts of Sana'a by President Saleh in 2008 
and Named After His Family 
 Ahmed al Saleh and other Saleh family loyalists continue to lead their own military units in 
the country, sabotaging key infrastructure sites, and effectively splitting the Yemeni army into two 
rival factions according to interviews conducted with Nocholas Hopton and other key stakeholders. 
At the same time, Saleh’s participation in President Hadi’s inauguration ceremony has led to 
concerns by some, including Prime Minister Mohammed Basindawa, that Hadi’s rule will be 
delegitimised by Saleh’s continued influence over the new President. Such suspicions have been 
aggravated by Saleh’s power-handover speech itself, in which he famously concluded that: “The 
responsibilities on the shoulders of the new president are immense, but we are confident that with 
our support he will succeed” (Al Jazeera, 2012). Of primary concern here is that the struggle 
between these and other elite stakeholders has overshadowed the youth movement that began the 
Arab Spring in Yemen, leading to the strong possibility that their grievances will once again be 
overlooked. 
 
2.5 Resource Competition and Poverty 
 While previous subsections of this chapter have concentrated on the political and historical 
causes of Yemen's fragility, what is instrumental to understanding the challenges that the country 
faces today is an appreciation for the significant resource competition generated by its rapid 
resource depletion and extreme poverty. In 2010, 42.8% of the population of Yemen lived below the 
poverty line on less than $2 per day, and poverty is said to have increased to over 60% in 2011 due 
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to the disruption of industry and employment during the Arab Spring (Sadeq Al-Wesabi, 2011)72. This 
trend risks being aggravated further by rapid population growth – the product of Yemen's high 
fertility rate. Additional stresses on Yemen's socio-economic environment stem from its 
continuously shrinking resource base, with food, fertile land, water and oil being consumed at a rate 
that dramatically exceeds their realistically sustainable usage. Weak resource management and 
wasteful resource extraction practices compound these challenges, resulting in nationwide conflicts 
over resource distribution between North and South Yemen, increased intra-tribal competition and 
violence, uneven development between urban and rural areas, and physical confrontations between 
and within families.  
 Oxford Analytica write that “the most pressing issues that Yemen will have to deal with in 
the near future are the loss of oil reserves and the depletion of its water table”, with underground 
water reserves shrinking by a total of eight metres per year in some parts of the country (2009, p. 
16). This high rate of water depletion stems from Yemen's lack of surface water, with the CIA World 
Factbook writing that the country's 527,968km² of land contain 0km² of surface water, leaving the 
24,133,400 large population of Yemen vastly dependent upon underground reservoirs for their 
water needs (2011). While the Government of Yemen is exploring other viable alternatives to non-
renewable water usage, such as constructing desalination plants along the Southern coastline, such 
projects have proven far too costly for the fragile state to implement on a sufficiently large scale to 
supply the entire country. Furthermore, unreliable rainfall patterns and the increasing availability of 
water mining technologies in Yemen has pushed many farmers to abandon the terracing of their 
fields (a traditional practice for collecting rainwater), and to switch to using underground water for 
their irrigation needs (Stakeholder Consultation, Food and Agriculture Organisation, 14 August, 
2010).  
 A lack of coordination between farmers and others using the same underground water 
supplies, poor mining practices and a lack of legal infrastructure to protect underground reservoirs 
has led to the frequent collapse of underground caverns, contaminating water supplies. The World 
Bank summarises that: 
Yemen’s water resources depend on rainfall, almost all of which is rapidly lost to 
evapotranspiration (ET).  About 6% of rainfall runs off as surface water and flows into 
stream beds, often as violent spate torrents.  Occasionally, very large rainfall events 
occur outside of normal patterns and cause destructive floods, as in Hadramout and al-
Mahra in October 2008.  ... Agriculture is estimated to use 93% of available surface and 
groundwater.  However, rapid increases in water abstraction and use have affected the 
water balance.  The rate of groundwater overdraft is currently twice the recharge rate, 
and is increasing, bringing depletion of water reserves, inequity, and shortages, with 
negative socio-economic consequences.  Reforms to tackle water problems have been 
under-way for a decade but no headway has been made in reining in the rate of 
overdraft. (2010a, p. xii) 
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 These facts are already mentioned in section 2.3, which outlined Yemen’s key demographics and geographic 
characteristics. They are repeated here because this section will go into the reasons for their prevalence more 
thoroughly. 
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A lack of capacity to deal with rainfall effectively, and a lack of built and maintained rainwater 
collection systems, has left Yemen extremely vulnerable to both flooding and drought. It is 
considered one of the most water starved countries in the world, with a water deficit of one billion 
cubic metres per year (Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2010). 
 The Yemeni oil sector – the backbone of Yemen's struggling economy – is facing similar 
challenges that have been aggravated by ineffectual domestic policies and destructive external 
economic trends. Oxford Analytica write that Yemen's: 
oil exports ... have declined steadily over the past five years. The 75% drop in oil 
revenues in the first half of 2009 was a devastating blow. Though international oil prices 
have largely recovered from their initial decline following the global financial crisis, it is 
the decline in output in Yemen that is of most concern. Most experts believe that oil will 
run out by 2017, but the 2009 figures suggest this could happen sooner. (2009, p. 16) 
Interviews with Yemeni members of state conducted in July 2011 indicated a strong reluctance 
among Government officials to admit to this claim, many stating that of yet unexplored areas of 
Yemeni terrain may reveal new, previously undetected oil supplies.  
 Liquid natural gas extraction has been listed as a potential replacement for the oil sector. 
However, what has become clear in recent years is that Yemen's single export-based economy 
model is unsustainable. This realisation has led both the Yemeni Government and its international 
and regional donors to channel their combined efforts into moving the country away from its oil 
dependency by focusing on the development of three other so-termed 'promising sectors'; those of 
agriculture, tourism and fisheries (Stakeholder Consultation, Ministry of Planning and International 
Cooperation, 15 August, 2010, Interview Led by Sultan Barakat). It is worth noting that prospects for 
tourism enhancement in Yemen are limited by the country's international reputation for conflict, 
violence and terrorism, while the agricultural and fisheries sectors are extremely vulnerable to 
resource scarcity and increased competition.  
 Diminishing oil production in Yemen, which has coincided with high points in oil market 
prices, has meant that the Yemeni Government has failed to capitalise on opportunities to turn 
around sufficient profits from this resource to generate development in other sectors. Across the 
board, all ministries interviewed73 reported that their existing budgets are barely sufficient to 
maintain staffing requirements, let alone to launch new development projects. The inability of the 
Yemeni state to capitalise on oil revenues is linked to its internal policy of oil subsidies, whereby 
Yemenis are able to purchase oil at an extremely low rate in order to maintain their businesses. The 
Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation states that these “Fuel subsidies absorbed on 
average 27% of the total [public] expenditures during 2006-08” (2009b, p. 7). Attempts to reverse 
this policy have traditionally been derailed by mass protests and rioting by Yemen's people – many 
of whom depend on oil subsidies to stave off poverty and starvation.  
 Although limited reductions to subsidies were made in 2010, leading to increased prices for 
diesel, Liquefied Petroleum Gas, kerosene, and gasoline; prices for these products in Yemen today 
remain on average 50% lower than global market rates. 
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 See Chapter 1, section 1.6.3 for a full list of consulted Ministries. 
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Figure 31 Yemeni woman carries grain from market in Sana'a 
 The need to cultivate Yemen’s oil and non-oil exports is compounded by two other large 
inter-connected resource deficits; those of food and arable land.  Yemen’s climate is extremely 
changeable and prone to desertification. According to the CIA World Factbook, arable land accounts 
for only 2.91% of land in Yemen (2011). The Government of Yemen writes that: 
Land problems are considered one of the most difficult challenges facing Yemen, as land 
has significant social and economic value in traditional Yemeni society. Land problems 
are a constant challenge to the rule of law, government authority, and social peace. In 
fact, land disputes directly account for 30 percent of all court cases and indirectly 
account for an additional 10-15 percent (through correlated issues such as land theft, 
forgery and related assaults). (2009, p. 7) 
Land and water resources are a leading cause of violence and conflict in Yemen. For the 
Government, “modernizing ownership and proprietorship rights, improving dispute resolution 
procedures, and ensuring appropriate issuance of land titles in order for land to be used as collateral 
in lending” are top priorities, not only for stabilising the country, but also for developing its economy 
and virtually non-existent banking sector (2009, p. 7).  
 Such changes need to be implemented quickly, as Yemen’s already limited availability of 
arable land is currently shrinking, due to “Increased drought frequency, increased temperatures, and 
changes in precipitation patterns” (Environment Protection Authority, 2009, p. 1). The quality of 
arable land is also deteriorating due to over-use and poor agricultural practices. This simultaneously 
contributes to all of Yemen’s other resource-related problems, including those concerning water, oil 
and food.  
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 Qat farming accounts for the vast majority of agricultural production in the country. This is 
because qat is a relatively hardy, easy to grow cash-crop, which also happens to be the only legal 
narcotic available in Yemen, the use of which is unrestricted by most interpretations of Islamic law. 
The Government of Yemen and the World Bank Group write that: 
Qat chewing is pervasive in Yemen, affecting every demographic group to varying 
degrees. Currently, it accounts for 6% of GDP, 10% of consumption, 1/3 of agricultural 
GDP and provides greater employment than the public sector, employing about 500,000 
people (or 1 of every 7 Yemenis). Despite the significant economic opportunities for qat 
producers and suppliers, the net effect of qat consumption is negative for Yemen’s 
economic development. (2007, p. 43) 
Qat farming is gradually replacing all forms of food production in Yemen, leading to an unfortunate 
paradox, whereby a predominantly agricultural society has grown entirely reliant upon food imports 
in order to stave off starvation. Yemen has become a net importer, with oil remaining one of its sole 
export commodities, the production of which was entirely disrupted in 2011 due to the Arab Spring. 
Ghazi Abdul-Rahman Al-Samia’y writes that “the percentage of people unable to meet their daily 
food requirements has increased to 20%”, and most have grown entirely reliant upon governmental 
and non-governmental handouts for their needs, leading to a crisis of protracted relief across the 
country (2009, p. 19). In 2010, the World Bank wrote: “Yemen has one of the highest malnutrition 
rates in the world. Data from the Family Health Survey (FHS) of 2003 indicate that 53.1% of children 
under 5 are stunted, 45.6 per cent are underweight, and 12.4 per cent are wasted. ” (2010b, p. 14). 
These rates are likely to increase dramatically in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, which severely 
disrupted economic production and development in 2011.  
 Aside from reducing food production, qat impacts water, land and oil scarcity. Christopher 
Boucek explains that: 
Because qat is more productive as it is given more water, there are no incentives to 
conserve water in irrigation. Farmers will therefore often over-irrigate their fields with 
little consideration given to the environmental after effects, including soil degradation 
caused by exhausting soil nutrients. (2009, p. 8) 
Qat is considered by many analysts to be the leading cause of Yemen's sky-rocketing rate of water 
depletion. However, because water for irrigation is drawn primarily from underground, qat also 
requires considerable oil expenditures to run water-pumps and pipelines, contributing to high usage 
of Yemen's already scarce resources and placing tremendous strain on Government budgets by 
exploiting oil subsidies.  
 The Yemeni Government and its people have become locked into a pattern of resource 
depletion, whereby reversing high rates of resource use will require significant external investment 
over a prolonged period of time. Thus far, the Yemeni state has managed to avoid economic collapse 
only through continuing external support and oil production. However, donor support has tended 
towards extreme inconsistency in recent years, undermined by accusations of Government 
corruption, so that money pledged by international and regional donors is often reduced in practice 
and consistently fails to match funds eventually delivered and disbursed throughout the country. For 
instance, of the US $5.7bn pledged to Yemen at the 2006 London Consultative Group meeting, only 
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10% had been disbursed in 2010 according to interviews conducted at the Ministry of International 
Planning and Cooperation, which has not been sufficient to reverse the country's fragility. Such 
funding is not adequate enough to develop Yemen's “promising” sectors in order to move the 
country away from its oil dependency.  
 Yemen's growing reputation for insecurity is causing the withdrawal of domestic and foreign 
investors to more financially stable climates, removing other forms of potential state income 
(Stakeholder Consultation, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 15 August, 2010, 
Interview Led by Sultan Barakat). Taxation is equally weak, and tax evasion, as well as low levels of 
contribution to government income, renders any existing investment socially sub-optimal in 
developmental terms (Chatham House, 2010). Within this socio-economic context, it is not 
surprising that poverty and resource scarcity are generating significant competition, which accounts 
for a large portion of violence, conflict and offences against the person committed in the country. 
Meanwhile the state remains both financially and physically unable to restore balance and equality 
to its people. 
 
2.6 Social Inequality and Lack of Access to Basic Services 
 Extreme poverty and lack of state capacity negatively impact the ability of Yemeni citizens to 
access basic services. These are further restricted by severe social inequalities: between the rich and 
the poor; between urban and rural, as well as central and peripheral areas; between landless people, 
nomads and land owners; between different groups of migrants; between tribal and religious 
groups; and between genders (Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations Population Fund, 14 
August, 2010). Since basic services include healthcare, education, social welfare and protection, 
these social inequalities have serious implications for maintaining poverty levels and prolonging 
uneven development conditions, which are a primary source of conflict and political unrest in 
Yemen. Pervasive social inequalities and poor service provision prevent marginalised groups from 
lifting themselves out of poverty by denying them various forms of social opportunity. As Rodrigo R. 
Soares asserts in his analysis of international differences in crime rates, social and economic 
inequality has proven to be one of the variables “most consistently related to crime rates”, 
particularly when it comes to “theft and contact crime”, as well as burglary (2002, p. 175). Yet, while 
healthcare and education are unevenly distributed across the country, social welfare and protection 
services are almost entirely absent everywhere, with unemployment benefits and child protection 
remaining the largest policy gap areas (Stakeholder Consultation, International Labour Organisation, 
15 August, 2010, Interview Led by Sean Deely). 
 Yemen was ranked 133rd out of 169 countries in the 2010 Human Development Index (HDI). 
While it has shown some level of improvement in its development indicators over the past decade, 
rising from its 2007 position of 140, it continues to be undermined by poor healthcare, education 
and welfare service levels. In 2010, the HDI classified 32% of the country as being “undernourished”, 
which accounted for the greatest health risk in the country. Yet while the under-five mortality rate in 
Yemen was at 69 registered deaths for every 1,000 people that year, public health expenditure in 
the country accounted for only 1.5% of gross domestic product (GDP), while education represented 
5.2%. This followed on from a prolonged period of deteriorating security, which saw the diversion of 
funds for public spending towards the development and supply of the country's military while the 
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global economic crisis saw a significant reduction in donor aid to the country. In practice, it meant 
that hospitals and other healthcare providers were ill-equipped to handle the sheer volume of 
injuries and related cases generated by crackdowns against protesters in 2011, leading many 
mosques and other public buildings to double up as care givers for those in need. This trend is 
anticipated to have had the potential to reverse recent advances in health in Yemen, linked to the 
containment of various diseases, such as measles, tuberculosis and malaria. These are also affected 
by the uneven distribution of potable water across the country, which is known to heavily impact 
health and sanitation (Stakeholder Consultation, World Health Organisation, 15 August, 2010). 
 
Figure 32 Yemeni girl works a vegetable garden in Sana'a 
 Although some advances have been made in public school systems, total school registration 
and student retention numbers remain incredibly low (Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations 
International Children's Emergency Fund, 15 August, 2010, Interview Led by David Connolly). Poor 
retention rates are linked to the reality that the education sector in Yemen has failed to attract 
quality professionals, leading to very poor levels of student engagement in the classroom 
(Stakeholder Consultation, Ministry of Education, 17 August, 2010). Extreme levels of poverty74 mean 
that many children are made to work to support their families rather than attend school. 
 Yemen's high fertility rate (another lead cause of poor general health levels and high child 
and maternal mortality rates), as well as the influx of foreign migrants from Iraq, Ethiopia, Djibouti, 
Somalia and other areas, have meant that the country's labour force has expanded considerably 
faster in recent years than the job market can accommodate. The Minister of Labour and Social 
Affairs noted in interview that he received 175,000 applicants for 1,000 new low-level positions 
created in 2009 to stem the impact of mass unemployment, a figure indicative of the severe 
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 According to the Central Statistical Organisation, unemployment rates rose from 16% in 2005 to 35% in 
2008, before the global economic crisis also triggered the vast return of labour migrant to Yemeni soil, 
removing remittances as one of the country's economic support systems (2008). Poverty has since been on the 
increase. 
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overcrowding of the Yemeni labour market (Stakeholder Consultation, 16 August, 2010). Travelling 
through Sana'a, it is easy to observe large groups of Yemeni men sitting by the side of the road, 
waiting for work, many of whom are qualified electricians, mechanics and traders, while women and 
children crowd around passing cars, begging for food and money. 
 
Figure 33 Yemeni boy minds a stall in the centre of Sana'a 
 The World Bank estimates that every person in Yemen between the ages of 15 and 65 who is 
in employment actually supports at least four others who are not, meaning that employment is no 
longer a valid means of overcoming poverty, as salaries are often not sufficient to raise a single 
individual out of deprivation (2007). In practice, this means that, rather than attending school, young 
girls often stay home to help their families by attending to farms, collecting water and caring for 
younger siblings, while school-age boys go out in search of work (Stakeholder Consultation, United 
Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, 15 August, 2010, Interview Led by David Connolly).  
 Despite these significant restrictions, Government efforts to lower the cost of education 
through subsidies – particularly for young girls who are often denied such services due to engrained 
gender inequalities – have succeeded in raising net enrolment rates, which, according to the United 
Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, increased from 52.7% in 1990 to 75.3% in 2008 
(2008, p. 3). Barakat et al write that these increases are attributable to parallel development 
projects, so that: 
Water projects, for example, have allowed more girls to attend school by reducing one 
major labour burden in their lives. Consequently, the female to male ratio in basic 
education increased from 44.6 per cent in 1990 to ... 74.8 per cent in 2008, with 
evidence of increasing community awareness and acceptance of the importance of girls’ 
primary education among traditional communities. These rising levels of acceptance are 
also largely the product of a 2006 decree that eliminated user fees for girls in grades 1 - 
6 and for boys in grades 1 - 3 in order to reduce the gender gap within the country. 
However, gender-specific education needs continue to be neglected so that health 
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education and reproductive health education have been sidelined in schools, reflecting a 
discrepancy between policy and gender-based needs in Yemen (2011b, p. 32) 
However, a parental preference for boys’ education remains across the country, with many girls 
dropping out of school early in order to marry and have children, with no legally set age limit for 
marriage in the country (Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations International Children's 
Emergency Fund, 14 August, 2010). Meanwhile boys’ education continues to be limited by the 
necessities of employment, whereby 10% of the known labour force in Yemen in 2009 was made up 
of predominantly male children, 12% of whom were aged between 6 and 14 years old (United 
Nations Development Project, 2010). 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 Mark Shaw notes that sovereign states have historically been defined as enclosed or 
“bordered” political organisations with exclusive ownership over legitimate (or simply internally 
legalised) violence within their territories (1997, p. 500). However, as Graham Brown and Frances 
Stewart note, fragile states are frequently defined as suffering from authority, services and 
legitimacy-based failures in tandem. Authority failures occur when a state “lacks the authority to 
protect its citizens from violence of various kinds”; service failures occur when a state fails to 
“ensure that all citizens have access to basic services”; and legitimacy failures occur when the state 
enjoys “only limited support among the people” and is “typically not democratic” (2010, p. 10). As a 
fragile state, Yemen today falls short of Shaw's criteria, whereby authority and legitimacy failures 
inhibit its Government from fully and effectively maintaining its territory in accordance with a 
bordered conception of statehood. The legitimacy and legality of violence committed by the Yemeni 
Government within its territory is often questioned by its citizens and the international community, 
while insurgents and foreign powers continue to use violence to bid for control of various 
governorates within the country, both with the Government's approval and without it. Even Yemen's 
challenges are not enclosed within its territory – with piracy, terrorism and (as the next Chapter 
argues) organised crime emerging as cross-regional phenomena and tribal divisions failing to 
recognise official state lines.  
 Yemen's severely limited infrastructure, which has had a telling influence on resource 
competition, service delivery, social inequality and poverty, almost calls for new definitions of 
statehood to be developed, although the fragile states framework, which is a comparatively recent 
innovation, is sufficiently flexible to remain pertinent in this context. Yemen's unique socio-political 
reality reflects its unusual evolution, and its context will prove extremely important for shaping 
theoretical analyses of criminal and political violence in this thesis. 
 The United Nations Development Project writes that: 
Overlaying a modern state upon Yemen’s traditional governance system has proved 
difficult, and both state formation and nation building remain works-in-progress. 
Meanwhile, to ensure its survival, the government has created informal political 
alliances with traditional shaiks, religious leaders, and powerful interest groups through 
intensive patronage networks outside the formal state structures – which has given rise 
to the so-called ‘parallel state’. (2010b, p. 11) 
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The existence of the Yemeni parallel state has worked both to secure the Government's position of 
authority prior to 2011 and to severely limit the extent of its power. While the parallel state 
quantifies the informal institutions that might be called upon to enhance the Government's decision-
implementing capacity, it actually serves to undermine official structures. Many manifestations of 
Yemen's fragility are intrinsically connected to weak governance, whereby the state remains 
incapable of monopolising control over legitimate violence and lacks the institutional capacity to 
exercise significant positive change in the lives of its citizens.  
 More importantly, Yemen's severe lack of institutional capacity renders it incapable of 
securing law and order throughout its territories, pushing it to use military violence against its 
citizens in order to maintain its integrity and sovereignty, thereby diminishing its claims to good and 
effective governance. The legality and legitimacy of such violence is brought into question by 
organisations like the Human Rights Watch, which make frequent reference to strikes against 
predominantly civilian targets (2010), arbitrary arrests (2008) and harsh responses to protests (2009) 
that are a violation of the country's international commitments under human rights conventions75.  
 James Turner Johnson writes that such conventions operate according to the principle that: 
Concern for protection of human rights has come to occupy a central place in 
contemporary understandings of the justification – or nonjustification – of resort to 
violent force and limitations on such force. Such understandings assume not only that 
violence can be justified – as opposed to the position that it is always wrong in itself – 
but also that it must be justified and, if justified, used in a manner consistent with its 
justifications. (1998, p. 319) 
Looking to the analysis that will unfold over the remainder of this thesis, it needs to be noted that 
not only are local perceptions of the state's use of violence as being “unwelcome” or “illegitimate” 
damaging to relations between law-enforcement members and Yemeni communities, but that the 
Government's current system of territorial control is not working. This system will be outlined far 
more thoroughly in Chapter 5, which, together with Chapters 7 and 8, will therefore put forward the 
argument that new models of security are likely needed in fragile states, where governments do not 
have the infrastructure or the institutional capacity necessary to approach policing in the same way 
as the developed world.  
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 These are listed in Chapter 5, section 5.2.1. 
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Chapter 3: Crime in Yemen 
 
 
Figure 34 Jambiyyah - Curved knives worn by Yemeni men as a symbol of male honour 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter provides an in depth analysis of crime in Yemen in order to document the 
extent of the problem. The country offers a fairly typical example of crime and young offending 
within a fragile state context. While its statistically recorded rate of total crime is very low, its 
homicide rate is high, as is its rate of violent offending. Thus, according to the United Nations Survey 
of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, Yemen registered a rate of 0.0336276 
homicides per 1,000 people in 2004, placing it at the 27th position out of 62 countries with available 
data (2005). In 2008, this number went up to approximately 0.04, according to the Human 
Development Index, indicating a steady and consistent increase (2010). Its rate of violent crime has 
since escalated further, yet the causes of these increases have not yet been made fully apparent.  
 The extent of the problem is significant, leading to a high rate of social violence, particularly 
against women and children. Here, uprooted communities seem to be especially vulnerable, and the 
United Nations Country Team's Child Protection Sub-Cluster has reported that 67.5% of displaced 
people under the age of 18 show evidence of being subjected to domestic violence, of which only 
33.4% may be attributed to the exercise of corporal punishment (2010, p. 5). Violence against 
children in schools and on the streets has additionally been proven to be very common (Stakeholder 
Consultation, United Nations Population Fund, 14 August, 2010). Likewise, however, adult men are 
also found to be at risk of grievous bodily harm and fatality, usually as a result of revenge killings or 
of violent disagreements over natural resources. The Small Arms Survey estimates that arguments 
relating specifically to water and land currently account for approximately 4,000 deaths per year in 
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rural Yemen alone (2010). Poor reliance on official state justice mechanisms, particularly in the 
peripheries, which are isolated from centralised rule, means that people tend to take justice into 
their own hands, turning personal confrontations into family, tribal or religious ones that affect a 
much larger populous.  
 These and other related trends stem from the fact that Yemen is today considered one of 
the most heavily armed countries in the world, which is a result of both the important cultural 
symbolism of weapons within Yemeni culture and of the country's very low border control capacity, 
which allows for the relatively easy trafficking of small arms into and out of its borders. Curved 
blades named jambiyyah that are worn on the belt (see Figure 34) have traditionally symbolised 
male honour and tribal affiliation, and are especially prominent in the North. However, these are 
now increasingly being replaced with or kept company by illegal firearms. In 2003, Derek B. Miller 
wrote that there were approximately 50 million small arms in the country – or roughly 2.5 firearms 
per person, if the 2003 population estimates are to be used – and many of these weapons are yet to 
be accounted for by the Government (p. 10).  
 Due to the importance of weapons in Yemeni customs and cultural practices, any official 
efforts to enforce control over weapons distribution and possession have in the past been met with 
great hostility, while those policies that are passed successfully are made redundant by a lack of 
implementation capacity. Limited progress was achieved in 2008 when the Ministry of Interior 
reportedly seized 92,028 weapons from the general population (Al-Zaidi, 2008). Yet the significant 
civilian gun violence that distinguished Yemeni demonstrations from broader public protests that 
swept across the Middle East and parts of Africa in early 201176 is testimony that these efforts have 
not proven sufficient in restoring law and order to the country. 
 Within this context of widespread social violence and the escalation of violence through the 
availability of weapons, there has emerged a growing trend towards violent behaviour among 
children and young people under the age of eighteen, attributed to the socialisation of children to 
violence. The United Nations Country Team summarise that the use of child combatants in the 
Northern conflicts77 of Yemen is creating a generation of young people “who perceive violent 
opportunism to be a normal aspect of life” (2010, p. 25), but the same link can be made for those 
children who are growing up in areas of high social violence that have not been exposed to war78. 
The visible effects of this growing culture of violence are an increased occurrence of young offending 
and a growing rate of violent offending among young people.  
 Building on the context analysis put forward in Chapter 2, this chapter will examine each of 
these developments in turn, starting with an overview of the extent of crime in Yemen, which will 
document rates of offending over time and trends in offending according to geographic distribution, 
with a particular emphasis on the difference between rural and urban areas. Next, this chapter will 
provide an evaluation of offender characteristics, followed by a more detailed examination of young 
offending and gender-based violence. It will continue its discussion of weapons proliferation within 
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 See Chapter 2, section 2.4.4, for a full analysis of the 2011 Arab Spring’s impact on Yemen. 
77
 These conflicts in the North refer to the six Sa’ada wars that are outlined in Chapter 2, section 2.4.1. 
78
 The connection between exposure to violence and the propensity to commit violence will be discussed in 
more detail throughout Chapter 4, and particularly in sections 4.2.3 and 4.3, when theories that analyse the 
impact of violence on the development of children and young people will be presented. 
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the broader context of the more general availability of criminogenic commodities in the country, 
based upon an analysis of organised crime and corruption. Finally, the findings of these sections will 
be reviewed holistically in order to build a more comprehensive portrait of crime in Yemen. This 
Chapter’s methodology is drawn loosely from Chris Kershaw et al's Crime in England and Wales 
study (2007) and Richard Boreham et al's Arrestee Survey (2007), though its analytical structure has 
been adapted to suit the parameters of a fragile state79. 
 
3.2 Data Sources 
 The purpose of this chapter requires a country-wide analysis of changing patterns of 
offending. The author has relied here primarily upon national statistics published by the Government 
of Yemen's Central Statistical Organisation, rather than upon independent field work. The chief data 
sources used within this chapter have been Yemen's Statistical Yearbooks of 2005 to 2010 and 
Security and Justice Statistics of 2003 to 2009, unless otherwise stated. Prior to 2005, Yemen's 
Statistical Yearbooks are incomplete while Security and Justice Statistics documents dating back 
before 2003 are unavailable, so that research has been supplemented by other publications of the 
Central Statistical Organisation. In this regard, while patterns in offences over time have been 
monitored through multiple publications, specific breakdowns of offences by severity and type have 
been drawn predominantly from the 2009 records period, a year offering the most recent  reliable 
statistics made available by the Yemeni state before the Arab Spring significantly shifted the political 
environment to a more violent condition, where the line between political offences and all other 
crimes became extremely blurred, and where many protesters were deliberately misfiled as 
insurgents or terrorists to boost international support for President Saleh's waning regime 
(Alkarama, 2011).  
 An over-reliance upon one organisation for information necessarily leads to research bias. 
To overcome this problem, the researcher has strived wherever possible to verify trends emerging 
from Government reports with United Nations data, made available by UNdata, as well as with 
trends identified by the Global Peace Index and the World Prison Population List. For further analysis 
of emerging trends and their implications, the researcher has conducted detailed interviews with 
high-ranking members of the Yemeni Ministry of Justice, informal interviews with international staff 
working in the country, and telephone interviews with Yemeni citizens in multiple governorates80. 
Finally, for a more impartial take on the reliability of Government data, the author has also relied 
upon Dennis Jay Kenney's independent report on Public Perceptions of the Police in Yemen, which 
deals with reporting and other issues that may have impacted the ability of the state to gather 
statistical data in the country (2008). It is hoped that a combination of these and other sources will 
serve to provide reliable information that may be comprehensively analysed to formulate an 
accurate picture of offending patterns in Yemen81.  
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 This has been accomplished mainly by expanding the degree of attention paid to infrastructure-related 
offences, such as corruption and organised crime. 
80
 The full Methodology has already been outlined in Chapter 1. 
81
 The reliability and coverage of this data has also been discussed in Chapter 1. 
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3.3 Defining Crime in Yemen 
 Yemen is a country currently suffering the effects of multiple crises. Among these crises are 
serious conflicts, intra-tribal confrontations, widespread popular protests, a growing separatist 
movement and terrorism. When talking about violent offending in Yemen, it is important to 
distinguish between criminal behaviour and the manifestation of genuine political grievances – one 
is to be judged as a contravention of the law, while the other is a deliberate affront on the state, the 
alleged righteousness and justification of which is not for this thesis to determine. The 2011 Arab 
Spring protests, for instance, can be interpreted as a legitimate expression of popular will. When 
these protests came to Yemen, violent clashes broke out between pro-government supporters and 
anti-government revolutionaries, which ought to be read primarily as political events. Yet limited 
looting began to take place82 – a sign of opportunistic behaviour motivated primarily by economic 
interests. Each of these forms of potentially harmful social behaviour may be dealt with through 
different means, so that protests are best resolved through increased national dialogue, while 
looting and crime are minimised through the up-scaling of law-enforcement and security services. 
The highly oppositional nature of these two types of intervention help to highlight the need for a 
separation of politically motivated violence from violent crime in any analysis of the subject. These 
arguments are further reinforced when we begin to look at terrorism or war alongside violent 
offending.  
 While there can be no doubt that the arbitrary killing of civilians should be outlawed, filing 
“casualties of war” under the label of “murder victims” or vice versa conceals the extent of both 
problems, not only insulting the memories of both sets of victims but also confusing any relevant 
policy objectives. Thus, researchers of violence tend to choose to distinguish between political and 
so-called “apolitical” behaviour. Michael Kenney does so in his study of Crime, Insurgency and 
Political Violence, where he plays with the boundaries of political and apolitical behaviour through a 
comparison of terrorism and organised crime. He writes that: 
One of the defining attributes of “organized crime,” … is that it is apolitical. Organized 
crime occurs when three or more participants, who together form part of a cohesive, 
hierarchical group, coordinate illicit activities in pursuit of “profit and power,” without 
due consideration for “social doctrine, political beliefs, or ideological concerns.” One of 
the defining attributes of terrorism, in contrast, is precisely its political orientation. 
While ... terrorism is a method or tactic of political violence and intimidation ... The 
instrumental use of violence and intimidation is also a hallmark of organized crime. 
...The difference with organized crime is that violence is applied in pursuit of allegedly 
“economic” rather than “political” ends. (2008, p. 2) 
While all crime, regardless of its motivation, is essentially a challenge to the state's ability to exert its 
authority and may hold significant political implications, the distinction between politically 
motivated behaviour and criminal behaviour is key to understanding and responding to both 
phenomena.  
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 According to telephone interviews conducted on the 9th and 10th of March, 2011, with local Yemenis living 
in Sana'a and Houdaidah: looting and theft were minimal throughout this time, but were nevertheless higher 
than normal. 
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 The Yemeni legal system makes this very distinction, separating out criminal, political and 
morality offences in the disaggregation of its statistical data. While the reality that Yemen has 
sufficient political and morality offences to justify three separate bodies of law may speak very 
strongly against the functionality of the State and the overall governance of the country, it also 
renders statistical analyses of Yemeni crime rates easier by listing casualties of war or terrorism as 
victims of political violence. As it is to the benefit of the Yemeni Government to link as many deaths 
as possible to political violence in order to justify its internal policies and its bids for foreign military 
aid83, analysts are left with the reasonable assumption that remaining records of violent behaviour 
offer an accurate portrayal of offending behaviour, subject to crime detection capacity. 
 Keeping these distinctions in mind, this thesis defines crime as any action that is against the 
laws of a state but cannot be linked immediately to political motivations. Within the context of this 
chapter, crime in Yemen is also analysed according to the definitions already established by the 
Yemeni state. 
 
3.4 The Extent of Crime in Yemen 
 
Figure 35 Registered Crimes Against the Person as a Percentage of the Total Number of Registered Crime in Yemen 
 Figure 35 illustrates the growth of violent crime in Yemen as a percentage of the total rate of 
registered crime, based upon those statistics made available by the Central Statistical Organisation 
between 2003 and 2010. Throughout the time of their publication, the Government of Yemen has 
made significant efforts to increase its own operational capacity. Following the initiation of 
hostilities in the North of Yemen in 2004, as well as the breakdown of the security situation across 
the country as a whole, the Government's capacity for law enforcement has significantly diminished 
in many governorates, while much of its operational budget has been siphoned towards its military 
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 As outlined in Chapter 2, political justifications have been especially important for the Yemeni Government 
in bidding for aid from Western powers and from Saudi Arabia. 
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priorities. Although Dr A. Al-Momen Shoga'a al'Deen of the Ministry of Justice stated in interview 
that civil courts have since seen an increase in case loads during this period due to a growing 
national reliance on official conflict resolution channels (Stakeholder Consultation, 17 August, 2010), 
a corresponding increase in pressure on the criminal courts cannot now be attributed to increased 
national confidence in the justice system.  
 In actuality, discrepancies between Kenney's findings and telephone interviews conducted 
as part of this thesis indicate that the rate of reporting of offences by civilians to law enforcement 
services has greatly diminished in Yemen since the publication of his study in 2008 and the collection 
of data for this work in 2010-201284. Overall decreases in budgeting capacity and security indicate 
that the rising crime rate pictured above is connected to broader social conditions, rather than 
increased reporting, and no evidence of increased reporting has been documented. Meanwhile 
crime detection capacities have actually diminished throughout this time.  
 The proportional growth of violent crime, which has risen from 42.08% to 48.04% of total 
registered crimes in the country, is equally troubling in its consistency, falling only in 2004 and 2005 
when the Houthi conflict in the North, accompanied by mass protests and unanticipated violence, 
rendered effective data recording infeasible in many governorates. There is evidence to suggest that 
violent offending increased dramatically in late 2010 and early 2011, when popular unrest triggered 
a wave of anger against President al Abdullah Al Saleh's Government, leading to increased street 
violence and opportunistic crime. This trend has not yet been confirmed by official data. 
 
Figure 36 Crime in Yemeni Governorates for 2009 
 Crime itself is distributed across the country with a concentration on urban, rather than rural 
areas, as is to be reasonably expected in light of issues relating to population density and police 
capacity in different regions. Yemen's largest cities, Sana'a, Aden, Taizz, Hudaydah, Mukalla, Ibb and 
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 See Chapter 1, section 1.2.2. 
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Dhamar are located in Sana'a, Aden, Al Hudaydah, Hadramaut, Ibb and Dhamar governorates 
respectively, and those governorates in turn demonstrate the highest rates of recorded crime (See 
Figure 3685). 
 
Figure 37 Reported Violent Crime in Yemen for 2009 
 Violent crime is particularly concentrated in those governorates that have most strongly 
been affected by conflict, including Sa'ada, Al Jawf, Amran and Hajjah (See Figure 3786). The biggest 
discrepancy in these findings is that Hadramaut's recorded crime rate remains considerably lower 
than those of more central administrative areas, despite containing a big city. This perfectly 
illustrates one factor that has significantly diminished the reliability of available data: namely, the 
uneven law-enforcement capacities of central and peripheral areas of the country. Hadramaut 
remains today one of the poorest governorates in the country and its level of policing is very low. 
Poverty itself, however, may also be a determining factor for raising incidents of violent crime as a 
percentage of total recorded offences (See Table 987). 
 
District 
Offences Against the Person 
as a Percentage (%) of Total 
Registered Crime 
 
Aggregate Percentage (%) of 
Poor 
Ibb 50.78 23.086-34.691 
Abyan 48.91 37.136-48.378 
Sana’a City 45.07 7.976-17.504 
Al Baida 80.87 51.431-70.395 
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 This map is drawn from data published in the Central Statistical Organisation’s Security and Justice Statistics 
for 2009 (2010). 
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 As above, this map is drawn from data published in the Central Statistical Organisation’s Security and Justice 
Statistics for 2009 (2010). 
87
 This table is compiled from the Central Statistical Organisation’s Security and Justice Statistics for 2009 
(2010) and Statistical Yearbook for 2009 (2010). 
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Taiz 48.86 37.136-48.378 
Al Jawf 78.23 37.136-48.378 
Hajjah 61.6 51.431-70.395 
Al Hudaydah 38.82 37.136-48.378 
Hadramout 24.64 37.136-48.378 
Dhamar 55.74 23.086-34.691 
Shabwa 35.58 51.431-70.395 
Sa’ada 72.35 - 
Sana’a 56.2 23.086-34.691 
Aden 31.48 23.086-34.691 
Lahij 39.86 37.136-48.378 
Mareb 53.16 37.136-48.378 
Al Mahweet 64.71 23.086-34.691 
Al Maharah 32.00 7.976-17.504 
Amran 85.79 51.431-70.395 
Al Daleh 56.62 23.086-34.691 
Reymah 65.12 23.086-34.691 
 
Table 9 The Distribution by Governorate of Aggregate Urban and Rural Poverty Rates and Offences Against the Person as 
a Percentage of Total Recorded Crime in 2009. 
 Across Yemen, offences against the person continue to represent a considerable percentage 
of total registered crime. Despite a higher statistically recorded level of crime in governorates 
containing large urban areas, rural governorates retain a proportionally higher rate of violent 
offending that has been attributed to conflicts over land and resources, made manifest by frequent 
gun violence. Overall, violent crime is particularly high in Northern Yemen, where government 
control is limited and war is frequent. An exception to this trend is Al Baida, where, while centrally 
located, the governorate's violent crime rate represented, 80.87% of total registered crime in 2009. 
This overwhelming tendency for violent offending can be attributed to the governorate's rigid 
reliance on tribal structures and high rate of weapons circulation88.  
 
3.5 Trends in Crime 
As has already been stated, trends in crime in Yemen have revealed a continual increase in 
the number of offences committed over the past decade, as well as a proportional increase in 
violent offences, which have grown both in total and as a percentage of all other offences. In this 
regard, Dennis Jay Kenney asserts that “Yemenis are at somewhat greater risk of most crimes – 
especially crimes of violence – than are citizens of many other countries throughout the world” 
(2008, p. 10). Furthermore, although Yemen's Central Statistical Organisation notes a fairly low rate 
of offences committed against public officials, Kenney argues that his survey of crime trends 
revealed those with friends and family members in the police to be at a greater risk of victimisation 
in violent crimes than other people. Kenney clarifies that among those people with no association 
with police services, the most common form of victimisation is through burglary. This trend is 
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 It is interesting to note, however, that in 2011, despite the governorate’s propensity for violence, anti-
government protests in al-Baida remained non-violent for considerably longer than they did in other areas, 
with many tribesmen handing in their weapons to authorities before entering public demonstrations (Yemen 
Rights Monitor, 2011). 
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supported by official Government data, which shows violent crime and property offences to occur 
with the highest frequency in Yemen (See Figure 3889). Interestingly, international employees 
working for governmental and non-governmental agencies unrelated to the security sector showed 
a low awareness in interview of property offences in Yemen and did not seem overly concerned for 
their safety with regards to crime, showing a low rate of victimisation of foreigners in all crime, apart 
from kidnapping. 
 
Figure 38 All Offences Reported in 2009 
 A correlation between relations with the police and violent crime, may be partially 
attributed to poor police-community relations, where, not only are the police services targeted by 
violent offenders, but those without connections to law enforcement are unlikely to report violent 
offences committed against them due to a lack of confidence in state justice systems. Most Yemeni 
citizens interviewed as part of this thesis's research reported that they would not ever seek 
assistance from the police because they either did not know if the police would help them, or frankly 
believed the police would not help them90. Many even found the suggestion that they would report 
an offence to the police fairly humorous. At the same time, a higher rate of burglary reporting 
among those without family or friends in the police could be attributed to a desire to have property 
returned to them if found, potentially yielding a direct financial benefit to the victims where 
reporting violence would not. To this end, Kenney writes that the risk of murder rises among 
Yemenis with no connection to police services, supporting the theory that they are just as likely to 
fall victim to violent crime, but less likely to report such offences to the state (murder being more 
easily detectable without reporting by the victim than assault or battery). 
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 This graph is compiled from data published in the Central Statistical Organisation’s Security and Justice 
Statistics for 2009 (2010). 
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 As established in Chapter 1, section 1.7.2, when asked whether they would seek help from the police if they 
fell victim to crime, 6 survey respondents said yes and 55 said no. 
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Figure 39 Recorded Morality Offences in 2009 
 Another prominent area of offending is constituted by morality crimes, among which alcohol 
consumption was the most commonly detected type of offence in 2009. However, more serious 
offences were also listed in this category, including rape, “adultery by force” and sexual assault (See 
Figure 3991). This data highlights sexual violence as appearing to be extremely low, and Yemen is 
actually listed by the United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice 
Systems as being 63rd out of 65 countries with available data for rape frequency (2003) (See Annex 
1). This trend may be due in part to the very low social mobility of women in Yemen, where many 
women are closely guarded by their families and thus are not exposed to the same degree of risk as 
women in other countries across the world, where women are either targeted by offenders more 
often or are more likely to report rape than male victims and children. This low trend of offending is 
also associated with the extreme stigmatisation of sexual relations in Yemen, rendering victims of 
sexual abuse across the boards highly unlikely to seek assistance through either official or unofficial 
channels. These ideas will be explored further later in this chapter, under the section on gender-
based violence. 
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Figure 40 Recorded Crimes Against Public Interest for 2009 
 Finally, a prominent area of offending worthy of note is crimes against public interest, which 
can be particularly harmful to both Government infrastructure and the Yemeni people. Among 
these, arson and the detonation of explosive devices are particularly prominent (See Figure 4092), 
which is unsurprising in a country affected by prolonged political crisis and conflict. 
 
3.6 Characteristics of Offenders 
 Most offenders in Yemen are identified and processed as male adults, above the age of 18. 
As shall be discussed further in section 1.7 of this chapter, many of these offenders include young 
males who are misclassified as being older than 18 due to a lack of appropriate documentation to 
prove their entitlement to processing under specialised youth justice systems93. Overall, the 
demographic composition of offenders is extremely gender weighted, so that Yemeni men 
represented 93.64%94 of all offenders in 2009. These demographics are most evident in the make-up 
of Yemeni prison populations, which displays the make-up of convicted felons, rather than that of 
arrestees (See Figure 4195). It ought here to be noted that these statistics only represent public 
correctional facilities, and that there exists a high concentration of privately-run informal prisons in 
Yemen, usually characterised by tribal or religious leadership and severe human rights violations96. 
The make-up of these facilities is not generally reported, but IRIN believes that many of the so-called 
                                                          
92
 As above, this graph is compiled from data published in the Central Statistical Organisation’s Security and 
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 See Chapter 5 for further details of Yemeni justice processes. 
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 These statistics may have been skewed by a tendency by male relatives to opt to go to prison in place of 
women, but rates of female offending are nonetheless very low in Yemen. 
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 This chart is compiled from data published in the Central Statistical Organisation’s Security and Justice 
Statistics for 2009 (2010). 
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offenders that they imprison are incarcerated for political or religious reasons (as in challenging local 
authority figures), rather than official criminal offences (2007). They have been discounted from the 
analysis in this Chapter. 
 
Figure 41 Yemeni Prison Population Demographics in 2009 
 Due to the sheer number of male arrestees in Yemen, the offences for which men are 
generally arrested are relatively representative of the broad trends in crime outlined in the 
preceding sections, with violent and property offences featuring most prominently. Women, who 
are hugely under-represented among prison populations, are most commonly brought in for 
offences against the person with varying degrees of severity, adultery-related offences and public 
indecency. Meanwhile, foreign nationals, who represent only 3.48% of the prison population, are 
predominantly arrested for immigration-related offences. Ali Saeed notes that a deliberate targeting 
of foreign nationals by police in theft and property investigations has been documented in Yemen, 
particularly in those areas with prominent Somali refugee populations (2011). The degree to which 
harassment of Somali suspects by police officers occurs in the course of legitimate investigations is 
not apparent. 
 
3.7 Young Offending 
 Young offenders comprise a very small percentage of statistically recorded crime rates in 
Yemen. However, the number of documented offences committed by young people under the age of 
18 has shown a continual increase from the year 2003 onwards (See Figure 4297). There are many 
possible explanations for this trend. Firstly, as the United Nations International Children's Emergency 
Fund (UNICEF) and the Yemeni Ministry of Health and Population assert, only 22.3% of children were 
registered at the time of their birth in 2006, leaving another estimated 77.7% without any proof of 
age or identity. UNICEF et al write that, while “There is no variation in birth registration between 
male and female children”, “Children living in the rural households ... are less likely to have their 
births registered than children living in urban areas (16.4 percent versus 38.2 percent)”, as are 
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children born to impoverished households when compared to those born in wealthier ones (where 
“birth registration took place in only 5 percent of the poorest households compared to 50.4 percent 
in the richest households”) (2006, p. 54). 
 
Figure 42 Criminal Cases Where Culprits Were Tried as Juveniles and Adults 
 As a result, it is extremely “difficult for many juvenile offenders to prove their age at the 
time of the offence, and in these situations courts sometimes sentence to death persons under age 
18 at the time of the crime” (Human Rights Watch, 2008, p. 16) or incorrectly process minors as 
adults through the criminal court system. The Human Rights Watch observes that in “February 2007, 
Yemen executed Adil Muhammad Saif al-Ma'amari for a crime allegedly committed when he was 16” 
and that “At least 18 other juvenile offenders are believed to be on death row”, despite Yemen's 
stated stance against the death penalty in cases where children and young people under the age of 
18 are the suspected culprits (p. 16). On the one hand, the low rate of identification of children and 
young people in Yemen has led directly to a low rate of identification of young offenders and to an 
under-representation of young offenders in official statistics. On the other hand, Government 
concern for young people, as well as steady donor funding to the Ministries of Justice and Health 
and Population, has led to a push to increase birth registration through awareness-raising and to 
increase funding for medical age-identification processes, leading to some minimal growth in the 
number of young offenders correctly identified as children over the past few years (although it 
should be several more years before newly registered children grow old enough for the effect of 
policies aimed at promoting birth registration to have a visible impact upon youth justice statistics). 
These realities account for a low rate of recorded offences committed by young people, and for a 
gradual increase in those figures. 
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 Secondly, low identification of young offenders can be attributed to displacement, where 
large-scale population movements caused by conflicts and natural disasters in Yemen have resulted 
in the loss of any existing documentation, as well as the separation of children and young people 
from their parents and families, so that many of them are no longer aware of their own ages and fail 
to question authority figures who process them as adult offenders.  
Finally, cultural conceptions of childhood differ substantially in Yemen to those adopted by 
the Western world, so that many young people under the age of 18 consider themselves – and are 
generally perceived – to be adults, remaining unaware of their entitlement to more lenient judicial 
processes. A combination of these three factors means that it is virtually impossible to produce an 
accurate estimate of the actual number of young offenders in Yemen, though it is relatively safe to 
assume that their number greatly exceeds that which is documented. Interestingly, this means that 
many children and young people are also classified as adults when they are found to be the victims 
of crime. 
 
Figure 43 Reported Juvenile Offending in Yemen, 2009 
 Although it is not possible to document fully the extent of the young offending problem in 
Yemen, it is possible to extrapolate a picture of offending patterns among children and young 
people, taking detected and recognised young offenders as a representative sample group of the 
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greater undetected or misclassified whole. Figure 43 provides a breakdown of recorded offences 
committed by children and young people. It reveals a strong tendency among young offenders 
towards violent crime, which represented, in 2009, 53.81% of offences committed specifically by 
young people, as opposed to 48.40% of all offences committed by everyone that year. This indicates 
a disproportional trend towards violent behaviour among people under the age of 18. 
 While it is not unusual for juvenile offending records in most countries to display a high 
percentage of crimes against the person (ranging from assault with no injury to robbery and assault 
with injury), it is extremely rare for such rates to represent over 50% of juvenile offences – and rarer 
still for crimes like murder, attempted murder or even manslaughter to be listed among them. In 
Yemen, in 2009, crimes against the person, including violent and sexual crimes, rose above this 
percentage, while murder, attempted murder and manslaughter accounted for 10.08% of their 
offences. The figure is staggering, particularly in light of the Yemeni Government's separation of 
criminal and so-termed “political” violence in official data. While mistakes are certainly possible 
under their classification system, it is relatively safe to assume that a significant portion of the 363 
murder, attempted murder and manslaughter cases detected in 2009 cannot be related to on-going 
conflicts in the country. 
 There is also a higher general tendency towards female offending among young offenders in 
Yemen than there is among the general population. Thus, in 2009, young women accounted for 209 
of the 4,060 young offenders detected by the state, representing 5.15% of offenders under the age 
of 18, as opposed to the national average of 1.50%. This trend could be associated with increasing 
social mobility among younger generations of women in Yemen, promoted through increased access 
to education98. In general, young offending among women in Yemen is predominantly grouped 
around adultery-related offences, violations of immigration laws and cases of light assault, leaving 
boys and young men as the main body of violent offenders among under 18 year old people in the 
country. 
 
3.8 Gender-Based Violence 
 Governmental criminological statistics made available by the Central Statistical Organisation 
and the Ministry of Justice do not provide a breakdown of victim demographics and are not very 
helpful in determining the extent of gender-based violence in the country. Furthermore, the 
extremely low rate of social mobility among women and girls in Yemen means that those who are 
exposed to violence or abuse generally do not seek assistance from the Government or its law 
enforcement services. This tendency is made most visible through official rape statistics, which show 
sexual offences to be virtually non-existent in the country, with only 0.004 offences committed per 
1000 people in Yemen (as opposed to, for instance, 0.778 offences per capita in Australia). It is also 
made evident through testimonies given by Yemeni women in telephone interviews, who reported 
specifically that they did not at any stage during the Arab Spring seek assistance from law 
enforcement services, even after they had been physically attacked by street thugs and Government 
loyalists.  
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 Increased social mobility for young women has likely come about as a result of the education policies 
detailed in Chapter 2, section 2.6. 
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 Information on gender-based violence is mainly acquired through other means, including 
governmental analyses of public health and welfare, reports by international actors and local non-
governmental organisations concerned with women's issues, and interviews with interested parties, 
such as employees of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), UNICEF and others. Through 
these means, it has been determined that, while gender-based violence (the deliberate targeting of 
women by agents of physical, sexual or psychological abuse) may be very high in the country, 
awareness of the issue, particularly among state employees and policy makers, is very low. 
International staff in particular, specifically those working for the UNFPA, complained in interview of 
a strong reluctance by their counterparts in the Yemeni Government to discuss the issue of violence 
against women, due to the extreme cultural sensitivity of the subject. Public denial of the extent of 
gender-based violence in Yemen is supported by the large percentage of violence committed against 
women that is perpetrated by family members, leading to a strong reluctance by women to admit to 
the existence of the problem. The Ministry of Health and Population's 2004 Yemen Family Health 
Survey, indicated that only 5% of Yemeni women admitted to being beaten by their husbands, 
mostly for refusing to obey their commands, while the vast majority denied any such accusations 
entirely (p. 155).  
 Violence against female minors is reported to be high and on the increase. The Women's 
National Committee reports that 1256 girls under the age of 18 had been recorded as falling victim 
to gender-based violence in 2008, as compared to only 167 girls in 2007 (2008, p. 60). This increase 
cannot be attributed to increased detection capacities, which would not have shown such a 
substantial increase in offences over such a short period of time. Of those violent crimes committed 
against young girls, battery, murder and attempted rape were listed as the most prominent, likely 
owing at least partially to reluctance by victims to confirm actual rape allegations. 
 
3.9 The Proliferation of Criminogenic Commodities 
 Criminogenic commodities are defined as those items which may, through their very 
presence, either trigger criminal activity or escalate rates of offending within given contexts 
according to frequency or severity. Such commodities are usually comprised of two categories, 
namely; weapons and narcotics. Since the very purpose of this thesis is to determine precisely which 
conditions are key to explaining the development of violent criminal behaviour among children and 
young people in fragile states, it has proven necessary to provide a full account of criminological 
theories relating to the effect of criminogenic commodities at a later stage in the argument. This has 
required, in particular, an in-depth analysis of narcotics proliferation in Yemen and its effect on the 
country's socio-economic environment. This analysis takes place during a broader investigation of 
existing criminological theory in Chapter 4 (section 4.2.1), and the overview of key findings provided 
in this section will remain relatively limited in relation to its coverage of narcotics proliferation. It is 
sufficient here to state that the most prevalent form of narcotics consumption in Yemen is the 
chewing of qat, which is a semi-narcotic plant, the production and consumption of which is perfectly 
legal within the country. While the effects of qat consumption will be debated further in Chapter 4, 
it is important to note that the plant is very popular among the general population. Other forms of 
drug use remain fairly minimal, among which alcohol consumption is the most frequently detected 
form of illegal intoxication. Most of this alcohol is illegally smuggled into the country, while qat is 
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sometimes transported illegally out of Yemen, most often into Somalia, but also across Yemen's land 
borders.  
 Weapons, as has already been stated, are widely available. Firstly, it is a matter of pride for 
many Yemeni men who have reached adulthood to carry a jambiyyah blade about their person 
whenever they leave the house. There has been no suggestion of criminalising this practice, nor 
would it be possible to enforce such a restriction, given the social dominance of the practice itself 
and the weak law enforcement capacity of the state. Small arms are also in common circulation, 
chief among them old assault rifles developed by the Soviet Union prior to its dissolution. The Small 
Arms Survey explains that: 
Weapons are an ordinary feature of Yemeni life, and personal weapons can range from 
small daggers to artillery. Weapons play a role as actual instruments used in conflict, but 
also as a statement about identity. The ordinary Yemeni man views his dagger and his 
automatic rifle as items of personal apparel. High-quality weapons give prestige to the 
owner. The capacity to purchase such items and to reward followers with weapons is 
both a form of power and a statement about power. The fact that the weapons are 
actually used to resolve conflicts should not obscure their social role. A weapon is a 
statement about the capacity and willingness to protect one’s family, clan, and tribe. As 
such, it is a statement about personal identity, self-worth, and one’s role in the 
community. To understand the desire for weapons is to understand the way life is 
organized in Yemen. (2001, p. 179) 
Weapons play an important role in tribal structures and social organisation, leading not only to an 
extreme reluctance by individuals to surrender illegal arms to the state, but also to a consistent 
demand for further weapons imports into the country, making estimates about the total number of 
arms in the country extremely difficult to extrapolate. Apart from their role in social customs and 
conflict resolution, weapons play an important role in escalating violence committed in the course of 
criminal activity. In this sense, carrying weapons is positively correlated with increased harm to 
bystanders resulting from, for instance, property offences like theft or burglary. Quite simply, the 
more weapons that are present at the sight of criminal activity, the greater the probability that 
weapons will be used in the course of said criminal activity. Furthermore, as Larry Alexander and 
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan write, “the particular weapon used” in such instances “is irrelevant except to 
the extent that it increases the risk or increases the risk's duration” (2009, p. 280). With estimates of 
small arms numbers in Yemen holding at approximately 2.5 arms per person, the risk of physical 
harm from criminal activity is extremely high. 
 
3.10 Organised Crime 
 In 2010, the Government of Yemen and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
identified “the two predominant threats to Yemen's security, stability and development” to be “illicit 
trafficking (particularly of drugs)” and “criminal networks (including terrorism and its financing)”. 
While these themes are aspects of the broader organised crime problem in Yemen, they are also 
intricately connected to sections 3.9 and 3.11, which deal with the proliferation of criminogenic 
commodities in the country and corruption. The separation of these three areas into independent 
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subsections may seem somewhat arbitrary at first, but while organised crime is often a root cause of 
weapons and narcotics circulation, and is facilitated by corruption, these sections are kept separate 
because not all weapons and narcotics in Yemen can be linked to organised crime networks, and 
because not all corruption contributes to organised crime.  
 Many of Yemen's weapons are left-overs of previous conflicts, and its primary source of 
narcotics consumption is legal, so much of the evidence linking organised crime to mainstream 
criminogenic commodities is circumstantial. There is evidence linking organised crime to the 
trafficking of specialised weaponry (like valuable antiques) and alcohol, but it is unknown whether 
alcohol trafficking (which is strictly against Al Qaeda's belief system) finances terrorism in Yemen like 
other forms of organised crime often do in fragile states. While some alcohol (including Baladi, a 
vodka-like liqueur) is brewed in Yemen, most is smuggled into the country from Ethiopia and 
Djibouti (Stakeholder Consultation, International Organisation for Migration, 16 August, 2010). 
Considering the high number of people arrested for drunkenness in the country99, alcohol availability 
must be fairly widespread.  
 Other forms of organised crime include banditry and kidnapping, whereby a relatively small 
group of people are able to win quick financial profits by harassing and intimidating communities 
and individuals. With long roads, large desert and mountain terrains, and low levels of police and law 
enforcement outside the major cities; Yemen lends itself perfectly to such criminal opportunism.  
 Ultimately, organised crime in Yemen is mainly linked to human smuggling and trafficking, as 
well as to the smuggling of agricultural and fishing produce – including qat – out of the country 
without passing through customs (Stakeholder Consultation, International Organisation for 
Migration, 16 August, 2010). In this sense, human smuggling is understood as the deliberate 
facilitation of an illegal border crossing by an intermediary for a financial or material benefit, while 
human trafficking is tantamount to modern day slavery, whereby the migrant is either: deceived 
about their destination point; deceived about the nature of the work they will be undertaking upon 
arrival at their destination point; made to work without pay during transit or at arrival; or, sold to a 
third party for their labour or internal organs (Stakeholder Consultation, International Organisation 
for Migration, 16 August, 2010). 
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 According to the Central Statistical Organisation’s Security and Justice Statistics for 2009, 1,862 people were 
arrested for drunkenness in Yemen in 2009 alone (2010). 
133 
 
 
Figure 44 Irregular Migration Into and Out of Yemen 
 Yemen's weak state capacity, which is manifested in its poor control of both its land and sea 
boundaries, renders the country extremely vulnerable to organised criminal networks. Meanwhile, 
its strategic location as a buffer zone between the Middle East and the Horn of Africa make Yemen 
particularly appealing to smugglers and traffickers from the North African states, who use the 
country as a preferred transit root for irregular migrants. They are aided in this regard by the 
growing insecurity of the Gulf of Aden as a whole100.  
Most irregular migrants come to Yemen from the Horn of Africa, though a minority originate 
in Iraq (See Figure 44). Many of those coming from Africa strive to move on elsewhere to countries 
with greater economic opportunities, including Saudi Arabia and Oman, and sometimes to Europe. 
At the same time, Yemenis themselves, and especially Yemeni children, are frequently trafficked to 
oil-rich Gulf states like Saudi Arabia to work as beggars, domestic help and camel-jockeys 
(Stakeholder Consultation, International Organisation for Migration, 16 August, 2010).  
 While many of the irregular migrants travelling into and out of Yemen are voluntary 
migrants, a large portion of them fall victim to slave labour and are made to do unpaid manual 
chores or to work in the sex trade. The vast majority are placed in considerable danger during their 
transit into-, through-, and out of Yemen. Sultan Barakat et al note that “Migrants are often forced 
by traffickers to swim ashore through shark-infested waters in the Gulf of Aden, and some die in the 
process” (2011b, p. 24). Once they reach Yemen, Somali migrants are offered some degree of 
protection by the state via de-facto refugee status, but representatives of other nationalities 
continue to evade authorities for fear of deportation, which means that they are extremely unlikely 
to seek assistance if they are abused by their smugglers or traffickers.  
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 The recent global growth in popularity of human trafficking can be attributed to its status as 
an extremely profitable trade, and Louise Shelley notes that while the drug trade remains the “most 
lucrative aspect of transnational crime”: 
Many criminals have switched to [human trafficking] because of high profits and low 
risks. Others, not previously involved in transnational crime have entered this trade 
because of the low initial costs of entry and the large demand for smuggled and 
trafficked people. … Moreover, drug traffickers can sell their commodity once, while 
human traffickers can sell trafficked people repeatedly, thereby deriving extensive 
profits. (2007, pp. 116-117) 
More worryingly, trafficking victims can be sold on as combatants and insurgents, contributing to 
general levels of insecurity within any given context, while smuggling routes allow for willing recruits 
to journey into a country undetected. In terms of financing and supplying terrorist activities in 
Yemen, human trafficking and smuggling, as well as the smuggling of other licit and illicit 
commodities has tremendous potential for destabilising the state and is treated as an important 
social problem. 
 
3.11 Corruption 
 When discussing challenges to Yemen's stable development and governance improvement, 
it is all too easy to centre upon the issue of corruption. While analyses of corruption can be 
unreliable due to their over-reliance upon anecdotal evidence, it is widely acknowledged that for 
many Yemeni citizens corruption has come to form part of daily reality (United States Agency for 
International Development, 2006, p. 55). Some international donors have shown a reluctance to 
provide bilateral aid to the Yemeni state for this very reason, according to interviews conducted at 
the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation in 2010, because they are afraid that the funds will 
evaporate. Corruption fosters weak state capacity, while weak capacity generates the very resource 
competition that fuels corruption (Stakeholder Consultation, Ministry of Local Administration, 17 
August 2010).  
 In Yemen, corruption is found at every level of society. One explanation for this is that the 
state's limited ability to exercise its authority has meant that it relies on patronage systems and 
tribal allegiances that inspire loyalty through give-and-take relationships. Another reason is that 
Yemen's very poor law enforcement system allows for a high incidence rate of criminal opportunism, 
while poor salaries of low level public officials encourage them to take additional payments on the 
side from those who aspire to cheat the system.  
 In 2010, Yemen remained locked in at 146th place out of 178 countries in the Perceptions of 
Corruption Index, despite having launched several governance reform strategies. This is a challenge 
that feeds into multiple other areas of offending, because, as Angélica Durán Martínez writes: 
“Corruption is essential for the survival of criminal organizations. It facilitates the movement of 
goods and persons, influences the rules of the game in favour of criminals, facilitates the financial 
operations necessary to launder illegal proceeds, and guarantees impunity” (2007, p. 7). More 
importantly, corruption discredits the rule of law by helping to ensure that citizens of the state are 
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treated neither fairly nor consistently, thereby discrediting both Yemen's judiciary and its legal 
system.  
 The United States Agency for International Development identifies two main forms of 
corruption in Yemen – petty or administrative corruption, and grand corruption. They write that: 
“grand corruption in Yemen is a by-product of the combination of weak state institutions and 
fragmented elites”, whereby, “In effect, a predatory relationship between elites and state resources 
has been encouraged” (2006, p. 7). Meanwhile, petty or administrative corruption involves either 
the bribing of public officials or the hiring of “ghost workers”. Here it is noted that “Petty corruption 
has become so ingrained in popular culture that it is no longer shameful for individuals to prosper as 
a result of corrupt practices” (p. 7). Mohamed Abdo Moghram adds the cross-cutting areas of 
embezzlement, theft, fraud, extortion, abuse of public office position, favouritism, and improper 
political contributions influencing public policy to these lists with regard to the Yemeni case study 
(2004, pp. 9-10). Both grand and petty corruption are equally important when it comes to 
establishing perceptions of the criminal justice system, the state and law enforcement services 
among the general public, and both contribute heavily to the criminogenic environment in Yemen. 
Both will be discussed further in Chapter 5, where corruption will form an important theme.  
 
3.12 Summary of Important Findings 
 The extent of crime in Yemen is not fully visible in the statistics made available by the 
Yemeni Government's Central Statistical Organisation. However, such data does allow for the 
extraction of specific trends and patterns in offending over time, confirmed through telephone 
interviews with Yemeni citizens and face-to-face interviews with heads of Government Ministries 
and international government organisations. These trends reveal that there is a strong tendency 
towards violent crime among the general population, and particularly among children and young 
people under the age of 18. Such violence may be attributed to the widespread availability of 
weapons in the country. This triggers and escalates violence committed in the course of other 
offences, including property-related offences, which are also fairly prominent in the country. While 
overall incidents of criminal behaviour occur with greater frequency in central governorates with 
large urban areas, peripheral governorates and rural areas with weak Government infrastructure 
show a higher propensity for violent crime, presumably associated with a high rate of retributive 
violence emerging from the low reliability of law enforcement services101.  
 Women and young girls are shown to have minimal involvement with criminal activity due to 
their extremely limited social mobility. The data suggests that they may be frequently victimised in 
violent and sexual offences that are left largely unreported for reasons relating to socio-cultural 
stigmatisation of their victimisation in such offences. Their vulnerability is increased by the presence 
of abusive organised crime networks and low nation-wide law enforcement capacity, which is 
further undermined by high levels of institutional corruption.  
 Ultimately, the findings of this Chapter indicate that it is possible to put together a good 
overview of patterns of offending in fragile states despite limitations on data availability. Yet even 
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 These trends will be assessed in more detail in Chapter 5, but it is worth noting that this means that men in 
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this brief overview indicates that gaps in understanding remain. More specifically, it is not possible 
to understand the causality of criminal activity in Yemen (or indeed elsewhere) without using 
existing theories of criminology and state fragility to connect these trends to the country's culture, 
justice environment and broader development context, as shall be done in the next Chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Existing Theories of Crime and Social Control and Their 
Relevance for Fragile States 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 While a large percentage of criminological literature has been written for and within the 
developed world, many of the theories that have emerged from these explorations may hold far-
reaching applications for fragile states, dealing, as many of them do, with multifaceted causes of 
youth aggression and violent offending. However, because fragile states offer a unique set of 
contexts that differ substantially to those presented by the developed world: it remains to be 
determined whether such existing theories of crime are suitable for adequately explaining the 
relationship between underdevelopment and violent young offending. This question will form the 
central theme of the following three chapters, Chapter 4 providing a brief overview of existing 
criminological theories and their potential relevance to this thesis, Chapter 5 using these theories to 
better understand Yemen's crime prevention and control systems, and Chapter 6 merging such 
theories with state development literature in order to strive to better understand the propensity for 
violent young offending in Yemen and other fragile states. Throughout these analyses, the emphasis 
will be placed as always on theories relating to young people and delinquency, within which violence 
will be an important overarching theme.  
 The analysis of these theories of crime, justice and development has been divided between 
three chapters to reflect the very broad, complex and contradictory nature of these academic fields, 
whose integration is by no means easy. Specific difficulties emerge from the lack of engagement of 
criminological theories with key cultural, religious and tribal dynamics that can prove central to 
determining the social structure of Yemen. However, these constraints will be explored as they 
emerge from the analyses conducted in all three chapters, while Chapter 4 will prioritise testing the 
application of criminological theories on fragile contexts first, before delving too deeply into the 
socio-economic dynamics that seem to be left out of their explanations. 
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Figure 45 Theories of Crime and Social Control, and How They Analyse Influences on Human Behaviour 
 Within contemporary criminology, two analytical systems developed so as to better 
understand human behaviour dominate: those that strive to determine why people break the law, 
and those that strive to determine why people obey the law (See Figure 45). These two systems, 
which are reflected in the two subdivisions of this chapter, are comprised of crime causation 
theories and theories of social control. Both narratives are superseded by the implied principle that 
most crime is opportunistic by nature, whereby offenders are largely thought of as reactive agents 
that respond to circumstance in order to achieve a criminal objective, usually without much 
forethought. Despite the opportunistic nature of crime, key determining factors have been pivotal in 
predicting where crimes are most likely to occur in Central Europe, America and elsewhere. Shawn 
Bushway and Peter Reuter summarise that crime “is the outcome of the intersection between the 
propensity to commit a crime and the opportunity to commit a crime” (1996, p. 6-1), and it is the 
propensity to commit a crime that has been the most important point of interest for this thesis 
because acts of so-called “mindless” violence are rarely a product of opportunity alone.  
 This is not an obvious starting point in the case of fragile states. After all, fragile states, 
which suffer the breakdown of government and law enforcement control throughout the vast 
majority of their territories, are arguably overrun with opportunities for offending behaviour. In 
'Doing Well Out of War', Paul Collier paints a bleak picture of the reality of state fragility and 
particularly of the reality faced by conflict-affected countries. He argues that the lack of 
predictability in life that is generated by conflict changes the very nature of societies and the way in 
which individuals and communities interact with each other. Collier writes that, as political 
environments shift, Government and individual spending is altered and economic behaviour, like 
crime, becomes steadily more opportunistic. Governments, Collier argues, decrease their spending 
on police services in times of conflict in order to increase spending on the military, thereby 
decreasing the effectiveness of law enforcement systems (2000, p. 102). As the threat of detection 
and punishment decreases, criminal activity increases, and people and their possessions become less 
secure within the country as a whole. Added to this is the continued threat of violence and 
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unpredictability. Within this type of social environment, people begin to sell their assets or to move 
them abroad.  
 This was seen in the Yemeni instance when it was reported by the staff of the Ministry of 
Planning and International Cooperation in interview that Yemeni nationals very seldom if ever kept 
funds in Yemeni banks and that threats of terrorist action, in particular, had pushed both local and 
international investors to move their businesses out of the country (Stakeholder Consultation, 
Interview Conducted by Professor Sultan Barakat, August 15, 2010). Collier adds that, within such 
contexts, people gradually become less concerned with savings, with preserving good business 
relations and with abiding by the law, which might explain Yemen's high tendency towards 
multilevel corruption, though this seems to be more of an entrenched crisis within the patronage 
networks inherent to Yemeni culture. Markets are disrupted during conflict so that products and 
services available one day may not necessarily be available the next. Meanwhile, trade is increasingly 
monopolised by powerful stakeholders, who raise the consumer-price index in order to maximise 
their profits at a significant cost for local communities (pp. 101-102). The disruption of societal 
norms of behaviour and the breakdown of infrastructure not only represent a breakdown of basic 
services, but also a suspension of livelihoods and legitimate money-making opportunities.  
 It is easily argued that all of these factors combine to create a society of angry, frightened, 
desperate and, above all, hungry people (be they hungry for food, water, shelter, safety, medicine or 
the right to live with dignity), so that, as Richard Caplan notes, “War itself creates opportunities, if 
not imperatives, for criminal economic activity” (2005, p.154). It is precisely this emphasis upon 
socio-political chaos that shifts – one might argue – unjustly the analytical lens of policy makers and 
academics interested in the study of security in fragile states away from attempts to understand the 
increased propensity of youth to commit violent crime and towards efforts to document 
opportunistic or politically-motivated offences. 
 The imperatives and opportunities for criminal behaviour implicit in explorations of fragile 
states and conflict-affected countries overshadow investigations into the propensity to commit 
crime in fragile states, but they are at times deeply misleading. The state fragility framework is used 
to group together a wide variety of countries affected by structural and governmental weaknesses 
that range from minor to severe crises of authority, capacity and legitimacy, and it is yet to be 
determined how useful this paradigm is for generating a real appreciation for criminological 
environments102. Fragile states that are affected by conflict are by no means affected uniformly by 
such dynamics, with insecurity being heightened in affected regions. Bubbles of safety and relative 
prosperity diminish the applicability of social chaos as a relevant analytical dimension at a national 
level, though the regional analysis of violent offending in Yemen conducted in Chapter 3 indicates 
that it might be much more easily correlated with violent young offending at a local level.  
 It can be argued that Collier's analysis is more important to understanding economically 
motivated criminal behaviour, like burglary and theft, rather than violent offending. Violent 
offending in and of itself is rarely motivated by economic opportunity alone and is in those cases 
where it is motivated by financial considerations associated with other forms of criminal activity, 
usually consisting of property offences, but also including kidnapping and human trafficking. The 
need to commit physical violence outside of clear economic motives is not adequately explained 
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simply by the reality that economies have shifted and police presences have decreased. It is also 
unclear whether a more satisfying explanation may be contained within existing crime causation 
theories or theories of social control, which are for the most part unused to dealing with 
environments generated by an almost complete absence of state control structures, leading to the 
need to conduct such an investigation within this chapter and this thesis more broadly.  
 The underlying principle of investigations into the propensity to commit crime within the 
field of criminology seems to stem from Henry Thomas Buckle's observation that “society prepares 
the crime, the criminal commits it” (1857). If this observation is accurate, then culture and society 
may be the most important factors for determining how criminal environments operate. Under 
these parameters, criminological theories that are adaptive to different cultural structures should 
prove extendible to fragile contexts, although they may be insufficiently targeted and specialised to 
generate real insights into state fragility. If, in accordance to Collier's view, economic and structural 
risk factors are more important, then broad criminological theories that address these issues may 
prove to be more rigorous and informative, particularly if they are applied at a local and regional 
level.  
 Within the study of crime causation, numerous notable criminologists have strived to 
identify the root and proximate causes of crime, among whom writers like Lawrence W. Sherman 
point to several aggravating risk factors (1996). Of these, community based influences are seen by 
theorists and practitioners alike to be a top priority. Other influences are listed as exposure to 
addictive substances, family backgrounds, school environments and the labour market. Represented 
visually, these influences can be organised according to different levels of explanation, at which 
analysts are invited to examine either society-wide or individually-based risk factors (See Figure 46). 
Wide-ranging theories of crime causation have been developed at each of these levels in a number 
of  fields, including those of psychology, sociology, economics, politics and even biology.   
 Within the realm of forensic and criminal psychology alone, as Dennis Howitt explains, 
several theories of crime causation are put forward at various levels of explanation. At an individual 
level, some of these arguments deal with the cognitive processes of individuals, others examine 
degrees of learning and social background, while others still look at the broader influence of society 
upon potential offenders. For instance, Howitt writes that neuropsychological theories of crime 
causation have linked the absence of an enzyme platelet called “monoamine oxidase” with 
psychopathic behaviour, and closed head injuries (particularly to the frontal lobe of the brain) with 
“dis-inhibition – a lack of response to the social niceties that makes behaviour acceptable in most 
people” (2009, p.64). Other theories, Howitt continues, have strived to document connections 
between crime and intelligence (pp.66-67), have postulated whether addiction to crime is at all 
possible (pp.70-73), and have even strived to incorporate Freudian psychoanalysis into the study of 
criminality (pp.69-70). 
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Figure 46 Levels of Explanation Adopted by Theories of Crime Causation 
 This thesis is grounded within a more socio-politically based area of analysis, which deals 
less with individual-oriented theories of crime causation and more with the macro and community 
levels because the nature of state fragility is such that it derives from governmental incapacity and 
requires nation-wide and regional solutions. However, two such theories stand out in particular, and 
will be considered to be important for analysing crime rates in fragile states, especially in regard to 
their potential adaptability to diverse cultural settings. These are Albert Bandura's social learning 
theory (1977) and Howitt's theory relating to the social construction of crime or “elite social 
constructionism” (1992). Both will be analysed as social control theories, rather than crime causation 
theories, within this chapter. Through these theories, Bandura describes the way in which children 
learn vicariously from the actions of others, and Howitt details the way in which authority figures 
and prominent institutions influence social conceptualisations of crime.  
 The following section and it subsections will analyse some of those theories of crime 
causation that are linked to broader societal influences. The section after it will deal with theories of 
social control, including theories of social constructionism, social learning, and legitimacy and 
cooperation. 
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4.2 Crime Causation 
4.2.1 Substance Abuse and Exposure to Addictive Substances 
 Criminological theories relating to substance abuse and exposure to addictive substances 
vary considerably, as do cultural and state responses to drug use. While it is certainly not true that 
all problem drug users and people who drink alcohol excessively go on to commit crime, a strong 
correlation between substance abuse and criminal activity has been established. Richard Dembo et 
al have documented that among young offenders in particular, for instance: 
Higher levels of involvement with substance use increase the rate of offending, the 
severity of the committed offence, and the duration of antisocial behaviour. Further, the 
earlier the age of onset of substance use, the greater the likelihood of severe and chronic 
offending (2007). 
What is not at all clear is the nature of the relationship between crime and substance abuse, and 
namely whether substance abuse is a root cause of crime or yet another symptom of broader 
societal problems, commonly faced by offenders and problem drug users alike. In short, does 
substance abuse cause offending, or are people who are likely to offend also likely to abuse 
substances? Is substance abuse to be read as a crime, the causality of which needs to be analysed 
and understood, or as a cause of crime? Though various studies into this area have been made, 
writers like Dawn Moore continue to call their findings into question (2007).  
 To suit the purposes of this thesis, existing criminological theories of drug use must be 
addressed and analysed not only in terms of their validity but also with regard to their applicability 
to Yemen and other fragile states. It should be noted that the lack of definitive answers to these 
questions makes substance-abuse-based theories of crime causality fairly weak at explaining 
criminological environments. It is the author's belief that substance abuse complicates the 
motivations behind criminal activity and prolongs or increases its severity wherever relevant, but 
does not cause those motivations to manifest – that it is, like the presence of any criminogenic 
commodity, an aggravating risk factor or a contributor, but not a pure source of criminality. 
Nevertheless, while the relationship between substance abuse and offending has not been 
adequately explained, a positive correlation between the two is virtually indisputable. 
 In February 2010, the inmates of Hydebank Wood, a prison for women and young offenders 
in South Belfast (Northern Ireland), were asked by the author to complete an exploratory survey in 
which they were left to freely express their views as to the primary causes of crime103. The facility 
provided an interesting surveying ground, due both to Northern Ireland's status as a country 
recovering from conflict and to its relative stability, which allowed for comparatively easy access to 
its correctional facilities and showed minimal literacy levels among its inmates104. Copies of the 
survey were left in recreational facilities and inmates were given a choice as to whether or not to 
complete them. There was no deliberate sampling method used and the 56 respondents who 
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 A number of the offenders had only basic reading and writing skills, and others were clearly unable to 
participate in the survey format. 
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completed the survey ranged from 15 to 45 years of age, and had been incarcerated for a multitude 
of different offences ranging from breach of probation to murder.   
 
Figure 47 Causes of Crime and Offending, as Identified by the Inmates of Hydebank Wood 
 An overwhelming 64% of respondents identified substance abuse as the leading cause of 
crime, with some offenders sighting alcoholism and others either identifying “drugs” in general or 
naming specific substances such as cocaine (See Figure 47). Younger respondents aged under 25 
years showed a much higher propensity to cite substance abuse as a leading cause of crime. 
Although the survey was not distributed to a sufficiently large sampling field to extrapolate real 
trends, the implications of these initial results are fairly serious. Firstly, they indicate a high rate of 
substance abuse among the offending population of South Belfast and a particularly high rate of 
substance abuse among young offenders. Secondly, they indicate that many offenders consider the 
effect of substance abuse to be strong enough to impact individual behaviour patterns, pushing 
people to either commit crime while under the influence of narcotics or to commit crime in order to 
pay for narcotics.  
 These findings, which are congruent with contemporary criminological theory, are common 
to multiple cultural contexts and are particularly relevant to countries affected by conflict and 
fragility. Such countries often either show high rates of narcotics production, as in the case of 
Afghanistan with its opium and heroin, Columbia with its cocaine, and Yemen with its qat; or 
experience a breakdown of their border control mechanisms, leading to the high influx of illegal 
narcotics, as has occurred in the cases of Iraq, Somalia and Tajikistan. When combined with the 
stresses of persistent social violence and the hazards of displacement, this high availability of 
potentially addictive substances leads to high rates of drug use among populations affected by state 
fragility, which consider drug use as either a relaxation tool or as a means of managing pain after 
physical or psychological trauma.  
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 Children and young people, who are exposed to all types of social abuse in such contexts 
(especially where conflict is present), are particularly prone to start using substances early, being 
socially isolated through homelessness or displacement from those communities and families that 
would have otherwise attached for them an intense social stigma towards serious drug dependency. 
What is obscured by unifying theories of substance abuse in crime, is the degree to which substance 
abuse is influenced by broader socio-cultural perceptions of narcotics, with many Islamic societies 
heavily penalising narcotics users through social exclusion and “othering”. Here, the degree of 
penalisation seems to depend largely upon the substance consumed, with alcohol consumption 
representing both a criminal and moral transgression in some nations, and other narcotics, like qat, 
being seen as having virtually no detrimental impact on those who use them.  
 The term “substance abuse” refers to the use of both licit and illicit substances, including 
alcohol, solvents and inhalants, chemical and natural products, drugs and narcotics. In Yemen, qat is 
the most highly used of such substances and is a perfectly legal narcotic.  
 While the use of qat is itself not a criminal act, the plant is associated with criminal 
behaviour. Firstly, the mass production of qat leads to the illegal extraction of underground water 
reserves, greatly adding to the rate of depletion of Yemen's water table. Qat farming produces 
better yields if fields are flooded with water. Secondly, the transportation of qat across Yemen's 
borders and into places like Somalia and elsewhere is, if not directly illegal, accomplished through 
illegal means and smuggling roots, contributing to the black market and war economies of both 
countries. Thirdly, high rates of family dependency mean that between 7 and 9.4% of household 
budgets are spent upon the acquisition of qat, which sidelines budgeting for other necessary items 
like food and medicine, leading to increased offending among family members through necessity 
(Republic of Yemen et al, 2007, p. 43). Finally, mass qat production has virtually obliterated the 
production of food and other products in Yemen, rendering the predominantly agricultural country 
entirely dependent upon imports.  
 This reality has wreaked havoc upon Yemen's economy, contributing to the poverty and 
desperation of the general population and rendering the environment highly criminogenic. Unlike 
the Hydebank Wood inmates, however, Yemeni communities tend to be reluctant to acknowledge 
the negative social and medical impacts of qat, the chewing of which is a much more socially 
acceptable practice. While substance abuse clearly affects both criminogenic environments, it is 
perceived extremely differently in each context.  
 Qat is a class C drug or light psychoactive substance, though it is thought only to be mildly 
addictive if at all so. When dealing with class C narcotics specifically, the term “substance abuse” 
becomes a very difficult one to use, with many states, including Yemen, refusing to legislate against 
drug use due to apparent low rates of addiction, despite high rates of problem drug use. It is 
important to note here that words like “addiction” and “abuse” are loaded with political and 
diagnostic implications which seek to comment upon the mental health and well-being of the drug 
user. Elizabeth Connell Henderson writes that: 
Addiction is a complicated condition, with biological, physiological, psychological, 
behavioural, and spiritual aspects. For this reason it is best to think of alcoholism and drug 
addiction as multifaceted disorders, only one of which is the compulsive use of the 
addicting substance. (2001, p. 3) 
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Accusing people of having such disorders can taint them with significant social stigmas, particularly 
in Islamic countries where heavy drug use and the use of class A or B drugs and alcohol can 
compromise religious and tribal doctrines. Although such terms will be utilised throughout this thesis 
in the absence of a politically neutral language, Kathleen M. Carroll and William R. Miller remind us 
quite rightly that the “names used to describe phenomena affect the ways in which one thinks about 
a problem and what to do about it” (2006, p. 5).  
 The Yemeni case study reveals that heavy drug use can be inherently linked to a country's 
culture and to that culture's rules on social interaction, much like alcohol consumption in Europe. 
Institutionalised substance abuse can create a highly criminogenic environment for young people by, 
for instance, restricting their ability to hold steady employment or to complete basic education 
programmes, with the Government of Yemen et al estimating that approximately 25% of its people's 
work hours are lost to qat (2007, p. 43). Such drug use does not necessarily call for the construction 
of narcotics rehabilitation centres, however it does clearly require some sort of intervention if the 
Yemeni economy is to be placed back on track and young offending to be minimised. 
 The prevalence of substance abuse among offenders greatly complicates the discussion of 
crime, and theories on this produced in the developed world are often insufficiently flexible to 
accommodate alternative cultural positions. As Tammy Anderson notes specifically of women drug 
users; substance abuse has traditionally been linked to “pathology and powerlessness”, so that 
“today's discussion about women substance abusers classifies them as either villains or victims” 
(2008, p. 1). The same is largely true of other problem drug users, with a general tendency among 
Western policy makers to view men as being more culpable and so-called “vulnerable” groups 
(which include people with mental health disorders and children under the age of seventeen) as 
being more innocent. This means that a large portion of young offenders are perceived in Europe 
and elsewhere as having diminished responsibility for their actions on two counts: on the one hand, 
as problem drug users that are victims of social circumstances and of their own dependence, and on 
the other hand, because the very influence of alcohol and other substances is known to remove 
social inhibitions.  
 Criminological theories of substance abuse take two distinct stances on the relationship 
between drugs and crime. They either adopt the position that substance addiction stretches limited 
financial resources so that drug users are tempted to look towards property offences (like theft) to 
support their habits (See Figure 48): 
 
Figure 48 Economic Explanations of Substance Abuse-Based Criminogenic Risk Factors 
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Or, that substance abuse inhibits the capacity of drug users to make rational decisions, or to cope 
with conflicts or complex challenges in a reasonable or a lawful way (See Figure 49). 
 
Figure 49 Physiological/Psychological Explanations of Substance Abuse-Based Criminogenic Risk Factors 
The two stances are not necessarily considered to be mutually exclusive. 
 Herschel Prins explains that in the United Kingdom alone: 
It is not uncommon in criminal cases, particularly those involving serious violence against 
persons or property, for a plea to be made by the accused that their liability should be 
diminished because of the effects of taking alcohol and/or other substances. (1995, p. 20) 
That it is comparatively rare for such pleas to be accepted does not change the validity of the 
argument: after all, those reported to be “under the influence” of certain substances are less in 
control of their actions than those who are not.  
 This position does not translate well to Islamic countries. In Yemen, the use of any mood-
altering substance other than qat is considered a “morality crime” and such defences are not 
applicable, though the philosophy behind them is still worth thinking about. In this sense, Yemen can 
be said to fit an exaggerated version of David MacDonald's interpretation of Afghanistan, because it 
“holds up a mirror to the developed world and the anomalies and paradoxes inherent in its drug 
policies”, whereby “For the better part of a century international drug control has been dominated 
by a western model based on prohibition and the criminalisation of drugs and those who use them” 
(2007, pp. 12-13).  
 As Louise B. Antoine summarises, the discussion of substance abuse is complex, although: 
The global drug problem has three major themes, which are clearly discernible in most 
countries around the world: concern about young people and drugs; concern about 
addiction; and concern about the effects of the illegal production, trafficking, and selling 
of drugs. (2002, p. ix) 
That it is not possible now to discuss substance abuse without considering these three themes more 
broadly speaks to the limitations of substance abuse-based theories of crime causation: problem 
drug use and particularly the use of illicit substances are symptomatic of a much wider challenge – 
namely, the proliferation of such substances among societies. The use of illegal substances implies a 
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certain level of crime within a given area, which allows for those substances to be produced, 
transported and sold to local communities. Setting aside the question of why young people and 
others use drugs from a psychological perspective, they are, above all, able to use them because 
such substances are readily available, despite stringent legislation. Furthermore, concerns about the 
exposure of young people to such substances coupled with concerns about the full effects and 
implications of addiction colour the discussion of substance abuse in general and the processing of 
offenders more specifically.  
 In certain fragile states, like Yemen, where substance abuse can also be read as a coping 
mechanism in a context of extreme violence and underdevelopment, and where mainstream drug 
use is a source of cultural identity not to be criminalised while other drug use is extremely 
stigmatised: the discussion becomes even more complex, leading to distinct concerns about the 
generalisation of criminological theory across multiple cultural contexts.  In this context, theories on 
the relationship between substance abuse and criminality leave too many unanswered questions 
because “the behaviour of drug use is not isolated, but it is intimately intertwined with a range of 
common, long-standing human issues and societal problems” (Carroll and Miller, 2006, p. 6) which 
are probably quite heavily case-specific. It is virtually impossible to disentangle these issues from 
criminal behaviour that is discovered to have been motivated or influenced by addiction or 
substance abuse. Rather than looking at substance abuse as a cause of crime, it is more helpful to 
examine crime and substance abuse in parallel as symptoms of broader social, familial, school and 
labour-based risk factors, though this answer in itself is mildly unsatisfying. 
 
4.2.2 Community Causes 
 In contrast to theories of substance abuse, community-based explanations of crime 
causation form a fairly comprehensive framework for assessing the impact of a number of risk 
factors. Offering in-depth analyses of communal influences upon criminal behaviour, they form a 
strong theoretical body in and of themselves that works independently as well as in association with 
alternative theoretical positions. In particular, they intersect effectively with theories of conflict and 
state fragility that prioritise social cohesion as a key determining factor in peace- and state-building. 
Their main shortfall is that they are relatively simplistic, reading, at times, like a list of components of 
criminogenic environments, rather than as an appraisal of the processes of crime causation.  
  Theories of crime causation that are based on community-level explanations can be 
effectively epitomised by the stereotype conveyed in the title of Amanda Elliott et al's Good Kids 
from Bad Neighbourhoods (2006). In distinguishing “good kids” from their backgrounds, they 
support the idea that “bad neighbourhoods” impact the psychological development of children and 
young people in such a way that makes them more likely to offend. This is not to say that there is 
such a thing as a typical offender background or a typical offender, but that the right combination of 
communal and other influences can serve to increase or decrease the probability of offending 
behaviour in both children and adults. 
 It is an unfortunate stereotype that “bad neighbourhoods” are associated with economic 
deprivation, though the relationship between poverty and crime is extremely complex105. Don 
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Wetherburn and Bronwyn Lind write that although it must be acknowledged that a relationship 
exists between “disadvantage and crime”, “empirical anomalies” tend to disrupt most theories 
relating to the nature of that relationship (2001, pp. 6-28). However, several neighbourhood traits or 
community-based risk factors have come to be positively correlated with the proliferation of crime 
in studies conducted in the United States, the United Kingdom and elsewhere. 
 
Figure 50 Community-Based Risk Factors for Criminal Activity 
 Lawrence W. Sherman's Preventing Crime lists these criminogenic risk factors to be: 
community composition; the nature of local social structures; the presence of oppositional cultures; 
the pervasiveness of criminogenic commodities; the availability of legitimate opportunities; and, the 
rate of social and physical disorder (See Figure 50).  
Community composition is taken to refer to the type of people that make up a community. 
Sherman finds that a prevalence of unmarried or divorced males, teenage males, non-working 
adults, poor people, single parents and people with prior offence records is likely to increase crime 
rates in any given area (p. 3-5). Such community composition is mitigated or exacerbated by the 
nature of local community social structures, a concept that refers to the net of interactions that take 
place between those people who comprise a community.  
 In this regard, Sherman argues that while: 
Children of single parents, for example, may not be at greater risk of crime because of 
their family structure … a community with a high percentage of single parent households 
may put all its children at greater risk of delinquency by reducing the capacity of a 
community to maintain adult networks of informal control of children. (p. 3-5) 
Although a community's composition and the presence of at-risk community members may not 
influence local crime rates directly, the density of that composition and the interactions of those 
members will significantly increase the likelihood of criminal activity, according to this theoretical 
framework. Similarly, community-based explanations of crime argue that the presence of an 
“oppositional culture”, “arising from a lack of participation in mainstream economic and social life” 
149 
 
can aggravate other risk factors, as can the presence of criminogenic commodities like weapons and 
narcotics (p. 3-6), although these influences should, perhaps, be read as symptoms of other more 
deep-seated problems.  
 Sherman believes that once all these factors have come into play, the mere appearance of 
social or physical disorder can tip a neighbourhood beyond safety limits. Quite simply, the same 
phenomenon that occurs in conflict zones (referred to as the “brain drain” or in this case the “peace 
drain”) also occurs in so-called “bad” neighbourhoods. Law-abiding citizens who have traditionally 
acted as stabilising influences over communities begin to move away. Those who cannot afford to do 
so remain. Neighbourhoods that have fallen into disrepair gain reputations for criminal activity, 
reinforcing studies that correlate poverty with crime.  
 Where this discussion of community-based risk factors becomes more complex is where 
criminological theory, which has been grounded predominantly in more politically stable countries, 
is brought into the discourse of state fragility and development, though community-based risk 
factors interact well with theories of development. What is not entirely clear from the literature is 
how oppositional cultures affect criminogenic environments when they exceed so-called 
“mainstream” cultural elements106. 
 The theory is also untested in fragile contexts where social chaos and the disruption of 
socialising activities is more common than in the developed world, though notable criminologists 
and development theorists have written about the interplay of community composition-based risk 
factors in specific case-studies like South Africa107 and Northern Ireland108, where fragility has not yet 
taken root.  
 This gap in the literature is mitigated because theories relating to community risk factors are 
not that different to those pertaining to the causes of ethnic conflict, where it is believed by many 
researchers, like Daniel G. Abele et al, that: 
Structural variables, such as ethnic composition of a community or the size of the minority 
and majority populations in the country, have been linked to attitudes toward ethnic 
relations and prejudice. Some argue that the greater the density of a minority population 
in a certain area, the higher the degree of prejudice. This reasoning assumes that a 
perception of threat from the minority group increases with minority group density, since 
increased casual contact increases opportunities to confirm stereotypes. In stark contrast, 
others assert that majority group members who live in close proximity to or who work in 
equal-status occupations with minority group members are less prejudiced than those 
who are without this kind of contact. (1996, p. 47) 
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“Urbanicity”, write Abele et al, age and gender are also important contributing factors, whereby 
urban populations, young people and men have all been found to be more tolerant towards other 
ethnicities than rural populations, middle aged and elderly people, and women. However, large 
numbers of unemployed men and young people have been found to prolong active conflicts, once 
these have been initiated, by providing a viable recruitment base for fighting forces.  
 Both crime and conflict causation theory readily accept community composition and social 
structure as sound areas from which to extract real and meaningful risk factors, while the presence 
of criminogenic commodities, and particularly of weapons, has time and again been proven to 
increase the likelihood of violent conflict, thereby prolonging state fragility. The trouble with 
conflict-affected fragile states is that while community composition may act as an initial cause of 
fighting, such compositions are invariably shuffled and reorganised in times of extreme political 
instability. Researchers are yet to fully understand the impact of such reorganisations upon the 
criminogenic environment. 
 Within fragile state contexts, the rate at which social and physical disorder infiltrate 
communities is accelerated by weak state capacity and conflict: homes and public buildings are 
devastated by fighting, and people are exposed to significant levels of violence. Reconstruction is 
inhibited by poverty and lack of institutional capacity, so that, even where conflict is not present, 
urban and rural areas in fragile states fall into disrepair. It is only natural for otherwise stabilising 
members of the community to move away from affected areas regardless of whether they can 
afford to do so.  
 This is not an unusual occurrence for conflict-affected fragile states like Yemen, and conflicts 
in other parts of the world have actually been motivated by the desire to instigate forced migration, 
as evidenced by the ethnic cleansing of Rwanda (1994) and of the Former Palestinian Territories 
(1948). What is unique to the Yemeni context is that the country is also estimated by the UNHCR to 
be host to 191,500 Somali refugees, along with 4,700 Ethiopians, 4,200 Iraqis and 1,600 others 
(2011). The interaction of these communities with the host population is another dimension that 
must be taken into account in any assessment of the criminogenic environment, leaving Yemen a 
country with a high rate of weapons proliferation and unemployment, experiencing an exaggerated 
crisis of social and physical disorder (brought about by the wanton destruction of public and private 
property, as well as by the mass movement of people).  
 As has been reflected in the criminal statistics listed in Chapter 3, the growing disorder of 
the social environment in Yemen since the outbreak of war in 2005 has resulted in a corresponding 
increase in crime, and particularly in violent crime, which, it now seems, may be associated with the 
conflict-induced changes incurred by Yemen's community-based risk factors. While criminological 
theories relating to community-based risk factors will likely be relatively informative in this sense 
therefore, it is yet to be determined whether or not they can be effectively adapted to contexts 
where such large social devastation has occurred. There is also an argument to be made that, while 
community-based risk factors offer a fairly rigorous theoretical framework, due to their similarity 
and overlap with much conflict and fragility literature, their integration into this sector may not bring 
an altogether new contribution to the study of international development.  
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4.2.3 Family-Based Causes 
 In 1996, Chris Coughlin and Samuel Vuchinich conducted a study on the effect of family 
experiences in preadolescence upon the development of male delinquency, interviewing 194 ten-
year-old males that had been predicted to be arrested by their late teens. They found that while “An 
association between childhood experiences in the family and juvenile delinquency has long been 
recognised”, that association can now be broken down into three particular aspects of family life, 
which include: 
 “an absence of parent-child attachment that inhibits a child's acceptance of norms and 
values”; 
 “inept parenting practices that promote impulsive, antisocial behaviour”; and, 
 “family structures such as step-families and single-parent families that involve transitions 
that can interrupt the socialisation process” (1996, p. 491). 
In this regard, Wei Chao et al concur that “parents who engage in inept parenting increase the 
chances that their children will affiliate with deviant peers” (2001, p. 66) (See Figure 51). 
 
Figure 51 The Impact of Family Life on Juvenile Delinquency 
 Family-based risk factors can affect all dimensions of human development, from early 
childhood through to adult life, pushing people to fall into criminal modes of behaviour. More 
specifically, Lind McKie argues that “Families and familial relationships are focal points for the 
transmission of knowledge and the formation of ideas on violence” (2005, p. 24). Many researchers 
tend to focus upon youth offending in particular in the study of family-based risk factors, because 
early interventions in the course of human development have not only proven to be quite vital but 
also more successful than interventions targeted at adults, which usually strive to limit or control 
domestic violence109. The body of criminological theory relating to family-based risk factors tends to 
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focus upon these two problem areas of youth crime and domestic abuse, with varying levels of 
success, which makes it extremely pertinent to this thesis.  
 However, because family life is, in effect, private life, it has been difficult for researchers to 
pinpoint specific criminogenic risk factors within family settings. Many governments have 
traditionally been reluctant to interfere in or even to probe into issues relating to their citizens' 
homes.  
 Yet the connection between family life and crime is emphasised in criminological literature. 
Sherman, for instance, argues that:  
While serious crime is geographically concentrated in a small number of high crime 
communities, it is individually concentrated in families with anti-social parents, rejecting 
parents, parents in conflict, parents imposing inconsistent punishment, and parents who 
supervise their children loosely (1996, p. 4-2). 
The most prominent family-based risk factor for youth delinquency is inappropriate parenting. 
 
Figure 52 Socialisation-Founded Explanations of Family-Based Criminogenic Risk Factors 
 It is argued that most children tend to learn how to socialise with others vicariously at home 
and at school, so that if they are not provided with adequate training in this process or are 
frequently exposed to violence and abuse, they are at greater risk of falling into antisocial and 
eventually criminal modes of behaviour (See Figure 52). As has been indicated by Hedy Cleaver et al 
in their study of Child Protection, Domestic Violence and Parental Substance Misuse (2007), family 
risk factors are gravely aggravated by both legal and illegal substance use. They write that parental 
“substance misuse [and] domestic violence … impact on their capacity to safeguard and promote the 
welfare of the children”, which logically stifles the social development of those children (p. 13). 
  Like illegal substance abuse, it is difficult to classify domestic violence as a family-based risk 
factor for crime because domestic violence is considered to be a form of crime in itself by many 
cultures with its own set of social, psychological and economic causes. Lind McKie writes that 
gender-based violence, and particularly violence that is targeted against women by their husbands 
and partners, is profoundly influenced by social conceptions of gender roles. She believes that 
“patriarchy”, or “The broad system of social and economic relations that offers and reaffirms men a 
dominant position”, “creates and promotes myriad dimensions of inequalities”. McKie argues that, 
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while triggers for violence may vary between relationships, it is these inequalities that allow for 
abuse to take place within the home by making violence against women seem more socially 
excusable as an affirmation of their subservience to their husbands/partners/sons (2005, p. 41). 
Even when violence is targeted against men or children, McKie believes that domestic abuse is, 
above all, an affirmation of family power structures.  
 This argument would seem to be partially justified by the James Bulger case of 1990, when 
two eleven-year-old boys abducted and murdered a two-year-old child. One of the boys, Robert 
Thompson, was the fifth of seven siblings living in a single parent household in which the chain of 
violence and abuse was passed down along the generations, escalating in severity as each younger 
child would strive to reaffirm their social standing within the family by assaulting the next (verbally, 
physically and sometimes sexually). There is also evidence to suggest that the other culprit in James 
Bulger's murder, Jon Vernables, expressed an unusual level of fear of his mother, an indicative 
warning sign of potential abuses in the family (Audrey Gillan, 2000). The incident would appear to be 
an extreme example of the old proverb that “violence begets violence”, particularly when violence is 
used to subjugate and subdue within family-based settings.  
 The extension of family-based criminogenic risk factors that have been identified in the 
developed world to fragile states is somewhat problematic, because state fragility is often 
accompanied by conflict and displacement, which results in the forceful disruption of the traditional 
family unit. However, It has been observed that conflict and fragility are positively correlated with 
domestic abuse in particular, due to the high levels of emotional pressure experienced by 
impoverished and war-affected communities under such circumstances.  
 In 2007, the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children reported that most of 
the Iraqi refugee women whom they had consulted in Jordan reported suffering from domestic 
violence and marital rape (p. 6). They attributed this increase in violence to the stresses of living in 
cramped conditions with no legal means of earning an income. This argument falls in line with 
contemporary psychosocial criminological theory, which David Gadd and Tony Jefferson use to argue 
that “Domestic violence … often occurs when perpetrators are unable to contain threatening 
anxieties” that could easily include conflict-related stress (2007, p. 146).  
 High levels of domestic violence are reported in many fragile states like Yemen, which can be 
classed as extremely patriarchal societies, marked, as Eva Engelhardt-Wendt and Julian Poluda 
believe, by “perpetuating male dominance and a general lack of awareness of gender rights” (2008, 
p. 5), whereby the authority of the mother in the home is diminished through the use of violence by 
fathers and/or sons. Legislation aimed at protecting women from violence in Yemen has been slow 
in development due to a general lack of political will in this area and has been widely dismissed as 
unenforceable, especially within the peripheries. Those mechanisms that are already in place have 
been negatively associated with foreign agendas due to their backing by the international 
community. In practice, they can be rejected at the grass-roots level (Stakeholder Consultation, 
United Nations Population Fund, 15 August 2010).  
 These gender inequalities are sometimes translated into contrasting parental roles, whereby 
one parent is clearly dominant within the household while the other is subservient not only to their 
partner but sometimes to their children. Such uneven parenting practices lead in the first instance to 
inconsistent rules of social interaction for children, and sometimes to other broader inept parenting 
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practices in the second instance. Of more importance, is that fragile states are also marked by an 
absence of formal support structures for parents so that, even when displacement and conflict are 
not factors, the capacities of parents to form constructive relationships with their children are 
hampered by the need to seek out employment for parents and children alike, as well as by the 
general absence of institutions to monitor children in single-parent situations or to remove children 
from abusive settings. Finally, fragile states are very poorly equipped to assist children who are 
entirely separated from their families, so that these are forced to fend for themselves on the streets, 
falling into patterns of criminal behaviour in order to survive. 
 
4.2.4 School-Based Causes 
 A lot of attention is paid to early childhood in the study of criminology. This is because, as 
Wei Chao et al concede in their analysis of delinquency growth curves: 
One of the most widely accepted findings in criminology is that childhood conduct 
problems are a strong predictor of subsequent involvement in antisocial behaviour. … 
And although only about 50% of antisocial children become antisocial adults, almost all 
antisocial adults displayed antisocial tendencies as children. (2001, pp. 63-64) 
Even a cursory glance at the literature on this subject will reveal a fairly wide range of arguments 
relating to the reasons for this trend, yet all of them tend to gravitate towards two camps. Most 
theorists will either support the idea that “antisocial” behaviour which develops into criminality is 
the manifestation of a character trait, or that antisocial behaviour is a product of the social learning 
process. Under both eventualities, childhood experiences and childhood behaviour patterns are 
thought to be strong indicators of future lawful or unlawful activity. 
 
Figure 53 The Impact of Childhood Experiences and Behaviour on Future Criminal Activity 
 Under both types of explanation, it is of little wonder that so many researchers have focused 
upon the family unit and the school environment (as well as the classroom environment more 
155 
 
specifically) in their effort to either stem the development of antisocial character traits or to monitor 
and control the social learning process through effective social bonding initiatives. After all, in the 
developed world:  
Given the amount of time spent in the academic setting, aside from the family, the 
institution of education becomes the primary instrument of socialization for youth. In 
other words, the school is responsible for teaching not only substantive information, but 
also the norms and values of society (Christine A. Eith, 2005, p. 2).  
It is commonly believed that a process of social bonding between schools and their students can 
help children to learn self-control, to understand the consequences of their actions and to reduce 
antisocial or criminal behaviour. This idea is drawn from Travis Hirschi's theory of social control, 
made famous by his ground-breaking work on the Causes of Delinquency (2002).  
 The trouble here is that school registration and student retention in fragile states tends to 
be extremely poor, so that many school-based risk factors cease to apply. In Yemen, for instance, the 
net primary school attendance rate for 2009 was only 68%, leaving 32% of children in situations that 
are not covered by theories of crime causation relating to school environments (United Nations 
International Children's Emergency Fund and Government of Yemen, 2009). Furthermore, in 2011 
and beyond, it is likely that the percentage of children out of schools increased due to diminishing 
levels of safety and the disruption of multiple governmental employment sectors, including that of 
education.  
 Theories relating to school-based risk factors tend to be catered to school-aged children in 
the developed world, ranging from age 3 to 18, depending on the country. It has been found that 
few children in Yemen and other fragile states complete primary school at all and fewer still move on 
to secondary education, so that school-aged children are overly represented by 5 to 10-year-olds 
(Stakeholder Interview, Ministry of Education, 15 August 2010). Nevertheless, because this body of 
literature deals directly with the interaction of children and young people with their social 
environment, identified risk factors may still be pertinent.  
 It has been found that multiple risk factors can affect the development of children and 
adolescents within schools, which are, after all, institutions that have been established specifically 
for the fast promotion of such development. Many of these risk factors are similar to those already 
covered under the community and family-based risk sections of this thesis. Most schools act as 
microcosms of the community, and many children bring aspects of their family lives with them into 
school.  
 For example, risk factors that relate to community composition will be reflected in the 
composition of students in schools, whereas problems related to community social structures will be 
mirrored in the associations and interactions of school children. Equally, where normal patterns of 
socialisation and social learning have been disrupted for children within their families, the school's 
grounds will provide a conduit for any resulting antisocial behaviour and broader delinquency. At the 
same time, a large presence of criminogenic commodities within the community will impact the 
school environment, particularly if weapons and narcotics are trafficked through the playground and 
classrooms.  
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 Schools form a useful and telling micro-study of the broader criminogenic influences that 
may be impacting a society and its young people. In fragile states, they can illustrate the conditions 
with which most children are faced on a daily basis – such as violence, poverty and malnutrition. 
Whether or not children attend school is determined by overall communal perceptions of safety 
(children do not go to school if they fear leaving their homes), access to water (if children have to 
collect water from a faraway source on a daily basis, this may prevent them from engaging in other 
activities), general levels of prosperity (if poverty is rampant, children may have to seek out 
employment opportunities rather than going to school), agricultural cycles (particularly during 
harvest and planting cycles, children may need to work farms during the day), and many other 
conditions, including hunger and disease. In Yemen, it has been found that gender is an equally 
important factor in the restriction of education, so that the female to male ratio in basic education 
remained 74.8 per cent in 2008, making the school environment semi-indicative of broader gender 
inequalities (United Nations Development Project, 2010a). 
 
Figure 54 Positive and Negative School-Based Influences on Child Development 
 Beyond these arguments, however, Denise C. Gottfredson identifies several aspects of 
school life and school administration which can adversely or positively influence crime rates. These 
include: “characteristics of school and classroom environments as well as individual-level school-
related experiences and attitudes, peer group experiences, and personal values, attitudes and 
beliefs” (1996, p. 5-1). These risk factors are harder to pin down than others because a lot of them 
operate at the micro rather than the macro level of crime causation and are to do with emotional 
well-being (see Figure 54). Gottfredson goes on to explain that classroom characteristics and the 
social construction of the school has a lot to do with its “academic mission”, and many adverse 
school-based experiences can be mitigated by a strong structure of emotional support (p. 5-1). 
Problems relating to bad school experiences can be flagged by poor performance in homework and 
testing or low rates of school attendance, although these could be symptomatic of problems 
experienced by the child elsewhere or at home.  
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 Peer-related risk factors include both a lack of socialisation and problems of association with 
delinquent peers. As has been stated during the analysis of family-based causes of crime, such 
associations can prove to be the product of inept parenting rather than of a high risk school 
environment.  
 It is found that while these factors can be extremely useful for understanding why children 
and young people go on to commit crime and violent crime in particular – they are virtually 
undetectable in fragile states where teacher training tends to be extremely poor and schools lack 
the capacity to monitor their students. In Yemen more specifically, it has been found that this lack of 
capacity is linked to a fundamental inability of the state to attract high quality graduates into the 
education sector, so that only those with the lowest results and most basic education levels choose 
to become teachers (Stakeholder Interview, Ministry of Education, 15 August 2010). This poor staff 
qualification level has not only led to ineffectual relationships between students and teachers, but 
also to a poor rate of retention of children in schools so that most Yemenis today do not see 
education as a necessary component for building a career. Their views are reinforced by the reality 
that the unemployed population of Yemen is disproportionately represented by university 
graduates, looking for a better quality of life, so that 44% of those with an intermediate level of 
education and 54% of university graduates were unemployed in 2008 (International Labour 
Organisation, 2008). 
 
4.2.5 Economic and Labour Market Causes 
 Struggling economies and over-saturated labour markets are key components of state 
fragility, and they exert an extraordinary hold over societies and crime rates, exacerbating virtually 
all other risk factors listed thus far. For instance, cheaper housing in one area and the availability of 
low-skill labour opportunities can affect community composition by prompting an influx of low-
income labourers and thereby generating community-based risk factors. Economic stress factors can 
increase pressure upon families, raising the risk of domestic violence and separation, leading to 
more single-parent households and disrupting the social learning process for children, thereby 
creating family-based risk factors. A lack of school funding can reduce the effectiveness of structures 
developed for the emotional well-being of children, increasing classroom sizes and reducing the 
school-to-student bonding process, paving the way for school-based risk factors.  
 Economic and labour market stress factors can feed into the causes of conflict by 
aggravating resource competition and inter-community tensions110. At the same time, as overall 
levels of well-being decline and economic stress levels continue to rise within communities, the 
demands for mood-altering substances increase, leading to increased substance use and addiction 
among the general population, thereby allowing for criminogenic commodity-related risk factors to 
take hold.  
 In short, economics and labour markets influence all aspects of society, with implications 
that economic risk factors related to poverty and unemployment that have been identified in the 
developed world (where GDP per capita in the richest country, Liechtenstein, is US $94,569) may 
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have huge implications for fragile states, where GDP can be as low as US $187 per capita, as it was in 
Zimbabwe in 2010 (United Nations Development Project, 2010). However, applying these risk factors 
to fragile states is not as straightforward as it seems, due largely to the extremely complex 
relationship between economics, labour market conditions and crime rates.  
 Discussions of economic and labour market risk factors in the study of crime tend, as 
Weatherburn and Lind surmise, to refer to the “economic stress-induced offender motivation 
paradigm”, which, rather than referring to the psychological impacts of economic pressures, 
“mediates the relationship between economic factors and crime” (2001, p. 6). Weatherburn and  
Lind argue that within this context:  
The term 'economic stress' is used … as a shorthand way of denoting the psychological 
condition or conditions which putatively mediate the link between factors such as 
unemployment (or poverty) and the individual motivation to offend. (2001, pp. 6-7) 
While this concept of “economic stress” is widely acknowledged, it remains unclear how exactly 
economic stress influences individuals to commit crime and why certain people are susceptible to its 
effects while others are not.  
 Weatherburn and Lind identify four theories that strive to explain this connection. They are: 
 strain theory, which suggests that poorer members of society “experience a significant gap” 
between their social aspirations (which are predetermined by socio-cultural and commercial 
perceptions of worth-while goals and pursuits) and their economic capacity to achieve those 
aspirations through legal means. The theory is used to set out the relationship between 
economic disadvantage and acquisitive crime (2001, p. 7) because, as Kerry Carrington 
argues “Strain … produces deprivation” (2009, p. 43); 
 social opportunity theory, which posits that crime (and particularly youth delinquency) is in 
itself “an act of rebellion against blocked social opportunities rather than … a means of 
achieving culturally approved goals” (Lind et al, 2001, p. 7). According to social opportunity 
theory, if illegitimate opportunities are present when legitimate ones are either not 
available or unsatisfactory, the desire to rebel will increase illegal activity in terms of both 
acquisitive and non-acquisitive crime111; 
 expected utility theory, which argues that offenders calculate the likelihood of their 
successful completion of a criminal act according to a cost-to-benefit analysis, taking 
account of perceived risk factors so that they may determine whether to pursue licit or illicit 
pathways by anticipating the expected utility of both outcomes. (p. 8) This is also sometimes 
known as economic choice theory; and 
 early Marxism, which views criminal activity as a product of capitalism-generated economic 
competition. (p. 9) 
While these explanations go some way towards detailing the impact of economic pressures on crime 
rates, they fall short of describing why so few people are affected by them in a criminogenic way 
within societies at large.  
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 By analysing behaviour as a product of economic push and pull factors, this body of theory 
can either omit other important stabilising and aggravating social forces, or break all offending down 
into economically-motivated activities. Due to their reluctance to engage with violent crime as a 
potential product of economic stress factors, it has been found that these theories require 
significant adaptation if they are to be made relevant to the main argument of this thesis112. To this 
end, Bushway and Reuter write in their analysis of 'Labour Markets and Crime Risk Factors' (1996) 
that labour markets and economic risk factors must always be analysed in tandem with one another 
in order to better understand how their interactions can either enhance or mitigate the effect of 
economic pressures on individuals. 
 
Figure 55 Positive Labour Market Social Influences 
 Employment in times of economic difficulty can exert a controlling influence over people by 
generating a social bond between individuals and the society in which they live, much like the 
school-to-student bond described previously113. This phenomenon is generally described under 
social control theory, according to which a lack of steady employment leads to a breakdown of social 
bonds and an increased likelihood of offending. In this sense, employment is thought of as a 
distraction to a certain degree, whereby people who are occupied by work are less likely to find time 
for criminal behaviour (see Figure 55). To this extent, Bushway and Reuter state that under the 
constraints of anomie theory – which deals with lack of job satisfaction – employment itself is not 
sufficient to deter crime in individuals unless it meets the conditions necessary to steer people away 
from antisocial tendencies. Income inequalities and other problems relating to job satisfaction or 
boredom at work can push people to offend even if they earn a steady and regular wage (p. 6-4) (see 
Figure 56).  
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Figure 56 Negative Labour Market Social Influences 
 This issue is pivotal to understanding high crime rates in fragile states, where unemployment 
is rampant while the monitoring of employment sectors is quite poor, so that equal work very rarely 
means equal pay. In Yemen, where the unemployment rate was estimated at 35% in 2010, for every 
person in formal employment – three more were thought to be working in the informal sectors, with 
460,000 known informal businesses working outside the remits of labour and tax laws (Stakeholder 
Interview, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 16 August 2010). Without recourse to labour laws 
and employment tribunals, the potential for employees to suffer as a result of corruption and 
human rights violations while at work are relatively high, and a lack of access to welfare and 
benefits, as well as a lack of potential for career advancement, can easily prove sufficient to convince 
people to search for other more illicit means of economic achievement. 
 Overall, as François Bourguignon notes: 
it is important to keep in mind that the preceding economic argument fits better crimes 
against property or illegal activity like drug dealing, illegal gambling or managing 
prostitution, which offer some economic gain, than crimes against the person. It cannot 
be ruled out that homicides, international or not, are more frequent among poor and 
less educated people and in areas where police is little present. Also part of 
international homicides and physical violence is directly linked to property crime or 
illegal activity. So, the homicide rate in a given area may be determined very much by 
the same variables as the rate of property crime. However, given the exceptional 
character of this type of crime the relationship with these variables is most likely to be 
weaker than for property crime. (1999, p. 13) 
While it is tempting to read crime in fragile states as a product of their most obvious character trait – 
their economic deprivation – economic and labour market risk factors are insufficient in and of 
themselves for determining the high rate of violent young offending in such contexts, though it may 
be the case that psychological pressure generated by economic stress could be more relevant114.  
 It can be argued that the significant economic underdevelopment of fragile states serves to 
aggravate other relevant risk factors and increase the emotional strain on young people, leading to a 
greater potential for violence and aggression. In Yemen, this aggression and growing general 
dissatisfaction can further be used to explain the appeal of the Arab Spring in 2011, during which 
unemployment and poverty were chief among popular complaints.  
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4.2.6 Judicial and Law Enforcement Causes 
 A founding principle of good governance is the commitment of any state towards observing 
and maintaining the rule of law. This is not only because the rule of law provides the foundational 
principle of effective legal systems, but also because public safety from crime and violence is 
considered to be one of the most important measures of a state's effectiveness, not to mention a 
key determining factor for a government's popularity. A starting definition of state fragility is when a 
government is no longer capable of maintaining a monopoly over legitimate violence within its 
territories, leading to parallel reductions in justice administration and law enforcement capacities. 
With levels of public safety resources being directly correlated with rates of offending in the 
developed world, it could be (and often is) assumed that the diversion of spending in fragile states 
away from conventional community protection mechanisms has caused a rise in opportunistic 
behaviour necessary to promote increased offending. However, when it comes to criminological 
theories relating to judicial and law enforcement causes of offending, significant divergences 
between fragile states and the developed world become apparent with broad theoretical 
contradictions.  
 Working in America, William K. Niskanen has found that an increase in police street presence 
“appears to have no significant effect on the rate of actual violent crime and a roughly proportionate 
negative effect on the actual rate of property crime” (1994). Niskanen argues that within the 
developed world it is extremely difficult to establish the relationship between policing figures and 
crime rates, because: firstly, police forces dedicate greater resources to areas with higher crime 
rates; secondly, police presence is correlated with other economic factors that include local 
government spending budgets; and, thirdly, because a higher police presence leads to a greater rate 
of detection of criminal activity. Each of these conditions leads to a skewing of crime statistics that 
can, in turn, generate faulty assumptions about the nature of the crime-policing relationship. 
Nevertheless, as George L. Kelling et al argue, “The prospect of police arriving at a crime in progress 
as a result of a call or a chance observation is thought to deter crimes”, despite these statistical 
discrepancies, so that a visible police presence can prove to be an effective deterrent for most forms 
of criminal activity (1988, p.2).  
 While these arguments shall be discussed further in section 4.3 as social control theories, it 
has contrastingly been strongly asserted that high levels of crime and insecurity in fragile states are 
directly connected to poor policing capacities, as has been argued by Paul Collier among others 
(2000, p.102). Of equal importance have been the capacities and conduct of other elements of law 
enforcement services, including those of judicial and penal bodies.  
 In this last aspect, theories of crime causation that are aimed at understanding criminogenic 
risk factors in the developed world and in fragile states alike have strongly coincided, with both sides 
acknowledging the radicalising impact of correctional institutions like prisons on adults and young 
people. In developed countries, these arguments relate to the hardening of criminals in prison, 
whereby petty offenders are pushed into more extreme forms of antisocial behaviour through 
prolonged association with other deviant members of society within confined environments. In 
fragile states, and particularly in conflict-affected Islamic countries, there is a similar concern that 
detention facilities have come to form a rich recruitment ground for future insurgents.  
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 In her study of 'Arab Prisons', Nicole Stracke writes that Arab states have long acknowledged 
that “prisons and detention centres could be breeding grounds for hard-liners and recruitment 
centres for terrorist groups”, whereby it has generally been accepted that this is “not a new 
phenomenon” (2007). This was also a key finding to emerge from the Yemeni case study, where 
interaction with prison environments was identified by young people in Yemen as an important 
cause of increased youth aggression in the country115. While criminological theories in the developed 
world tend to focus on prison environments and prison cultures as the primary criminogenic 
influences within penal systems, analyses of the Middle East in particular tend rather to focus on law 
enforcement practices, with Stracke noting that Islamic radicalisation in prisons has been strongly 
associated with “the alleged cruel treatment of Islamist prisoners and the harsh interrogation 
methods used inside prisons”. This is a strong point of diversion between criminological literature 
and theories of fragility, with criminological theory that has been produced in the developed world 
remaining fairly limited in its capacity to conceptualise the extremely poor living conditions that are 
characteristic of prison facilities in least developed countries and even in more prosperous Middle 
Eastern ones.  
 In Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the realisation that prison management could contribute to 
increased community radicalisation triggered vast reformations of prison systems in the early- and 
mid-2000s. In fragile states, such reforms have proven much more logistically difficult to 
implement116. It is sufficient to note here that prison reforms in Yemen have thus far been stalled by 
weak state capacities, a lack of political will, a lack of funding and, above all, by the fact that many 
prisons are privately owned by powerful stakeholders who are known to have little respect for 
human rights. Freedom House claim that the Yemeni Government has failed time and again “to 
investigate hundreds of disappearances since the late 1960s in both north and south Yemen” that 
are linked to the private prison system (2002), with IRIN reporting incidents of torture in private 
detention facilities even in cases of petty offences (2007).  
 IRIN write that: 
The issue of private prisons in Yemen has only once before been raised in parliament - 
after more than 400 residents of Raash village in the southern Ibb province were 
displaced from their land in January 2007 by their local tribal leader, Sheikh Mohammed 
Mansour, who allegedly has four private prisons. “But parliament can’t do anything about 
the issue as some MPs have their own private prisons,” MP Shawqi al-Qadhi, a member of 
the parliamentary Rights and Freedoms Committee, told IRIN  (2007). 
According to this article, Government-owned prisons, including the Central Prison in Sana'a, also 
include private cells that are leased by sheikhs and other prominent community members, indicating 
an institutional acceptance of existing practices. Overall, conditions in Yemeni prisons remain dire 
regardless of ownership, with Freedom House sighting the prevalence of “poor sanitary conditions, 
overcrowding, inadequate food, and torture” in governmental detention facilities, all of which may 
be correlated with increased levels of aggression among inmates who survive long enough to see 
their release dates. 
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 Prison-based criminogenic risk factors in fragile states are rendered all the more dangerous 
by inconsistent judicial and law enforcement practices117. Just as privately owned prisons are beyond 
the reach of the Yemeni Government's control, so too are private security and informal judicial 
systems largely unmonitored. It has been found that powerful tribal leaders in Yemen often 
administer their own forms of justice, arresting and imprisoning without trial those who are thought 
to pose a threat to their authority or to violate their beliefs. These members of society are generally 
thought to be beyond the reach of the law and remain under-investigated by state law enforcement 
institutions.  
 Yemeni police officers and members of the judiciary themselves are also thought to operate 
in a way that is inconsistent with international human rights principles. Of the highest priority here is 
that the Yemeni justice system fails to segregate offenders according to the severity of their crimes, 
so that prison populations are comprised of various types of offenders who should not necessarily 
be placed in the same environment, leading to an increased probability of socialisation to negative 
and harmful behaviour patterns for petty criminals. This means that Islamic radicals, insurgents, 
murderers and rapists are imprisoned with irregular migrants, children and other vulnerable groups, 
including the mentally handicapped. It has been found that Yemeni police officers engage in 
intimidating and discriminatory practices, whereby migrants and Somali refugees especially can be 
deliberately targeted at the investigation phase without cause, leading to their over-representation 
at the sentencing stage (Ali Saeed, 2011). Meanwhile, it has been observed that the Yemeni judiciary 
fails to take into account mental handicaps and other illnesses when sentencing and imprisoning 
offenders, with Maan A. Barri Qasem and Ahmed Mohamed Makki recommending that at the very 
least patients suffering from mental illnesses should always be separated from general prison 
populations (2008, p. 91). As has been outlined in the introduction of this thesis, judicial processes 
established to protect children from imprisonment with adult offenders fail to identify those in need 
of aid due to a lack of birth registration, so that the Yemeni Government has virtually no capacity to 
determine the ages of suspected minors (Stakeholder Interview, United Nations Population Fund, 14 
August 2010).  
 Such practices, when combined with the state's reputation for institutional corruption at the 
elite and grass-roots levels, have led to a distancing of the community and individual from law 
enforcement services, leading to a general lack of detection of criminal activity and a corresponding 
rise in offences that might have been deterred by police presence. Ultimately, long processing times 
and a failure to address grievances has meant that, of those Yemenis interviewed and surveyed in 
2011, virtually all said that they would not engage with the police or the criminal courts if they fell 
victim to crime, though some acknowledged that they might strive to initiate civil proceedings if 
their property was stolen. These findings would seem to imply that even a drastic effort to reform 
the law enforcement and judicial systems of Yemen would fail to immediately reverse criminogenic 
risk factors, due to an overwhelming lack of faith in state services and capabilities.  
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4.3 Social Control 
4.3.1 Theories of Social Constructionism and Social Control 
 Criminological theories of social constructionism and social control are associated with one 
another in the discussion of the composition of legal frameworks and their origins. In particular, 
social control theories outline the reasons why conformity to standards of lawful behaviour appeals 
to most individuals, while elite social constructionism reveals how governments help to enforce 
conformity by punishing deviants. While constructionism is thought of as an extension of labelling 
theory, which, according to Frank Tannenbaum, is a process of social reaction to the behaviour of 
individuals through which some people become “labelled” as deviants from the norm (1938): 
constructionism and elite constructionism help to outline why, though some crimes are prosecuted 
to the full letter of the law, others are ignored entirely by governments, law enforcement services 
and community members. For example, theft is considered to be a serious offence by many people 
while the theft of a chocolate bar by a child inspires less concern. 
 If contrasted with one another, social control theories can be understood as explanations of 
why individuals choose not to break the law, while social constructionism illustrates why societies 
reject individuals who do break the law. Both sets of theories are intrinsically tied into notions of 
conformity, and, because they have much to teach us about why most people tend to obey the law 
in the developed world, they may also hold the key to understanding why fragile states conversely 
experience such great difficulties in law enforcement. Interestingly, social control and social 
constructionism also need to be understood alongside theories of deviance, which posit that: “Social 
groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance”, whereby elite 
social constructionism, which codifies “norms into laws”, “thus determine[s] what constitutes 
acceptable and deviant behaviour” (Carrington, 2009, p. 45). 
 
Figure 57 The Process of Deviance Construction Through Social Grouping and Blocked Social Integration 
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 According to classical theories of social control originating, for instance, within the works of 
Albert J. Reiss (1951), Jackson Toby (1957) and F. Ivan Nye (1958); crime begins to occur when 
offenders cease to have a strong stake in conformity, so that non-criminal pathways of achieving 
desired objectives become less appealing than criminal ones that offer short-cuts to success. Travis 
Hirschi summarises that “Control theories assume that delinquent acts result when an individual's 
bond to society is weak or broken” (2002, p. 251).  
 Hirschi writes that such bonds are divisible according to four types of relationship that 
include: 
 attachment; described as a conventional bond to society, the attachment of individuals to 
one another is said to be an element of internal control, through which people are said to 
restrain their own behaviour for the benefit of other members of their communities with 
whom they empathise. This bond is variously referred to as an “internal” or “informal” 
system of social control (p. 252); 
 commitment; often thought of as the “rational component in conformity”, commitment is 
the term used to encompass the idea that people cherish the investments that they have 
made into their positions in society, including furthering their educations and careers. The 
commitment bond allegedly dictates that individuals who are committed to maintaining 
such investments are less likely to indulge in criminal behaviour for fear of losing the 
benefits that they have worked for, such as their jobs or even their freedoms. Hirschi argues 
that “To the person committed to conventional lines of action, risking one to ten years in 
prison for a ten-dollar holdup is stupidity, because to the committed person the costs and 
risks obviously exceed ten dollars in value”, so that “The concept of commitment assumes 
that the organisation of society is such that the interests of most persons would be 
endangered if they were to engage in criminal acts” (p. 253); 
 involvement; the argument that states that most individuals are simply too busy with other 
activities to take part in crime, involvement is an essential element of contemporary control 
theory. According to this theory, the individual who is involved in the conventional activities 
of daily life, including employment, education and leisure activities, has too little time to 
think about or take part in criminal behaviour; and 
 belief; the final of the four social bonds, belief is the most commonly cited aspect of control 
theory. It dictates that societies are united through a common value system, and that most 
citizens will not act against the dominant narrative of right and wrong. According to this 
argument, people do not ordinarily act against the belief system within which they have 
been socialised unless other external criminogenic risk factors come into play.  
Within the context of social control theories, it becomes relatively easy to speculate that fragile 
states are more prone to exhibiting high rates of offending because individuals generally have less 
stake in conformity.  
 Fragile states tend to be overrun with the conditions necessary to break people's bonds with 
society. Such conditions generally include high rates of unemployment, a general lack of 
participation in education, displacement and a lack of opportunities for career advancement based 
on skills and duration of commitment. These aspects of state fragility generally lead to a lack of 
engagement in normalising social and political processes, and thereby hold significant potential for 
generating deviance, particularly among young people who do not yet have strong social 
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responsibilities such as children of their own. This view is helpful in aiding conceptualisations of state 
fragility, but is also relatively superficial and can be inapplicable to those fragile states that are 
heavily influenced by the prevalence of strong, uniform cultural and religious valuation systems.  
 While it is true that Yemen is a country in which levels of involvement are probably 
genuinely quite low, the role that attachment, commitment and belief play in forming the identities 
of young people and the general population should not be underestimated. This was seen during the 
Arab Spring of 2011 in the very high level of participation in protests by young people who felt as 
though they had a stake in the country's future, as well as by the lesser participation of older 
members of society with children of their own, who had a responsibility to care for their families 
rather than risk their lives in public demonstrations118. This was also seen most strongly in the 
relatively low rate of petty offending that took place during the Arab Spring despite the high 
prevalence of opportunities for criminal activity, a reflection of the strong socio-cultural rejection of 
property-related crime based on Islamic principles119. While social control and social constructionism 
are likely to hold important insights into criminological investigations of fragility, their impact on 
criminal activity is unlikely to be very straightforward, indicating a strong need to cater theoretical 
frameworks to cultural phenomena, not just structural and economic ones as the theories 
themselves would imply upon a first reading.  
 Kerry Carrington argues that, within the context of young offending, social controls and 
social constructionism result in two forms of deviance in the developed world. Primary deviance 
might be thought of to comprise behaviour that results in the commission of a criminal offence. 
Secondary deviance “occurs if the young person adopts a delinquent identity as a self-defence 
mechanism to the social reaction to his or her behaviour” (2009, p. 45). In this sense, Carrington 
believes that “Young people who are stigmatised by labelling of their deviant behaviour can become 
socially ostracised, reinforcing and amplifying their initial deviance” (p. 45).  
 This argument holds disturbing consequences, which are that children and young people 
who engage in criminal activity, perhaps in response to the various criminogenic risk factors that 
have already been identified, will then continue to engage in criminal activity in order to justify their 
resulting sense of social exclusion from what is perceived as a generally law-abiding society. It is also 
foreseeable that, due to the inconsistent law enforcement practices identified in section 4.2.6, such 
a sense of exclusion among children and young people in fragile states might be thought of as 
externally implemented and unjustified, leading to a greater need for a rejection of normative values 
and the formation of a new criminal identity.  
 Interestingly, the same phenomenon is observable in times of conflict particularly in main-
land Africa, when children and young people are pushed into participating in armed violence. Here, 
it is found that even after the cessation of hostilities, child soldiers face extreme difficulties in 
reintegrating into society due to their perceived rejection by host communities, so that many fall 
into patterns of criminal activity or other forms of harmful behaviour, whereby it becomes “hardly 
possible to speak of reintegration” (Douglas et al, 2004, p. 89). Likewise, it has been observed that, 
among many children and young people in Yemeni cases of accidental violence, similar effects 
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prevail, whereby children who unintentionally injured or killed family members while playing with 
firearms subsequently fled their homes and created new criminal identities for themselves out of a 
fear of returning home and facing the social and emotional repercussions of their actions (IRIN, 
2010). In cases where community identities are strengthened through tribalism, this social isolation 
may be more severe, though this assumption needs more testing and investigation. 
 Carrington writes that “Defining and labelling crime and deviance assumes a social 
consensus and collective agreement about what is normal” (p. 46), which is not necessarily 
applicable to fragile states where social constructionism and the pressures of elite social 
constructionism may be fundamentally misaligned. It ought to be noted that the Arab Spring has 
been a clear manifestation of this misalignment. In particular, it is evident that the Yemeni 
Government's rejection and criminalisation of pro-change protesters is not reflective of broader 
social constructions of right and wrong.  
 Deviance theory, nonetheless, applies to more traditional conceptualisations of crime in 
Yemen, whereby acts of violence and sexual deviance in particular can lead to the rejection of 
individuals by their communities. Such broad rejection of social deviancy is traditionally associated 
within criminal literature with moral panics – the demonisation within law, cultures and the media of 
individuals or groups who act in contradiction to dominant moral values.  
 In Yemen, such values can be found to differ substantially depending upon the region in 
which communities are located, their tribal and religious identities, political affiliations and 
economic prosperity. These radical distinctions make Yemen an extremely difficult state to police 
and administer, with individual areas of the country implementing and administering their own 
alternative laws and justice proceedings120. Under such circumstances, it is extremely easy for young 
people, migrants and other vulnerable groups to become mislabelled as social deviants and locked 
into patterns of criminal behaviour, though the regional specificity of their interactions with 
communities and state officials would seem to imply that it is difficult to generalise about the 
applicability of broad social control theories within the country as a whole.  
 
4.3.2 Social Learning Theory 
 Social learning theory posits that, particularly during childhood, individuals can learn new 
information and new modes of behaviour by watching other people interact with their 
environments. As Stephen W. Verrill summarises, the theory is used to explain “minor forms of 
juvenile offending and substance use” in the developed world, though it has partially accounted for 
broader offences, including “illegal computer behaviour”, “intimate partner violence” and “digital 
piracy” (2008, p. 2). Social learning has applications for violent offending, particularly among 
children and young people, and could be used to help to generate theories of violent young 
offending in fragile states.  
 While its foundational concept seems relatively straightforward, social learning theory 
provides the backbone of much criminological study, in terms of understanding both criminogenic 
risk factors and elements of social control. It establishes that children and young people learn about 
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drug use and other commodities through association with peers, that children learn aggression and 
violent modes of behaviour from their families, communities and school environments, and that 
people learn to conceptualise morality and “right and wrong” from general modes of behaviour 
common to their societies. 
 
Figure 58 Social Learning Theory and the Learning of Violent Behaviour Through Observation 
 Such theories of social learning are associated with Albert Bandura, who officially pioneered 
the idea in 1973. In its contemporary form, social learning theory is also connected with Ronald L. 
Aker's theory of differential reinforcement and association (1977). This theory posits that “The 
primary learning mechanism in social behaviour is operant (instrumental) conditioning in which 
behaviour is shaped by the stimuli which follow, or are consequences of the behaviour”, rather than 
by behaviour itself (Akers et al, 1979, p. 637-638). Social learning is a type of mimicry, whereby 
behaviour is observed and copied by onlookers based upon its consequences, rather than upon the 
actions of which that behaviour is comprised. It is the combined observation of action and 
consequence that determines the type of behaviour learned by the observer (See Figure 58). 
 In this way, “Social behaviour is acquired both through direct conditioning and through 
imitation or modelling of others' behaviour” so that “Behaviour is strengthened through reward 
(positive reinforcement) and avoidance of punishment (negative reinforcement) or weakened by 
aversive stimuli (positive punishment) and loss of reward (negative punishment)” (p. 638).  
 This thesis argues that, within fragile states where both social and military violence are 
generally widespread, children and young people readily observe the reward of violent behaviour 
committed by those who are more socially and physically powerful than they are, without witnessing 
those individuals receiving any immediate punishment because state and law enforcement 
capacities are too weak to detect such offences. This has led to the emergence of a new glorification 
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of violence within Yemeni society among young people and new generations in particular121. In this 
way, children are pressured into learning aggressive and antisocial modes of behaviour through the 
observation of such behaviour in adults and other children without any negative consequences, 
whereby the perpetrators of violence are readily and frequently rewarded for their actions with 
physical and economic gains. As Akers summarises: “Whether deviant or conforming behaviour is 
acquired and persists depends on past and present rewards or punishments for the behaviour and 
the rewards and punishments attached to alternative behaviour” – a statement that provides the 
entire basis of differential reinforcement. 
 Social learning also ties into other forms of social control. In particular, it has been proposed 
that social learning is strongly reinforced by communal constructions of right and wrong, so that if 
important individuals who exert a strong social influence on children and young people openly and 
directly reject a form of antisocial behaviour, this may, in some cases, be sufficient to stem 
delinquency in individuals, despite the perceived benefits of aggressive behaviour models. Likewise, 
delinquent peers who perceive criminal behaviour patterns as necessary or positive can reinforce 
the negative effects of social learning by providing another form of reward for antisocial behaviour – 
increased social standing for individuals within groups.  
 This method of entrenching harmful behaviour patterns is most commonly observed in the 
developed world within gang culture, where criminal activity is used by children and young people to 
generate “street cred” and rise to higher organisational levels within criminal networks (Simon 
Harding, 2011). In Yemen, it may also be associated with protecting tribal interests, defending 
property rights, or protecting family reputations, as it is in cases of violence committed against the 
state, violence committed through the resolution of land and water disputes, and violence 
committed in the pursuit of justice and honour killings respectively. It is found that retributive 
violence in Yemen is highly prevalent, where revenge killings are seen as socially acceptable in a 
range of criminal circumstances (Stakeholder Interview, Ministry of Justice, 17 August 2011). In this 
way, “Behaviour is said to be reinforced when repeated episodes are met with a response by others 
that influences the actor to engage in the behaviour again under similar circumstances” (Teresa Vigil 
Bäckström et al, 1994, p. 149). Social learning theory may be viewed as contradicting deviance 
theory, however both theories actually work relatively nicely in tandem. It should be noted that, 
while deviance theory analyses criminal behaviour patterns and the construction of criminal 
identities as a product of the broad social rejection of offenders through labelling, social learning 
refers to the acceptance of such individuals within criminal sub-groups or oppositional cultures 
buried inside larger societies.  
 
4.3.3 Theories of Legitimacy and Cooperation 
 Theories of legitimacy and cooperation within social control stem largely from the works of 
Jeffrey Fagan and Tom R. Tyler122, in which the authors argue that perceptions of state and law 
enforcement legitimacy strongly impact the extent to which individuals are willing to cooperate with 
and obey the law. Equally, it is argued that civilian cooperation with law enforcement is a basic pre-
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requisite of effective crime control systems. In the context of fragile states, this line of reasoning 
stands to have huge implications for the criminological environment because fragile states are 
generally defined specifically by their lack of authority and legitimacy123, and many are affected by a 
severe distrust of police forces124.  
 Lack of faith in law enforcement services in Yemen is characterised by an outright refusal to 
report criminal offences to the police, a tendency that dominated among both pro-change and pro-
government supporters alike in interviews and surveys conducted in 2011 and 2012125. If the goal of 
this thesis is “normative” – as defined by John Baylis et al, whereby the object of political study is to 
put forward solutions to political problems (2011), – then it could be argued that increasing police 
legitimacy should be seen as a top priority in the study of crime in fragile states, because, as Fagan 
and Tyler argue: 
To be effective in lowering crime and creating secure communities, the police must be 
able to elicit cooperation from community residents. Security cannot be produced by 
either the police or community residents acting alone – it requires cooperation. Such 
cooperation potentially involves, on the part of the public, both obeying the law and 
working with the police or others in the community to help combat crime in the 
community. (2008, p. 231) 
The purpose of legitimacy and cooperation theories is to identify and address the social, political and 
economic factors that impact perceptions of law enforcement services among communities, so that 
it might be possible to identify conduits for the improvement of police-community relations.  
 The greatest limitation of such theories in fragile contexts is not their lack of applicability but 
rather their low potential for physical impact, whereby the reinstatement of the kind of community-
police relationship that they recommend would require such a massive expansion of policing 
capacity and such an extensive reform of law enforcement services that it would be impossible to 
implement any meaningful initiative without a phenomenal financial contribution by foreign donors. 
This would be extremely difficult to organise, bearing in mind that from a multi-sectoral perspective, 
fragile states tend to be hugely “under-funded” overall (David Carment et al, 2008), leading to a 
prioritisation of development assistance to other, more immediate, structural needs over policing 
ones. Aid provision to police forces tends to be limited to personnel training or personnel 
substitution with international forces, rather than addressing capacity expansion. Having said this, it 
is worth spending some time understanding theories of legitimacy and cooperation in order to gain a 
more accurate picture of criminological environments in fragile states.  
 Fagan and Tyler argue that there are two distinct branches of legitimacy and cooperation 
theory, which are embodied by the social control or instrumental model and the legitimacy or social 
norms model respectively. Both are inherently concerned with the behaviour and motivations of the 
individual in society.  
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 The instrumental model draws heavily from theories of social control in reading the 
individual as a self-interested actor who makes value-based decisions while determining the 
methods through which they will strive to achieve an objective. Therefore, the instrumental model 
reads the individual as a rational and self-interested actor, who chooses to cooperate with the police 
only if the police are able to demonstrate their effectiveness as a crime-fighting organisation. This 
model posits that the individual cooperates with the police if cooperation offers “greater personal 
utility” than a failure to cooperate (p. 231). It fits nicely with survey and interview data presented in 
Chapter 1, where the majority of Yemenis who said that they would not turn to the police for 
assistance if they fell victim to crime also justified their answers by stating that the police would 
likely fail to help them even if they did ask for aid. In other words, those Yemenis interviewed tended 
not to expect any personal utility from cooperation with the police and thus chose not to cooperate 
at all.  
 This analysis falls in line with Fagan and Tyler's framework, through which they argue that: 
“Unfortunately, from the instrumental perspective, it is in some people's short-term self-interest to 
break rather than obey the law”, and that “Cooperation with law enforcement agencies and other 
legal actors follows suit” (pp. 231-232). A tendency towards non-cooperation, they theorise, is only 
natural in any context where “some people may see little immediate personal utility in supporting 
police efforts to control crime, reporting crimes and criminals, or helping in community efforts to 
fight crime” (p. 232). This is found to be the case in Yemen, where corruption within police 
structures is speculated to be rampant, where tribal structures can be found to be far more powerful 
than state ones, and where regular revenge killings and incidents of street justice demonstrate that 
individuals consider formal justice systems to be virtually irrelevant126.  
 It is for these reasons that Fagan and Tyler add a secondary control dimension, the social 
norms model, which serves to explain the prevalence of at least some police-community 
cooperation in the developed world and other contexts. 
 The social norms model of legitimacy and cooperation theory, similarly to those social 
control theories that strive to document the connection between belief and behaviour, argues that 
people obey the law because they perceive the law to be representative of dominant moral and 
social norms, and therefore view the law as being legitimate. Yet Fagan and Tyler speculate that 
legitimacy not only produces a sense of obligation to obey the law, but also a duty to “defer to 
decisions made by legal authorities” (p. 233), and it is this control aspect that is largely missing in 
fragile states because, although some laws may compliment dominant belief systems, there is little 
acceptance of the law's official enforcers among Yemeni communities, particularly in the South and 
in Northern peripheries.  
 This lack of acceptance is most likely linked not only to the poor capacity of police services 
and allegations of police corruption in Yemen, but also to the politicisation of police services through 
their absorption of additional government-support roles that go far beyond the remits of controlling 
crime. The police have been used as a repressive tool to stem the expression of oppositional politics, 
where they have been made to arrest opposition leaders and disband protesters, and where they 
have been instructed to deny family members access to information about political prisoners. 
However, this lack of acceptance is also linked to the severe de-legitimisation of the police through 
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rampant corruption, with one Yemeni survey respondent writing that he does not cooperate with 
security services because: “You need to pay the police money to get them to do anything for you so 
unless you have the money it would be useless to try to approach them for anything” (May, 2011). 
 
Figure 59 Instrumental Factors and Social Norms Necessary to Generate Cooperation with Law Enforcement Services at 
the Community Level 
 It has been found through interviews and surveys conducted by the author that there is 
confusion on the ground in Yemen about the separation of military and policing services, with the 
police frequently observed as losing their impartiality by working towards military objectives rather 
than merely striving to protect civilians. This disruption of traditional police roles can be connected 
directly to the loss of legitimacy of law enforcement services, as well as to a corresponding loss of 
legitimacy by the state, and a reduction in police-community cooperation. Within this context, it is 
important to note that this phenomenon is equally attributable to Yemen's very poor history of 
policing, where many of the peripheral areas of the country have had virtually no contact with police 
services since the formation of the state and have rather come to associate armed personnel in 
uniform with the threat of military conflict127.  
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4.4 Conclusion 
 While the theories of crime causation and social control analysed within this chapter have 
far reaching applications for fragile states, it is clear that some element of adaptation is required of 
them in such contexts and that some theories have proven themselves to be significantly more 
adaptable than others, with cultural and tribal dynamics proving to be particularly difficult to 
integrate. However, several other conditions of criminological theories and their interactions with 
state fragility are extremely important to keep in mind in this regard.  
 To begin with, criminogenic risk factors that have been identified as influential within the 
developed world are significantly more common in fragile states and it is not at all clear what the 
theoretical implications of their high availability and interactions may be. Of further consideration is 
that, being based within the developed world, some criminogenic risk factors identified by crime 
causation literature, including school, labour market, judicial and policing risk factors, make far too 
many assumptions about the stability of the local environment, so that it is expected by such 
theories that most children are in school, that labour markets are generally legislated and that law 
enforcement services hold at least some limited control over society.  
 While these risk factors still have much to bear on the socio-political environment of fragile 
states, the comparatively more abstract nature of social control theories renders them more flexible 
within diverse developmental contexts than theories of crime causation. This body of literature fits 
more broadly into theories of social disintegration, which target a readily observable phenomenon 
present in both fragile states and economically deprived areas of the developed world to varying 
degrees – the effect of the disintegration of communities and the built environment on crime. Yet 
the overly general nature of social control theories fails to take into account the specific tensions 
that exist between elite and communal constructions of crime, as well as the importance of localised 
value systems that prioritise religious ethics or tribal affiliations, for instance, over national and 
state-based conceptions of morality. 
 Social disintegration theory, when combined with understandings of social control, may hold 
the key to understanding the relationship between crime and fragility. As Kerry Carrington argues:  
Like strain theory, social disintegration theory views crime largely as a product of social 
processes, specifically within a context of social disorder, inequality and change. This 
perspective expands the idea … that rapid social change is associated with increases in 
crime, due to a break down of social controls (2009, p. 43).  
According to Carrington, within the developed world, social disintegration theory is used to explain 
why high rates of delinquency are associated with geographic areas that are “characterised by 
transient populations of immigrant settlement, severe economic hardship, physical deterioration of 
housing stock, high levels of poverty and high rates of crime and delinquency” (p. 43).  
 Yet while social disintegration theory has logically been associated with urbanised areas 
within the developed world – as these are the areas that experience the most rapid levels of social 
change in countries that are not affected by internal war – it is easy to see how its implications might 
be applied to fragile states both in urban and rural settings. After all, fragile states experience social 
disintegration on a prolonged and sustained basis, aggravated by sudden and unanticipated events 
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that include man-made and natural disasters. It is within periods of social disintegration that other 
criminogenic risk factors are normally aggravated and that social controls become eroded.  
 These are issues that will be analysed and further contextualised in the next Chapter, which 
will provide more information on Yemeni systems of crime prevention and social control. What has 
begun to emerge as a very strong issue in Chapter 4, is the degree to which localised phenomena are 
important in determining the development of criminological environments in fragile states, and 
particularly in Yemen, which will lead to a broader investigation of whether or not it is possible at all 
to use fragility to link contexts together in order to produce unifying theoretical approaches to youth 
aggression. A key theme of this exploration is the degree to which cultural specificities should be 
analysed as an additional dynamic within studies of crime. 
  
175 
 
 
Chapter 5: Yemeni Systems of Crime Prevention and Control 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 The criminological theories over-viewed in Chapter 4 suggest that crime prevention and 
control systems may be contributing to the criminological environment of Yemen. These 
observations and their implications for intervention necessitate further questions in order to build a 
more complete picture of crime causation in this particular context. In the case of Yemen, it is 
necessary to ask what the existent crime prevention and crime control systems are, and what their 
impact upon the offending population is with regards to whether or not they serve as controls or 
contributors for violent criminal behaviour. Placing an emphasis on justice and judicial processes, 
and based upon the theoretical framework established in this thesis, Chapter 5 will look at existing 
interventions into young offending in Yemen in order to evaluate the capacity and effectiveness of 
Yemen's crime control and crime response systems, and to get a better insight into the crime-
control-based challenges that may be affecting fragile states.  
 Generally speaking, there are three systems of crime control and social intervention that are 
worth noting in Yemen from a youth offending perspective. These include: official state crime 
response services that fall under the control of the Yemeni justice system; informal tribal justice 
processes and communal self-administration; and, facilities and activities designed to increase the 
social integration and socialisation of would-be offenders. As part of the evaluation of Yemeni justice 
systems, it is important to understand the Yemeni legal system as the operational language of justice 
in the country, as well as Yemeni justice structures and court systems, and justice processes, 
including the provisions set in place for the prosecution of vulnerable offenders like children and 
young people. Law enforcement services and local perceptions of law enforcement services will be 
analysed here to assess procedural fairness and the legitimacy of existing justice systems. 
 As representatives of the state, it is necessary to determine the role that police services play 
in either affirming or negating the authority and legitimacy of the state. Any conclusions drawn 
about communal perceptions of law enforcement services will be supported not only by extensive 
reading and research, but also by telephone interviews and the anonymous surveys circulated online 
in 2011128. 
 The Yemeni prison system will also bear evaluation. It should be noted here that such an 
assessment will likely be fairly limited due to the poor accessibility of state prisons in Yemen to 
outsiders and the even more problematic accessibility of private detention facilities run by wealthy 
individuals, and by tribal and religious leaders. These issues will be outlined to some extent in 
section 5.2.5. 
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 See Chapter 1, section 1.7.2, for an overview of survey and distance research findings. 
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Figure 60 Yemeni Police Officers Patrolling Busy Market Square, Sana'a, Historic City Centre 
  The assessment of state justice processes will be supplemented by a parallel assessment of 
tribalism and self-administration. These are judged to be important structures that both contribute 
towards and inhibit the course of the rule of law and the implementation of security in Yemen. 
Yemen's tribes have acted as a support network for the state129, and their hierarchies and 
organisational subdivisions will be explored in more detail here. The tribes have also frequently 
contested the authority of the state and many have developed their own approaches to justice and 
criminality through centuries of cultural evolution. These customary laws and traditional mediation 
processes or informal justice systems are at times subsidised and encouraged, and at others actively 
disparaged by the Yemeni state, depending on their origins, or on shifts in national political climates. 
Though confusing at the best of times, these systems remain central to the Yemeni way of life, 
particularly in the North of the country where they are more prominent than official judicial services. 
It should be noted here that the Yemeni justice system does not exist or operate in isolation, and 
that patronage networks abound here as they do in all other sectors of Yemeni society.   
 
5.2 The Yemeni Justice System 
 Representing a merger of conflicting legal systems, brought about through years of partition 
and occupation, the Yemeni justice system is extremely complex, offering a challenge for legal 
practitioners, as well as for outsiders seeking to understand its inner workings. This section will 
attempt to shed some light upon these nuances. By focusing on the structure and operation of 
Yemeni judicial structures, it may inadvertently obscure the reality that these structures have 
extremely little physical impact on the country. Yemen's justice system, much like the rest of the 
state's infrastructure, is a victim of the state's fragility, so that its capacities have remained 
extremely weak since the country's formation in 1990.  
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 This has already been outlined in Chapter 2, which provided an in-depth context analysis of Yemen. 
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 Over the past decade, and particularly since 2005, the United Nations Development Project, 
working with a wide variety of international donors and with the Yemeni Government itself, has 
made an extensive consolidated effort to improve the country's justice system in an attempt to 
increase or restore governmental legitimacy through a restoration of the rule of law (Stakeholder 
Consultations, United Nations Development Project, 14 August, 2010, and Ministry of Justice, 17 
August, 2010). 
 In practice, many Yemeni people remain beyond the reach of official law enforcement 
systems, possessing little knowledge or awareness of such services. Nevertheless, the Yemeni 
Ministry of Justice and corresponding law enforcement services are rapidly expanding organisations 
that bear close monitoring and analysis from both a criminological and a development perspective. 
This expansion has been undercut and disrupted in light of the political events of 2011 and 2012, 
though it is a continuing priority to the Friends of Yemen Group and large international donors, 
meaning that it will, no doubt, emerge as a significant policy objective in the coming years (Expert 
Consultation, Nicholas Hopton, 20 July, 2012).  
 
5.2.1 Laws 
 The body of Yemen's state laws is referred to as qânûn – a word that is understood to 
represent a system of laws administered by a Muslim sovereign, or a body of laws that is distinct 
from Sharia or Islamic law though mindful of these principles (Stakeholder Consultation, Ministry of 
Justice, 17 August, 2010). Today, qânûn-based legal systems are most commonly associated with the 
Ottoman Empire, where they were largely used to supplement Islamic law and to legitimise the 
position of Ottoman administrative structures in various geographic territories. These systems of 
justice and administration were introduced to North Yemen under Ottoman leadership and have 
remained, in a large part, the foundation of contemporary justice procedures in the country. The 
International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) note that Yemen's “legal framework for 
delivering justice and security is based on an array of English common law, Turkish law, and Sharia 
law”, whereby legal gaps emerging from the unification of North and South Yemen in 1990 have 
been supplemented by Egyptian laws (2010, p. 10). Yemen's contemporary qânûn system is, 
therefore, quite distinct from those that came before it, displaying an odd synthesis of pre-existing 
judicial structures emerging from the dissolution of an Islamic republic in the North and a communist 
state in the South of the country. As a result, ISSAT write that Yemeni laws are poorly catered overall 
to the specific needs of the local context, sidestepping important local values or being 
misinterpreted by implementers of the law.  
 Scholars are known to disagree on the degree to which these contradictions inhibit the 
functionality of the Yemeni judicial system, though there is regular recorded confusion among legal 
practitioners over the jurisprudence of competing systems, as noted by Elobaid Ahmed Elobaid 
(2010). In Yemen today, significant tensions remain between state, customary, and Islamic legal 
frameworks based on Sharia law. In particular, there exists considerable confusion over the 
incorporation of human rights-based legislation into existing legal systems, at the request and 
insistence of the international community, which is easily observable in interviews, even at the elite 
level. At the practitioner level, Noha el-Mikawi reports that even at Universities, legal professors are 
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not always clear about whether or not international conventions supersede national and Islamic 
laws in rulings (2005, p. 42).  
 Yemen has ratified over fifty international law-making conventions, including seven of the 
nine major human rights conventions recognised by the international community (see Table 10) 
(Elobaid, 2010, p. 6). Each of these conventions is meant to occupy a supreme position in the 
domestic legal systems of any state that recognises them. They are intended to create positive legal 
rights, which are protected by law. 
Human Rights Convention Date of Global 
Entry into Force 
Date of 
Ratification by 
Yemen 
Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination 
04/01/1969 18/10/1972 
International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 
03/01/1976 09/02/1987 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
23/03/1976 09/02/1987 
Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
03/09/1981 30/05/1984 
Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 
26/01/1987 05/11/1991 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 02/09/1990 01/05/1991 
Convention on Migrant Workers 01/07/2003 Not a state party 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities 
03/05/2008 26/03/2009 
International Convention for the Protection 
of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance 
Not yet in force Not yet a state party 
 
Table 10 Ratification Status of Human Rights Conventions in Yemen 
In conjunction with these documents, Yemen's constitution, as drafted in 1990, guarantees 
equal rights to all citizens. However, it explicitly states in Article 3 that Islamic law is to remain the 
highest body of regulation in the country, which means in practice that women's rights are 
significantly undermined in the course of legal proceedings, particularly with regard to family rights 
and property law (ISSAT, 2010, p. 10).  
 Issues of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments are often ignored in 
practice, while instances of forced labour and child recruitment into the armed forces continue to 
undermine Yemen's commitment to human rights principles (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Yemeni 
laws and legislation are frequently riddled with contradictions, which are, thanks to a legacy of 
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British common law systems in the South, left to the discretion of judges to resolve. The legally-
binding decisions of judges in the North and South of the country are sometimes quite different 
from one another, based on competing tribal and religious values, leading to poor consistency and 
reliability within legal frameworks throughout the country (Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations 
Development Project, 14 August, 2010).  
 Yemen's laws are divided into four bodies, which deal with criminal, morality, political and 
civil matters separately (though it is worth noting that morality offences are often tried as criminal 
actions) (Central Statistical Organisation, 2010).  
 Criminal law deals specifically with criminal offences, including property offences and violent 
crimes, which are the focus of this thesis.  
 Morality law, which overlaps with criminal law, is more concerned with public order and 
decency, including offences against religious or cultural values. This body of law is drawn most 
closely from Sharia law and is used to prosecute minor incidents of misconduct (such as public 
drunkenness) or more serious family offences, including adultery. It is worth noting here that despite 
the incorporation of morality offences into the Yemeni legal system, the Yemeni Government does 
not officially condone the more extreme forms of punishment enshrined in Islamic law, such as 
honour killings, though these are often implemented nonetheless within families or tribal structures 
(Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations Population Fund, 14 August, 2010).  
 Political laws are those to which proponents of human rights in Yemen object most strongly. 
They are used not only to prosecute acts of insurgency and terrorism, but also to pressure 
opposition groups and inhibit the functionality of a free press in Yemen (Expert Consultation, 
Maysaa Shujaaldeen, 7 March, 2012). Offences committed against public officials, including attacks 
on members of law enforcement and military services are dealt with under the umbrella of political 
offences.  
 Finally, the civil law systems are left to deal with all remaining grievances and disputes 
relating to property, land, family rights, business and so on. This is the most rapidly growing branch 
of Yemeni law130. 
 According to the author's observations and anonymous expert consultations, the 
incorporation of tribal values and common law practices into the legal system tends to mean that all 
four bodies of law are treated more as informal guidelines for behaviour management than as strict 
legal systems, and they can be ignored by both average citizens and public officials in favour of 
generating or maintaining patronage networks. Corruption remains a huge problem in this sense, as 
does a lack of even coverage and awareness of different rights and protection systems.  
 The Ministry of Human Rights, among other government institutions, has been tasked with 
harmonising Yemeni legislation. Their work is impeded because: “Yemen does not have a designated 
institution tasked with overall law reform activities”, while its Ministry of Legal Affairs is charged 
                                                          
130
 The Yemeni Government has prioritised the development of a legal framework to protect and encourage 
foreign and local investment in the country over the past five years, in order to improve their ranking in the 
World Bank's annual Doing Business report series, along with other similar indexes and publications 
(Stakeholder Consultation, Ministry of Justice, 17 August, 2010). 
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only with: “ensuring that laws are properly revised and modernized” so that “many reform activities 
are reduced to simplistic attempts at drafting new codes and/or alternative positions” (Elobaid, 
2010, p. 8). Though these and other reform-based activities are judged to be an extremely positive 
move for addressing inconsistencies within Yemeni laws, the basic challenge for Yemen's legal 
system is implementation. There is a great need for capacity building in the Ministry of Justice, 
increased monitoring and evaluation of judicial staff, and better and more rigorous training 
programmes for legal professionals (Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations Development Project, 
14 August, 2010).  
 From a criminogenic perspective, the design of Yemen's legal system may be causing some 
serious challenges in terms of violent crime prevention. There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, 
confusion over the legal system and uncertainty over the way in which it is applied mean that 
Yemeni laws are inherently difficult to follow. Issues relating to accidental transgression are likely to 
be relatively common, particularly when it comes to violent behaviour within homes or 
communities, whereby a lack of awareness and education on the illegality of physical abuse could 
mean that low-level confrontations with the potential for serious escalation would not be perceived 
as being punishable by the law, removing the preventive impact of criminal laws.  
 Secondly, a lack of uniform application of the laws throughout the country allows emphasis 
to be placed on different elements of criminal law, depending upon the implementing governorate. 
This confusion is compounded both within given areas where multiple judges preside, for instance, 
and at a national level when individuals begin to move from area to area.  
 Thirdly, and more importantly, the laws of Yemen, due in part to the country's extremely 
wide variety of tribal, cultural, religious and localised identities, do not reflect the value systems of 
those whose behaviour they strive to regulate. The integration of human rights principles into 
Yemeni legal codes often conflicts with local understandings of morality or is insufficient to reflect 
liberal principles adopted by proponents of equality.  
 Where dispute resolution and familial relationships are concerned, blood feuds and revenge 
and honour killings that are made illegal by the law tend to be considered by communities to be 
outside the remits of the state's interference. They represent personal matters that necessitate a 
violent course of action, even if such actions risk incurring formal sanctions. The state's involvement 
in such cases succeeds only in alienating local communities and contributes to the regeneration of 
on-going civil conflicts.  
 To return briefly to the social control and legitimacy and cooperation theories outlined in 
Chapter 4, there can be little expectation that a community will obey the law if there is a high 
probability that transgressions will not be punished and if the laws themselves are not 
representative of people's belief systems. The Yemeni legal system, while it may eventually become 
part of the solution, currently represents part of the problem. This is an observation likely to be 
applicable to all other fragile states where legal education is either low or uneven, where social 
fragmentation represents conflicting moral valuation systems, and where the state's capacity to 
raise awareness on fundamental legal principles at a community level is lacking. These challenges 
trickle down to the implementation level, where they are compounded by problems relating to law 
enforcement capacities or create new challenges that affect the overall functioning of the Ministry 
of Justice as shall be argued in the following subsections.  
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5.2.2 Judicial Structures 
 Yemen's processes of governance are divided between the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary. All three bodies are overseen by the Yemeni president to varying degrees, leading to 
significant concerns by international observers over issues relating to the separation of powers. John 
Locke theorised as far back as 1690 in his Second Treaties on Civil Government that a separation of 
powers is an essential element of democracy. To this day, it is called for in any state seeking to 
ensure procedural fairness, so that those who make the law ought not to be the same parties who 
implement the law and judge transgressors of the law within an accountable system.  
 The Yemeni legislature, the law-making branch of the Yemeni Government, is comprised on 
paper of the ruling parties, including all members of any coalitions. From 1990 through to 2011, it 
was overseen by the General People's Congress, as headed by President Saleh, with many other 
relevant stakeholders, like the Yemeni Socialist Party and Islah, being relegated to a subservient 
position (Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations Development Project, 14 August, 2010). This 
ruling order was reflected likewise in the other two branches of governance, leading observers to 
label Yemen as an authoritarian, rather than a democratic regime.  
 According to ISSAT, the legislature comprises the Presidium (that is, four members of 
Parliament elected by an absolute majority within the House of Representatives), the executive 
secretariat (led by the Secretary General, a position that is selected directly by the Yemeni 
President), twenty standing committees, and a consultative Shura Council, which is also a member of 
the executive, reflecting a balance of political and tribal governing bodies (2010, pp. 14-15). It is 
charged with creating the laws that govern the lives of Yemeni citizens. The implementation and 
interpretation of those laws is, allegedly, left to the executive and the judiciary.  
 While the latter forms the focus of this section, Yemen's judiciary is rarely able to operate as 
independently as this division should allow. In practice, neither the legislature nor the judiciary are 
fully independent from the executive, with all three branches being tightly controlled by Yemen's 
ruling elite. In particular, no analysis of the judiciary in Yemen is complete without an appraisal of its 
strong connection to the executive, which has proven to be a major point of contention for both 
citizens and implementers of the law in the 2011-2012 revolutionary period (Expert Consultation, 
Atiaf Alwazir, 5 June, 2012).  
 Generally, the executive is understood to form the administrative and operating face of the 
Yemeni government. In this sense, it is responsible for implementing Yemeni laws. From a judicial 
and law enforcement standpoint, ISSAT see the most relevant members of the Yemeni executive to 
comprise the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Human Rights 
(sometimes referred to in Government reports as the Council of Human Rights), and the Ministry of 
Finance. The presence of the Ministry of Justice on this list is problematic within a democratic 
system from a “separation of powers” point of view, as the executive, like the legislature, is 
ultimately under the control of the Presidium.  
 In practice, the Ministry of Justice is directly responsible for supervising judges (Stakeholder 
Consultation, Ministry of Justice, 17 August, 2010). According to ISSAT, it is also responsible for 
creating laws pertaining to the operations and management of the judicial system, meaning that the 
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Ministry of Justice at times holds triple legislative, executive and judiciary roles within the 
governance system: not an altogether uncommon phenomenon among global judicial institutions.  
 Causes for concern stem from the fact that the Judicial Inspection Authority, which is 
responsible for evaluating the performance of judicial structures like Yemen's court system, is based 
within the Ministry of Justice. Although ISSAT write that the Inspection Authority is not involved in 
assessing what they term to be “disciplinary matters”, these are administered by the Supreme 
Judicial Council, which is also based within the Ministry of Justice. 
 These and other concerns have led to the formation of the Justice, Rule of Law and Security 
Working Group of the Friends of Yemen, who have worked in close contact with the United Nations 
Development Project and the Government of Yemen to reform the Yemeni justice system in order to 
ensure the independence of both the judiciary and the Ministry of Justice (Stakeholder Consultation, 
United Nations Development Project, 14 August, 2010). Much of this work was put on hold during 
the Arab Spring protests in 2011, when international aid programmes designed to provide direct 
support to the Yemeni state were frozen (Eyder Peralta, 2011). In 2013, the main obstacles 
preventing real reform revolve around a significant lack of finances. Corruption and resulting donor 
reluctance to invest in the Ministry of Justice have led to a prioritisation of personnel-training-
oriented programming by international stakeholders above capacity enhancement and personnel 
recruitment. Additionally, the absence of a single agency tasked with the reform of Yemen's laws 
and judicial structures leads to bureaucratic stalling and confusion for any programmes that 
encapsulate more ambitious aims, impeding the conversion of available funds into useful and visible 
outputs.  
 Bureaucratic obstacles to reform stem from the extremely complex and confusing 
composition of Yemen's legislative, judiciary and executive branches of state, which comprise 
multiple and conflicting roles when it comes to justice design and implementation131. Ideological 
divides are visible in the application of justice in central versus peripheral regions of Yemen; in urban 
versus rural areas; and, in sectors under the control of competing tribal interests. Some of these 
difficulties emerge from the continuing political divide between North and South Yemen, with the 
two territories yet to be successfully unified in their perceptions of different cultural value systems. 
The conflict between these two rose to the fore in 2011 and again in 2012, so that much judicial 
reform was put on hold while overall control over the state was restored. A failure to instigate 
reforms immediately after the 2011 Arab Spring led to the rise of Yemen's “Revolution of the 
Institutions” in 2012, where slow processes of reform and a governmental failure to address 
accusations of top-level corruption effectively led to nation-wide strikes in military, healthcare, 
education, and judicial sectors, with judges' strikes closing down many of Yemen's courts completely 
in May of that year (Ahmed Dawood, 2012). 
 Much like Yemen's laws, Yemen's court system retains signs that it once operated within two 
different states. The country's two pre-existing court systems were integrated through the 1990 Law 
on Judicial Power. New structures retain elements of both systems. However, it can be argued that 
they were integrated more thoroughly than Yemen's laws in this sense, with clashes and 
contradictions seemingly less apparent. These competing systems are observable in descriptions 
offered by authors like Nathan J. Brown, who writes that: 
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 This has already been outlined in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 of this Chapter. 
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Yemen's judicial structure is unusual (though not unique) in three respects: first, 
Islamic jurisprudence plays a larger role in legal and judicial training than in most 
other Arab states. Second, the judiciary is unusually unified; Yemen does not have 
the series of specialized courts that has arisen in many Arab countries. Third, the 
executive branch has a strong presence in the Supreme Judicial Council, though there 
has been some promise of reform to enhance judicial independence. (2010)  
While portraying the judicial system as being highly integrated, his assessment of the judiciary as 
being “unusually unified” speaks to the artificiality of the system and, in this sense, to its youth. Its 
reliance upon Islamic jurisprudence as well as the strong interest that the executive retains over its 
internal processes are indicative of the level of Northern cultural and political dominance over the 
higher organisational levels of Yemeni justice systems.  
 Stated reliance upon Islamic principles in judicial training above socialist or liberal values 
form a rejection of the South's communist history, creating a barrier against the proliferation of 
Western rights-based values despite Yemen's stated commitment to these goals. The executive's 
continued interference in judicial processes (the executive itself having been comprised of, until 
2011, primarily Northern representatives) indicates the presence of a strong institutional paranoia 
relating to who has ultimate control over judging and sentencing transgressors of the law, and 
controlling the labelling and punishing of social and political deviance. This meant that, in 2012, 
judicial independence from the executive was a central theme of judicial strikes. Given Yemen's 
complex history and cultural identity, the characteristics described by Brown become less random in 
appearance and more purposeful.  
 While Brown writes that Yemen has few specialised court structures, the country retains the 
primary expected subdivisions within its judicial organisation. The Yemeni court system is divided 
between three tiers according to superiority. First instance or ibtida'iyya courts operate at the local 
level (though they are quite scarce due to infrastructure and capacity limitations), appeals courts 
operate at the district or governorate level, and the Supreme Court operates at a national level 
(Stakeholder Consultation, Ministry of Justice, 17 August, 2010). 
 The first instance courts provide a first point of contact for Yemeni citizens who enter the 
court system, while the appeals court has the power to overrule disputed cases and the Supreme 
Court has a final say on all judgements. In parallel to this, according to Brown, the Supreme Court is 
also responsible for trying high officials, passing judgement on interpretations of the constitution, 
determining the outcome of jurisdictional disputes in the justice system, and adjudicating election 
disputes – each of which has been used as a justification for increased independence of the judiciary 
from the executive.  
 Following on from this, it should be understood that Yemen has no strictly defined 
specialised courts that are separated according to trial types or bodies of law. Such a court system is 
prohibited by the Yemeni constitution due to its potential for political abuse. The Yemeni judiciary 
deals with issues pertaining to juvenile offending and other targeted areas through specialised 
chambers within the established court system.  
 No understanding of the Yemeni judicial sector is complete without an appreciation for the 
fact that the Government of Yemen also allows for “other forms of dispute resolution” to run in 
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parallel to this central system132 (Laila al-Zwaini, 2006, p. 2). Thus Yemen's tribal tapestry is 
informally integrated into judicial processes, though allegedly “only insofar as these are consistent 
with the officially prescribed rules and procedures” of the Yemeni courts (2006, p. 2). Such informal 
justice systems often fail to follow procedural restrictions and are poorly administered by the state. 
 Evidence from stakeholder interviews conducted at the Ministry of Justice (17 August, 2010) 
indicates that Yemeni citizens were beginning to rely on civil courts as a tool for dispute resolution 
through official channels in mid-2010. However, the state's traditional manipulation of the judiciary 
as a tool for political repression, as well as the Ministry's heavy integration into the political tapestry 
of Yemeni governance, has led to a compromising of its independence and of its appearance of 
neutrality. The constitutional prohibition of specialised courts has inadvertently meant that the 
entire court system is implicated in the sentencing of political criminals in specialised chambers. 
Allegations of corruption and prolonged trial processing times caused by poor capacity and – most 
recently – protracted strikes have led to increased frustration with the judiciary among the general 
population. These concerns bring doubt about the general legitimacy and accountability of judicial 
structures in the country, so that instances of Yemeni citizens taking justice into their own hands and 
regenerating cycles of conflict in land, water and honour disputes might suggest linkages to the 
overall failure of judicial systems to inspire confidence as a tool for mainstream peaceful dispute 
resolution. 
 
5.2.3 The Justice Process 
 The poor capacity and low level of personnel in judicial structures in Yemen are reflected in 
the functionality of the country's justice process, which can prove to be slow and confusing for those 
who enter into it. For violent young offending, this has meant that the country has been slow in 
developing effective protection mechanisms for juvenile delinquents (though these have repeatedly 
been highlighted by the Ministry of Justice as a priority area for future service expansion). High 
fertility rates, an emerging youth bulge, and poor levels of birth registration make this task more 
difficult. The Ministry currently has neither the capacity nor the capability to properly identify and 
process this largest segment of society in specialised chambers and through targeted justice 
processes. The difficulty of proving one's age, combined with the huge incentive of diminished 
sentencing for doing so (with harsher penalties like the death penalty being prohibited for minors), 
adds to the general stress and lack of accessibility of the justice process for young people 
(Stakeholder Consultation, United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, 15 August, 
2010). 
 As the Interagency Panel on Juvenile Justice (IPJJ) summarise, an absence of targeted 
response capacity within juvenile justice sectors leads to a corresponding lack of data that is: 
relevant to the administration of juvenile justice, and necessary for the development, 
implementation and evaluation of policies and programmes aiming at the prevention and 
effective responses to juvenile delinquency (2011).  
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 This will be outlined in more detail in section 5.3, which deals specifically with ‘Tribalism and Self-
Administration’ in Yemen. 
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A lack of identification of minors has led to a lack of information on the scale of the youth offending 
problem133, so that: “Failure to record and strategically make use of juvenile justice related 
information contributes to a failure to ensure the protection of children in conflict with the law”, and 
this is an assessment that most likely holds true in all fragile states affected, by their very definition, 
by a lack of judicial capacity (IPJJ, 2011). While the Ministry of Justice has procedures in place to 
process young offenders, these are rarely utilised effectively, so that most are processed as adults.  
 This section and this chapter are targeted towards an analysis of the operation of the 
criminal, rather than the civil law-based justice system in Yemen. This selection is reflective of the 
largest point of interaction with the Ministry of Justice for Yemeni citizens, because, as Hesham Nasr 
et al write in their appraisal of Arab justice systems:  
For many citizens of the Arab world, it is the criminal justice system that imposes itself 
most directly. Civil disputes require at least one party to initiate legal action; the criminal 
justice system assigns initiation to a state official (2004, p. 1). 
As a result of the poor level of reliance of Yemeni citizens upon the civil court system, criminal 
justice processes tend to play a more prominent role in the everyday lives of citizens. Being 
involuntary participants in the justice system, young offenders who enter the criminal justice process 
are at their most vulnerable at all three stages of prosecution, which include: arrest, trial and – if 
relevant – incarceration134.  
 Yemen operates under a niyaba system of justice, with prosecutors also possessing 
investigatory powers (Nasr, 2006). Brinkley Messick writes that the niyaba system was introduced in 
North Yemen in 1977, prior to which criminal and other cases were considered to be matters for 
private prosecution, rather than public affairs in need of administration by state institutions (1983). 
The Yemeni tradition, before the introduction of the niyaba, was thus one of self-administration and 
tribal law, whereby the onus for reporting has always been on the victim. The external imposition of 
justice is a relatively new and misunderstood phenomenon for many Yemeni communities to this 
day, who consider crime to be an issue that they either deal with directly or choose to bring to the 
attention of higher institutions.  
 Before the niyaba system was officially adopted in North Yemen: “The right to private 
retaliation [was] guaranteed in Islamic law”, so that “the plaintiffs in the cited case demanded 'legal 
retaliation'”, which, in the case of homicides, usually ended in some form of public execution 
whereby “retaliation [was] frequently direct, without the prior legitimation of a sharia court” 
(Messick, 1983, p. 509).  
This assumption that bypassing state institutions in the pursuit of retributive justice is an 
acceptable social norm has persisted, causing three important judicial challenges for the Yemeni 
state. Firstly, under tribal law, official intrusions represent an obstruction of local justice processes 
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 Arrest and incarceration will be discussed further in sections 5.2.4 and 5.2.5, being two of the most 
commonly cited problem areas for child rights violations, particularly keeping in mind that Yemen does not 
have a segregated prison system for vulnerable and serious offenders. Yet the trial stage, which shall be 
outlined more fully here, is likewise a challenging area when it comes to child protection, albeit an area that is 
less glamorous than the other two and thereby overlooked by human rights supporters and international 
media. 
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and are therefore illegitimate. Secondly, cooperation with state judicial authorities is not a natural 
part of Yemeni life throughout the country, so that victims and witnesses may not choose to assist 
prosecutors and investigators in putting together cases against potential suspects, and may be 
overwhelmed by the complexity of the judicial process. Thirdly, those tried and convicted of grievous 
violent offences and homicide may, in the eyes of their communities, have had the right to commit 
their crimes under the confines of retributive justice. Conversely, there is no stop-gap, without a 
state trial, to ensure that those who are executed through tribal processes or retributive justice have 
been convicted through the reasonable interpretation of evidence beforehand. In particular, due to 
different conceptualisations of childhood and adulthood, and due to an absence of lenient 
sentencing for minors under tribal customs, children and young people are exposed to significant 
risk under tribal prosecution systems.  
 Despite the investigative powers awarded to both the police and the public prosecution 
service in Yemen, most criminal trials are still initiated upon the submission of an event report by a 
private citizen (who is normally but not necessarily either the victim in the case, or a member of the 
injured party's family). Notable exceptions to this rule occur if: crimes are committed within sight of 
a police officer (usually within an urban centre); crimes are political and constitute an apparent 
threat or challenge to the ruling regime: and, a murder occurs and the victim's family have not 
themselves demanded an investigation. This indicates that the vast majority of offences remain un-
investigated, regardless of severity. The United Nations Programme Office on Governance in the 
Arab Region write that, once initiated, the trial process operates according to the following 
schematic (2010), taking place either in a regular or specialised chamber, as required by the nature 
of the offence and the identities of the defendant(s) and victim(s): 
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Figure 61 The Yemeni Prosecution Process 
The identity of offenders in terms of status as adults or young people is normally determined at the 
arrest phase, though it is on very rare occasions reassessed if the prosecutor is also the lead 
investigator in the case.  
 Due to the high case volume-to-court-capacity ratio, however, arrestee trial and processing 
is accomplished extremely quickly, though defendants may spend months waiting for an actual trial 
date. This prolonged waiting period is considered one of the main reasons why Yemeni citizens are 
reluctant to bring incident reports to state justice services, so that private justice and tribal 
mediation systems remain the preferred methods of dispute resolution in many regions of the 
country (Stakeholder Consultation, Ministry of Justice, 17 August, 2010). These systems can result 
either in a miscarriage of justice or corruption because of their lack of accountability. From a 
criminological perspective, this may have created the social reality where certain forms of physical 
violence become perceived as being acceptable constructions by community members and 
community leaders, so that they are eventually learned by children and young people. 
 
Step 1: The incident 
report and any 
supporting evidence  is 
received by the office of 
public prosecution. 
Step 2: This data is 
collated and recorded in 
the public prosecution's 
registry. It is then handed 
to a district attorney. 
Step 3: The district 
attorney refers the case 
to one of its members for 
review. The reviewer 
chooses whether to 
investigate the offence 
further or to dismiss the 
charges. 
Step 4: If the charge is 
upheld, the reviewer 
passes the case on to the 
relevant court and 
chamber, as appropriate. 
A date is set for the 
preliminary hearing with 
the presiding judge. 
 
Step 5: The defendant is 
ordered to appear in 
court and the trial begins 
under the management 
of the court and its 
relevant chamber. 
Step 6: The court hears 
the evidence presented 
by the prosecution and 
the defence and sets a 
date for the public 
pronouncement of the 
sentence. 
 
Step 7: The sentence is 
delivered back to the 
prosecution office for 
execution. If any party 
has contested the 
sentence, the case is 
passed to the Appeal 
Court or the Supreme 
Court and the process is 
repeated. 
Step 8: Once a final 
decision is reached, the 
prosecution records the 
sentence in its registry 
and sees that it is carried 
out. 
Step 9: According to the 
judge's decision, the 
defendant is either 
released, incarcerated or 
executed. 
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5.2.4 Law Enforcement 
 
Figure 62 Market Scene, Sana'a City Centre 
 The complex interaction of state fragility, lack of state capacity and entrenched communal 
values of self-reliance, which have led to the diminished importance of judicial processes, have 
impacted Yemeni perceptions of both civil and military law enforcement. The use of police services 
to arrest dissidents of the state, as well as the use of the military to enforce law and order, has led to 
a distinct confusion of the roles of these two bodies at an institutional level, a service 
implementation level, and, most importantly, at a community level.  
 In an anonymous online survey conducted in April of 2011, one 23 year old male Yemeni 
student, when asked about whether or not he thought police services were important, replied that:  
I think we all can protect ourselves and we don’t need any help from anyone. With a 
backward country like ours we don’t wait for the army to protect us. Each house, as you 
are aware is armed [Translated from Arabic]. 
This statement highlights three very serious tensions within Yemeni law enforcement services. 
Firstly, it advocates a general rejection of state law enforcement systems by the population at large, 
indicating a severe breakdown in the relationship between police forces and the community. 
Secondly, it illustrates the high level of confusion within the Yemeni population when it comes to 
distinguishing between members of the police and members of the army, with both services 
adopting dual and overlapping roles, leading to the obstruction of the police force's primary role as 
an instrument for the protection of civilians from crime. Thirdly, it suggests that Yemeni 
communities have reached a point where they are so dissatisfied with law enforcement services that 
they have taken the enforcement of the rule of law into their own hands, with the threat of armed 
violence, aggravated by the huge prevalence of guns in the country, risking at any moment to ignite 
a very serious violent crisis.   
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Each of these trends is made all the more disturbing by the severe tension and aggression 
implicit in the construction of this statement. This emerged as an important issue in Chapter 1, when 
Husam al Sharjabi spoke quite openly about the difficulty of containing youth hostility against the 
police and military as a civil society leader during the Arab Spring. Sharjabi's account offers an 
example of young people equating law enforcement services with unpopular political regimes, 
evidencing the extreme politicisation of these institutions in Yemen. 
 
Figure 63 Traffic Officer Working in Central Sana'a 
 The precarious position of policing services in Yemeni society is influenced by its relatively 
brief history, whereby protracted colonization meant that North and South Yemen established their 
own security systems only after the achievement of independence. These differed remarkably 
between the two countries, with “The Aden Police” force maintaining a very clear role in its division 
between the three services of Armed, Riot and Security Police in the South, and the Northern police, 
according to Nathan Brown et al, emerging as a much more passive, “less centralized” and “less 
pervasive” institution that aimed to strike a balance between state and tribal authority (2004, p. 6). 
Thus a far stronger tradition of tribal autonomy and self-administration evolved in the North than in 
the South of the country, where a prioritization of tribal affiliations was categorized by the state as 
being backwards and archaic135.  
 When these competing institutions and values were merged together under the 
management of the Ministry of Interior upon Yemen's unification in 1990, they were broken into 
three new branches, which comprised a regular police service, a central security organisation, and a 
political security organisation. This process implies that police services from that point onwards 
ought to have had greater standing and more legitimacy in the South than they did in the North, but, 
in practice, the formation of a political security organisation was seen by Southerners as a way of 
containing separatist ideologies.  
 According to Brown:  
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 The parallel development of different administrative systems in North and South Yemen is outlined in 
Chapter 2. 
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Southerners … complained about this new force, as well as the army, which they held 
directly responsible for increased banditry. They also accused the largely northern 
security forces of attacks on socialists and their supporters (p. 6).  
Since Brown et al first wrote this assessment in 2004, a wealth of evidence has been produced by 
the Human Rights Watch among other organisations that shows that the Government of Yemen has 
repeatedly used the police force as a tool of political repression in the South, and the military as 
such in the North, with both services also being forced to adopt compromising positions nation-wide 
during the Arab Spring136. 
 These issues have seriously undermined the role of law-enforcement agencies in Yemen so 
that, from a social-control perspective, communities are left with little to no incentive to cooperate 
with institutions that they do not perceive as being legitimate. This lack of trust is both a cause and 
an effect of the privatisation of security in Yemen, with powerful and wealthy individuals hiring 
body-guards and security organisations, and tribal communities maintaining their own policing 
services. These parallel organisations are virtually impossible to monitor, and serious human rights 
violations occur with some frequency. At the same time, both official and unofficial organisations are 
reportedly beset by corruption137. Individual Yemeni citizens, particularly those living below the 
poverty line, see few services available for their assistance if they fall victim to crime138. 
Independent surveys conducted by the author have documented that tensions between law 
enforcement personnel and communities were particularly high over 2011, though surveys 
conducted by the Yemen Polling Centre indicate that relations are improving in 2013 in the 
aftermath of President Saleh’s departure. In particular, the Yemen Polling Centre have successfully 
shown a demand for higher levels of police community protection, though 19.6% of people surveyed 
nationally still said that they would feel less secure if police presences were increased in their areas. 
41.1% of people surveyed by the Centre believed that, at present, they were alone in protecting 
their own security, while 22.9% believed that security was mainly provided by tribal shaykhs (2013). 
Thus, while the Yemeni people want to see change, most currently believe that informal, tribal or 
street justice occupies a more important role in security provision than state services. 
 
5.2.5 The Prison System 
 Little is really known about the Yemeni prison system today, due in part to a continued 
reliance by powerful and wealthy members of Yemeni society upon private prisons and holding cells, 
as well as a low rate of monitoring of state and private gaols (Stakeholder Consultation, International 
Organisation for Migration, 16 August, 2010). It is not currently possible for outsiders to generate a 
reliable or even a realistic estimate of the number of prisons in Yemen, let alone of the potential 
number of people now in detention in the country. Not only are state facilities poorly documented, 
with private citizens and government officials being given the option to rent spaces in public 
institutions, but notable community leaders have also established their own detention facilities, 
either within their cities, villages or within their homes (Human Rights Watch, 2009). What was once 
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 See Chapter 2 for full conflict analyses. 
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 See section 3.11, which analyses corruption in Yemen. 
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 This has also been argued in more detail in section 1.5.2. 
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thought of as a tribal tradition is also practised by prominent political figures, with Atiaf Alwazir – an 
important citizen journalist and activist – reporting in interview that General Ali Mohsen kept a 
private prison for the detention of Yemeni citizens during the Arab Spring, failing to release 
detainees after the revolution had officially come to an end in 2012 (Interview conducted on the 4th 
of June, 2012)139.  
 In Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes, Victoria Clark writes that in the:  
north's era of the imams and Ottomans, it was accepted that if someone wanted a 
malefactor arrested he had to pay for the service, but, equally, it was understood that if 
the malefactor wanted to escape imprisonment he would have to pay even more. (2010, 
p. 243) 
It is not entirely clear whether or not such systems were purely a symptom of entrenched networks 
of patronage associated with dominant tribal values in the North, or whether they prevailed in the 
South of the country as well, keeping in mind that tribalism was less pervasive in the People's 
Democratic Republic of Yemen than it was in the Yemen Arab Republic140.  
 What is clear is that this largely Northern attitude towards service delivery eventually 
permeated through the South due to the dominance of Northern administration over Southern 
governance processes, which occurred as a result of the unification of the two countries in 1990 and 
of the failed war for separatism in 1993.  
 Today, writes Clark, patronage and corruption within the prison system are seen by 
Southerners as symptoms of Northern cultural intrusion into their power relations, though in 
actuality both sides of the former border are guilty of obstructing the course of what is thought of by 
the international community as being “justice” and “due process”. In the South of Yemen, these 
concerns have been severely aggravated by the formation of the Political Security Organisation. This 
organisation has largely been seen by Southerners as abusing its position in order to detain 
members of formal and informal opposition groups.   
 In reality, many Northerners have also been imprisoned by this organisation and by other 
bodies within the police, military and judiciary. Members of “troublesome” tribal factions, 
journalists, and critics of the ruling regime have been disproportionately targeted in this sense 
(Expert Consultation, Atiaf Alwazir, 5 June, 2012). This tradition continued in 2012 long after the 
removal of President Saleh, as evidenced by Muaad al-Maqtari's article, in which he writes of the 
imprisonment of Majed Karoot (2012). Karoot was jailed in June of that year for having criticised 
members of the Communication Corporation of Al-Baida on his Facebook page, in a move that the 
Yemeni Journalists Syndicate referred to as having broken their faith in state justice systems, so that 
“Journalists no longer trust the judiciary system”.  
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 The criminological implications of such private use of detention facilities in Yemen, as well as the many 
human rights violations that occur as a result of the lack of accessibility to these facilities by external monitors, 
have already been outlined to some extent in section 4.2.6, so that 5.2.5 will be aimed primarily at filling in 
some of the gaps left by this theory-based overview within the more description and case-specific context of 
this Chapter. 
140
 See Chapter 2. 
192 
 
 Less public forms of arrest are also prevalent. In 2009, the Human Rights Watch wrote that 
“Estimates of the numbers of persons” who “disappeared” in the North during the Sa'ada wars 
“vary”, so that:  
Yemeni rights organizations have documented dozens of cases of persons who have 
“disappeared,” most of whom eventually reappeared at the facilities of the Political 
Security Organization. … In August 2008 officials stated that there were approximately 
1,200 political prisoners still detained, with plans to release 130 of these. The government 
has taken no steps to investigate or hold accountable those responsible for enforced 
disappearances. 
Relatives of those who are imprisoned have little access to information about their loved ones, so 
that arbitrary arrests and an absence of fair trials motivated a series of protests by the families of 
arrestees in February of 2011 (Alkarama, 2011).  
 The United States Agency for International Development write that Yemeni prisons can be 
read as “violence academies” where low level opposition members and regular citizens are turned 
into hard-line radicals through torture and association with other political prisoners in Yemen's jails 
(2008, p. 35). The assumption here is that those who had no strong feelings against the state going 
into gaol will turn against the ruling regime once they have been through the Yemeni prison system.  
 
5.3 Tribalism and Self-Administration 
 
Figure 64 Tribal Composition of Yemen 
 Elobaid Ahmed Elobaid writes that: “The formal Yemeni legal system is still in a state of flux” 
and that “One of the factors influencing the pace of legal modernization is the existence of other 
competing normative systems, especially the tribal one.” (2010, p. 10). Yemenis are comprised of 
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different peoples, who identify themselves according to ethnic and tribal affiliations (see Figure 
64141). These identities transcend geographic boundaries and are deeply intertwined with 
established systems of patronage142. As one onlooker has observed, Yemeni tribes have strong 
internal social structures and have historically proven extremely self-reliant, so that, today, while it is 
possible for tribes to function effectively without the state – it is not possible for the state to 
function without the tribes (Alexander Knysh, 2011). Prior to 2011, various rulers of Yemen, both 
before and after unification, had maintained control over their territories through co-opting and 
bargaining with powerful tribal leaders. These tactics have proven instrumental in stalling human 
rights based legislation and reforms, particularly within the justice sector. 
 
Figure 65 Yemeni Man Wearing Tribal Clothes 
 The tribes themselves form entrenched social networks that have shifted their composition 
mildly over the past two decades in response to changes in Yemen's power structures, but that have 
largely remained the same in their internal groupings. They are united according to overarching  
organisational structures, the most prominent of which have been the Hashid Federation and the 
Bakil Federation respectively, though independent tribes are not entirely uncommon. In particular, 
tribes that have crossed over into Saudi Arabian territory in the far North of the country have been 
able to maintain some independence through their isolation from central administration. These 
tribesmen identify themselves primarily as Yemenis, though they are geographically located beyond 
the reach of the Yemeni state. Nevertheless, North Yemen, and particularly the mountainous regions 
across the Saudi Arabian border have historically been dominated by the Hashid Federation. Here, 
the Hashid tribe has been able to gain sympathy and influence through shared Zaydi belief systems 
and common grievances.  
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 The Bakil Federation have also established a strong foothold within this region. While the 
Bakil Federation seems to be far more organisationally sophisticated, the Hashid Federation, run by 
the Al-Ahmar family, is by far the more powerful and strategically important of the two structures, 
particularly because of its strong presence within Sana'a, the capital of Yemen. It has been noted 
that the Hashid Federation incorporates the Sanhaan tribe, to which both President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh and General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar – key players in Yemeni politics – belong, though Sanhaan 
actually remains subordinate to the Hashid tribe within the Federation (Michael Horton, 2011).  
 In South Yemen, while both tribal federations still hold some influence, cross-tribal 
organisation is less pronounced, due largely to the region's history of socialist rule, during which 
tribal systems were heavily repressed by the state. Elham M. Manea writes that the most dominant 
tribes in the South belong to the Himiar and Madhhij Federations, which have proven far less 
politically active than their Northern counterparts (1996). These tribes have historically been easier 
to dominate due to their high reliance on agricultural land. As farmers, they remained largely settled 
in one locality and tethered to their lands with little room for geographic movement, so that they 
became exceedingly vulnerable to military pressure from the state (Horton, 2011).  
 There has been less mention of these tribes in recent news because they have traditionally 
shown themselves to be far less violent than their Northern equivalents, whose members have been 
involved in fighting in both the Sa'ada wars and elsewhere. Increasing economic pressures on the 
South and growing calls for separatism might serve to reverse this trend, and evidence suggests that 
some Southern tribes have begun harbouring and supporting Al Qaeda fighters, though this is a 
hugely contested issue143. Finally, it should be noted that North and South Yemen are also home to 
the Tihami, Soqotri and Mahri tribal groupings, which have been known to transcend federal 
divisions in the past. Encompassing a huge geographic terrain but lacking in organisation, these 
groups are identifiable by their distinctive languages and belief systems (Miranda Morris, 2007). 
They contribute to observations that tribes in Yemen have no singular political voice.  
 While some level of organisational sophistication and power structuring can be identified 
within the visible tribal composition of Yemen, these structures remain extremely difficult to pin 
down, because their alliances are based within patronage systems that have been deliberately 
obscured by the state. Linked to allegations of corruption, insurgencies and human rights violations, 
these tribal structures have remained deliberately hidden from outsiders, though they are crucial to 
determining and shaping political realities in Yemen. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 A major challenge for re-establishing the rule of law in Yemen is the significant lack of faith 
between the citizens of Yemen and the state's law enforcement and judicial services, which are 
insufficiently accessible, unrepresentative of pre-existing conflict mediation services, and uneven in 
their distribution, as well as in their implementation. When asked what his priorities for the reform 
of the Yemeni state were at a Chatham House event entitled Yemen: A Way Forward, Husam al-
Sharjabi, Head of the Yemeni Civic Coalition of Revolutionary Youth, reflected a common consensus 
among young people in the country today when he replied that: “What we want is a state where 
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everybody is equal under the law” (March 7, 2012). This statement reflects not only that selected 
tribes and communities are seen to be treated differently in different regions, but also that elite 
stakeholders are seen to escape prosecution, with corruption ensuring that the wealthy and the 
powerful have more recourse to protection from justice than others.  
 As Danniel Shimmin summarises, security services in Yemen could some day be made to be 
more legitimate in the eyes of the Yemeni people, but “Overcoming rumour and mistrust” will be a 
lot “more difficult than just ensuring transparency” - an age old priority of foreign interventions into 
Yemen (Expert Consultation, 2012).  Establishing an effective relationship between Yemeni citizens 
and the justice sector will require genuine reform.  
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Chapter 6: Understanding Violent Young Offending in Yemen and 
Other Fragile States 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 As the previous chapters have evidenced, criminological theory, which can be loosely divided 
between theories of crime causation and theories of social control, has largely been pioneered 
within the developed world (though it has been used in the past in emerging democracies with 
relatively strong infrastructures, like South Africa and Columbia) to analyse the prevalence of 
elevated criminal activity. While criminological theory has clear benefits for analysts of least 
developed countries, it has generally not been integrated into political development literature and 
has not been designed to explain criminal behaviour patterns in fragile states or been used to do so 
by development practitioners.  
 In order to effectively integrate criminological and development literature, this chapter will 
begin by presenting an overview of contemporary literature on conflict and state fragility, with 
particular reference to how these phenomena impact children and young people. Three bodies of 
theory will be explored here, – those pertaining to conflict causation, state fragility, and the impact 
of conflict and fragility on children and young people from a psychosocial welfare perspective. It has 
been found that while conflict is not a necessary condition of fragility, there is barely a single fragile 
state today that has not been at some point affected by war, so that conflict and fragility are 
strongly correlated. In 2008, twenty-eight fragile states were actively engaged in conflict, according 
to the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). Therefore, it has been 
determined that any overview of contemporary development literature would be severely lacking if 
it did not incorporate theories of conflict causation, specifically as they apply to civil wars.  
 Each of these areas will be reviewed in its own subsection in order to provide the building 
blocks of a new criminological theory of violent young offending that takes state fragility and its 
effects into account. To ensure the relevance and workability of this theoretical framework, it shall 
be developed alongside an in-depth analysis of the actual socio-economic situation of children and 
young people in Yemen, building upon the analyses of Yemen's context, justice sector and criminal 
environment provided in Chapters 2, 3 and 5.  
 
6.2 Conflict Causation 
 Theories of international politics have been obsessed with the notion of inter-state war and 
its inevitability since the end of the Second World War and, most likely, before that time as well. 
Theories of realism, liberalism, Marxism, constructivism, and so on, have provided the analytical 
framework for those striving to understand humanity's propensity for violence in a world that has 
proven increasingly uni-polar since the conclusion of the Cold War, but that threatens at any 
moment to reveal the emergence of new superpowers and new agendas in global geopolitics. While 
these theories continue to maintain their relevance in the contemporary world order, another 
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branch of political theory has emerged in recent years that deals almost exclusively with violence 
experienced by those countries that have not traditionally been seen as key players in international 
politics. It centres around the paradigm of 'new wars' – the idea that, over the past five decades, 
conflict has featured a unique set of characteristics that renders it markedly different to the wars of 
the past and therefore less likely to occur among the leading world powers.  
 Siniša Malešević summarises that: 
the argument is that these new wars differ in terms of scope (civil rather than inter-state 
conflicts), methods, models of financing (external rather than internal), and are 
characterised by low intensity coupled with high levels of brutality and with the deliberate 
targeting of civilians. … Furthermore, unlike the 'old wars' these new violent conflicts are 
premised on different fighting tactics (terror and guerilla tactics actions instead of 
conventional battlefields), different military strategies (population control rather than 
capturing new territory), utilise different combatants (private armies, criminal gangs and 
warlords instead of professional soldiers or conscripts), and are highly decentralised 
(2008, p. 98). 
While it is still to be determined whether or not this new paradigm has been validated and whether 
we are beginning to witness the end of large-scale inter-state violence of the kind that defined the 
World Wars, this increased tendency towards civil war particularly in weak states or underdeveloped 
countries was well documented in the 1990s, which registered a significant spike in armed violence 
that has arguably diminished in the 2000s (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). While its participants have 
advocated peaceful demonstrations, the Arab Spring has highlighted the potential vulnerability of 
even more politically and economically stable states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia to internal conflict, 
while the collapse of ruling regimes elsewhere in 2011 and 2012 may well foreshadow further 
increases in levels of violence over the twenty-first century.  
 Due to this thesis' concern with fragile states, which are commonly marked by civil wars, this 
section and those that follow it will analyse conflict and conflict causation theory only in as far as 
they relate to this paradigm of new wars, rather than looking at broader international relations 
theories that might have addressed the issue of conflict on a more global scale. This selection has 
been made not only to limit the scope of the research initiative, but also because low income and 
underdevelopment have themselves come to form key determining factors for civil war, with least 
developed countries facing a significantly greater risk of violence than middle and high income 
states.  
 It is important to note that while the new wars paradigm is extremely useful, it remains 
highly contested within development literature, whereby one of the central issues to emerge from 
contemporary debate on the subject is conceptual. While it is clear to many theorists that new wars 
are fairly different to large-scale inter-state conflicts, they have occurred in such a variety of 
different contexts that their characteristics remain fairly difficult to quantify. Jacob Mundy points 
out that:  
Not long into its prolific and influential career, the new school of civil war studies began to 
claim that there existed a degree of ‘consensus’ among the various models used to 
determine the trigger causes, sustaining conditions and intensifying factors of civil wars. 
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Surprisingly, however, this consensus has been achieved without the use of a consistent 
conception of civil war.  One of the most visible effects of the use of varying criteria to 
identify and measure civil wars has been the production of significantly different lists of 
civil wars. According to one survey, the proposed number of civil wars between 1960 and 
1993 ranges from 58 to 116 depending on the criteria followed. (2011) 
The plethora of frameworks and understandings of new wars that have emerged in the field since 
the paradigm's inception reflects the equally diverse range of actors who have chosen to engage 
with this area, with academics, development agencies, donors and governments aligned to different 
interventionist agendas ranging from democratisation and stabilisation to transactional 
development each adopting their own slant upon this challenging subject.  
 Definitions of civil war have become politicised, which is to be expected in a field where 
authors and analysts are able to make choices about whether or not to use words like “uprising”, 
“genocide” or “conflict”, and likewise “combatants”, “insurgents”, “freedom fighters” or “terrorists” 
when describing new wars and their participants. Causality is also a huge point of disagreement 
among observers of the new wars phenomenon. In particular, questions about what spurs on or 
discourages conflict reflect the priorities of different agencies: with the United States Agency for 
International Development being chiefly concerned with the causes of Islamic and other forms of 
radicalisation; the United Nations and its many off-shoots adopting a primarily rights-based 
narrative; non-democratically aligned states like China adopting an economically-based perception 
of civil unrest; and, regional movements like the West Asia North Africa Forum prioritising 
understandings of conflict causality that are based upon state capacities and infrastructure 
limitations to encourage bilateral aid responses.  
 Within this setting, the potential for analytical biases to emerge from research is extremely 
high, which is one of the main reasons why this thesis has chosen to include conflict as a dimension 
of fragility only in terms of its effects upon populations. However, even having taken these 
challenges into account, there are several trends in conflict causation that are generally agreed upon 
and that tend to be valued above others. Key among these is the central component that lead to the 
emergence of the new wars paradigm in the first place, which is the observation that several 
underdeveloped states have experienced extremely violent civil wars, leading to the notion that 
underdevelopment is an important dimension of contemporary conflicts.  
 This idea has yet to be disputed with any degree of real empirical certainty, though it should 
be noted that underdeveloped states are also frequently associated with histories of colonialism, 
where imposed cultural, religious and ethnic segregations have severely impacted the social 
cohesion of societies, pointing to other parallel underlying causes of rising hostilities (as evidenced 
by the Yemeni case study where both underdevelopment and a history of geographic and religious 
antagonism have played a part in sparking violence).  
 The main danger here is that, as Paul Collier et al argue, while development tends to reduce 
the risk of civil war, fragile states have generally “not shared in development” so that if this situation 
persists: “the global incidence of conflict will not continue to rise indefinitely, but neither will 
development secure global peace”, and “The world will find itself stuck with a self-sustaining 
incidence of civil war, determined by the large and persistent pool of nondeveloping, low income 
countries” (2003, pp. 5-6). With the growing entrenchment of protracted unrest in fragile states that 
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fall victim to Collier's self-sustaining “conflict trap”, his prediction does not seem unreasonable in 
our latest century of global development.  
 While Malešević and others have stated that one of the new wars paradigm's greatest 
limitations is buried within its attempt to anticipate the future behaviour of states in the global 
political sphere,  the new wars paradigm may still be used to access relevant theories relating to a 
specifically defined body of contemporary conflicts that tend to impact fragile states. This can be 
achieved without assessing the potential long-term applicability of the paradigm itself, by prioritising 
the present behaviour of conflict-affected fragile states in order to understand the legitimacy and 
authority-based challenges that they are seen to be facing. 
 It is necessary to understand that the new wars paradigm is, above all, a definitional 
framework, whose terminology has been left overly vague and malleable by those who make 
reference to it, but that it is open to more rigorous and clear-cut interpretations. Despite its 
limitations in this sense, new wars are commonly accepted within academic literature to be conflicts 
that are characterised by six traits, which include: 
1. The actors that take part in them. New wars tend not to be fought between states, but 
rather between state and non-state actors, as well as public, private, terrorist and warlord 
groups; 
2. The motivations of their protagonists. New wars tend to be fought for ideological and 
material reasons rather than purely over territorial control (though, in practice, these ideals 
are often achieved through the enhancement of geographic influence); 
3. Their “spatial context”. New wars are normally civil wars that can spill into neighbouring 
countries, rather than wars started between states themselves; 
4. Their methods. New wars tend to be characterised by specific technological and physical 
methods of achieving violence, where strategists tend to target civilian populations, employ 
terrorist and guerrilla tactics, and rely on all technologies made available to them, with states 
possessing far more sophisticated weaponry than insurgents and combatants; 
5. Their impact. New wars tend to result in significant human victimisation and displacement, 
as caused by the violation of human rights legislation and resulting in significant social and 
material costs; and, 
6. Their political economies. New wars are “driven by globalisation and liberal economic 
forces” that generate a deligitimisation of the state, followed by state failure and increased 
competition for resources (Newman, 2004, pp. 174-175). 
The very definition of new wars alludes to the root causes of contemporary conflict. They are driven 
by weak state capacities and an inability by governments in underdeveloped countries to safely 
weather global economic pull factors. Growing material and economic grievances at the local level 
are streamlined into nationwide discontent until they generate conflicting and anti-establishment 
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narratives that provide a lightning rod for the recruitment of new and emerging combatant 
groups144. 
 David Keen writes that “the idea that a conflict is bi-polar – in other words, that conflict is 
'really' about government troops fighting rebel troops … – has proven extremely useful to elites 
protecting their own privileges”, but has ultimately proven to be misleading and counter-productive 
for theorists and external observers striving to understand the actual causes of war (2007, p. 6). 
While it is tempting to analyse the narratives and motivations of individual actors in times of conflict, 
these confuse the deeper issues behind violence and serve to obscure genuine root causes of 
political unrest and military action.  
 Frances Stewart extends this argument to the ethnic or cultural dimension of conflicts. 
Although “Many groups of people who fight together perceive themselves as belonging to a 
common culture (ethnic or religious), and part of the reason that they are fighting may be to 
maintain their cultural autonomy”: it has been found by analysts in most contexts that any 
“tendency to attribute wars to 'primordial' ethnic passions” that make them “seem intractable … is 
not correct” because such tendencies “diver[t] attention from important underlying economic and 
political factors” (2002, p. 342). The limits of these observations are that they downplay ideological, 
ethnic and religious narratives of war, which are extremely important to understand if effective 
dialogue between warring parties is ever to be established. This has been seen in the Middle East 
within the regional Sunni-Shia divide, in Rwanda during its ethnic genocide, and in Kashmir within its 
intra-state religious and national identity-based conflict. 
 The new wars paradigm was originally designed to integrate these narrative-based and 
deeper causal tensions within one analytical framework. The term was coined by Mary Kaldor in her 
ground-breaking work on New and Old Wars, in which she began to read contemporary conflict as 
being more akin to “organised violence” than traditional warfare, placing the alleged uniqueness of 
the economic environments and funding mechanisms behind new wars at the forefront of her 
analysis.  
 In her development of the new wars conceptual framework, Kaldor used the word “new” 
specifically so as to “distinguish” contemporary conflict from “prevailing perceptions of war drawn 
from an earlier era”, and the word “war” in order to strongly: 
emphasise the political nature of this new type violence, even though … the new wars 
involve a blurring of the distinctions between war (usually defined as violence between 
states or organised political groups for political motives), organised crime (violence 
undertaken by private organised groups for private purposes, usually financial gain) and 
large-scale violations of human rights (violence undertaken by states or politically 
organised groups against individuals). (1999, pp. 1-2) 
Since then, numerous theoretical readings have been put forward in striving to understand the 
reasons behind the contemporary prevalence for civil war in underdeveloped countries. With many 
of these theories continuing to be founded within economic modes of analysis and concentrating on 
the financing of conflict and insurgency; they exhibit strong overlaps with criminology, particularly as 
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this discipline addresses criminogenic risk factors within labour markets and community 
composition. It is found that, even in Kaldor's work, the emergence of new wars is strongly 
connected to the thematic discussion of globalisation and similar frameworks of increased 
internationalisation, interconnectedness, and – more importantly – economic competitiveness in the 
world, so that these frameworks remain to this day virtually inseparable from conflict-causation 
theory.  
 Malešević argues that the very positioning of fragile states in a new, increasingly globalised 
world order is central to the development of conflict-generating socio-economic conditions, 
whereby the: 
inability to compete at the global level weakens the state's economy and simultaneously 
its capacity to extract revenue, thus opening the door to systemic corruption, criminality 
and consequently for the general privatisation of violence. State failure creates a new 
Hobbesian environment where armed warlords control the remnants of state structures, 
and relying on foreign remittances and international aid invoke identity politics to spread 
terror among those deemed a threat to their religious or ethnic group. (2008, p. 100) 
Malešević's interpretation of the new wars phenomenon suggests that the inability of weak and 
fragile states to engage with world markets is directly connected to the breakdown of state 
capacities, which is a precondition of state failure145. State failure opens the door to the privatisation 
of violence and the generation of conflict.  
 Malešević's jump from struggling economies to the development of warlordism and the 
spread of terrorist tactics is both sudden and severe: but the move remains a logical one that is 
emulated by many other writers in the development field.  
 Other prominent theoretical works on conflict causation focus on economic methods of 
analysis, with the most famous of these, the “greed versus grievance” theory of conflict generation 
put forward by Paul Collier and Anke Hoffler, seeking to explore the relationship between financial 
motivation and other social factors in the creation and sustenance of contemporary civil war. 
Containing prominent ideological overlaps with the theories put forward in Chapter 4, the “greed 
versus grievance” model draws strong distinctions between the stated goals of protagonists in 
conflict and the underlying opportunities for financial gain that war and insecurity generate. Collier 
and Hoeffler write that narratives that might incite rebellion are present in almost every country, 
demonstrating the universality of certain common social grievances. While “all countries might have 
groups with a sufficiently strong sense of grievance to wish to launch a rebellion,” rebellions will only 
occur “where they are viable”, or where constraints on rebellion are particularly weak, or where 
economic and development indicators are particularly relevant (2002, p. 6). In addition, for key 
stakeholders, including rebel leaders, the economic incentives to continue conflict once it has been 
initiated can be significantly stronger than those associated with peace, whereby war represents the 
continuation of criminal flows, while peace represents demobilisation and unemployment, 
imprisonment or execution.  
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 The most common criticism of the “greed versus grievance” framework is that it paints an 
extremely limited “either/or” picture of conflict causality, which obscures the nuances and 
complexities of the interactions between genuine grievance-based motivations for conflict and the 
economic conditionalities for fighting. While economic predictors of new wars are undoubtedly 
hugely important, the Global Economic Crisis of 2007/2008 highlights that a lack of economic 
growth, rapid economic shifts and unemployment are not sufficient in themselves to cause violent 
conflict, or we would have seen civil wars hit virtually every major power by 2012. Granted, it is true 
that poverty and unemployment figures in the developed world remained only a fraction of what 
they were in fragile states throughout this time, but the distinct lack of civil war in developed 
countries during the late 2000s is worth noting in this sense, while many least developed countries 
continued to be mired in political crises.  
 As Kaldor highlights, it is important to dwell on further implications of the increasing global 
interconnectedness of the current world order as a potential element of conflict-causation. Kaldor 
writes that “new wars arise in the context of the erosion of the autonomy of the state and in some 
extreme cases the disintegration of the state. … they occur in the context of the erosion of the 
monopoly of legitimate organised violence” (p. 4). While the European Union, NATO, the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, and other networks for international cooperation serve today as the best 
examples that there has been a gradual decline of states as bordered entities146 that are the primary 
actors in international politics with some very positive results: it has been found that the erosion of 
state sovereignty in countries without a pre-dating history of strong governance147 can have a 
significant negative impact upon areas where governmental infrastructure and capacities are already 
either weak or absent.  
 A loss of autonomy has made fragile states particularly vulnerable to regional and global 
geopolitical shifts, leaving them unable to weather regional population movements, market 
fluctuations, cross-national radicalising political movements, and many other external forces. Their 
vulnerability in this sense fosters their over-reliance on international humanitarian and 
developmental aid, pushing them to become intertwined with the unpopular foreign policies of 
donor countries148. Each of these stresses has been found to be a strong contributing factor to the 
emergence of new wars, strengthening existing socio-cultural divisions among communities, 
decreasing state capacity for effective service provision, and increasing nationwide social 
inequalities. 
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 President Saleh's support of the American-led War on Terror triggered conflict in the North and significantly 
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Figure 66 The Heavily Barricaded American Embassy in Sana'a 
 Stewart concludes that the major root causes of contemporary civil conflicts are diverse, but 
have included; “political, economic and social inequalities; extreme poverty; economic stagnation; 
poor government services; high unemployment; environmental degradation; and individual 
(economic) incentives to fight” (p. 342). According to Stewart, these causes can be 
compartmentalised according to group and individual motivational forces. Thus, groups within 
conflicts can be divided according to various cultural, religious, ethnic or geographic characteristics. 
These distinctions will only become a source of conflict where strong contrasts exist relating to the 
deprivation of economic or political power, where “political redress is not possible”, and where 
these distinctions amount to severe “horizontal inequalities” (p. 343).  
 As to individual or “private” motivational forces, Stewart writes that conflict creates 
employment opportunities for combatants, and allows for looting, theft and other considerable 
economic incentives, so that poverty becomes an important determining factor. In practice, private 
motivational forces are seen as dynamics that prolong, rather than instigate, conflict.  
 The World Bank's Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit adds to Stewart's analysis 
with an extensive list of risk screening indicators that are said to determine whether a country is 
likely to experience conflict. These overlap with Stewart's but are designed to be more measurable 
in order to aid practitioners in the field to produce comparative assessments of development 
contexts (though it is debatable to what extent they achieve this purpose). They include: a history of 
conflict; low income per capita; dependency upon primary commodity exports; political instability; 
the denial of political rights; militarisation; ethnic dominance; active regional conflicts; and, youth 
unemployment (2002, p. 2). Interestingly, the dependency on primary commodity exports actually 
means that countries with natural resources of value are more likely to descend into conflict than 
countries that seem to possess no resources of value, with some notable exceptions like Somalia. 
 Of biggest concern here is the “history of conflict” dimension of conflict causality. Johnie 
Christian et al write that although:  
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It has become abundantly clear that since the end of World War II civil war – revolutions, 
secessionist wars, and other forms of armed conflict within nations – has replaced 
interstate war as the dominant conflict modality in the international system … What is less 
widely recognised is that most of the civil wars that have occurred in the last half century 
have recurred in a nation that previously experienced a civil war. (2007, p. 1) 
They argue that this is likely to be because conflicts that end through negotiated peace settlements 
rather than clear-cut military victories allow “both sides to retain the organisational capacity to 
renew war in future” (p. 2), though in Yemen, even where the North's victory over the South in the 
1994 Civil War remains uncontested, hostility continues to this day.  
 This summary is linked to Collier's conflict trap, and is of all the more concern in relation to 
this thesis because it has been found that even a brief examination of conflict causation theory and 
the new wars paradigm indicates that these factors are deeply interconnected. Most, if not all, tend 
to be present in fragile states, leading to an increased tendency towards civil war that has been 
validated by empirical evidence from the field. It is found that state fragility itself feeds into conflict, 
while conflict aggravates and feeds back into state fragility, locking countries into 
underdevelopment and further compromising state infrastructures. Beyond this, it remains 
extremely difficult to understand what might really be the full extent of the relationship between 
conflict and fragility.  
 
6.3 State Fragility 
 State fragility is a fluid and loosely defined concept that is used by donors, international 
organisations and academics to group together a diverse set of cultural and political contexts 
according to the governance and infrastructure challenges that they face149. The term has been 
deliberately broadened by those who use it and, while many analytical frameworks have been put 
forward by the World Bank and others that have strived to measure fragility (including the Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) and the Failed States Index), there remains, according to 
Alina Rochal Menocal, “no firm consensus within the international community on exactly what 
constitutes a ‘fragile' state or situation” (2010, p. 1).  
 To avoid becoming entangled in theoretical or ideological biases, this thesis uses a single 
definition of “state fragility”, which prioritises poor state capacity, high social fragmentation and 
poor political integration. This section will cover in more detail how that definition emerged from a 
merging of existing academic and practitioner literature on the subject. 
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 From the onset, therefore, as has been set out in the research questions outlined in sections iii and 1.2.2, 
there are immediate issues and concerns that surround the use of the state fragility framework as a tool for 
grouping together least developed countries, and some of these arguments will be addressed and resolved 
within this section. However, with the overall aim of this thesis being to find a new way to discuss and think 
about the connections between violent young offending and underdevelopment, this section's primary 
purpose will be merely to provide an overview of key literary works that address the features and 
characteristics of state fragility, as well as the main causes of fragility, as these have already been referenced 
to some extent in section 6.2. The usefulness of the state fragility framework itself will also form an 
overarching theme for this chapter, which shall be commented upon further in its conclusion, as well as in 
Chapter 8. 
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 As Menocal argues, despite the absence of unifying approaches to fragility “there is general 
agreement on some key characteristics”, which include weak institutions and poor state capacity as 
the core features that brought about a need for this separate terminology in the first place. The 
Department for International Development (DFID), defines fragile states as those countries where 
“the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to its people”, whereby the lowest 
countries on the CPIA are “sometimes used as a proxy for fragile states” (2006). This distinction 
between political capacity and political will is problematic, as it allows for the integration of 
sufficiently developed countries with oppressive political regimes into the state fragility framework, 
where this thesis has chosen instead to focus upon those countries that are suffering from severe 
infrastructure and capacity-based limitations.   
 Due to the broad nature of the state fragility framework, the concept is understood by 
development practitioners to encompass different characteristics, with many actors placing different 
levels of emphasis on each of these. Fragility is defined as an inability by the state to perform basic 
functions150, including service provision, whereby, as Lisa Chauvet et al summarise, “The most basic 
role of the state is to provide physical security to its citizens” (2007, p. 1), because, as Robert 
Rotberg concludes: “The delivery of a range of other desirable political goods becomes possible 
when a reasonable measure of security has been sustained” (2004, p. 3).  
 It is this security-based focus that has led to the securitisation of international aid, 
particularly in the aftermath of 9/11, when the severe lack of security in fragile states was finally 
acknowledged by policy makers as having far-reaching consequences for even the world's most 
developed countries. Yet security is not the only state service of relevance in determining state 
fragility. International conventions have come to place an equal emphasis on human security, a far 
broader, rights-based measure of state effectiveness.  
 Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart write that there are seven other state functions that are 
particularly relevant for maintaining public safety and ensuring a minimum standard of human rights 
protection. These functions include: (1) a duty to maintain the rule of law - “a glue that binds all 
aspects of the state, economy and society” (2008, p. 125); (2) an ability to hold a monopoly over the 
legitimate implementation of violence; (3) administrative control (including taxation); (4) “sound” 
management of public finances, ensuring efficient budgeting and minimising institutional corruption; 
(5) a certain degree of investment in human capital through educational services, the creation of 
livelihood opportunities and pathways for career development; (6) the creation and protection of 
citizenship rights through social policy and legal instruments; and, (7) the provision of infrastructure 
services. These include: power provision; healthcare and welfare services; water provision; and, 
waste disposal, among other services.  
 These seven dimensions are prioritised within this thesis' institutional understanding of 
fragility. It is interesting to note that, while they seek to incorporate a relatively broad understanding 
of state roles, their conception of fragility encapsulates two general trends that have emerged 
strongly from the literature on fragility: it is foremost a security-centred understanding of fragility, 
with the first three-to-four conditions (depending upon the reader's interpretation) being aimed at 
reducing crime and violence while increasing state authority. It is also an understanding that is 
located at a national level of explanation, where fragility is not commonly thought of to be a product 
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of community-level, regional or global political forces. Through their analytical focus, these 
understandings of fragility place the blame for underdevelopment and insecurity squarely on the 
shoulders of the ruling regime, failing to take into account cross-border or internal sources of 
weakness. Having said this, an absence of any one of the seven functions identified by Ghani and 
Lockhart can have severe destabilising consequences and lead to the conditions necessary for state 
fragility, even where a country has previously maintained a balance of development indicators above 
crisis levels. 
 In order to avoid black and white conceptions of underdevelopment, Michael Anderson and 
Magui Moreno Torres write that there are varying degrees of state fragility, which require different 
levels of international intervention. Similarly to Sultan Barakat's reading of the fragility framework, 
in which he posits fragility as a cross-over point between poor governance and social fragmentation, 
Anderson and Torres read fragility as an intersection of weak political will and weak capacity (see 
Figure 67).  
 
Figure 67 State Fragility as a Measure of Capacity and Political Will 
Anderson and Torres believe that state fragility can be categorised according to all four of the 
situations pictured above (Figure 67). The author of this thesis takes a more restrictive view, where 
fragile states are primarily analysed as lacking in infrastructure and state capacity. To do otherwise 
would create too wide a variety of nations upon which to overlap theories of violent young 
offending, compromising the relevance of any potential emerging insights into the relationship 
between violent crime and underdevelopment.  
 Nevertheless, Anderson and Torres' critique remains hugely relevant to any analysis of 
fragility. In particular, they write that the “features of weakness” – poor institutional capacity and a 
lack of political will to instigate change – combine and interact with one another in multiple and 
dynamic ways, producing results that are largely dependent upon context, demands for reform and 
the degree of infrastructure development present in a country.  
 Most prominently, according to Anderson and Torres, state fragility can result in the 
following six consequences: 
1. State collapse: The most urgent and dramatic risk associated with state fragility is that of 
state failure or state collapse, when the government ceases to function entirely. As 
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evidenced by Somalia, once a state has moved from fragility to failure, reversing 
underdevelopment and political instability can prove virtually impossible without a 
substantial, costly and long-term external intervention. 
2. Loss of territorial control: Many theorists define state fragility as a condition which 
inherently leads to a loss of territorial control, whereby the state's authority and 
administrative capacity does not extend much further than the capital of the country if at all, 
Anderson and Torres note that “Incomplete control of the territory may have a long history, 
or be a sign of a low level of state penetration linked to the enduring power of local or 
intermediary authorities” (p. 5). 
3. Low administrative capacities: Lack of administrative capacity is reflected in the inability 
of states to monitor their citizens or implement new policies, due to budgeting, resource-
based or staffing shortfalls. As seen in Yemen, a lack of operational capacity, as resulting 
from poor governmental administration, was a key feature of growing political instability 
and resentment against state infrastructures particularly in the peripheral governorates.  
4. Political instability: Due to administrative and authority-based weaknesses, fragile states 
are often marked by significant political unrest, including civil war. This unrest stems from a 
failure by the state to manage grievances and to deal effectively with conflict, and is 
aggravated by severe social inequalities, as outlined in the previous section. 
5. Neopatrimonial politics: Fragile states are prone to exhibit strong signs of neopatrimonial 
politics, shown through high rates of corruption and entrenched patronage systems. Poor 
state capacity leads government stakeholders to negotiate with outside parties for 
assistance in supplementing state roles, such as the maintenance of security and the rule of 
law. Anderson and Torres argue that: “In such cases of pervasive clientelism, the political 
logic of the system diverts state authority from the stated policy goals to the pursuit of 
private wealth and power”, as has become apparent in Yemen through the emergence of 
strong, protracted internal power struggles within a demi-shadow state (p. 6). 
6. Repressive polities: While many theorists read state fragility as being the product of an 
infrastructural failure, Anderson and Torres expand the term to include issues relating to 
bad governance as well. They hold to the view that a state may be considered fragile where 
it has a strong administrative base and repressive regime that has little desire to reform for 
the better protection of human rights. This thesis takes the view that fragile states are 
necessarily characterised by poor governmental capacity. This has been seen in numerous 
fragile states, but also in the far North and South of Yemen where government crack-downs 
on protesters and insurgents led to significant casualties in 1994, and between 2005 and 
2011. 
Anderson and Torres' list, as outlined above, is extensive. It serves to highlight the potential 
consequences of fragility and to explain why it is that policy-makers and members of the 
international community have proven increasingly concerned with fragility in recent years.  
 The primary worry is that, as Robert Zoellick confirms, “fragile states can create fragile 
regions” (2009, p. 69), so that if, as Chauvet et al conclude: “state failure produces large spillover 
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costs to neighbours”, then “there may be good reason to rethink the conceptual foundations of 
sovereignty, shifting some sovereignty from the nation to the region, and in the process empowering 
international intervention” (2007, p. 1). However, the diversion of sovereignty can create cycles of 
protracted relief and severe aid dependency in fragile states on the one hand, and justify aggressive 
foreign policies on the other, both of which can serve to further undermine the local authority.  
 As has already been argued, both Zoellick and Chauvet's economic and almost strategic 
readings of fragility are problematic. They passively acknowledge a dominant theoretical view within 
both policy and academia that, while fragile states can negatively impact the development of the 
regions within which they are located, regional and global forces are not to blame for the conditions 
that initially generated the underdevelopment of those fragile states. Regionalism in the study of 
fragility only cuts one way. The fragility framework, with its focus upon national infrastructure and 
national willpower, only ever undertakes a localised analysis of the main causes of 
underdevelopment while acknowledging the potential for its international effects. This reality is 
reflected in the loaded terminology adopted by organisations like the British Department for 
International Development and the United States Agency for International Development, which 
highlight the political willpower of countries to reform as a key component for analysis in instances 
of fragility. Such readings push analysts to begin their investigations by determining the degree to 
which affected governments are to blame for not reforming themselves effectively.  
 Overall, while the fragile states framework has enabled the growth of comparative research 
of underdevelopment within the realm of international politics, and while that framework has at all 
times striven to be all-inclusive in its understanding of states and state roles, it has also acted in an 
extremely restrictive manner, adopting a very country-based and often security-oriented conception 
of underdevelopment.  
 Despite the vast advances that have been made in development literature since the 
innovation of the fragile states framework (and particularly in terms of the theoretical 
conceptualisations of that framework), it is important to keep in mind that, as the Overseas 
Development Institute write: “Neat categorisations such as fragile/resilient or conflict/post-conflict 
obscure more than they reveal, defining contexts according to what they are not rather than what 
they are” (2011, p. 1). Defining fragile states as simply lacking in capacity, political will or social 
cohesion can lead to an unproductive colouring of the real issues at hand151. 
 However, the fragile states framework nonetheless remains extremely useful when it comes 
to producing a shorthand terminology that instantly evokes a set of key conditions in the mind of the 
reader and allows for the generation of exportable findings precisely because of its flexibility. 
Furthermore, understandings of state fragility have led to greater insight and collaboration on the 
causes of underdevelopment. As Rotberg asserts, it is generally acknowledged that:  
Nation-states fail when they are consumed by internal violence and cease delivering 
positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their governments lose credibility, and the 
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continuing nature of the particular nation-state itself becomes questionable and 
illegitimate in the hearts and minds of its citizens  (p. 1) 
Never has state fragility been higher on the international agenda for this reason. In light of 
increasing crises across the world, as well as growing resource scarcity and economic competition, 
never has it been more important to understand the root causes of violence and instability in fragile 
contexts. 
 Unfortunately, what is evident is that, while the state fragility framework offers one of the 
best and most comprehensive approaches to underdevelopment produced within the sector, it is 
beset, like all tools for comparative analysis, with limitations and complications, which emerge in 
particular when the literature that has been produced on the subject is scrutinised at more than a 
merely superficial level. There remains a very valid question about the suitability of this framework 
for providing a baseline for comparative criminological analysis.  
 This thesis argues that because of the specific patterns of violent criminal behaviour that 
have emerged from countries that score poorly on the United Nations Development Project's 
Human Development Index, there is a need to better understand the correlation between country-
wide underdevelopment and youth aggression. Furthermore, it has been observed that 
underdevelopment is heightened by a lack of institutional capacity, resulting in authority, services 
and legitimacy-based failures that are characteristic of fragility, as argued by Stewart and Brown, 
and evidenced in Chapter 2. It is for these reasons that this thesis has generated and maintained its 
own typology of state fragility from the outset, which has been needed in order to restrict the 
variety of cases that can be compared with one another, by adopting a more narrowly defined 
conception of fragility that examines cases of extreme underdevelopment, like Yemen, only.   
 
Figure 68 State Fragility and Social Cohesion 
Comparing Barakat’s reading of fragility (Figure 68) with that of Anderson and Torres (Figure 
69), this thesis reads fragility as a nexus of both frameworks. 
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Figure 69 State Fragility as a Measure of Capacity and Political Will 
According to this nexus, weak state capacity and a corresponding high level of social fragmentation 
or social disorder are seen as key defining features of fragility (see Figure 70). 
 
Figure 70 State Fragility as a Product of Poor State Capacity, High Social Fragmentation and Poor Political Integration 
This reading of state fragility is symptom-focused, taking the more prominent features and 
characteristics of so-termed fragile states and using these to identify countries for comparative 
analysis.  
 Here, Anderson and Torres' criterion that fragile states are characterised by a lack of political 
will to reform has been substituted with lack of political integration. The emphasis is shifted away 
from the political intent of the ruling regime towards community perceptions of state willingness to 
change, to incorporate oppositional voices and to grant access to mainstream calls for reform.  
 It is argued that under this typology, notions of “weak” and “strong” instances of state 
fragility are removed from the analytical framework, so that only countries experiencing all three 
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categories of poor state capacity, high social fragmentation and poor political integration are 
considered to be fragile. Contrary to much of the literature on fragility, this typology is not 
particularly concerned with the causes of fragility, but rather with its manifestations and effects, 
which include the inability of fragile states to weather regional and global socio-economic changes 
safely.  
 With a focus on the manifestations of fragility, the author has chosen to add another 
dimension of conflict to the analysis, so that fragile states without any history of civil war are not 
considered in the end criminological analysis employed by this thesis. The typology is therefore 
primarily used to better understand the impact that country-wide underdevelopment, prolonged 
insecurity and a lack of service provision have on societies from a specifically crime-based 
perspective.  
 Whether or not such restrictions of the state fragility framework will allow for the 
generation of a unifying theory of crime causation is a theme that will be discussed throughout this 
Chapter and addressed more specifically in Chapter 8. It is important to note here that a feature that 
makes this process of comparison easier is that the typology continues to distinguish between fragile 
and failing states, so that all countries analysed, like Yemen, must maintain a functioning, if 
extremely weak, government, thereby excluding states like Somalia.  
 
6.4 The Impact of Conflict and State Fragility on Children and Young People 
 The two previous sections of this chapter have outlined to some extent contemporary 
theories of conflict and fragility. Even a brief examination of these issues reveals that conflict and 
fragility have a huge potential to harm vulnerable members of society like children and young people 
in particular, especially given the emergence of new wars in which civilians have proven to be the 
primary targets.  
 It has been found in the United Nations World Youth Report of 2003 that young people are 
at risk of being singled out for recruitment into armed violence and criminal organisations, so that: 
Young people’s participation in armed hostilities is facilitated through the trade of small 
arms and light weapons. The dearth of opportunities in their communities often leads 
them to gravitate towards violent conflict and acts of terrorism. Many are successfully 
mobilized through the ideologies of war. As victims and witnesses, they cannot help but 
be affected by the grim realities surrounding them. (p. 371) 
Beyond the effects of direct violence, children and young people are at risk of feeling the brunt of 
indirect consequences of war and displacement, which are equally important. Thus the spread of 
common communicable diseases, which may prove easily treatable in peace time, can prove deadly 
to children even where they may be relatively safe for adults to endure. Likewise, the economic 
effect of fragility, which results in unemployment, poverty, malnutrition and starvation, can be 
devastating.  
 Edward Goldson writes that, where conflict takes place in underdeveloped countries, 
“children are maimed and killed”, but they also die of “outright famine”, as well as of “measles, 
diphtheria, polio, malaria, cholera, meningitis, and dysentery, which, by and large, are preventable 
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and certainly treatable illnesses” (1993, pp. 18-19), where diarrhoea remains the greatest killer to 
this day. The effects of fragility are therefore easily made visible through child mortality rates, with 
child mortality being heavily correlated with state fragility (see Table 11). 
Human Development Indicator America Canada France Germany United Kingdom 
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1000 
people) for 2008 
8 6 4 4 6 
Human Development Indicator Afghanistan Somalia Iraq South Africa Yemen 
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1000 
people) for 2008 
257 180 44 67 69 
 
Table 11 Under 5 Mortality Rates in Fragile States and Most Developed Countries 
Even where conflict is not a factor, state fragility leads to a significant escalation of under 5 mortality 
rates.  
 If we are to take a strict view of fragility as being symptomatic of poor institutional capacity, 
then the impact of conflict and state fragility on children and young people can be analysed as being 
directly related to the absence of corresponding state services. A lack of state capacity to deliver 
education leads to poor education levels among children in fragile contexts. A lack of healthcare 
services leads to increased rates of disease contraction, as well as higher physical consequences of 
illness and injury, including death. A lack of welfare services leads to the rise of poverty and hunger. 
A lack of public safety leads to increased vulnerability to crime and violence. Thus, in contexts 
affected by fragility as well as by conflict, it is found in the World Youth Report that “Young people 
have much at stake, yet they have little say in the policies and activities that pertain to their lives” 
(2003, p. 373): in Yemen youth groups have been excluded from peace negotiations, despite their 
strong involvement in pro-change movements. 
 Apart from having a real physical impact on the safety and integrity of children, these factors 
also produce important psychological effects in young people that can strongly alter their psycho-
social development with corresponding criminogenic influences. It is found that the vast majority of 
children and young people who have been directly exposed to conflict and insecurity have 
experienced traumatic events as strictly defined in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and the 
emergence of post-traumatic stress disorder in the late 1970s, where “the concept of trauma was 
confined to catastrophic events falling outside the perimeter of everyday experience” (Richard 
McNally, 2004, p. 1). Such experiences, where they do lead to psychological scarring or post-
traumatic disorders can manifest themselves through several “signs and symptoms” that include; 
“repeatedly re-experiencing the trauma”, “avoidance of activities and stimuli associated with the 
trauma and emotional numbing”, and “heightened arousal” - defined here as heightened 
“irritability” or as an “exaggerated startle reflex” (p. 2).  
 Adding to these risks, the World Youth Report states that “During warfare, girls … encounter 
threats of rape, sexual mutilation and exploitation, trafficking and humiliation”, so that “Many are 
beaten regardless of their level of compliance with the demands of their attackers” (2003, p. 374). 
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Boys are forcefully recruited into gangs and armed groups as child soldiers or low-level criminals, 
where they face enormous pressures to commit significant acts of violence (often being held 
themselves quite literally at gunpoint) in order to advance their social standing within these 
“emotive” or “antisocial” organisations. These gender vulnerabilities are frequently reversed as well, 
with boys falling victim to rape and girls being pushed into violent behaviour, but these reversals are 
less widely talked about and seem to be largely absent in most literature on child soldiers, as they 
are absent from the World Youth Report. In both cases, the nature of state fragility is such that boys 
and girls alike are unlikely to gain access to the kind of social services that would allow them to 
overcome their traumas. In practice, they are more likely to meet severe social and cultural 
stigmatisation from local communities that can severely hamper their effective reintegration into 
peaceful and law abiding societies, maintaining and reinforcing their “deviant”152 identities.  
 Displacement, caused by either conflict or natural disaster, is another dimension that 
increases child vulnerability in this sense. In 2011, it was reported that “the number of forcibly 
displaced people around the world [had] reached a 15-year high”, with “43.7 million refugees and 
people displaced within their country”, of which “more than half of the total” were children (Shiv 
Malik). Displaced children and young people are not only often separated from their families and 
therefore placed at far greater risk of suffering the traumas detailed above, but they are also usually 
out of school and employment, while sometimes facing the resentments of local community 
members who see them to be a drain on local resources.  
 This was found to be the case in Yemen among Somali refugees in particular, who were seen 
to be an unwelcome criminal element by host communities and local law enforcement services153. 
Such perceptions are aggravated across the world, write the United Nations International Children's 
Emergency Fund, because: “Adolescents from disadvantaged groups, including ethnic minorities and 
migrants, are disproportionately likely to offend”, while “Adolescents who spend periods of pre-trial 
detention or serve prison sentences alongside adults are much less likely to be reintegrated into 
society when they are released and much more likely to revert to criminal behaviour” - leading to 
self-perpetuating cycles of criminality among migrants and displaced children and young people 
(2011, p. 55). 
 To make matters more complicated, Jon Pederson and Tone Sommerfelt contend that 
children in conflict-affected countries can be understood to occupy “three states”: “children may be 
in danger of getting involved, they may be in conflict, and they may occupy a post-conflict state” 
(2007, p. 253). The authors argue that each such state needs to be analysed separately, so that 
children become either “exposed” to violence or “participants” in violence. This thesis is primarily 
concerned with children and young people who “participate” in violence, but participation does not 
negate exposure, and, as Chapter 4 has demonstrated, exposure to violence can be an important 
determining factor for future aggressive behaviour.  
 Peterson and Sommerfelt quantify their argument by stating that children who are exposed 
or affected by conflict include those who live “in an area under occupation, where armed combat 
occurs or where the use of arms or the threat of use of arms disrupts normal provision of means of 
livelihood, health, security and/or other basic rights of the child” (p. 254). Likewise, it is argued here 
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 The concept of deviance is used here according to the definition put forward in section 4.3.1. 
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 See Chapter 2. 
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that children and young people who are affected by state fragility are equally those who feel the 
brunt of a lack of effective state services most strongly, where such services include healthcare, 
education, welfare, potable water, electricity, fuel, justice and security, so that the risk of exposure 
to social and political violence is greatly increased.  
 Peterson and Sommerfelt conclude that in countries where significant governance failures 
have occurred, it is relatively easy to determine the number of children and young people exposed 
to conflict (or, in this case, fragility). However, it is virtually impossible to know how many are 
participants in violence, precisely because their participation, as combatants, criminals or deviants, is 
deliberately concealed either by themselves or by the organisations and groups within which they 
are involved. Thus, “Children who participate” in conflict and violence “are considerably more 
difficult to study than those that are simply 'exposed'” to these phenomena, though both groups are 
equally vulnerable to the effects of conflict and fragility (p. 256). This only complicates the nature of 
the challenges faced by children and young people who participate in violence by leading to a lack of 
investigation into, and a lack of understanding of, their aggressive behaviour modes by academics, 
governments and development practitioners.  
 
6.5 The Situation of Children and Young People in Yemen 
 
Figure 71 Two Young Street Vendors, Sana'a City Centre 
 All of the conditions outlined that are faced by children and young people in conflict-
affected fragile states can be found in the Yemeni context. These impact the development of Yemeni 
children in multiple ways, which can be correlated with the criminological theories outlined in 
Chapter 4 and used to gain an insight into the patterns of violent young offending illustrated in 
Chapter 3. Children and young people in Yemen are at a heightened risk of malnutrition, starvation 
and premature death154. With an under-5 mortality rate of 69 deaths per 1000 people in 2008, the 
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most common causes of death among Yemeni children are: diarrhoea, contracted through the 
consumption of unsafe drinking water; exposure to common and often treatable communicable 
diseases; poor hygiene; bad eating habits; and, a number of other associated illnesses. 
 
Figure 72 World Health Organisation Yemen Health Profile Table of Under-5 Mortality Causes for 2011 
 As Figure 72, taken from the World Health Organisation's Yemen Health Profile for 2011, 
indicates, other causes of child mortality include conditions associated with bad birthing procedures, 
maternal malnutrition during pregnancy and poor living conditions. Abdulkarim Ismail Al-Arhabi, 
Mohamed Ahmed Al-Hawri and Abdulmajeed Al-Shaikh Ali Al-Batuly write that 53.1% of “under five 
children are dwarfed while 46% are underweight (mild and severe) and 12.4% are thin (severely 
underweight)” owing to severe malnutrition, whereby “These percentages increase in rural areas 
more than the urban ones” (2010, p. 26). They find that the “proportion of underweight under-5 
children in the poorest performing governorates” in Yemen reached 71% in Al-Dhaleah, was 64.4% in 
Amran and 63.4% in Al-Hodeidah in 2010, while even “the better performing governorates” of “Al-
Maharah (11.8%), Hajja (20.8%) and Aden (23.4%)” were not untouched by undernourishment (p. 6).  
 Young people are at risk of contracting sexually transmitted diseases, particularly in coastal 
areas where there is elevated population movement and migration. With the high stigmatisation of 
sexual activity and poor rates of sex education coverage on a national level, they are extremely 
unlikely to seek medical treatment if they are affected by such illnesses. Girls and boys who fall 
victim to sexual violence are also unlikely to seek any kind of medical or psychological assistance (as 
is made evident by Yemen's negligible rate of rape reporting155), resulting in a high probability of 
physical harm, prolonged depression and trauma among victims. 
 Other factors compound the effects of poverty, hunger and violence on children and young 
people in Yemen, compromising their healthy development.  These are made evident by Yemen's 
poor performance in the Human Development Index (see Table 12). 
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 See Annex 1: Yemen had a rate of 0.0038597 rapes recorded for every 1,000 people in 2005, which is 
extremely low, compared to other countries. 
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Indicator 2011 Value 
Expected years of schooling (of children under 7) 
(years) 
8.6 
Adult literacy rate, both sexes (% aged 15 and above) 62.4 
Mean years of schooling (of adults over 25) (years) 2.5 
Combined gross enrolment in education (both sexes) 
(%) 
54.4 
Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women aged 
15-19) 
78.8 
 
Table 12 Child Welfare and Development Indicators for Yemen 
While overall levels of student enrolment in schools in Yemen have increased dramatically over the 
past decade, owing, in part, to the reduction and even the eradication of school fees in some areas 
in 2006 (Ministry of Education et al, 2010); there remain real constraints inhibiting the long-term 
retention of school-aged children in education, so that adults above the age of 25 tend to have only 
completed 2.5 years of schooling on average within their lifetimes.  
 In 2011, despite the abolition of school fees “for girls attending grades 1-6 and boys in 
grades 1-3” (p. 3), the combined gross enrolment in education for both sexes stood at only 54.4%, 
with huge numbers of young women leaving school particularly after marriage or early pregnancy 
and many other children kept out of school due to the general insecurity brought about by the Arab 
Spring.  
 Adding to population growth, the high fertility rate among young girls and women 
contributes to resource competition and unemployment156, increasing the stresses of daily life for 
children and young people across Yemen. Growing pressure to secure income, nutrition and 
standing within communities leads not only to significant emotional pressure at a young age, but 
also to increased threat of exposure to violence and criminality. 
 In their comprehensive and multi-sectoral assessment of youth in Yemen, the Education 
Development Centre (EDC) of the United States Agency for International Development write that: 
“Youth violence is a growing problem in Yemen”, where “youth” are defined for the purposes of 
their survey as people between the ages of 15 and 25 (2008, p. 31). The EDC posit that a number of 
dynamics in Yemen, as identified by Yemeni youth themselves, have led to the mass radicalisation of 
young people, which can be understood as eleven interlinking phenomena. While these phenomena 
are frequently associated with political violence, they are nonetheless important for conceptualising 
the unique living conditions of children and young people in the country.  
 The EDC write that (1) poor family communication and high isolation within families is a 
strong precursor for violent behaviour in Yemen: “young people are under pressure because they 
feel their families and communities do not value and appreciate them, which leads to isolation. 
According to the participants, this pushes them to the streets where they mix with the 'wrong peers' 
and become vulnerable to recruitment by extremist groups” (p. 32). The effect of this absence of 
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positive home environments is compounded by (2) a general lack of safe spaces for social 
interaction, so that children and young people are at risk of social violence and other negative 
influences as soon as they are out on the streets. With a lack of community and leisure centres, 
there is nowhere else for young people to go. Displaced, runaway and homeless children are at a 
heightened risk of harm in this sense. 
 The lack of safe spaces for children and young people ties into another significant factor for 
youth frustration, which is (3) a general dissatisfaction with educational services and facilities 
resulting in an overall reluctance to go to school. It has been found by the EDC among others that 
there exists a significant discrepancy between education needs and education, whereby secondary 
school does not prepare students with the sufficient skills necessary to face common day-to-day 
challenges in life. This issue also emerged from interviews conducted with the Ministry of Education 
(17 August 2010) and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (15 August 2010), 
where it was noted that the Government of Yemen simply could not offer sufficiently appealing 
working conditions to attract high calibre graduates to teaching in schools, so that teachers, in 
practice, represented the least qualified school-finishers of Yemeni society. The lack of commitment 
and dedication of educational staff to their students was considered by key stakeholders to be a 
priority factor behind Yemen's extremely poor student retention rates, so that many children and 
young people no longer see participation in school to be conducive towards future career 
enhancement. 
 Of greater concern here are (4) the high levels of violence in schools reported by the EDC 
between students and between students and teachers, as identified by young people themselves. 
This speaks to both the high level of student dissatisfaction with educational environments and the 
overall socialisation of young people to violence. Such socialisation, young people implied, occurred 
through their interaction with several crucial social dynamics in their communities: (5) the 
idealisation of aggressive behaviour models through popular media; (6) uneven access to political 
representation and the mainstream political sphere; (7) perceived international, regional and 
national injustices that marginalise religious groupings; and, (8) the pervasiveness of religious 
extremists and manipulative political parties or tribal leaders in positions of high social influence. It is 
particularly interesting to note that the idealisation of violence, as combined with a lack of effective 
avenues for interaction with the state, have been identified as central themes of aggression by 
children and young people in Yemen, supporting the hypothesis of this thesis157.  
 The marginalisation of young people from political processes, as combined with broad social 
inequalities, makes them prime targets for recruitment by violent social groups, including insurgents, 
terrorists and criminal organisations. These social factors are aggravated, according to young people 
themselves, by economic stresses that include: (9) low access to financial resources, including 
employment opportunities, lending agencies and social welfare funds; and, (10) inflation, including 
escalating wedding and dowry prices. Solutions to the violence and heightened aggression 
generated by these dynamics have also proven to be ineffectual, with young people citing the final 
contributor to their violent behaviour as being (11) an interaction with prison environments, 
whereby young offenders are integrated with political extremists in prison communities. This last 
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point formed a priority for analysis in Chapter 5, emerging as it did as a secondary effect of criminal 
behaviour and punitive interventions. 
 
6.6 Violent Young Offending in Fragile States 
 As the 2011 World Development Report summarises, there are many overlaps between the 
causes of violence and the causes of conflict: “Internal causes of conflict arise from political, security, 
and economic dynamics”, and “it is difficult to disentangle causes and effects of violence”. Key 
factors such as “Lower GDP per capita”, “youth violence”, “political exclusion” and a need to feel 
“more secure and powerful” are “robustly associated with both large-scale political conflict and high 
rates of homicide” (p. 6). Each of these factors is necessarily present in fragile states, where many 
countries experience the significant victimisation of children and young people who tend to be 
isolated from political processes and social services alike, so that young people begin to emerge as 
both the victims and perpetrators of violent crime.  
 Mapping these points against each other, along with theories of crime and conflict, 
important socio-economic and political risk factors of state fragility begin to emerge (see Figure 73). 
 
Figure 73 Causes of Crime Versus Causes of Conflict in Fragile States 
 It becomes apparent that certain defining features of fragility emerge as predictors for 
violent criminal behaviour among children and young people, with key cross-over points including 
economic stress factors and socialisation to violence. Issues of social and physical disorder, as 
associated with property damage and degradation, weapons and narcotics proliferation, poverty and 
ineffective policing all seem to be especially important in this sense, and ought to be prioritised by 
any relevant interventions that seek to reduce youth aggression.  
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 As these conditions offer merely a list of relevant indicators, rather than a coherent 
theoretical framework, they remain somewhat unsatisfying as an academic answer to the problem 
of youth violence in fragile states. It seems that they offer more of an end snapshot of the conditions 
that result after social degradation has taken place, as opposed to revealing the process through 
which such degradation occurs and impacts child development.  
 There is a need to conduct a two-part analysis, which seeks to understand why children and 
young people resort to apolitical violence in Yemen in the first instance and whether or not this 
same explanation can be applied to all fragile states in the second instance.  
 In an attempt to address these issues and to prioritise emerging dynamics effectively, Table 
13 maps theories of crime and fragility against the priority indicators for aggressive behaviour 
identified by young Yemeni people in the United States Agency for International Development's 
Education Development Centre (EDC) survey. It lists a number of socio-economic and political 
dynamics identified as relevant by development practitioners and criminologists for understanding 
the propensity for states to display characteristics of fragility or high criminal violence (explored in 
Chapters 4 and 6). It seeks to identify which of these dynamics are equally important for producing 
state fragility and high levels of criminal activity, but also, which of these are furthermore prioritised 
by Yemeni young people as challenges that have led them to adopt aggressive behaviour patterns 
when overcoming the obstacles in their own lives.  
Socio-economic or 
political dynamic 
Is it a defining 
feature of state 
fragility? 
Is it prioritised by 
criminological 
theory? 
Is it identified by 
Yemeni young 
people as a cause of 
violence? 
Poverty √Yes √Yes √Yes 
Unemployment xNo √Yes √Yes 
An absence of security 
and a lack of 
government control 
over legitimate violence 
√Yes xNo xNo 
A lack of state 
administrative capacity 
and service delivery 
√Yes xNo √Yes 
Political instability √Yes xNo √Yes 
Repressive polities, 
lack of political 
representation, loss of 
state legitimacy 
√Yes It is prioritised by 
theories of legitimacy 
and cooperation 
√Yes 
Poor family 
communication 
xNo √Yes √Yes 
A lack of safe spaces 
for children and young 
people, association with 
social deviants 
This is a defining 
feature of conflict-
affected fragile states 
more specifically 
√Yes √Yes 
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Poor education services √Yes √Yes √Yes 
Socialisation to 
violence, idealisation of 
aggressive behaviour 
No, though it is often an 
implied feature of 
fragility and is a 
defining feature of 
conflict-affected fragile 
states 
√Yes √Yes 
Weapons and narcotics 
proliferation 
√Yes √Yes xNo 
Ineffective or 
illegitimate policing 
and judicial services 
√Yes √Yes xNo 
Social isolation of 
young people 
xNo √Yes √Yes 
 
Table 13 Important Criminological Dynamics in Fragile States 
Those dynamics that are identified in all three categories are those to be prioritised by any 
emerging analytical framework of violent young offending in fragile states or, at the very least, being 
classed as important in all three areas, warrant further investigation. While only suggestive in 
nature, the findings of this analysis help to open up the debate on the relationship between state 
fragility and violent crime, allowing those interested in international development to consider the 
causes and consequences of youth violence and aggression without having to work exclusively 
within the over-analysed framework of youth radicalisation. The problem of youth violence can be 
considered within its social, cultural, criminal and economic context, rather than from the purely 
political focus that seems to have been adopted by the international development sector. 
 It has been found here that: poverty; repressive polities and a loss of state legitimacy; a lack 
of safe spaces for children and young people; poor education services; and, socialisation to violence, 
are cross-cutting themes that are generally associated with a rejection of social norms and increased 
violence and hostility in Yemen. However, are these factors sufficiently important to play a part in 
generating aggression in other fragile states? Poverty seems here to be a particularly prominent 
indicator, but while the community-based risk factors outlined in Chapter 4 imply that a high 
prevalence of poor people can elevate crime rates – economic and labour market risk factors would 
indicate that the relationship between poverty and crime should not necessarily be considered to be 
so straight forward.  
 Indeed, although the findings of this thesis are based predominantly theoretical rather than 
statistical research, and though its claims are therefore intended to be read as suggestive, rather 
than empirical, a comparative analysis of global development and homicide statistics shifts the 
priorities established in Table 13 in order to corroborate the behaviour anticipated by criminological 
theory in this sense on a global level. If, therefore, the world's countries are listed according to their 
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) values, as listed in the Human Development Index for 2011, no 
clear correlation between poverty as defined by the international community and homicide rates 
emerges (see Figure 74). 
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Figure 74 Countries Listed According to Their Multidimensional Poverty Index Value 
This may be because countries in the developed world are not given an MPI rating, whereas within 
the developing world, fluctuating rates of poverty that are already comparatively quite high are not 
sufficient to generate large fluctuations in rates of homicide.  
 A different story begins to emerge, however, when states are listed according to their GDP 
per capita in purchasing power parity (see Figure 75). 
 
Figure 75 Countries Listed According to Their GDP per Capita in Purchasing Power Parity 
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Here, while countries with high levels of gang violence generated by international narcotics 
smuggling rings and organised crime networks represent high peaks in homicide rates, as evidenced 
in the cases of Colombia, Mexico and the Russian Federation, there is an overall mild rate of increase 
in murders as correlated with a decrease in GDP values. Also of interest is that this increase in 
homicide seems to be correlated with incidents of income inequality, so that the homicide trend line 
exhibited follows the same peaks and dips as the trend line indicating national percentages of loss of 
income due to inequality (see Figure 75). This finding is interesting as it supports economic social 
opportunity theories158, which are used to argue that crime emerges as a reaction to blocked social 
and economic opportunities.  
 Other poverty indicators, like a decrease in national gross rates of enrolment in education 
for both sexes, are associated with an increase in homicide rates, which is fairly interesting given the 
picture painted by Table 13, which lists poor education services and a lack of safe spaces for children 
and young people as important indicators for youth aggression. Thus, while criminological theories 
pertaining to the behaviour of school-aged children tend to be overly concerned with school 
environments to acknowledge the influences of state fragility, social control theories might argue 
that the lack of social involvement generated by children being left out of education, along with the 
alienation of young people from their schools and homes, diminishes their sense of attachment to, 
and involvement in, communities.  
 School-based criminogenic risk factors159 can be used to argue that those children who do 
attend school are affected by an absence of positive school-to-student bonds, which are undermined 
by poor teacher training and violence between students and teachers160.  
 The influence of these trends becomes more obvious when countries are listed according to 
their rates of income inequality (see Figure 76). The higher the levels of socio-economic inequality, 
the higher the probability of violent offending, where the global correlation is weak but present. 
While poverty emerges as an important global trend associated with violent crime, economic 
disparity and inequality at a national level, as combined with other broad social inequalities, seem to 
be more important promoters of criminal violence and aggression among children and young 
people. 
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 Likewise, the family-based risk factors pertaining to delinquency and youth violence that were detailed in 
Chapter 4 indicate that an absence of child attachment to positive adult role models may also lead to inhibited 
socialisation or a lack of acceptance of social norms, values and beliefs, leading to an increased rate of young 
offending. In Yemen, however, where religious value systems are extremely prominent, leading to a 
demonisation of theft and other property offences, it makes sense that child rebellion against social and state 
rules might take on more overtly violent forms, particularly when social learning theories are considered in 
light of Yemen's emerging culture of violence. 
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Figure 76 Countries Listed According to Income Inequality 
 This seems to hold true at the national level in Yemen, where violent crime is positively 
associated with impoverished governorates, and particularly so in Northern areas where 
communities perceive their state as exercising a high level of religious discrimination against them.  
 There are potentially important lessons to be drawn here from theories of legitimacy and 
cooperation, where violent crime is positively correlated with geographic areas where government 
legitimacy is perceived as being low due to discriminatory policies and a lack of integration and 
representation of diverse cultural and religious groupings within mainstream political processes (see 
Figure 77). 
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Figure 77 Map of Reported Violent Crime in Yemen for 2009. 
 These findings also seem to hold true at a global level, so that it is not entirely unreasonable 
that the prevalence of income inequality, and other forms of social injustice, are likely to be key 
determining factors for criminal behaviour in fragile states. Yemen's national statistics in this sense 
confirm another finding from the Table 13, where a socialisation to violence was identified as an 
implied feature of fragility, a priority for Yemeni youth, and a key influence within criminological 
theory: those governorates in Yemen that are found to be the most affected by violent offending are 
also those that have been exposed to protracted conflict, where the continual exposure of children 
and young people to political violence seems to make them more likely to adopt modes of behaviour 
that are either criminally or mindlessly violent. 
 From a criminological perspective, the high prevalence of income inequality and physical 
violence in fragile states (if they are impacting the rate of violent young offending within these 
countries) must be adding to rates of physical and psychological stress for young people by 
increasing the level of everyday obstacles that they face to achieving their social and economic 
goals, and by diminishing their stake in society and social conformity161, where social conformity 
implies an acceptance of socio-economic inequality. This argument is supported by strain theory, 
which views crime as a reaction to emerging gaps between social ambitions and social capacity.  
 It can be speculated that the importance of these stress factors must increase with state 
fragility, whereby the general lack of support structures, socialising activities and social services 
made available to children and young people undermines their ability to deal with and move past 
the pressures of facing daily socio-economic barriers to their integration within community, tribal, 
economic and national hierarchies. These priority areas are highlighted by the selection by Yemeni 
young people of poverty and the payment of important socio-cultural expenses like dowries and 
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weddings as primary factors leading to their increased stress and violence. They indicate that 
children and young people in Yemen have a strong desire to be integrated into mainstream social 
and communal structures, to start families, and to succeed economically, but that the lack of 
avenues for them to do so legitimately is generating a sense of hostility towards the norms of 
Yemeni society, raising frustrations that are likely to accumulate and erupt through violent means of 
self-expression. 
 It is posited that, as children and young people are isolated from social activities like 
employment and education, and placed at the bottom of the country's income generating 
population (children, young people and university graduates in Yemen show the highest combined 
levels of unemployment in the country), their aggression and propensity to commit violence 
naturally increases.  
 Those children and young people who are able to secure livelihood opportunities in Yemen, 
meanwhile, face continual fears of losing such income, as well as poor working conditions and a lack 
of income stability. Most do not pay income tax and are employed in businesses that are 
deliberately hidden from the state, as has been confirmed in interviews conducted with both the 
Yemeni Ministry of Social and Labour Affairs (August 16th, 2010) and the International Labour 
Organisation (August 15th, 2010), so that young people are generally extremely limited when 
accessing official sources of assistance if they are mistreated at work. 
 
Figure 78 Young Yemeni Merchant, Sana'a City Centre 
 Added to this is the stress of continual exposure to violence or the threat of violence that 
many Yemeni young people face at home, on the street and in schools, and as a result of either 
social, criminal or political risk factors.  To understand this as a linear process correlated with the 
degree of state fragility, it is suggested that it might be more conceptually helpful to visualise 
violence committed by children and young people as being the product of a build-up of aggression 
and frustration over time. Within the context of Yemen, the socio-economic and political conditions 
generated by state fragility place young people under enormous psychological and physical pressure 
to survive in the first instance (depending on their location and social identity) and to achieve some 
sort of income and sense of social standing in the second.  
226 
 
 Combined with a general lack of public safety and safe public spaces for children and young 
people, it is suggested that these issues can lead to growing psychological fatigue, depression or 
irritability, with aggression and violence increasing as natural bi-products of these conditions. In 
Yemen, the pressures generated by each of these social and economic dimensions are aggravated by 
cultural, religious and tribal factors, where the constraints of tribal and religious valuation systems 
prevent young people from committing petty theft and property-related offences while also creating 
very high social pressures to conform to particular cultural standards – like owning land or paying 
high dowry prices – which are simply beyond the reach of the country's poor. Meanwhile, tribal 
affiliations and cultural principles have led to a gradual rejection of state services, state 
representatives and state bodies of law enforcement, leading to a lack of access by young people to 
the state, and by the state to young people.  
 While the economic and social pressures experienced by young people in Yemen are likely to 
be translatable to other fragile states, it is not immediately evident to what extent these cultural 
aspects are equally universal, and to what extent they are central to elevating youth aggression 
beyond safety limits in Yemen specifically. This one point of contention could bar the formation of a 
unifying theory of violent young offending in fragile states or, rather, it could mean that any unifying 
theory would always have to be catered to local environments when applied to new cultural settings 
(though universal trends would remain important). The analysis carried out thus far indicates that 
key cross-over points between criminological theories and development literature contain pertinent 
observations about the way in which state fragility impacts violent young offending, generating 
exportable conclusions.  
 To return to Michael Anderson and Magui Moreno Torres' reading of the dimensions of state 
development: state fragility is frequently understood to be a measure of a lack of institutional 
capacity and a lack of political willpower to reform state infrastructure and governmental 
representativeness. While it has been found that a lack of institutional capacity is a key element for 
increasing psychosocial pressure on young people, it is a lack of visible or perceived political 
willpower to reform and improve service provision by the state that seems to have emerged as a 
crucial cause of frustration among children and young people in Yemen, culminating in their violent 
rejection of the ruling regime during the Arab Spring of 2011. This has meant that even peaceful 
protest organisers have been unable to keep young people from venting their frustrations through 
violent forms of expression that include criminal violence, as emerged from interviews with Husam 
Al-Sharjabi in 2012.  
 At a fundamental level, fragile states are defined as those that do not hold a monopoly over 
legitimate violence and have only loose territorial control over their countries. It can argued that, 
while the Yemeni state retained some element of authority prior to 2011, its general inability to 
distribute services and resources evenly across the country led to calls for political reform, 
heightened national hostility and radicalisation, and a deterioration of the security situation and the 
further collapse of state capacities that resulted from the diversion of funding towards military 
expenses.  
 The dissatisfaction of Yemeni children and young people with this status quo and with the 
continual disintegration of the security situation is made evident by their identification of uneven 
access to political processes and repressive political procedures as a main cause of their increased 
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aggression. While the violent criminal behaviour analysed in this thesis can be referred to as 
“mindless” violence, that is – violence committed, for the most part, without a clear political or 
economic objective, violent young offending in Yemen can nonetheless be read as the product of 
political risk factors and the stagnation of political deadlocks, whose lack of effective resolution has 
led to significant levels of general frustration, stress and aggression among children and young 
people. Due to the definitional parameters of state fragility, where state fragility is read by Frances 
Stewart and Graham Brown (2010) as a cross-over of legitimacy, authority and services failures, 
similar challenges are likely to abound across other least developed contexts, where apolitical 
violence may occasionally require political solutions, with a strengthening of state capacity and a 
widening of state service delivery being potentially vital to reducing criminal violence162.  
 Due to a lack of authority generation by fragile states, least developed countries face a 
gradual breakdown of their security situations, particularly where conflict is a factor, paving the road 
for criminal opportunists and aggressive movements to take hold and increase general levels of 
violence. Widespread violence not only results in the closure of social services, but also in 
diminished access and accessibility of important institutions, including educational facilities and 
healthcare centres. Basic security is necessary to ensure all other state functions163. The more 
violence increases, the more state capacities are affected and weathered away by insecurity.   
 As the security situation and the capacity of the state deteriorates, socio-economic 
pressures on young people begin to accumulate, as aggravated by the overall stresses of continual 
exposure to multilevel violence, leading to a gradual build-up in youth aggression, aggravated by a 
lack of socialising activities like education or gainful employment (see Figure 79).   
 
Figure 79 State Fragility and Youth Aggression 
 Frances Stewart notes that existing theories of conflict causation state that “social stability is 
based on a hypothetical social contract between the people and the government”, whereby “People 
accept state authority so long as the state delivers services and provides reasonable economic 
conditions”. With clear links to theories of legitimacy and cooperation within criminology, as well as 
theories of socialisation and social learning, Stewart explains that as “economic stagnation or 
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decline” increases and state services worsen, “the social contract breaks down, and violence results” 
(2002, p.343). What is more apparent now is that it is not necessary for such violence to be of a 
political character, so discussions of youth radicalisation can obscure a much wider problem where 
violence resulting from political crises is not always linked to social causes but can be far more 
mindless, spontaneous and unpredictable in nature. The challenge of youth violence, particularly 
when it emerges as criminal violence without a clear political objective, is likely to outlive the social 
causes that generated increased insecurity in the first place. 
 To contrast these findings against the original theoretical dimensions identified as part of 
the hypothesis, it is now possible to see how, while many of these observations remain important, 
some require amendment or re-prioritisation. It was anticipated that a theory of violent young 
offending in fragile states would end up focusing on: (1) pervasive violence, (2) a breakdown of 
governmental legitimacy, and (3) an erosion of traditional norms of socialisation, with (4) the 
distribution of weapons and narcotics emerging as a potential supplementary condition for violent 
activity. It is now argued that (4) is an aggravating risk factor, which likely increases the severity of 
criminal violence in fragile states but is not in itself a cause of violent young offending within such 
contexts.  
 The three remaining dimensions are still very pertinent, though it has become possible as a 
result of the research initiative to form a clearer understanding of their interactions. Upon re-
evaluation of criminological and development literature, it is now argued that (1) the absence of 
state services, legitimate opportunities and socialising activities for young people in fragile states, 
along with (2) their exposure to significant levels of violence, produces (3) extreme economic, 
psychological and socio-cultural stresses that lead to their increased aggression and (4) rejection of 
state legitimacy, combine to raise the likelihood of violent young offending in Yemen and other 
fragile states.  
 Included in the absence of state services and legitimate opportunities are a lack of good 
quality primary, secondary and higher level education facilities, as well as a lack of employment 
pathways, leading to diminished processes of socialisation and the erosion of corresponding social 
control mechanisms, whereby young people do not feel that they are involved or have a stake in 
mainstream society, and do not develop important connections that generate empathy with their 
fellow citizens. Meanwhile, exposure to violence incorporates both the stress factors associated with 
a perpetual fear for personal safety as well as a diminished sensitivity to the shock value of strong 
violence, so that violence against others becomes an almost acceptable behavioural norm. This re-
assessment and the dimensions it comprises forms the theoretical framework of violent young 
offending in fragile states for this thesis, which is informed more specifically by the Yemeni case 
study164. 
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 The extent to which this framework is applicable to all fragile states, not just to Yemen, is an issue that will 
be further debated in Chapter 8. 
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6.7 Peripheral Causes of Criminality in Fragile States 
 Peripheral causes165 of violent young offending in Yemen and other fragile states are taken 
to refer to aggravating risk factors that are likely to increase rather than trigger youth aggression 
(see Figure 80). 
 
Figure 80 Central and Peripheral Causes of Criminality and Violent Young Offending in Fragile States 
This section will look at each of these influences in more detail, grouping them together thematically 
within its overview. Social isolation, lack of effective family communication and unemployment will 
be grouped together under the umbrella category of “youth isolation”, pertaining as they do to a 
lack of effective integration of young people within society. Violence escalation, lack of stigma 
associated with violence and gender-based violence, weapons proliferation and imprisonment will 
be addressed under the category of “violent socialisation”. Poor administrative capacity, illegitimate 
or ineffective law enforcement systems, and substance abuse will be analysed as aspects of “weak 
state infrastructures”. Adding to the list of indicators provided in Chapter 4, each of these should be 
read as criminogenic risk factors that emerge specifically from the context of state fragility.  
 
6.7.1 Youth Isolation 
 Three risk factors identified in section 6.6 (Table 13) but not prioritised within the 
framework include; social isolation, lack of effective family communication and unemployment. All 
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 While the previous section sought to prioritise facets of crime causation in fragile states as a process, this 
section is more interested in resulting criminogenic risk factors that can be extrapolated from the 
criminological literature surveyed in Chapter 4 and adapted to Yemen and other fragile state contexts. The 
theory outlined in section 6.6 has been deliberately selective in its analysis in order to understand socio-
economic pressures to offend and their linkages to international development. As such, it has prioritised key 
criminogenic conditions above other peripheral dynamics that also acts as contributors to criminal 
environments. Thus, the framework should be read as a causal analysis, rather than as an exhaustive list of 
criminogenic influences. 
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three of these influences diminish the effectiveness of the four elements of social control outlined in 
section 4.3.1, in that each of these contributes to the isolation of children and young people from 
community, social, economic and cultural life in fragile states. It has been found within the Yemeni 
case study, as summarised by Kate Nevens, Middle East and North Africa Programme Manager for 
Chatham House, that “there is no access for young people” to community or tribal decision-making 
processes, which are left to the administration of community elders (Interview conducted 29 
February, 2012). Likewise, there has been very little access to political processes offered to young 
people within traditional Yemeni political systems, a trend that is likely to continue even after the 
strong involvement of young people within the Arab Spring in 2011.  
 Combined with a lack of employment opportunities in the country, this means that 
development conditions in Yemen are geared towards inhibiting the attachment, commitment and 
involvement of young people to society, under a social control model of criminological theory. When 
the lack of family communication highlighted by Yemeni youth is taken into account, it is also 
suspected that belief-based systems of crime control may be undermined. While family, educational, 
state and tribal involvement in the lives of children and young people are relatively low in Yemen, 
the strong commitment of young people to religious principles and conceptions of morality likely 
serve to mitigate the absence of other belief-based mechanisms for instilling social constructions of 
right and wrong, compensating for this last aspect of youth isolation within Yemeni homes. 
However, due to the integration of religious and tribal systems of valuation in Yemen, these belief 
systems are not necessarily used to prioritise violence reduction, being focused more prominently 
upon other behavioural norms. This has led to an acceptance of certain forms of violent behaviour 
within Yemeni society in particular166.  
 These distinctions may speak to the uniqueness of the Yemeni context, but the high 
prevalence of youth isolation, particularly in work environments and homes, is a criminogenic risk 
factor that is likely to be present in all fragile states, due to the very nature of the conditions that 
generate state fragility.  
 
6.7.2 Violent Socialisation 
 Violence escalation, a lack of stigma associated with violence and gender-based violence, 
weapons proliferation and imprisonment are a very diverse set of indicators that seem to impact the 
probability of violent young offending in fragile states as part of the broader background of the 
socialisation of children and young people to violence and violent modes of behaviour. These risk 
factors influence the propensity of young people to commit violence in many ways, some of which 
have already been discussed in sections 3.1 and 3.9, which dealt with the effect of the proliferation 
of small arms and other criminogenic commodities on Yemen; sections 2.4, 3.5 and 3.7, which have 
tracked the escalation of criminal and political violence in Yemen since its formation in 1990; 
sections 3.8 and 4.2.3, which have addressed the vulnerability of women to violence in Yemen and 
the social acceptance of gender-based violence in many fragile state cultures; and section 4.2.6, 
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which has considered the theoretical impact of imprisonment on minors as well as the actual 
criminogenic impact of imprisonment on young people in Yemen167.  
 While these issues have been dealt with separately throughout this thesis due to their 
overlap with other thematic areas, they also combine and interact with one another in such a way 
that significantly increases the daily exposure to violence and acceptance of violent behaviour for 
children and young people.  
 From a social learning perspective, young people in Yemen are pressured through an 
interaction of these conditions from an early age to accept violence as a normative reality of Yemeni 
society, while imprisonment serves to radically accelerate this process of socialisation to violence. 
Although some of the risk factors associated with each of these elements can be argued to be 
culturally or historically specific to the Yemeni context, if only conflict-affected fragile states are 
considered within an analysis of the interaction between criminological and international 
development literature, then these conditions become fairly easily translatable to many other least 
developed countries. 
 One rogue element within these observations is the severe gender inequality evidenced by 
Yemen, which significantly increases the likelihood of gender-based violence, as well as the social 
acceptance of violence against women. Owing to the extreme vulnerability of women in times of 
conflict, particularly so when state fragility results in an absence of services for their protection, 
similar conditions are likely to impact the way in which young people perceive the acceptability of 
violence in multiple contexts.  
 
6.7.3 State Infrastructural Weakness 
 The conditions associated with infrastructural weakness as a pre-requisite of state fragility 
have a vast criminogenic impact, which is made visible within the interaction of three specific risk 
factors: poor administrative capacity; illegitimate or ineffective systems of crime control and law 
enforcement; and, increased smuggling and proliferation of criminogenic commodities that include 
licit and illicit substances168.  
 Important criminogenic risk factors to emerge from the interaction of these weaknesses 
with Yemen's lack of administrative capacity are the extremely low rate of crime detection and 
citizen welfare monitoring capabilities of the Yemeni state. Researchers are currently extremely 
limited by the poor availability of data on criminal offences, on breakdowns of offending patterns, 
and on identities of offenders. It is also extremely difficult to gain access to young people in custody 
in order to develop a fuller picture of their backgrounds, characteristics and motivations. Likewise, it 
is difficult to paint an accurate portrait of the “typical” Yemeni victim of crime.  
 These limitations impact the criminological environment in Yemen by creating dangerous 
gaps in information, which have led to poor awareness of the problem of violent offending and a 
reluctance to engage with this challenge on the part of the Yemeni state, the international 
community and influential humanitarian assistance and development aid donors. There is therefore 
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also a severe gap in the availability of information to do with welfare needs associated with the 
conditions generated by criminality in Yemen and other fragile states. This lack of information and 
resulting lack of state capacity for intervention, both of which stem from administrative and 
infrastructural weakness, compound the challenges associated with youth isolation within fragile 
state-based societies169.  
 It can be argued that, while all criminal activity is difficult to analyse because crime is 
generally intended to be hidden from external observers, crime in fragile states is even less visible 
than crime in developed countries. This is an extremely dangerous observation. Criminogenic risk 
factors that have been identified through decades of advancement in criminological theory within 
the developed world are noted to be significantly more prevalent in most cases within fragile states. 
In particular, fragile states, through their weak capacity to patrol borders, their high incidence rate 
of institutional corruption, and their low law-enforcement capabilities, tend to be particularly 
vulnerable to the proliferation of criminogenic commodities. These commodities include weapons 
and narcotics which, as the Yemeni case study has demonstrated, can also be entirely legal and 
socially acceptable. Due to the inability of researchers to gain sufficient information upon their 
availability, usage and effect on consumers, it is not possible to fully establish their impact upon the 
welfare of children and young people, so that it is also not possible to identify high priority cases for 
future violent behaviour.  
 
6.8 Conclusion 
 Upon a close evaluation of criminological and development theory, it has become evident 
that criminological literature can prove extremely useful for understanding the socio-economic living 
conditions of fragile states and their impact on children and young people. However, crime 
causation theory that has emerged from the developed world fails to take into account the pervasive 
and widespread nature of criminogenic risk factors in fragile states, with an under-appreciation for 
the huge psychosocial stresses that they produce for children and young people. Social control 
theories, therefore, tend to prove more informative when analysing fragile states, particularly 
because fragile states, which show a much higher rate of criminal behaviour, also show a diminished 
availability of socialising activities. Ultimately, it is only through an integration with development and 
fragility literature that these theories truly become applicable to the context.  
 Through detailed case studies of fragile states, it is possible to use the predictions contained 
in all of these theories to produce more informed assessments of the pressures faced by children 
and young people within such contexts. It is worth noting that neither set of theories alone is able to 
produce an effective portrait of violent young offending in fragile states, while many questions 
about the implications of the theoretical framework developed within this thesis remain 
unanswered. In particular, while it is evident that psychosocial and economic stress factors lead to 
heightened aggression within children and young people in the short term, further research is 
required to determine the long term effects of the continuing social pressures associated with state 
fragility on the cognitive development of young Yemenis as they progress into adulthood. Likewise, it 
remains unclear to what extent cultural, religious and tribal dynamics that are unique to Yemen may 
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inhibit the extraction of state-fragility-based generalisations in the study of criminal behaviour. 
These two questions will form an important theme in remaining chapters, which will analyse 
alternative ways in which Yemen has chosen and may yet in future choose to respond to the 
problem of violent young offending from a state-based, tribal and religious perspective. 
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Chapter 7: Current and Recommended Pathways for the Improvement 
of Crime Prevention and Social Control in Yemen 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 The theory of violent young offending in fragile states put forward in Chapter 6 suggests that 
heightened levels of psychosocial and economic pressure are placed upon children and young 
people in Yemen, which act as a primary cause of increased aggression and violent criminal 
behaviour. The overlap of theories and understandings showcased in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 also 
suggest that, without adequate intervention or offender reintegration into society, such patterns of 
violent behaviour risk continuing into adulthood or escalating in severity, as evidenced by the high 
rate of serious violent offences like murder and attempted murder committed by young people in 
Yemen and in other fragile states. It is clear from the theoretical implications of Chapters 4 and 6 
that while such interventions may stem from law enforcement and judicial services, there is an 
urgent need to build capacity in these areas, as well as to look to other social control systems, in 
order to improve the situation. 
 In particular, as explicitly stated in this thesis' theory of violent young offending and 
implicitly evident from the challenges of poor governance and weak institutional capacity that are 
rooted in the very analytical framework of state fragility: deteriorations of state authority and state 
legitimacy are key factors in determining the propensity for criminal behaviour among communities 
and individuals. From a crime causation and social control perspective, as informed by criminological 
theory, two aspects of fragility are particularly important here, specifically as they relate to the 
relationship between the citizen and the state. One is to do with the relevance of the state for its 
citizens, whereby individuals will have little positive relationship with their government if they are 
not provided with state services, cannot access relevant infrastructures, or are not protected by the 
state's authority. The other is to do with the state's ability to maintain the rule of law and procedural 
fairness, particularly in judicial processes. Beyond this, however, where the state encounters serious 
structural challenges to fulfilling these roles, there is a need to provide citizens and young people 
especially with a conduit through which to vent their grievances, where a degree of political 
integration or participation in community-level decision-making processes is essential to restoring 
positive relationships between states and their citizens. These need necessarily to show citizens that 
their views have an impact on policy making, even if such policy is not always effectively 
implemented. 
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Figure 81 A Balanced Way Forward For The Yemeni State 
 Four pathways for reducing violent criminal tendencies among children and young people in 
Yemen can be identified. These include: providing access to state services for young people and 
raising awareness of these services, even where young people may choose not to use them; 
providing avenues for political participation to young people in both local and national governance; 
creating a system of community policing that is relevant to community values and respectful of 
community structures; and, prioritising visible anti-corruption strategies within police and judicial 
services while ensuring that young people have recourse to protection from community leaders if 
they are threatened or mistreated by them.  
 
7.2 Implications and Recommendations for Alternative Systems of Social 
Control 
 Judicial services, as well as formal and informal methods of law enforcement, are not the 
only tools at society's disposal for reducing rates of violence and violent offending170. Patterns of 
crime across the world can be heavily influenced by the characteristics of local employment and 
education sectors, the effectiveness of social welfare and psychosocial support structures, and the 
prevalence of community-building, leisure and recreation activities, linked to community centres and 
sports clubs, for instance. These systems of social control operate on a principle of decreasing social 
deviance by increasing the engagement of community members in society, thereby increasing their 
stake in social compliance. Related efforts offer “simple solutions” to the problem of crime. 
However, these solutions can also prove extremely costly. It is not sufficient to provide everybody 
with employment and education to generate social cohesion – such education must be perceived to 
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be beneficial by those who undertake it, while employment must incorporate the potential for 
career advancement and pay equality171.  
  
7.2.1 Education and Employment 
 The limitations of the education and employment sectors in Yemen are outlined in Chapters 
2, 4 and 6. The registration and retention of school-aged children in primary and secondary 
education is extremely low in Yemen, and especially so within rural communities. There is also a high 
discrepancy between male and female registration in education, though both groups are adversely 
affected by poverty and entrenched gender roles, where boys and girls have been found to be 
responsible for a number of tasks outside of school (e.g. earning money, looking after younger 
siblings or assisting their families). These keep them from completing even elementary studies. In 
October 2011, the Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) reported that: “With poverty 
being a key factor in child labour in Yemen, many more families are sending their children to work to 
boost family income amid increasing food prices caused by the unrest”172.  
 Equally important is the reality that many children and young people in Yemen do not 
associate education with long-term gains or career progression, a development that is most likely 
associated with the high unemployment percentage among university graduates in the country, the 
poor training and capacity of educators, and the absence of effective relationships between students 
and their teachers (Stakeholder Consultation, Ministry of Education, 17 August, 2010).  
 In an article by Jeffrey Fleishman, Salah Rashed Alhanshali, a former public school principal, 
is cited as summarising that in Yemeni schools:  
Students are learning, but their minds don't change … They graduate with a little 
knowledge, but they don't aspire to be scientists. They yearn to be tribal sheiks. It's the 
stigma of our history. Teachers are belittled and scrimp by, and students who want to 
succeed are discouraged by nepotism and corruption. (2009) 
The low operational budget of the Ministry of Education has been cited by the Ministry as a key 
reason for this emerging contempt for teachers (Stakeholder Consultation, 17th of August 2010). A 
lack of capacity to offer competitive salaries has led to a governmental inability to attract and retain 
qualified teaching personnel in the sector. Only the lowest scoring school and university graduates 
tend to investigate teaching as a viable career pathway. Most receive little to no training prior to 
taking on the role, and programmes like Britain's “Teach First” (that aim to place “exceptional” 
graduates in “challenging” or impoverished school environments by offering incentives) are deemed 
to be unrealistic in Yemen's case, where a complete overhaul of primary, secondary and higher 
education is urgently needed. Within this context, it is difficult to talk about early warning systems 
for young offending.  
 Priorities for school reform in Yemen among both the Ministry of Education and the 
international community have included outreach and advertising aimed at getting children back into 
schools, as well as capacity building, which has been slow to trickle down from a policy to a grass-
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roots level, or from the centre of Yemen to the peripheries. “Decentralisation” has been a popular 
buzz word among the international community in this sense (United Nations Capital Development 
Fund, 2008). It aims to provide an effective solution to the bureaucratic stalling of governance and 
service reform.  
In light of Yemen's weak infrastructure and violent history, it is difficult to see how 
decentralisation might be successfully implemented without first establishing some degree of 
centralisation in the Yemeni Government. In any event, these reforms have side-stepped the debate 
as to whether or not schools should also be seen as hubs for further potential socialising clubs and 
activities. With teachers earning only minimum salaries, and students staying in their class rooms 
only for a bare minimum of time, there has been little to no discussion of the potential for after-
school programmes, community-building events, or projects aimed at fostering team-building or 
creativity within the education sector.  
 An integration of international development and criminological literature in Yemen also 
indicates that measures to be taken in fragile states in order to increase the socialisation of children 
and young people need to look holistically at homes, schools, jobs and community environments. 
Large-scale interventions of the type needed in this instance may be infeasible in fragile contexts 
due to the limits of international aid delivered to affected countries. “When measured in terms of 
aid per capita” and population needs, “fragile states are” found to be “under-funded”, particularly 
“relative to the … volatility of aid flows”, which have “also increased over time” (David Carment et al, 
2008, p. 12). Socialising mechanisms in Yemen and other fragile states tend to be extremely limited, 
with key challenges for increasing youth integration into societies not only including provisions to 
drastically enhance the education sector, putting a school in every community no matter how 
isolated, but also dramatic service reforms aimed at increasing teacher training, luring more 
qualified individuals into the education sector, and improving student-teacher relations.  
 A positive sign here is that both the international community and the Government of Yemen 
have shown a strong commitment towards these principles, working towards increasing student 
registration in schools, under the requirements of the Millennium Development Goals. Yet as a 
result of the inability or unwillingness of both sides to address the issue of quality assurance in the 
education sector in Yemen, it will likely take decades before these advances begin to show real 
positive impact upon the rate of youth socialisation.  
 Cheaper solutions aimed at increasing the relevance of educational bodies in communities 
and increasing the local profile of schools might generate smaller but faster outputs here. Pushing 
schools to adopt dual roles as houses of education and community centres might be an effective 
long-term strategy. Simple projects like organising sports days for all community children, even 
those out of education, hosting special events open to the public on national children's days, or 
putting together sports teams for children and young people, given that Yemeni children are 
increasingly attracted to football and various forms of street dancing, might prove extremely 
popular. Offering school space to young people to run their own projects after hours might also help 
to provide them with safe spaces and creative outlets when they are unable or unwilling to go home, 
due to family difficulties. In this way, small, simple projects may be able to achieve what larger ones 
will not be able to do for some time: they may be able to increase the relevance and integration of 
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schools within communities, allowing for community-building and socialising networks to develop 
around them. 
 
Figure 82 Yemeni Mercheants Working in Central Sana'a 
 Reform in the employment sector is undermined by a severe lack of documentation, where a 
lack of taxation and an absence of paper trails for small businesses has made it impossible for the 
Government of Yemen to effectively regulate minimum wages or to ensure labour rights. Existing 
patronage networks that support the status quo have undermined the implementation of 
established legal frameworks for employee protection. It is in the interests of business owners, law 
enforcement officers and employees to conceal violations of rights principles from the state. At the 
same time, the severe shortage of employment opportunities in Yemen, combined with a booming 
population and rising poverty levels, mean that few who are in active employment are willing to risk 
complaining about abuses of authority in the employment sector. Likewise, Yemeni citizens are more 
likely to take on work that may be inappropriate for their age, gender or health status. IRIN have 
found that “Since 2001, the Child Labour Combating Unit - in conjunction with the ILO - has managed 
to rescue 4,200 children from dangerous jobs”, which mainly involved jobs in the agricultural sector 
associated with operating heavy machinery or working with pesticides. 
 While these issues are important, the Yemeni Government's priorities for improving the 
labour sector have focused upon expansion and economic development for the past decade, in an 
effort to improve their ratings in the World Banks's annual Doing Business country review series and 
to boost foreign investment. This approach is largely reactive, stemming from an urgent need to 
forestall the country's economic collapse. The criminological position that employment is not 
sufficient to deter crime without some degree of employee welfare and job satisfaction is not 
explored as an issue that should influence policy at this emergency stage, where job provision is 
deemed more important than job quality. This attitude is probably incorrect. 
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7.2.2 Social Welfare and Psychosocial Support Structures 
 Governmental social welfare and psychosocial support structures, particularly as they are 
targeted at increasing the well-being of children and young people, aim to address the main areas of 
socio-economic harm for this age group in Yemen, which include: physical and emotional abuse; 
poverty; malnutrition; and, starvation. The harmful effects of these dynamics are normally 
compounded in Yemen by early marriage and early pregnancies, poor child retention in schools, high 
rates of unemployment among young labourers and young professionals, and the spread of 
dangerous diseases. Each of these dimensions is a major cause of psychological stress among 
children and young people, and should not be ruled out as a potential cause of increased aggression 
and violent behaviour.  
 Yemen is a signatory of the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child173 and as such has a 
responsibility to protect people under the age of eighteen from enduring unfair treatment and 
harassment. Governmental and non-governmental institutions have launched a National Action Plan 
for Children in order to reduce the negative influences of these socio-economic dynamics, 
supplemented by increased social welfare provision for the poorest of Yemeni families174.  
 The Government's Action Plan divides its programming in order to meet the needs of three 
segregated age groups, which include; children aged between 0 and 5 years, children between the 
ages of 6 and 14 years, and young people aged 15 to 24 years. This last expanded age band 
recognises that young people under the age of 25 face unique challenges in Yemen and are 
extremely vulnerable to economic shifts, and also that Yemen's poor age detection capacities mean 
that expanded searches for young people are necessary if all members of this vulnerable group are 
to receive assistance.  
 The Yemeni National Action Plan for Children aimed at the 0 to 5 age groups focuses 
primarily on healthcare and nutrition. Comprised of four components, this policy aims to close 
Yemen's significant shortfalls in terms of achieving the Millennium Development Goals of the 
Millennium Declaration.  
 The first component deals with policies that have been designed to strengthen the 
Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses, a plan which comprises the treatment and 
vaccination of children against common diseases175 as the biggest contributors to Yemen's under-5 
mortality rate. Linked to this, the second component is concerned with increasing child access to 
immunisation across the country, while the third component seeks to develop a comprehensive 
national nutrition plan. The fourth component is perhaps the one that is most closely linked to 
welfare strategies that can be said to reduce criminal activity and build upon an environment of 
social control. It comprises comprehensive care for children, which is designed to impact early 
childhood development.  
 The National Early Childhood Development Plan aimed, between the years of 2006 and 
2010, to establish a pre-school programme that would get children ready for school either through 
educational facilities or through training and information provided to parents and care-givers. A 
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reform of birth registration services was integrated into these initiatives, so that children in need of 
special attention might be more readily identifiable. Unfortunately, this component remained 
relatively underfunded throughout its implementation, receiving by 2010 only US $382,000 of the 
$854,000 estimated cost of running it effectively. The distribution of resulting services proved 
geographically limited to the centre, with many war-affected regions failing to reap the benefits of 
these policy changes.  
 The National Action Plan for Children aged 6 to 14 took on a whole different approach, 
adopting a multi-sectoral perspective of the in-school environment that aimed to enhance inclusive 
education by piloting disadvantaged children into both formal and informal education (component 
1); strengthening school-based health and nutrition packages designed to protect children and to 
provide an incentive for them to complete their studies (component 2); diminishing the gender gap 
by providing better qualified female teachers in rural areas (component 3); and, protecting 
disadvantaged children by creating a legislative framework to ensure their rights, and by running 
targeted reintegration programmes for displaced and war-affected young people (component 4). 
The immediate drawback of this policy is that only the fourth component deals directly in its design 
with the needs of children outside of school. Its policies, however, are relatively comprehensive, 
establishing protocols for the community-based monitoring of children in conflict. They are 
established within legal parameters, representing, as such, a foundational framework and operating 
language for future interventions, rather than a social welfare scheme in itself. 
 The third segment of the National Action Plan, which deals with the needs of young people 
aged 15 to 24, is aimed at reducing early pregnancy and substantially diminishing the risks 
associated with reproductive health for young Yemenis, by increasing girls' access to secondary 
education and raising the legal marriage age. Other components of the plan also involve improving 
national identity through youth inclusion in political processes, increasing leisure options and 
incorporating youth activities in urban development planning, and creating a national youth 
employment plan. At least on paper, the Yemeni Government has striven to develop an integrative 
approach to child welfare. The trouble remains in the arbitrary segregation of groups of young 
people who face many of the overlapping challenges addressed by all three sections of the National 
Action Plan. Added to this is the significant absence of psychosocial support structures for children 
who continue to experience psychological stress, physical abuse, or trauma, despite the launching of 
these new policies.  
 UNICEF write that: 
the Yemeni Mental Health Association indicated – through data of the hotline for 
psychological assistance in 2003 – that 37 cases of the age group 3-15 experienced abuse 
in its different forms in the period April–June 2002. The rate of physical abuse was higher 
with males (63.15%) than females (16.7%). Emotional abuse, however, was higher with 
females (44.4%) than males (21%). Concerning sexual abuse, 38.8% of females and 15.7% 
of males indicated their exposure to this kind of abuse. (2008, p. 52) 
What is evident from these figures176 is that Yemen continues to face high rates of under-reporting 
when it comes to all forms of abuse and social violence, especially where such abuse includes acts of 
                                                          
176
 See also the research conducted in Chapters 1, 3 and elsewhere. 
241 
 
a sexual nature. While the Yemeni Government, alongside international organisations, has worked 
to improve rates of abuse reporting and mechanisms for child protection; these have largely come to 
form legislative interventions and awareness raising campaigns with only limited institutions for 
providing protective shelters or the treatment of trauma for the victims of these crimes. 
 What is particularly promising in the social welfare and psychosocial support sectors is that 
remarkable commitments are being made by the Yemeni Government and the international 
community to address important causes of social isolation, resentment and delinquency among 
young people. Unlike reform in the education and employment sectors, the potential difficulties of, 
and obstacles to, implementation have not prevented the exploration of policy development.  
 
7.2.3 Community-Building, Leisure and Recreation 
 While the study of criminology has been divided relatively evenly between investigations 
into why people either break or obey the law, it can be argued that theories of conflict and fragility 
founded within the international development sector have been disproportionately focused upon 
identifying and mitigating the causes of political and economic violence in least developed countries. 
However, a recent shift in the literature focus onto the notion of “community resilience” has 
generated interest not only in how individual governments and the collective international 
community might help to prevent violence, but also in why certain communities have been more 
resistant to conflict than others.  
 Yemen is a priority case study in this sense, because, as Danniel Shimmin – Governance 
Advisor for the British Department of International Development – explains: “Yemen has always 
confounded outsiders” through its continuing position on the edge of state failure (Expert 
Consultation, 3 June, 2012). That Yemen is not yet a failed state, despite its “governance trends 
pointing downwards”, and that Yemen faces the potential to undergo a transition that could place it 
on a “positive trajectory”, has deeply perplexed both foreign and national analysts.  
 Part of Yemen's on-going stability is a product of the main causes of its fragility: namely, its 
strong tribal values and community isolation. These have insulated tribal groupings from state 
interference, while also helping to propagate the social inequalities and underdevelopment that 
have generated the conditions necessary for state fragility to take root. Danniel Shimmin argues that 
a very delicate balance exists in Yemen between competing factions, a balance that risks being upset 
by escalating causes of conflict, with 2012 seeing a “greater intensity” of resource competition, as 
well as a  diminishing “security capacity to deal with conflict”. Paradoxically, powerful tribes do not 
necessarily mean stronger communities in this sense, as a long history of political manipulation of 
tribal systems in Yemen has meant that many tribal leaders, according to Shimmin, have been 
“incentivised to support patronage”,  and not necessarily to support communities. Social cohesion is 
a very complicated topic for analysis in Yemen, though there is a growing recognition that 
community based organisations, community centres and civil society organisations may hold the key 
to stabilising the country. These arguments fall in line with theories of social control, which state 
that strong communities and socialising, community-building activities can decrease social deviance 
and criminal behaviour.  
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 Drawing on the work of James Taylor on transformation and development in South Africa 
(1998), Erica Fraser and Lyndsay McLean Hilker differentiate between strong and weak communities 
in the study of violence, fragility and conflict. They write that: “'strong communities' that can 
monitor individual behaviour and bring to bear a variety of social incentives and sanctions are key to 
limiting participation in violence”, and that likewise “The youth and development literature also 
stresses the importance of decision-making mechanisms that empower young people by giving them 
voice and allowing them to exercise agency” (2009, p. 34). 
 
Figure 83 Yemeni Youth Wearing an Arsenal Football T-Shirt 
 These arguments suggest that limiting violence, be it political, economic or mindless, 
requires an extensive community-building strategy that incorporates socialising activities, political 
integration and inclusion in local governance and decision-making processes. While Yemeni 
communities have had significant government support in this first area of socialisation, President 
Saleh's regime, failed while he was in power, to bring about real political inclusion, particularly for 
young people, women and marginalised groups. Yet as the history of Sa'ada illustrates, community 
centres, leisure, recreation and civil society movements have always been, through various different 
forms and incarnations, a strong part of Yemeni social life – with the original al-Houthi movement 
and the Believing Youth being two of the most famous community-based organisations to rise up 
and gain a significant following (albeit an often violent one). The al-Houthi movement demonstrates 
that a part of Yemen's limited Government budget has traditionally been set aside for encouraging 
such activities, particularly in the arena of supporting the formation of sports clubs and societies, 
among which football has emerged as a favourite national pastime. Small-scale leisure and 
recreation activities with no clear political motive have thrived in given communities, but larger scale 
civil organisation and community-building initiatives remained underfunded and quite heavily 
restricted until the Arab Spring of 2011. 
 While recent events reversed this trend, raising the demand for community participation in 
government processes, there is a significant risk of such advances being negated as the political 
situation in the country stabilises. Atiaf Alwazir, as one of Yemen's most prominent activists, 
summarises the current situation in the country by arguing that: “People have realised for the first 
time that their voice matters”, but by supplementing this statement by acknowledging that “I don't 
think we will continue seeing this forever” (Expert Consultation, 5 June, 2012). 
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7.3 Recommendations for Improved Crime Control 
 Due to allegations of corruption launched against the police in countries like Yemen, along 
with the reality that police services are often militarised by governments in times of conflict, as 
combined with the sensationalism associated with stories about police brutality within such 
contexts, – it is often forgotten that, as Kerrin Smith177 summarises: “you have to be very brave to 
work for the police” as a local national within a conflict-affected fragile state (Expert Consultation, 28 
June, 2012). Despite the shortage of livelihood opportunities and the attractions of a steady income, 
working as a ground level member of police services within fragile states is not a glamorous 
occupation. Often, it turns employees and their families into valid targets for terrorists and 
insurgents, or into targets for random violence committed by community members who see law 
enforcement personnel to be representative of corrupt and illegitimate regimes. This was seen in 
Yemen in 2011 and 2012 in the targeting of police and members of security forces by terrorist cells 
(Ghaida Al-Ariqi, 2012), as well as in the random acts of violence committed by children and young 
people against the police during the Arab Spring178.  
 Anger at the state can be displaced into anger against state officials, and the dangers for law 
enforcement personnel are very real. There are naturally many reasons for this, but a central issue 
found in Yemen, Iraq and other fragile contexts is precisely the nature of police roles within 
societies, whereby police services are made to act like police forces, and where a duty to restore 
security has led those who plan policing strategies to neglect community policing – that is the 
policing of the everyday community level. The immediate consequence of these policies is that 
communities cease to consider the police as a conduit for controlling crime and start to see the 
police as a tool for reducing political violence, so that members of the community do not consider 
the police to be a potential source of help if they fall victim to crime.  
 A second consequence is that police services have little to no relationship with communities, 
are not offered community support in their actions, and are not seen to reflect local community 
values or priorities179. Key to reversing this trend in Yemen is a recognition of this problem by 
governments, the international community, and policy-makers, while solutions would involve 
creating a system of community policing that is relevant to community values and respectful of 
community structures, including tribal and religious structures.  
Due to rising threats of terrorism in Yemen, there has been little interest in exploring the 
concept of community policing. It has been found in interviews conducted with Nicholas Hopton, the 
British Ambassador to Yemen, that while the European Union is taking point on judicial and security 
sector reform in Yemen as the largest donor in this field, resulting expansions of the police services 
will likely maintain a “paramilitary” focus (Expert Consultation, 22 July, 2012). 
 The problem here, as Kerrin Smith summarises, is that the police cannot reduce crime 
without a secure environment, where “immediate risk to life is the highest threat” that police 
officers should deal with. Counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency are extremely important in 
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conflict-affected fragile states because the police “have to ensure that the environment that they're 
living in is a safe environment” (Expert Consultation, 28 June, 2012). However, having acknowledged 
this fundamental principle, the “police should ultimately be a service to the community and should 
reflect community values”, and it is this aspect of policing that is commonly absent from fragile state 
policing services, while also being fairly low down on the international agenda (Kerrin Smith, Expert 
Consultation, 28 June, 2012). One obstacle seen in Yemen is the self-reliance of communities from a 
law-enforcement point of view, where many have little to no history of police administration, and 
where the police are perceived as a governmental tool for repression. An important first step to 
overcoming this barrier would likely be acknowledging the importance of tribal structures within 
Yemeni society and learning to work with tribal leaders and communities both separately and 
together. A cooperative community-based system might be the only way forward within the Yemeni 
context, and while there is huge potential for corruption within such a system, there is also huge 
potential for increased security, if the system is executed and monitored effectively.  
This system would be limited to participation in law enforcement. It would not mean 
allowing tribes to take part in military action. It also would not mean continuing to allow tribes to act 
as sole distributors of security. A recent study by Ibrahim Sharqieh demonstrates that many tribes in 
Yemen would like to see the state take on a bigger role in security provision, so that they might exit 
the “vicious arms race” that they currently wage against each other and spend more time securing 
their “children’s food and education” (2013). The notion that this thesis puts forward is that tribes 
should be involved in the decision-making processes that determine security distribution within the 
context of law enforcement and integrative community policing. 
 So what would an integrative community policing strategy look like in Yemen? Firstly, it 
would involve making sure that police, while remaining strictly and exclusively under government 
control, worked with and consulted tribal organisation structures when planning patrols, choosing to 
prioritise prominent forms of offending, and investigating offences. Communities and tribal leaders 
should also be informed of arrest and prosecution procedures before arrests are made, in order to 
minimise the threat of diplomatic incidents that could irreparably damage relationships in the short 
term. After all, it is important to remember here that, as Danniel Shimmin argues, “An ongoing 
source of tension in Yemen occurs where tribal values around criminality conflict with those of the 
modern state”, and in particular, the police should strive to investigate and acknowledge whether 
the crimes in which they are intervening are viewed by communities as an attempt to resolve a 
previous conflict, even if the police are duty bound to control those offences in order to prevent 
them from escalating into blood feuds (Expert Consultation, 20 June, 2012). Again, it is not that the 
police should sanction criminal behaviour committed by communities or tribes, but that there is a 
need for dialogue on these issues between police services and their constituencies. As Nicholas 
Hopton has explained in interview, “Its not a case of creating a new police force: part of it is about 
training, part of it is about recruitment, but part of it is about trying to instil in the population the 
idea that there is a rule of law and that its not just tribal” (2012). The inclusion of tribal organisations 
in security will, of course, bring with it ethical challenges and dilemmas, particularly in terms of 
exposing tribes to harm by portraying them as state collaborators: but as long their consultative role 
is limited to law enforcement, excluding military activity, risks to participants should be minimised.  
 Secondly, integrative community policing would involve increasing police relevance for 
communities, both by getting young people involved in security planning according to an open-
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source security model, and by encouraging police to adopt additional community-support roles. 
These ideas will be explored further in Chapter 8.  
 Finally, where these initiatives failed, adequate complaints procedures would have to be 
installed, particularly in light of the elevated potential for tribal allegiances to corrupt law 
enforcement services in Yemen. Here, communities need viable third party options to turn to if they 
are in need of protection from abusive tribal leaders, and if police services fail to grant them such 
protection. In these instances, it is of the highest priority that the Government of Yemen be seen as 
siding with its citizens in cases where personal freedoms are violated, even if the Government itself 
lacks the capacity to intervene. There is a very delicate balance to be struck here, and it certainly 
would not be easily achieved. However, in light of Yemen's current process of transition, the 
Government has a real opportunity, the likes of which it has never seen before, to strike out a new 
relationship with its people, and the international community would be extremely foolish not to 
move on this window before it shuts. There is also a strong incentive to make police services more 
demographically representative of their constituencies, though this would be a far more costly, long-
term strategy.  
 Each of the recommendations outlined above are targeted towards improving the 
relationship between the Yemeni state and its citizens. However, it is posited that none of these 
recommendations are likely to reach their full potential if the state does not also work to improve 
the image of the elite members of its ruling parties by taking a stand against multi-level corruption. 
There is a strong need for the Government of Yemen to resume judicial reform processes initiated 
prior to the Arab Spring and for the international community to foster monitoring and evaluation 
within priority areas that include local councils (which act as representatives of the state on the 
ground), law enforcement and judicial services, and larger Government bodies that administer 
finance and state budgeting, like the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning and 
International Cooperation. A good starting point for this would be the increased monitoring and 
review of bilateral aid – that is development and humanitarian assistance that is channelled directly 
through the Yemeni state.  
 
7.4 Recommendations for State Building and Bilateral Aid 
 The process of generating state service provision for communities in Yemen seems to be an 
enormous, daunting and overwhelming task. Obstacles abound, where weak capacity, bureaucratic 
stalling and corruption emerged from stakeholder interviews as the main reasons why state services 
were seen to be failing in Yemen in 2010 by the international community, donors and some 
Government officials as well. Overwhelmingly, aid organisations have responded to these challenges 
with capacity building activities that generally involve building new Government structures for 
Yemen, and providing Government employees with training opportunities. Direct financial assistance 
towards escalating Government budgets was highly limited under President Saleh's regime due to 
concerns about potential fund misappropriation, and were fully discontinued for the duration of the 
2011 Arab Spring, while more direct assistance to the Yemeni people was delivered through 
international governmental and non-governmental organisations, as well as through local 
community-based organisations and private individuals.  
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 These policies have done little to reverse Yemen's poor rate of Government-based service 
distribution, because few are geared towards increasing the state's financial capacity to deliver 
those services, so that for many Yemenis state services are either not worth using or have been 
supplanted with alternative sources. What assistance the Yemeni state is able to provide is often 
channelled through tribal structures, so that the prevalence of third party service providers in the 
country negates the possibility of constructing any mutually dependant relationship between the 
Yemeni Government and its citizens. The same observation can be made in many other fragile states 
where tribal structures and international aid abound, including, most notably, Afghanistan.  
 It is suggested that there is a need here for donors and the international community more 
broadly to re-examine policy objectives in international development if citizens in Yemen are to form 
more constructive relationships with their state and thereby increase their stake in society under a 
criminological model of social control. From the point of view of intervention planning, as Kerrin 
Smith notes, development practitioners need to ask themselves: “Is it about making us [the 
international community] look good, or is it about making them [the local Government] look good?” 
(Expert Consultation, 28 June, 2012.) For example, strong concerns voiced by the Yemeni 
Government, as emerged from interviews conducted at the Ministry of Justice in 2010, revolved 
around the perception of their aid absorption practices among Yemeni citizens. It was noted by the 
Ministry of Justice in particular, but also by other Ministries as well, that the tendency of local 
newspapers to publish the international community's pledges to deliver aid to Yemen led Yemeni 
citizens to equate money pledged with money received. In reality, although the London Consultative 
Group  meeting pledged US $5.7 billion in assistance packages in 2006, for instance, only 10% had 
been disbursed by 2010, while Yemenis on the ground tended to expect immediate visible changes 
as a result of this commitment, leading to growing frustration with state bodies and increased 
allegations of corruption at the ground level (Stakeholder interview conducted by Sultan Barakat, 
Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 15 August, 2010). In this case, by delivering 
small short-term gains, such as capacity building assistance, donor contributions that are 
operationally limited in scope by anti-corruption policies, poor donor-recipient relations or 
bureaucratic stalling may have ultimately done more harm than good by lowering instead of 
improving local acceptance of state institutions.  
 It is posited that challenges to state legitimacy that emerge from supplemented service 
delivery can be mitigated by working more directly within the structures of the Yemeni Government 
to provide Yemeni citizens with international aid. However, improving state capacity ultimately 
necessitates offering direct assistance to the Yemeni state. In order to avoid dangers of corruption, 
this would require a considerable expansion of monitoring and evaluation programming, with strict 
requirements for the Yemeni state to report regularly upon aid utilisation.  
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 As the previous chapters have demonstrated, a wide range of criminogenic risk factors 
currently impact the Yemeni development context, elevating patterns of criminal activity and, of 
primary interest to this thesis, patterns of violent young offending. Yet the role of these criminogenic 
risk factors is enhanced substantially by the erosion of Yemen's social control mechanisms by 
decades of state fragility, conflict and insecurity. This Chapter has endeavoured to look at some of 
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these social control mechanisms in more detail, particularly by examining formal and informal 
systems of law enforcement, but also by assessing the status of alternative services aimed at 
enhancing community socialisation.  
 In the absence of more effective systems for law enforcement, there is scope for some 
enhancement of other systems of social control in Yemen, based on education and labour sector 
reform, increased community participation in governance processes, more transparent integration 
of tribal structures into local government services, increased opportunities for socialisation, 
community policing and state capacity building. However, the way forward for crime reduction in 
Yemen will likely be a very long and costly process. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 The end of the Cold War brought the emergence of the “new wars” paradigm, which was 
developed in response to the rise of intra-state conflict and genocidal warfare that defined the 
1990s. The past twenty years have seen huge advances in international development literature, with 
a steadily increasing dedication among practitioners and academics towards acknowledging the 
realities associated with state fragility and finding pathways to the elimination of instability. Yet 
while violence has come to form a central theme of such research, contemporary readings of fragile 
environments continue to interpret criminal activity as an implied product of political instability, 
more akin to a force of nature than a sociological phenomenon. This has led other parallel advances 
in the social sciences, including advances in criminology, to be swept aside in analyses of fragile 
contexts, where youth radicalisation and recruitment into armed forces have generated significantly 
more media and international attention than broader social violence.  
 As David Carment et al write: 
A focus on the security-instability nexus is legitimate, of course, if the underlying purpose 
is to develop policies on armed conflict in the most egregious cases of [state] failure; 
however, to the extent that conflict is a symptom and not a cause of fragility and failure, it 
does not enhance our understanding of the phenomenon. (p. 44) 
Likewise, a focus on youth radicalisation offers only a very limited view of the complex tapestry of 
violence in Yemen and other fragile states, obscuring the impact of violence upon children and 
young people while failing to address the root causes of why young people turn to violence 
themselves.  
 A focus on the security-instability nexus has meant that policy responses to youth violence, 
where youth violence is equated with insurgency and warfare – or at the very least with the chaos of 
fragile political environments, – have acted as reactive instruments whose primary purpose is to 
punish offenders. There have been few attempts made by practitioners and academics to develop 
real analyses of crime patterns that would strive to understand the root causes of criminal 
behaviour.  
 The security-instability nexus that Carment et al refer to has produced an ironic 
contradiction, whereby offenders are treated as being responsible for their own behaviour but are 
robbed of any sense of identity or agency in the literature, which tends, rather, to make reference to 
shadowy “opportunists” and “vulnerable” child participants: neither parties' behaviour motivations 
are analysed in great depth. This has led many prominent academics, including Michael Humphrey, 
to the conclusion that it is not possible to analyse offender motivations in cases of criminal violence 
in fragile states, the implication of which is that researchers can only currently study the 
characteristics of this phenomenon, rather than its causes (2011). This thesis has rejected this 
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position while endeavouring to determine whether or not the causes of violence can be better 
understood by reaching out to other disciplines, like criminology. 
 It has been found within this thesis that dominant attitudes towards violent young offending 
obscure the reality that so-called “vulnerable” children and young people are rarely treated as such 
within the judicial systems of fragile states, which, as the Yemeni case study indicates, have virtually 
no provisions set in place for separating them from broader offending populations. Thus, as the 
United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund find: 
Whatever the circumstances, effective social work with youthful offenders and victims is 
generally lacking in many national and local settings. Worldwide, UNICEF estimates that at 
any given moment more than 1 million children are detained by law enforcement officials. 
And this is likely an underestimate. In the 44 countries with available data, around 59 per 
cent of detained children had not been sentenced. ... In prisons and institutions across the 
world, adolescents are often denied the right to medical care, education and 
opportunities for individual development. Detention also exposes children to serious 
forms of violence, such as torture, brutality, sexual abuse and rape, as well as poor 
conditions. (2011, p. 55) 
Part of this problem stems from poor judicial practices, capacities and procedures, so that children 
and young people are either incorrectly processed by law enforcement services, inappropriately 
treated by law enforcement practitioners, or inadequately protected by legislative protocols.  
 Greater challenges stem from a lack of understanding of the reasons why young people 
offend and a failure to mitigate these reasons wherever they are apparent. This is not a problem 
that is limited to fragile states, because developed countries are often equally guilty of negligent 
policy making or policy implementation in this sense. Yet the overall sense of discouragement and 
apathy that surrounds the issue of apolitical youth violence in conflict-affected fragile states, 
particularly at the international onlooker level, is no longer excusable given the scope of this 
phenomenon and its implications for child welfare.  
 This thesis was designed to investigate whether or not it would be possible to produce a 
unifying theoretical framework of violent young offending in fragile states by conducting an in-depth 
analysis of the Yemeni development context and its emerging patterns of crime and youth 
aggression. The thesis and its investigation were geared towards integrating and testing the validity 
of criminological and fragility literature for understanding the relationship between crime and 
underdevelopment, while generating more awareness of the processes of violent crime causation in 
fragile states. It endeavoured to achieve these purposes by asking five research questions.  
 Now that this research initiative has come to an end, it has become apparent that while 
some progress has been made in achieving these goals, significant further work remains to be done 
and that, at this stage, the field of international development, at its intersection with criminology, 
still only provides a partial picture of the interaction between violence and fragility in Yemen today. 
While answering the five research questions, this chapter shall examine more closely the main 
contributions and important findings that this thesis has generated, the key challenges and 
limitations emerging from this investigation, further work remaining to be conducted, and the main 
recommendations for donors and members of the international community that can be drawn from 
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an overlap of international development and criminological literature, as it has been and can yet be 
applied to Yemen and other fragile states.  
 
8.2 Answering the Five Research Questions 
 
1. How appropriate a concept is state fragility for providing a unifying framework through 
which low-ranking countries in the Human Development Index might be analysed in the 
context of similar patterns of criminality?  
 State fragility, as the term is used by the international community, is too broad in its 
inclusion and exclusion of development indicators and too varied in its application to provide a solid 
foundation for a rigorous and relevant comparative study of the relationship between criminality 
and state underdevelopment180.  
 However, the more targeted and specific the application of the state fragility framework to 
limited environments, the more relevant the application of criminological theory becomes to 
underdeveloped contexts. It is therefore possible to test theoretical frameworks and to extract 
policy implications that are more useful for helping practitioners to identify localised aggravating 
criminogenic influences in the first instance and to learn from them in the second. Taking structural 
factors as central aspects of fragility, the definition of the term put forward in this thesis181 describes 
a condition associated with ineffective governance and weak state infrastructure. It is sufficiently 
limited to draw out “like” cases182. 
 Under this theoretical approach the fragile states framework put forward in Chapter 6 is 
adequate for grouping together low-ranking countries in the Human Development Index, as long as 
they share a set of common indicators that can be connected to parallel important socio-economic 
and political conditions identified within the field of criminology. There is a subtle difference 
between the adequacy of the fragile states framework here and its appropriateness to the task: with 
its associations of institutional weakness, state fragility is still a highly politicised term.  
State fragility has been selected over the labels of “least developed countries”, “conflict-affected 
environments”, “complex emergencies” and “failed states” because of the specific set of 
circumstances that the term encapsulates and because of its focus upon governance based 
indicators. It is possible within the fragile states framework to study only those countries with 
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 For instance, when the definition put forward by the Peace Fund's Fragile States Index is adopted, fragility 
becomes a development rating rather than a specific condition, whose inclusion of a range of countries 
provides too wide a spectrum to identify “similar” patterns of criminality. See Chapter 6. 
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 This thesis defines fragility as the point of intersection between three major conditions that include; (1) 
poor state capacity, as generated by a lack of authority and ability to control state territories, and as evidenced 
by a lack of effective state service provision; (2) high social fragmentation, accompanied by a history of 
conflict, community isolation and conflicting localised identities; and (3) poor political integration, leading to 
low levels of community access to political processes, reinforced by a perceived lack of political will to reflect 
popular demands in policy changes. 
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 Secondary socio-political realities are added to the definition only because, as David Carment et al write, 
“Single or limited factor analyses are inappropriate for complex fragile environments” where “A wide survey of 
performance indicators” that accounts for social, political and economic trends might provide “a sound basis 
for cross-state strategic-level comparative analysis” (2011, p. 47). 
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functioning governments that are affected by conflict while facing other specific infrastructural 
challenges. 
 
2. In what ways are fragile states different from more stable ones? 
 Fragile states differ from more economically developed countries mainly in their inability to 
reach all of their citizens, their limited administration of their territories, and their lack of access to 
sufficient budgetary and structural resources to be able to effect any real (and particularly any 
positive) change upon their constituencies183. Other development based indicators relating to 
mortality, fertility, literacy, employment and social equity have already been addressed. However, 
these function as symptoms, rather than root causes of fragility. At their core, fragile states generate 
these distinguishing characteristics because of their institutional weaknesses, which render effective 
service distribution across the entirety of their administrative areas infeasible. 
 
3. What are the main causes of criminal violence in Yemen, and to what extent are these 
causes related to state fragility? 
 
 Weapons Proliferation: Violence in Yemen is aggravated and rapidly escalated by the 
widespread proliferation of weapons in the country184. The higher the capacity and the 
faster the potential for a weapon carried by a perpetrator of violence to be used to cause 
physical harm to a person, the more severe the injuries inflicted upon victims tend to be. 
With Yemen being one of the most heavily armed countries in the world, all violent crime 
committed there in which weapons are used is indirectly connected to the Government's 
inability and unwillingness to confiscate small arms, as well as to its inability to control its 
own borders and to stop the inflow of new guns and ammunitions into Yemen. While all 
violent crime might not be related to state capacity and the development context; virtually 
all violent crime is escalated in severity by these structural characteristics.  
 
 Tribal violence: Tribal violence in Yemen can be read as being directly associated with the 
historical evolution of the Yemeni state, the Government's over-reliance upon tribal 
structures and patronage networks, the limited reach of law enforcement within hard-to-
access geographic areas, and the lack of basic services that has pushed Yemeni communities 
in the North especially to look to tribal structures as a tool for self-administration.  
o Tribal violence in Yemen tends to be violence between tribes or between tribes and 
the state. It also incorporates economically motivated violence aimed at achieving a 
tribal objective, which can take the form of banditry kidnapping, racketeering, 
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 See Chapters 2 and 6. 
184
 Jason Roach and Ken Pease have found that in criminological studies conducted in multiple settings 
“weapon characteristics” are “relevant to the degree of harm inflicted”, with knives, bottles, broken glass and 
guns – particularly easily concealable guns – being generally associated with the escalation of fights and 
brawls, as well as of gender-based, social and economic violence (2011, p. 394). Known as “the firearm effect”, 
they write that this phenomenon “consists in escalating consequences” of violence, for example, with 
“altercations involving knives” resulting “far less often ... in death” than those involving guns (p. 395). 
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robbery or burglary as long as the economic outputs of these crimes are intended to 
be channelled back into a tribal unit or sub-unit.  
o While it incorporates political power relations, tribal violence is different from 
conflict because it tends to be limited in its scope and impact, however tribal 
tensions are also played upon and escalated by the state in the Sa'ada wars and the 
North-South divide.  
o Triggered by resource competition, as well as by land and water disputes, tribal 
violence is a direct product of the state's lack of service delivery, both in terms of 
basic services and security, where a tribe's need to fend for itself, to compete with 
other tribes for political power and representation, and to protect itself from 
outside threats are instrumental in increasing tribal reliance upon violence.  
o Emerging systems of patronage that have developed as a result of the state's 
reliance upon tribalism to administer its territories have helped strengthen the 
grass-roots, institutional and elite corruption levels that are necessary for organised 
crime and banditry to take hold. Therefore tribal violence is also a contributor to 
other forms of crime. 
 
 Gender-Based Violence: Cultural and religious influences impact gender-based and sexual 
violence, which are encouraged in Yemen by an extremely low rate of reporting. In a culture 
where the victims of sexual violence risk being severely discriminated against or 
dishonoured by coming forward, perpetrators are encouraged to commit acts of sexual 
violence because they have little to no fear of getting caught, which removes a strong social 
constraint on their behaviour. Gender-based violence is also aggravated by gender inequality 
on multiple fronts, including economic, political and cultural organisation systems, and 
within families.  
 
 Family Violence: Family violence escalates youth violence; firstly by increasing youth 
exposure to violence; and secondly by making children and young people more reluctant to 
spend too much time at home, forcing them out onto the street where there is a lack of safe 
spaces outside the reach of either politically or criminally violent influences.  
 
 Economically Motivated Violent Offending: Economic criminal activity is generally 
motivated in Yemen by economic stress factors caused by extreme underdevelopment. It is 
made visible through statistical records of burglary, theft, robbery, racketeering, fraud, 
banditry, and a number of other associated offences that have turned violent. While 
property related offences remain fairly low in Yemen – and while all countries suffer from 
mild rates of theft and burglary so that the Yemeni development context cannot be held as 
being especially to blame for these – incidents of kidnapping and banditry are likely to be 
attributable to the state's general levels of insecurity, as well as to a lack of targeted policing 
of these offences. It has additionally emerged from stakeholder interviews that kidnapping is 
occasionally used by tribes (and possibly by Yemeni police officers) as a means of dispute 
resolution, where one community's perceived wrongful seizure of land or resources, for 
instance, can result in the forced detainment of one of their members by another 
community until such a time as the wrong is made right.  
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 Insecurity: Each of the criminogenic risk factors identified above contributes to the overall 
insecurity of Yemen, exposing the population to heightened levels of violence that are 
interlinked with political conflict, protests and war. A lack of resolution of these issues by the 
Yemeni Government, combined with the inaccessibility of the Yemeni political system and 
the under-representation of non-ruling political groups in Government, have led to growing 
rates of frustration among Yemeni citizens, and particularly among Yemeni youth, causing 
heightened aggression that can trigger increased outbursts of both mindless and social 
criminalised violence. The pressure to commit social criminalised violence, is increased by: 
poverty; unemployment; poor family relations; an absence of safe spaces for children; poor 
education services; a socialisation to violence and an idealisation within media of violent 
behaviour; and, the social isolation of youth. 
 
 Culture and Religion: Yemen’s culture, tribal values and religious make-up serve to impact 
rates of violent and non-violent offending, but more comparative research is needed to 
determine the extent of these influences. They serve at once to raise and lower different 
patterns of crime.  Crime in Yemen remains heavily stigmatised as un-Islamic and un-Yemeni, 
so that victims and perpetrators can be unwilling to report on or discuss their experiences 
with officials. This leads to diminished rates of punishment of offences and removes 
important social controls185. At the same time, “Islam develops a strong sense of moral  
community, where religion is an influential social force generating social sanctions … and … 
this contributes to a low crime rate” overall, where property offences are especially frowned 
upon (Seyed Hossein Serajzadeh, 2002). Yet a lack of stigmatisation of gender-based and 
retributive violence within some interpretations of Islam, depending upon context, 
heightens the risk of exposure to harm for key demographic groups, like women and 
children.  
 
4. Which (if any) specific attributes of fragile states promote criminality and violent criminal 
behaviour among children and young people? 
The relationship between violent young offending and state fragility is likely to be such that; 
the absence of state services, legitimate opportunities and socialising activities for young people in 
fragile states, along with their exposure to significant levels of violence, produces extreme 
economic, psychological and socio-cultural stresses that lead to their increased aggression and 
rejection of state legitimacy, all of which combine to raise the likelihood of violent young offending 
in Yemen and other fragile states. Included in the absence of state services and legitimate 
opportunities are a lack of good quality primary, secondary and higher level education facilities, as 
well as a lack of employment opportunities. This leads to diminished processes of socialisation and 
the erosion of corresponding social control mechanisms, whereby young people do not feel like they 
are involved or have a stake in mainstream society and do not develop important connections that 
generate empathy with their fellow citizens. Exposure to violence incorporates both the stress 
factors associated with a perpetual fear for personal safety as well as a diminished sensitivity to the 
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 See Chapters 1 and 4. 
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shock value of strong violence, so that violence against others becomes an almost acceptable 
behavioural norm. 
 The specific attributes of state fragility that result in increased violent young offending 
include a lack of structural capacity to deliver basic services like quality education and psychosocial 
assistance packages, which would otherwise fulfil socialising and stress mitigating functions. Other 
absences are evident in a lack of community-building activities and limited employment generation.  
 Further dimensions associated with the definition of fragility include a history of conflict and 
social fragmentation, which create a situation of prolonged community exposure to violence that is 
attributed to the state's lack of capacity to generate security; to hold a monopoly over the legitimate 
use of violence; and, to maintain the rule of law.  
 The impact of these attributes is strengthened by a general lack of administrative capacity in 
fragile states, which decreases their ability to monitor children and young people who fall off the 
radar and are exposed to multiple unknown or immeasurable risks that the state is unable to 
mitigate.  
 Any resulting sense of youth isolation becomes a source of hostility towards the state when 
it is combined with a lack of political integration, which is associated with fragility in instances where 
the state fails to address popular political grievances or to be seen to be addressing these. 
 
5. How, if at all, are these criminogenic attributes mitigated by existing youth justice 
systems, and how can youth justice systems be better used to advance the cause of peace? 
 Few of the criminogenic attributes identified are mitigated by existing youth justice systems 
in Yemen, which suffer from extremely poor administrative capacity that limits their ability to access 
large portions of the country, leaving many communities without the protection of state-based law 
enforcement and judicial services. The impact of law enforcement and policing services is diminished 
by poor police-community relations and the unapproachable air of law enforcement personnel, 
which is generated by their paramilitary mandate and their use by the Yemeni Government as an 
oppressive political force.  
 Increasing the credibility of law enforcement services by making them more legitimate in the 
eyes of the communities that they police should be a top security priority.  
There is also a need to integrate other judicial processes into the everyday reality of the 
community level, though this would require a significant and costly expansion of the judicial sector. 
A major obstacle to this is that the responsibility to bring cases to the attention of the court system 
remains with the victims of crime in Yemen, and not with the justice or law enforcement sectors. 
There is little incentive for the average Yemeni citizen to initiate this process, which is significantly 
more complicated and time consuming than using tribal mediation or taking matters into their own 
hands. 
 Imprisonment seems to expose low-level criminal offenders to radicalising elements, so that 
prisons in Yemen create more hard-line extremists than they reform. There is an immediate need, 
therefore, to segregate prison populations, at least in terms of separating low-level transgressors, 
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such as property-related offenders or irregular migrants, from political radicals and serious life-time 
criminals.  
 
8.3 Main Contribution 
 The main contribution of this thesis is that it has demonstrated that criminological theory 
can be effectively integrated with international development literature in order to generate more 
informed analyses of multiple forms of violence and their relationship with state fragility. A brief 
overview of the theories outlined in Chapters 4 and 6 indicates that criminological literature is fairly 
flexible when it comes to extending risk screening indicators to fragile contexts, though further 
research needs to be conducted in order to determine in more detail how a variety of frameworks 
would cope in a multitude of underdeveloped localities, and not just in Yemen.  
 Even a brief endeavour to integrate criminological theory into the international 
development sector reveals important lessons for practitioners and academics working to 
understand the situation of children and young people in fragile states. The most important of these 
is that violence in fragile states emerges in a multitude of forms, some of them criminal, the 
causality of which can and should be analysed by existing frameworks. Criminal violence in particular 
is not a problem that will simply go away if insurgencies are contained and conflicts are averted: it is 
a challenge in its own right that requires further investigation and more recognition by donors and 
the international community.  
 The theoretical framework put forward by this thesis has its limitations and is of secondary 
importance to the main contribution. In order to gain full use of this theoretical framework in future 
research, it is useful to assess its values and challenges in accordance with John Martinussen's 
“minimum requirements of a good social science theory” (1997, p. 346), which are its ontology, 
epistemology, normative premises, sphere of applicability, logical consistency, and ability to survive 
falsification (see Figure 84).  
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Figure 84 Anatomy of Theory of Violent Young Offending in Fragile States Put Forward By This Thesis 
 
8.4 Emerging Challenges and Concerns 
 Several concerns emerge from the analysis conducted over the past seven chapters. These 
are to do with the nature of violent young offending observed in Yemen, and the state's capacity to 
effectively respond to this growing challenge. As has been outlined in the introduction to this thesis, 
part of the problem stems from a lack of research and a lack of appreciation for the severity of 
apolitical violence as an obstacle to stability and development. Another stems from a lack of policy 
adaptation and targeted strategies to deal with youth violence, which is easily dismissed as too big 
an issue for any fragile government to address. The roots of this problem go back not only to 
approaches in international development literature that prioritise the containment of radicalisation 
over criminality, but also to assumptions made within criminology about the socialising impact of 
growing up, for instance, - assumptions that do not hold true in fragile states. 
 One example of this is the youth crime curve (see Figure 85). The youth crime curve has 
become a staple of contemporary criminological literature. It states that young offenders broadly 
begin to indulge in criminal behaviour between the ages of 10 and 16, depending upon gender, 
background and geographic location to hit a peak in criminal activity between the ages of 17 and 21, 
and then to diminish in their rate of offending. By the age of 25, most have re-entered society as law 
abiding citizens. Only a very small minority of young people will continue to offend into adulthood, 
•  Ontology: There is only one reality. This reality can be described. The researcher is part 
of this reality. 
•  Epistemology: Realist. 
Ontology and 
Epistemology 
•  Normative Premises: Violent behaviour among children and young people is not a sign 
of normal or healthy development. Violent behaviour is harmful to both victims and 
perpetrators of violence. 
•  Political Priorities: In order to help overcome emerging cultures of violence in fragile 
states, there is a need to address violent young offending alongside political violence. 
Normative 
Premises and 
Political 
Priorities 
• This theory is only applicable to fragile states where there is evidence of: 
•  Poor state capacity; 
•  High social fragmentation; 
•  Poor political integration. 
• This theory is only suggestive, not empirical. 
Sphere of 
Applicability 
•  This theory maintains clear ontological and epistemological parameters throughout, and 
does not deviate from these. 
•  This theory maintains that individuals are rational agents, and that observable behaviour 
can be analysed by using existing theoretical approaches, as set out in sections  2.3.1 
and 2.3.2 of the Methodology. 
Logical 
Consistency 
•  This theory can be falsified through application to comparative analysis, particularly if it is 
found that young people do not respond to identified stimuli in other fragile states in the 
same way as they respond to them in Yemen. 
•  This theory can be verified through further quantitative research, if access is gained to 
violent young offenders in Yemen, and if they are categorised according to their exposure 
to and opinions of the identified stimuli. 
Falsifiability 
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usually displaying an increase in the frequency and severity of criminal activity, becoming “lifetime” 
criminals. Darrell J. Steffensmeier, Emilie Andersen Allan, Miles D. Harer and Cathy Streifel write that 
“the proposition that involvement in crime diminishes with age is one of the oldest and most widely 
accepted in criminology”, even though “there is disagreement about the strength and the 
universality of the age-crime relation” among experts (1989). 
 
Figure 85 The Youth Crime Curve 
 The immediate limitations of the youth crime curve in the context of fragile states are self-
evident. Firstly, the youth crime curve is a measurable phenomenon that has been detected and 
recorded by criminologists in the developed world, and there is little to no evidence that it holds 
true in fragile states where it is much more difficult to monitor young offenders over time.  
 Secondly, the youth crime curve is said to work on the principle that antisocial children 
become socialised through increased involvement in society as they grow older, form families and 
gain livelihoods. While these socialising activities can be limited in developed countries, they are 
nowhere near as diminished as they are in fragile states, where families and children often only 
increase the economic pressures placed on young parents who are left without access to social 
welfare services.  
 Thirdly, as applied most commonly to Western countries with ageing populations, the youth 
crime curve trivialises the importance of youth offending, while peak offending ages of 17 to 21 may 
represent an epidemic of violence and criminal activity in fragile states that experience high fertility 
rates and protracted youth bulges. Under this crime curve, the mean population age in Yemen is also 
a peak risk age for committing criminal violence.  
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 Finally, one last issue for consideration is that, while violent behaviour and criminal activity 
is sometimes extended for young people in the developed world through participation in gang 
culture or association with delinquent peers; the 10 to 25 age span is also a period when children 
and young people in fragile states are at heightened risk of recruitment into radical organisations 
and insurgencies.  
 These clear discrepancies highlight the need for targeted research and theorisation in fragile 
states, as well as revealing many of the limitations of existing criminological theories that work in 
isolation from international development literature and vice versa. With no clear indications about 
the applicability of the youth crime curve in countries like Yemen, however, there is a need for 
urgent preventative intervention into young offending in order to avoid a worst case scenario of 
perpetually increasing violence and insecurity across the country. 
 Within the context of Yemen's judicial and law enforcement systems, there are very real and 
pressing concerns about the way in which interventions into violent young offending should be 
framed in fragile states, where the detention and arrest of offenders can have an extremely negative 
impact upon rates of offending – increasing rather than reducing the scope and severity of the 
problem186. Important questions about whether or not societies should continue to criminalise 
certain forms of behaviour, thus placing the state in a position of direct responsibility to administer 
offenders, are extremely important in this sense. Questions relating to the way in which states 
should respond to violent young offending are equally problematic.  
 It is the position held by the author that a failure to criminalise and respond effectively to 
violent behaviour is akin to sanctioning this kind of conduct, and furthermore that many of the 
challenges experienced by Yemen and other fragile states can be attributed to a lack of intervention 
and policing at a community level, rather than to an over-involvement by states into the private lives 
of their citizens. Andrew Ashworth summarises that: 
The idea of a crime is that it is something that rightly concerns the State, and not just 
the person(s) affected by the wrongdoing. Many crimes are civil wrongs as well (torts or 
breaches of contract, for example), and it is for the injured party to decide whether or 
not to sue for damages. But the decision to make conduct into a crime implies that there 
is a public interest in ensuring that such conduct does not happen and that, when it 
does, there is the possibility of State punishment. (2006, p. 2) 
In an ideal system, State punishment eliminates (or at least reduces) retributive violence and 
prevents crime from turning into conflict. It lowers crime rates by generating a fear of being caught 
among potential perpetrators, and it protects potential victims of crime while also helping actual 
victims to gain a sense of justice. However, it has become evident that in the case of fragile states, 
there is a need to think beyond exclusively security-centred responses to offending behaviour.  
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 See Chapter 5. 
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8.5 Policy Recommendations 
 The analysis of the Yemeni development context and justice systems provided in Chapters 3 
and 6 leads to one inescapable conclusion: as a fragile state Yemen is virtually ungovernable 
according to Western models of state-provided security, given current levels of international aid and 
Government budgetary resources. A focus on the security-instability nexus in Yemen has failed in 
this sense to secure positive change in the country, by treating insecurity and radicalisation as a 
cause of instability, rather than as a symptom of instability. While building state capacity through 
police training and equipment provision, Ministry expansion and finances will likely continue to 
prove important, particularly over the next decade of Yemen's development. Such reactive security-
building strategies are unlikely on their own to offer viable solutions to the problem of violence in 
fragile states. As James Stavridis argues, these “20th Century tools” - including sophisticated 
weaponry, defensive perimeters, and closed security precautions based on force, secrecy or 
defensibility - “are not going to work” in a 21st Century context of terrorism, organised crime, 
conflict and underdevelopment (2012).  
 Donors, fragile governments and members of the international community need to accept 
that, in the context of state fragility: “we cannot deliver security solely from the barrel of a gun. We 
will need the application of military force, and when we do it we must do it well and competently”, 
however such traditional tools and approaches will not succeed in reversing instability or insecurity 
(Stavridis, 2012). Alternative solutions may begin to emerge from Stavridis' vision of open source 
security, that is – security, as Andy Salmon summarises, based on increased openness, 
communication and designed “networks of stability” (2012).  
 As Stavridis explains, open source security is about strategic communication, as he envisages 
it, between “international, inter-agency, private, public” bodies, whereby “Open source security 
means connecting in ways that create longer-lasting security effects” (2012). In the context of 
reducing violence and youth violence in Yemen, there is a need to extend this vision much further to 
include those individuals who are at risk of becoming either victims or perpetrators of the behaviour 
targeted by the security strategy, within emerging networks of stability and communication.  
 What this means in terms of practical recommendations is that there is a need for the 
Government of Yemen to talk to its citizens directly about security and to involve them in security 
planning and programming. As Chapter 6 argued, from a security-implementation perspective, this 
means increasing community policing and police-integration at the community level. Yet more 
fundamentally, at a policy level, this may also mean rethinking the segregation of police and tribal 
structures, as well as the purpose of policing strategies in fragile states. In particular, given the social 
isolation of police officers in Yemeni social and cultural life, it is worthwhile for the Yemeni 
Government and the international donors working to restructure security in the aftermath of the 
Arab Spring of 2011 to ask whether they envisage future security in Yemen to be supported by a 
police service or a police force.  
 It is the fundamental belief of the author that establishing a paramilitary police force in 
Yemen without community participation will not work. Nowhere in Yemen have any members of the 
country's diverse cultural and tribal tapestry readily accepted the imposition of centralised law 
enforcement regimes upon their communities in the past, and this is likely to remain the case if 
Yemen continues to operate on a closed and socially isolated mechanism of security delivery in 
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future. The author strongly recommends that Yemen pursue the creation of a police service based 
on an open-source security model now that President Saleh has resigned his position. 
 One potentially empowering and integrative initiative for members of Yemeni society in this 
sense would be the formation of community watch organisations that would work in collaboration 
with state police and report offences to them. Another would be voluntary programmes aimed at 
children and young people specifically, based on scouts-type models, in which they could participate 
to identify threats to the communities that they lived in and pathways for building community 
resilience. In line with theories put forward by Sultan Barakat, threats to the community here would 
be defined under a human security-based, rather than a physical security-based, umbrella, including 
environmental threats, threats emerging from accidents or emergencies, poor security precautions, 
and so on (Private Consultation, September, 2012). By being involved in a Government-sponsored, or 
Government-controlled scouts programme, children and young people could help to build 
awareness of security challenges among families and communities, while gaining access to positive 
socialising activities, and receive practical training and guidance to challenges that they are likely to 
encounter in the future, equipping them with skills and learning experiences that could help them to 
contribute positively to Yemen's development.  
 In the spirit of openness, as Stavridis mentions in the context of training security personnel 
in Afghanistan, any open security programming in Yemen would have to be based on a principle of 
improving literacy among children, young people, community members and law enforcement. This is 
because literacy – as a means of opening local, national, regional and global pathways of 
communication for individuals – is the ultimate tool for creating stability and integration, as well as 
the fastest way of bringing public grievances to the attention of policy-makers.  
 Existing comparative models for project design in terms of generating community watch 
groups and scouts organisations in Yemen could be drawn from the Afghanistan National Solidarity 
Programme or the British scouts system, though key thematic adaptations would have to be made to 
the local cultural context in both cases. These adjustments are particularly necessary in terms of the 
spectrum of activities that would be made available to scout members, and in terms of the focus of 
scout programmes, which would have to be shifted towards principles of endurance, survival and 
community protection.  
 While a scout-based model of youth engagement in Yemen might be difficult to develop in 
the short term, restricted financial resources are not the main obstacle to success for such a 
programme – human resources are. More than money, what Yemen needs now is a system of 
recognising and rewarding passionate individuals in communities: these are individuals with a keen 
interest in improving the lives of young people. While Yemeni schools are notorious for engaging 
under-qualified staff members, some such individuals can be found within the existing education 
system. Others can be found among qualified university graduates, many of whom are currently 
unemployed and actively engaged in asking the Yemeni Government for work. These individuals are 
not difficult to find – they can be easily picked out in Yemen through targeted job advertising 
campaigns. However, they will require training and support, as well as opportunities to design and 
implement scouts-based activities for young people in the country.  
 These and other initiatives aimed at integrating communities in open-source security and 
networks of stability are not necessarily costly endeavours. However, they will require 
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experimentation, as well as significant research on implementation, in order to make Yemen a safer 
place for children and young people, as well as a more stable environment for their development. 
 
8.6 Recommendations for Researchers of International Development and 
Post-war Recovery Studies 
 Apart from opening up new pathways for the analysis of crime in fragile states through inter-
disciplinary approaches, this thesis has demonstrated that there is a need to consider more seriously 
the multi-faceted nature of violence in fragile states. As section 8.1 of this Chapter has argued, this 
involves moving away from the security-instability nexus. There is a need for greater clarification of 
key terminology used to describe environments affected by social chaos and social disintegration. In 
particular, there is a need to distinguish more rigorously between different forms of violence, 
including political and apolitical behaviour, in order to encourage better-targeted responses to these 
challenges and more holistic understandings of these phenomena.  
 
8.7 Key Challenges and Limitations of the Investigation 
 “Children who participate” in conflict and violence within fragile states “are considerably 
more difficult to study than those that are simply 'exposed'” to these phenomena, though both 
groups are equally vulnerable to the effects of conflict and fragility187 (Pederson and Sommerfelt, 
2007, p. 256). This is because it is relatively easy to gage how many children are affected by the 
realities associated with conflict and fragility by identifying a conflict-affected area, estimating the 
population density of that area, and then assuming that all children contained within it are in some 
way victims of these circumstances. This victimisation does not preclude children and young people 
from holding dual and conflicting roles as aggressors and as the aggressed within societies where 
“victims can be victims and not be innocent” (Rieff, 2002.p. 53).  
 With the breakdown of law enforcement and judicial services that is characteristic of state 
fragility, and with the growth of self-reliance and community isolation in fragile environments, it is 
extremely difficult for outsiders to discover the number, let alone the identity of children and young 
people who participate in violent criminal behaviour within such contexts, and it is even more 
difficult to gain access to such people for research purposes. This reality proved to be an important 
limitation in this investigation, emerging as a major reason why findings produced by this thesis 
remained suggestive rather than empirical. It is extremely difficult to provide empirical analyses of 
criminal environments in any political setting, but challenges to obtaining accurate data multiply 
exponentially in fragile settings, particularly as conflict and political violence increase.  
 These challenges are complicated in Yemen by: the severe cultural and religious 
stigmatisation of crime; the difficulty of separating violent offending from political violence; and, the 
isolation of children and young people within Yemeni society, which makes them hard to reach for 
interview and commentary. A lack of access to police detention cells, prisons and hospitals provided 
for independent researchers interested in interviewing victims and perpetrators of crime in Yemen is 
another barrier. 
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 Again, see Chapter 5. 
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 These challenges are most likely to prevail in other fragile contexts where the severe 
isolation of children and young people, coupled with the inaccessibility and poor legitimacy of law 
enforcement services, would obstruct the completion of research conducted directly with violent 
young offenders. The author has attempted to counteract these challenges by prioritising the 
Yemeni case study in her analysis, working to interview a wide range of Yemeni civilians, elite 
stakeholders and experts to provide as complete a picture as possible of this one development 
context. Another limitation of the theoretical framework established in Chapter 5 is that, although it 
contains lessons that are easily translatable to other fragile states, it is firmly grounded in Yemen 
and has not been tested in other contexts. This is not overly problematic in itself because the main 
contribution of this thesis has been to open up the discussion of violent young offending in fragile 
states by integrating criminological and international development literature, rather than providing a 
definitive solution to this challenge. However, it does reveal avenues for future work. 
 
8.8 Suggestions for Further Work  
 The relational theory of violent young offending and state fragility put forward by this thesis 
is drawn from the unique development and socio-cultural environment of Yemen. A number of 
problems need to be addressed if this theory is to be transformed into a truly general purpose tool 
for understanding the pressures on young people to use criminal violence within these settings. 
These problems suggest a number of directions for future investigations.  
 Firstly, in order to address the limitations of this thesis, there is a need for further research 
to be conducted in different fragile states, aimed at investigating whether or not international 
development literature can be integrated with criminological theory just as effectively in other 
fragile contexts as it can be in Yemen. Such research falls beyond the scope of this thesis but would 
help to significantly improve our understanding of violent environments in fragile states, including 
how violence is generated, why children and young people in fragile states turn to violence, and 
what the characteristics of the social environments of violence in fragile states are, beyond violence 
that is associated with conflict or political motivation. It would require additional specific localised 
analyses of crime patterns and their interaction with underdevelopment on a case by case basis, 
following a similar method to that which has been showcased in this thesis.  
 Secondly, there is a need to conduct comparative analysis of similar case studies identified 
using the fragile states typology put forward in Chapter 6 and the criminological theories over-
viewed in Chapter 4. It is speculated that such comparative analysis would be more informative if 
countries were also broken down according to similar cultural traits or religious make-ups, which 
might generate greater specificity within the theoretical framework.  
 Thirdly, there is a greater need to consider issues of crime and social chaos in fragile 
environments, where researchers need to assess more critically how “natural” a bi-product of social 
chaos and degradation different forms of offending are, particularly in terms of crime that is not 
associated with property offences188.  
                                                          
188
 See Chapter 4. 
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 Fourthly, understandings of crime in Yemen would benefit from greater investigation of 
religion and tribalism as a system of social control. Such an investigation fell regrettably beyond the 
scope of this thesis. Other areas for research expansion include a comparative analysis of crime in 
urban versus rural communities in Yemen, as well as a more in-depth exploration of gender-based 
discrepancies in criminal behaviour among children and young people.  
 Finally, in terms of the application of the theory put forward, there is a need for greater 
integration of alternative tools for analysis within international development research that strives to 
interpret issues relating to young people, security, security sector reform, violence and community 
welfare, with a particular need to be more inclusive of other disciplines, such as those of criminology 
and psychology. This thesis has looked most closely at the overlaps between criminology and 
international development. It has pointed out a greater need for similar studies to be conducted, 
based on greater research with communities, on the integration of advances made in the field of 
psychology and psychosocial health with international development theories relating to state 
fragility. 
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Annex 1: Reported Global Crime Rates189 
 
 
                                                          
189
 These statistics are drawn from the seventh United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of 
Criminal Justice Systems, which covers the period of 1998 to 2000 and represents the most accurate and 
comprehensive analysis thus far of global comparative criminologies (2005). 
Dominica: Colombia: South Africa:
New Zealand: South Africa: Seychelles:
Finland: Jamaica: Australia:
Denmark: Venezuela: Montserrat:
Chile: Russia: Canada:
United Kingdom: Mexico: Jamaica:
Montserrat: Estonia: Zimbabwe:
United States: Latvia: Dominica:
Netherlands: Lithuania: United States:
South Africa: Belarus: Iceland:
Germany: Ukraine: Papua New Guinea:
Canada: Papua New Guinea: New Zealand:
Norway: Kyrgyzstan: United Kingdom:
France: Thailand: Spain:
Seychelles: Moldova: France:
Hungary: Zimbabwe: Korea, South:
Estonia: Seychelles: Mexico:
Czech Republic: Zambia: Norway:
Italy: Costa Rica: Costa Rica:
Switzerland: Poland: Venezuela:
Portugal: Georgia: Finland:
Slovenia: Uruguay: Netherlands:
Poland: Bulgaria: Denmark:
Korea, South: United States: Germany:
Mauritius: Armenia: Bulgaria:
Zimbabwe: India: Chile:
Lithuania: Yemen: Thailand:
Spain: Dominica: Kyrgyzstan:
Latvia: Azerbaijan: Poland:
Uruguay: Finland: Sri Lanka:
Russia: Slovakia: Hungary:
Ireland: Romania: Estonia:
Bulgaria: Portugal: Ireland:
Japan: Malaysia: Switzerland:
Romania: Macedonia: Belarus:
Slovakia: Mauritius: Uruguay:
Jamaica: Hungary: Lithuania:
Belarus: Korea, South: Malaysia:
Mexico: Slovenia: Romania:
Tunisia: France: Czech Republic:
Costa Rica: Czech Republic: Russia:
Ukraine: Iceland: Latvia:
Hong Kong: Australia: Moldova:
Macedonia: Canada: Colombia:
Greece: Chile: Slovenia:
Venezuela: United Kingdom: Italy:
Thailand: Italy: Portugal:
Moldova: Spain: Tunisia:
Kyrgyzstan: Germany: Zambia:
Malaysia: Tunisia: Ukraine:
Qatar: Netherlands: Slovakia:
Zambia: New Zealand: Mauritius:
Colombia: Denmark: Turkey:
Turkey: Norway: Japan:
Armenia: Ireland: Hong Kong:
Georgia: Switzerland: India:
Papua New Guinea: Indonesia: Qatar:
Azerbaijan: Greece: Macedonia:
India: Hong Kong: Greece:
Yemen: Japan: Georgia:
Saudi Arabia: Armenia:
Qatar: 0.00115868 Indonesia:
Yemen:
Azerbaijan:
Saudi Arabia:
Total Crimes per 
1,000 people
Murders per 
1,000 people
Rapes per 
1,000 people
 1   113.822   1   0.617847   1   1.19538  
 2   105.881   2   0.496008   2   0.788294  
 3   101.526   3   0.324196   3   0.777999  
 4   92.8277   4   0.316138   4   0.749384  
 5   88.226   5   0.201534   5   0.733089  
 6   85.5517   6   0.130213   6   0.476608  
 7   80.3982   7   0.107277   7   0.457775  
 8   80.0645   8   0.10393   8   0.34768  
 9   79.5779   9   0.102863   9   0.301318  
 10   77.1862   10   0.0983495   10   0.246009  
 11   75.9996   11   0.094006   11   0.233544  
 12   75.4921   12   0.0838593   12   0.213383  
 13   71.8639   13   0.0802565   13   0.142172  
 14   62.1843   14   0.0800798   14   0.140403  
 15   52.9265   15   0.0781145   15   0.139442  
 16   44.9763   16   0.0749938   16   0.12621  
 17   43.3601   17   0.0739025   17   0.122981  
 18   38.2257   18   0.070769   18   0.120836  
 19   37.9633   19   0.061006   19   0.118277  
 20   36.1864   20   0.0562789   20   0.115507  
 21   34.3833   21   0.0511011   21   0.110856  
 22   33.6236   22   0.045082   22   0.100445  
 23   32.8573   23   0.0445638   23   0.0914948  
 24   31.7267   24   0.042802   24   0.0909731  
 25   29.1982   25   0.0425746   25   0.0795973  
 26   28.8753   26   0.0344083   26   0.0782179  
 27   22.8996   27   0.0336276   27   0.0626305  
 28   22.8867   28   0.0289733   28   0.0623785  
 29   21.921   29   0.0285642   29   0.062218  
 30   21.7017   30   0.0283362   30   0.0599053  
 31   20.5855   31   0.0263303   31   0.0588588  
 32   20.2376   32   0.0250784   32   0.0547637  
 33   19.9886   33   0.0233769   33   0.0542829  
 34   19.177   34   0.0230034   34   0.0539458  
 35   16.4812   35   0.0229829   35   0.0514563  
 36   16.3537   36   0.021121   36   0.0512295  
 37   14.3231   37   0.0204857   37   0.0508757  
 38   13.1592   38   0.0196336   38   0.0505156  
 39   12.8406   39   0.0179015   39   0.0497089  
 40   12.5634   40   0.0173272   40   0.0488234  
 41   11.9788   41   0.0169905   41   0.0486543  
 42   11.7793   42   0.0168499   42   0.0454148  
 43   11.6817   43   0.0150324   43   0.0448934  
 44   9.689   44   0.0149063   44   0.0433254  
 45   9.6347   45   0.014705   45   0.0427648  
 46   9.307   46   0.0140633   46   0.0402045  
 47   8.80422   47   0.0128393   47   0.0364376  
 48   8.58967   48   0.0122456   48   0.0331514  
 49   7.50486   49   0.0116461   49   0.0266383  
 50   6.97921   50   0.0112159   50   0.0244909  
 51   6.76437   51   0.0111538   51   0.0237525  
 52   5.27668   52   0.0111524   52   0.0219334  
 53   4.98654   53   0.0106775   53   0.0180876  
 54   4.11252   54   0.0106684   54   0.017737  
 55   4.03889   55   0.00946215   55   0.0150746  
 56   3.21338   56   0.00921351   56   0.0143187  
 57   2.39711   57   0.00910842   57   0.0139042  
 58   1.76416   58   0.0075928   58   0.0132029  
 59   1.63352   59   0.00550804   59   0.0106862  
 60   1.16109   60   0.00499933   60   0.0100492  
 61   0.00397456   61   0.00938652  
 62    62   0.00567003  
 63   0.0038597  
 64   0.00379171  
 65   0.00329321  
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Annex 2: Table of Important Data 
 
HDI 
Rank 
Country 
2005 GDP per 
capita in 
purchasing 
power parity 
2005 
Murders 
per 1000 
people 
2005 
Combined 
gross 
enrolment in 
education % 
(both sexes) 
2011 Multi-
dimensional 
Poverty Index 
2011 % Loss 
of income 
due to 
inequality 
2011 Loss of 
education 
due to 
inequality 
1 Norway 47,305 0.010668 98.4 .. 10.6 2.2 
2 Australia 32,698 0.015032 112.5 .. 16.6 1.7 
3 Netherlands 35,105 0.011154 97.4 .. 12.5 3.9 
4 United States 42,534 0.042802 92.2 .. 32.4 3.7 
5 New Zealand 25,305 0.011152 106.8 .. .. .. 
6 Canada 35,033 0.014906 .. .. 17.1 3.2 
7 Ireland 38,578 0.009462 98 .. 13.8 3.2 
8 Liechtenstein .. 
 
.. .. .. .. 
9 Germany 31,364 0.011646 .. .. 14.5 1.8 
10 Sweden 32,723 
 
95.1 .. 10.3 3.9 
11 Switzerland 35,784 0.009214 85 .. 14.3 2 
12 Japan 30,310 0.004999 86 .. .. .. 
13 Hong Kong, China  35,678 0.005508 74.5 .. .. .. 
14 Iceland 34,921 0.016991 95.5 .. 11.8 2.6 
15 Korea (Republic of) 22,783 0.019634 96.8 .. 18.4 25.5 
16 Denmark 33,214 0.010678 102.8 .. 10.2 3.1 
17 Israel 23,390 
 
90 .. 23.7 7.9 
18 Belgium 32,127 
 
94 .. 11.7 6.5 
19 Austria 33,377 
 
88.9 .. 15.1 2.4 
20 France 29,809 0.017327 94.9 .. 13.9 9.1 
21 Slovenia 23,498 0.017902 91.3 0 8.5 3.1 
22 Finland 30,684 0.028336 101.4 .. 10.6 2.1 
23 Spain 27,377 0.012246 95.5 .. 16.7 5.5 
24 Italy 28,144 0.012839 90 .. 16.8 11.4 
25 Luxembourg 68,319 
 
.. .. 13.5 6.2 
26 Singapore 45,374 
 
.. .. .. .. 
27 Czech Republic 20,362 0.016850 82.8 0.01 9.6 1.3 
28 United Kingdom 32,731 0.014063 92.8 .. 17.3 2.2 
29 Greece 24,640 0.007593 99.7 .. 17.1 14.3 
30 
United Arab 
Emirates 
48,992 
 
.. 0.002 .. .. 
31 Cyprus 24,403 
 
77.6 .. 10.9 15 
32 Andorra .. 
 
60.3 .. .. .. 
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33 Brunei Darussalam 47,468 
 
77.6 .. .. .. 
34 Estonia 16,548 
 
92.2 0.026 14.5 2.7 
35 Slovakia 16,164 0.026330 77.8 0 9.6 1.6 
36 Malta 20,958 
 
81.2 .. .. .. 
37 Qatar 64,452 0.001159 71.7 .. .. .. 
38 Hungary 16,955 0.020486 89.3 0.016 11.2 4 
39 Poland 13,784 0.056279 87.6 .. 16.3 6.6 
40 Lithuania 14,194 0.102863 93.2 .. 17.5 4.1 
41 Portugal 21,294 0.023377 89.3 .. 19.3 5.6 
42 Bahrain 27,962 
 
.. .. .. .. 
43 Latvia 13,038 0.103930 91.1 0.006 21 3.8 
44 Chile 12,172 0.014705 82.9 .. 34.1 13.7 
45 Argentina 10,819 
 
89.7 0.011 34.4 12.1 
46 Croatia 15,329 
 
77.8 0.016 27.8 10.4 
47 Barbados 19,189 
 
.. .. .. .. 
48 Uruguay 9,683 0.045082 .. 0.006 27.8 10.8 
49 Palau .. 
 
.. .. .. .. 
50 Romania 9,359 0.025078 77 .. 22.2 5 
51 Cuba .. 
 
87.5 .. .. .. 
52 Seychelles 17,352 0.073903 82.1 .. .. .. 
53 Bahamas .. 
 
72 .. 24.5 7.9 
54 Montenegro 8,265 
 
.. 0.006 11.3 2.5 
55 Bulgaria 9,807 0.044564 76.4 .. 19.9 5.9 
56 Saudi Arabia 21,220 0.003975 78.6 .. .. .. 
57 Mexico 12,593 0.130213 77.9 0.015 35.6 21.9 
58 Panama 9,186 
 
79.5 .. 40.5 17.8 
59 Serbia 8,515 
 
.. 0.003 10.3 9.9 
60 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
15,792 
 
.. .. .. .. 
61 Malaysia 11,755 0.023003 71.4 .. 0 .. 
62 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
20,014 
 
62 0.02 21.9 6.6 
63 Kuwait 43,560 
 
.. .. .. .. 
64 
Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya 
13,653 
 
.. .. .. .. 
65 Belarus 8,541 0.098350 88.7 0 12.1 5.4 
66 Russian Federation 11,853 0.201534 82 0.005 11.9 11.2 
67 Grenada 7,985 
 
.. .. .. .. 
68 Kazakhstan 8,699 
 
91.1 0.002 13.8 5.3 
69 Costa Rica 9,002 0.061006 73 .. 33.7 17.7 
70 Albania 6,162 
 
.. 0.005 18.3 11.9 
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71 Lebanon 9,517 
 
.. .. 30 24.1 
72 
Saint Kitts and 
Nevis 
13,158 
 
.. .. .. .. 
73 
Venezuela 
(Bolivarian 
Republic of) 
9,924 0.316138 .. .. 44.9 18.1 
74 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
6,232 
 
.. 0.003 19.3 5.2 
75 Georgia 3,610 0.051101 76.4 0.003 22.7 3.3 
76 Ukraine 5,583 0.094006 87.7 0.008 10.9 6.1 
77 Mauritius 10,158 0.021121 75.2 .. 16.6 13.5 
78 
The former 
Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia 
7,656 0.022983 69.9 0.008 21.8 17.5 
79 Jamaica 7,027 0.324196 .. .. 24.1 8.3 
80 Peru 6,323 
 
80.9 0.086 30 24 
81 Dominica 7,205 0.028973 .. .. .. .. 
82 Saint Lucia 8,683 
 
73.1 .. .. .. 
83 Ecuador 6,736 
 
.. 0.009 38.8 22.1 
84 Brazil 8,505 
 
87.2 0.011 40.7 25.7 
85 
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
7,155 
 
.. .. .. .. 
86 Armenia 4,098 0.042575 71.2 0.004 10.8 6.5 
87 Colombia 7,305 0.617847 79 0.022 53.9 22.8 
88 
Iran (Islamic 
Republic of) 
9,314 
 
67.4 .. .. .. 
89 Oman 19,533 
 
.. .. .. .. 
90 Tonga 4,098 
 
.. .. .. .. 
91 Azerbaijan 4,496 0.028564 71.9 0.021 4.5 8.3 
92 Turkey 10,977 
 
70 0.028 26.5 27.4 
93 Belize 6,254 
 
76.9 0.024 .. .. 
94 Tunisia 6,445 0.011216 77.8 0.01 21.8 38.7 
95 Jordan 4,334 
 
76.8 0.008 21.1 22.4 
96 Algeria 7,176 
 
74 .. .. .. 
97 Sri Lanka 3,546 
 
.. 0.021 20.8 17.9 
98 
Dominican 
Republic 
6,200 
 
.. 0.018 33.8 26.8 
99 Samoa 3,858 
 
73.7 .. .. .. 
100 Fiji 4,295 
 
73.6 .. .. .. 
101 China 4,115 
 
.. 0.056 29.5 23.2 
102 Turkmenistan 4,668 
 
.. .. .. .. 
103 Thailand 6,751 0.080080 71.8 0.006 34 18 
104 Suriname 6,067 
 
69.9 0.039 34.9 20.1 
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105 El Salvador 5,687 
 
75.4 .. 31.1 32.4 
106 Gabon 13,029 
 
.. 0.161 22.1 7.3 
107 Paraguay 3,897 
 
72.1 0.064 33.4 19.8 
108 
Bolivia 
(Plurinational State 
of) 
3,757 
 
.. 0.089 47.2 27.6 
109 Maldives 4,035 
 
73.1 0.018 23.2 41.2 
110 Mongolia 2,613 
 
78.3 0.065 16.4 5.8 
111 
Moldova (Republic 
of) 
2,362 0.078115 71.1 0.007 18.9 6.1 
112 Philippines 2,927 
 
78.9 0.064 30 13.5 
113 Egypt 4,319 
 
.. 0.024 14.2 40.9 
114 
Occupied 
Palestinian 
Territory 
.. 
 
80 0.005 .. .. 
115 Uzbekistan 2,001 
 
74 0.008 17.9 1.4 
116 
Micronesia 
(Federated States 
of) 
2,972 
 
.. .. 63.1 22.4 
117 Guyana 2,478 
 
83.7 0.053 32.1 11.7 
118 Botswana 11,772 
 
72.8 .. .. .. 
119 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
3,954 
 
64.9 0.021 18.3 31.5 
120 Namibia 5,389 
 
71.4 0.187 68.3 27.8 
121 Honduras 3,270 
 
.. 0.159 43.4 31.8 
122 Kiribati 2,341 
 
76.2 .. .. .. 
123 South Africa 8,597 0.496008 .. 0.057 .. 20.8 
124 Indonesia 3,217 0.009108 69.3 0.095 17.7 20.4 
125 Vanuatu 3,529 
 
.. 0.129 .. .. 
126 Kyrgyzstan 1,728 0.080257 77.3 0.019 12.2 11.1 
127 Tajikistan 1,480 
 
70.9 0.068 15.3 9.4 
128 Viet Nam 2,143 
 
.. 0.084 11.4 17.1 
129 Nicaragua 2,322 
 
.. 0.128 33.6 33.3 
130 Morocco 3,497 
 
58.8 0.048 23 45.8 
131 Guatemala 4,064 
 
67 0.127 38.5 36.1 
132 Iraq 2,897 
 
.. 0.059 .. .. 
133 Cape Verde 2,676 
 
.. .. .. 30.7 
134 India 2,300 0.034408 60.8 0.283 14.7 40.6 
135 Ghana 1,193 
 
52.6 0.144 27.2 40.9 
136 Equatorial Guinea 24,770 
 
.. .. .. 29.2 
137 Congo 3,497 
 
.. 0.208 30.3 25.4 
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138 
Lao People's 
Democratic 
Republic 
1,651 
 
58.8 0.267 15.5 30.5 
139 Cambodia 1,453 
 
.. 0.251 21.4 31.1 
140 Swaziland 4,335 
 
60 0.184 40.9 29.8 
141 Bhutan 3,471 
 
54.3 0.119 .. 44.8 
142 Solomon Islands 2,055 
 
49.6 .. .. .. 
143 Kenya 1,339 
 
58.8 0.229 36 30.7 
144 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
1,416 
 
65.9 0.154 44.2 19.1 
145 Pakistan 2,184 
 
39.5 0.264 11 46.4 
146 Bangladesh 1,069 
 
47.8 0.292 17.7 39.4 
147 Timor-Leste 713 
 
.. 0.36 17.8 47.4 
148 Angola 3,611 
 
.. 0.452 50 .. 
149 Myanmar .. 
 
.. 0.154 .. .. 
150 Cameroon 1,956 
 
52.4 0.287 19.9 35.3 
151 Madagascar 882 
 
62.5 0.357 36.1 30.1 
152 
Tanzania (United 
Republic of) 
1,065 
 
51.3 0.367 20.6 32.8 
153 Papua New Guinea 1,859 0.083859 .. .. .. .. 
154 Yemen 2,194 0.033638 54.4 0.283 17.6 49.8 
155 Senegal 1,614 
 
41 0.384 23.9 45.1 
156 Nigeria 1,737 
 
54.7 0.31 28.8 44.2 
157 Nepal 956 
 
.. 0.35 37.4 43.6 
158 Haiti 1,016 
 
.. 0.299 47.9 40.7 
159 Mauritania 1,672 
 
47.7 0.352 21.5 43.2 
160 Lesotho 1,201 
 
61.5 0.156 47 24.3 
161 Uganda 901 
 
63.3 0.367 29.1 32.2 
162 Togo 772 
 
57.5 0.284 20 41.5 
163 Comoros 1,127 
 
61 0.408 .. 47.4 
164 Zambia 1,127 0.070769 .. 0.328 20.8 23.8 
165 Djibouti 1,848 
 
24.8 0.139 21.3 47 
166 Rwanda 860 
 
56.3 0.426 34.5 30.7 
167 Benin 1,309 
 
56.7 0.412 23.6 42 
168 Gambia 1,142 
 
.. 0.324 .. .. 
169 Sudan* 1,601 
 
34.1 .. .. .. 
170 Côte d'Ivoire 1,560 
 
.. 0.353 34.4 43.2 
171 Malawi 606 
 
61 0.381 19.7 34.7 
172 Afghanistan 835 
 
51.4 .. .. 39.3 
173 Zimbabwe .. 0.074994 .. 0.18 34.5 20.1 
174 Ethiopia 633 
 
44.2 0.562 20.8 38.2 
175 Mali 985 
 
42 0.558 .. 36.9 
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176 Guinea-Bissau 973 
 
62 .. 32.5 40.3 
177 Eritrea 638 
 
34.5 .. .. .. 
178 Guinea 952 
 
45.3 0.506 31.1 42 
179 
Central African 
Republic 
658 
 
30.3 0.512 28.1 45.9 
180 Sierra Leone 653 
 
.. 0.439 31 47.4 
181 Burkina Faso 1,040 
 
28.9 0.536 25.3 37.3 
182 Liberia 323 
 
.. 0.485 19 46.4 
183 Chad 1,342 
 
37.1 0.344 21 43.4 
184 Mozambique 667 
 
52.5 0.512 25.8 18.2 
185 Burundi 340 
 
38.3 0.53 .. .. 
186 Niger 605 
 
24.9 0.642 17.9 39.5 
187 
Congo (Democratic 
Republic of the) 
266 
 
.. 0.393 36.8 31.2 
.. Tuvalu .. 
 
.. .. .. .. 
.. Somalia .. 
 
.. 0.514 .. .. 
.. San Marino .. 
 
.. .. .. .. 
.. Nauru .. 
 
64.9 .. .. .. 
.. Monaco .. 
 
.. .. .. .. 
.. Marshall Islands .. 
 
.. .. .. .. 
.. 
Korea (Democratic 
People's Rep. of) 
.. 
 
.. .. .. .. 
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